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provide students with an opportunity to exercise their legal writing skills and 
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EDITOR'S NOTE: 
About the Consumer Protection Journal 
Perhaps the term "consumer law" denotes a somewhat illusory con-
cept. The issues arising in this area of the law are, for the most part, 
?erived from other, more traditional, topical fields of legal study. For 
Instance, many of the remedies presently available to the aggrieved 
consumer are based on theories of tort (e.g., fraud, negligence in pro-
duct design, etc.) or contract (e.g., breach of warranty, etc.). In a sense, 
then, this notion of "consumer law" partakes of most aspects of modern 
law and therefore would not seem to warrant treatment as a separate 
field of concern. 
Yet, the body of law relating to the interests of the consumer has 
received widespread recognition as being a conceptually distinct legal 
sub-species. Law schools now offer classes in consumer law, govern-
mental agencies have created consumer protection departments, many 
newly enacted statutes bear titles which include the word "consumer", 
and a number of private law firms have begun to "specialize" in repre-
senting consumers. Indeed, consumer problems have received an unpre-
cedented amount of attention in recent years, and the rights of the 
consumer are currently undergoing a markedly rapid evolution. New 
statutes are being enacted almost daily, new cases decided, and new 
ad~inistrative procedures created which affect the legal status of this 
~nique but pervasive class of persons. Thus, although the concepts 
I~volved under the heading "consumer law" may have originated from 
diverse legal doctrines, their concentrated application to the problems 
?f the consumer certainly warrant their being considered in a special-
IZed context. · 
1 
A little over three years ago, while researching various consumer-
related issues, several students at this school discovered the apparent 
lack of any legal publications dealing specifically with consumer prob-
lems on a regular basis. Contemplating the myriad legal questions 
created by the accelerated development of this field, they recognized 
~h~ .need for such a publication and began considering the possibility of 
1~Ihating a specialized "law review" devoted exclusively to the discus-
Sion and treatment of consumer issues. After obtaining the school's 
approval for their project, they commenced laying the foundation for 
What eventually became the Loyola Consumer Protection Journal. 
J, After enduring a problematic two-year period of gestation, the 
ournal was finally born in print during the summer of 1972. This issue 
marks the Journal's second publication. 
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The Journal was conceived with the notion that, due to the rapid 
emergence of consumer law, some means was needed to apprise the 
legal community of current and prospective developments in this field. 
In order to fulfill this need effectively, the Journal was designed to serve 
a dual function: 
1. As a tool for legal research, and 
2. As a forum for the discussion of consumer-related issues. 
As part of its first function, the Journal will publish articles, com-
ments, and notes to provide sources of persuasive authority for those 
researching consumer problems. To be of further use to the legal writer 
and the practitioner, the Journal will also present works intended to 
help clarify some of the more complex legal developments in the area of 
consumer protection. Such topics will include discussions of analysis, 
interpretation, and ultimate impact, of statutes and decisions of consu-
mer importance. 
The second function of the Journal is premised on the need for the 
continued refinement of consumer law. The Journal will provide a plat-
form from which writers can express their views on the legal, social, 
and economic implications of consumer protection. Included will be 
proposals for new and revised legislation, broad discussions of govern-
mental priorities and policies, and suggested approaches to isolating 
and alleviating various consumer problems. 
The Journal will maintain an objective approach in the discussion of 
all consumer issues. It will not endorse positions taken by any of its 
. writers, and will accept qualified works espousing any point of view. 
Readers of the Journal are to be found throughout the United 
States, and in Australia and Canada. For the most part they are in 
fields directly related to the law, such as law students and professors, 
practicing attorneys, judges, legislators, governmental administrators, 
and legal organizations. So that this readership may best be served , the 
Journal will only publish works which conform to the following stand-
ards: 
1. Universal Significance: Articles treating consumer problems of 
purely local interest will not be published . Discussions of local or state 
issues may be deemed appropriate, but only if they can serve an exern-
plary purpose or otherwise be of interest to readers in other jurisdic-
tions. 
2. Substantial Consumer Impact: Due to the enormous number 
and variety of consumer problems, the Journal will publish only topics 
concerning consumer problems of substantial social or economic impor-
tance. 
[ 
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3. Legal Interest: Works published in the Journal must relate to 
the law, as it contemplates or affects the interests of the consumer. 
Topics must have some bearing on the enforcement, administration, 
interpretation, or creation of the law. Issues of a "quasi-legal" nature 
(e.g., industry self-regulation, etc.) may also qualify for treatment in the 
Journal. 
4. Intellectual Standards: The Journal will include only works 
~hich meet the requirement of originality; that is, they must raise new 
Issues or provide novel insights into consumer problems. Furthermore, 
all works must be adequately supported by recognized authority (where 
appropriate), and must be written in a manner which most effectively 
conveys the author's ideas. 
The Journal is still a very young publication. In order to insure its 
continued growth and refinement, the Journal welcomes comments and 
criticisms from its readers. It is only by way of such response that the 
Journal can be made to better serve the interests of the legal commu-
nity. In addition, the Journal actively solicits manuscripts from readers, 
for publication in future issues. 
On behalf of the Journal, I would like to take this opportunity to 
thank the students, faculty, and administration of Loyola University of 
~os Angeles, School of Law for the tremendous support they have man-
I~e~ted in favor of this publication. I would especially like to give recog-
nition to Assistant Dean Lola McAlpin-Grant, without whose dedicated 
efforts the Journal could not have survived, and to Cary Medill and 
~len Rabenn who are primarily responsible for the Journafs coming 
Into being. 
K .M.B. 
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A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO UNCONSCIONABLE SALES 
CONTRACTS 
Martin A. Frey* 
5 
Traditional contract law has provided the consumer with relief in 
some of the more severe unconscionable contract situations ; for exam-
ple, usury, fraud and duress. Unfortunately for the consumer, not all 
unconscionable contracts come within established doctrines. Some sym -
pathetic courts have strained to give the consumer relief by construing 
the contract language adversely to the merchant, by manipulating the 
rules of offer and acceptance, and by determining the unconscionable 
clause to be contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the 
contract! The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code have supplied 
the consumer with relief; 2 under section 2-302, courts now can pass di-
rectly on the unconscionability of the contract or on a particular clause 
in that contrace 
Section 2-302 expressly authorizes the trial court to make a finding 
as a matter of law that a contract or a contract clause was unconscion-
able at the time it was made. Upon this finding, the court may tailor 
the contract to avoid the unconscionable result; it may refuse to enforce 
the contract; or it may delete the unconscionable clause and enforce the 
remainder of the contract.4 At face value, this section seems a very po-
tent weapon in the consumer's arsenal when faced with a merchant 
1 
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.S.M .E. 1962, Northweste rn University; J.D. 
965, Washington University; LL.M. 1966, George Washington University. I wish to thank Marilyn 
Shell , Junior law student , Texas Tech University, for her skilled assistance in research. 
I. UNIFORM COMM E RC IAL COD E§ 2-302, Commen t I. 
. . 2. T he unconscionability doctrine of 2-302 is broad enough to encompass the traditiona l doc-
~nnes of usury, fraud a nd duress as we ll as those situa tions which we re not within the estab li shed 
oc tnnes . In app lication . however , the courts have shown a tendency to use the established doc-
tnne when the fac ts so indica te ra ther th an strike off into the uncharted sphere of 2-302. An ex-
ample is Toker v. Perl. 103 N.J. Super. SOO, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), a.ff 'd. 108 N.J. Super. 
129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970). Tne tria! court held the insta llment sa les contract unenforce-
able on two ground s: (I) fraud; and (2) unconscionability. The appellate court affirmed holding 
tha t the fraud ground was sufficient a nd therefo re it was unnecessa ry to express an opinion on 
unconsc ionability. 
, 3. UNIFORM COMMERC IAL CODE§ 2-302, Comment I. Unconscionability is a question 
of l a~v and must be determined by the court and not by the jury. Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Con -
trac ttng Co .. 3 UCC. REP. SERV. 293. 296 (Pa . Ct. C.P., Butler County 1965), holding that it was 
error for the Tria l Court to submit the issue of unconscionability to the jury. 
4. UN IFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-302 : 
(I) If the court as a matter of law find s the contrac t or any clause of the contrac t to have 
been unconscionable a t the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract. or it 
~l ay enforce the remaind er of the contract without the unconscionable cla use. or it may so limit 
1 lC app licat ion of a ny un consciona ble c lause as to avoid any unconscionable resu lt. 
(2) Wh en it is c laimed or a ppears to the court that the contract or a ny cla use th ereof 
rnay be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportuni ty to present ev id ence 
as to It s commercial setting, purpose and effect to a id the court in making the determination. 
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armed with a form contract. But is it? When can a contract be attacked 
as unconscionable? Are consumers in California under a severe disabil-
ity since their legislature deleted 2-302 from the California version of 
the Code? 
This article will not attempt to explore the history of 2-302; other 
authors have labored at that task and their efforts are readily available.5 
Nor will it prophesize on the future of this provision. Instead, this arti-
cle is written for the consumer's attorney. It is intended to supply him 
with a check-list and guidelines for testing whether his client has a 
possible case of unconscionability. Before getting to the check-lists, 
however, it is necessary to take a moment to isolate the type of contract 
that will be dealt with and to put unconscionability in its factual set-
ting. 
The contracts under consideration involve the sale of goods by a 
merchant to a consumer. Implicit is the fact that non-sale of goods 
contracts will not be considered. This approach is consistent with the 
formal scope of article 2 of the Code (Sales).6 The exclusion of non-sales 
contracts does not mean that these contracts cannot be held unconscio-
nable under 2-302; the Code's influence extends far beyond its formal 
scope, and some non-sales contracts have been held unconscionable? 
5. E.g .. Braucher, Th e Un conscionable Contract or Term , 31 U. PITI. L. REV. 337 (1970); 
Davenport , Un conscionability and the Umfo rm Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121 
(1 967); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Un conscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 757 (1969); Leff, Un conscion-
ability and the Code--The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Leff, Un con-
scionability and the Crowd--Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT L. REV. 349 
(1 970); Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability , 31 U. PITI. L. REV. I (1 969); Shulkin , 
Unconscionability-- Th e Code, The Court and The Consumer, 9 B. C. IND. & COM . L. REV. 367 
(1 968): Spanogle, Analyzing Un conscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969): 
Speidel. Un conscionability. A ssent and Consum er Protection, 31 U. PITI. L. REV. 359 (1970). 
6. "Unless the contex t otherwise requires. this Article applies to transactions in goods . . .. " 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-102. "'Goods' means all things (including specially man-
ufac tured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale . . . . ·: /d. § 
2-105(1 ). "In this Article unless the context otherwise requires 'contract' and 'agreement' are lim-
ited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods. 'Contract for sale' includes both a 
present sa le of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A 'sa le' consists in the passing 
of titl e from the se ller to the buyer for a price (Section 2-401) . . . . " /d. § 2-106(1 ). 
7. Contrac ts held unconscionable : Fairfield Lease Corp . v. Pratt , 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 537, 278 
A.2d 154 (1971) (l ease agreement); American Home Improvement , Inc. v. Maciver, 105 N.H. 435. 
201 A. 2d 886 (1964) (home improvement contract) ; Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 324 
N.Y.S. 2d 813 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1971) (enrollment agreement between a school and a stu-
dent); Dav id v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 1145 (N .Y. Civ. Ct., Kings 
County 1968) rev'd, 59 Misc . 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 847 (App. T. 1969) (checking account con -
trac t): ~t: In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E. D. Pa. 1966) (contract to advance money 
aga inst the assignment of accounts receiva ble). Comra. In re Advance Printing & Litho Co., 387 
F. 2d 952 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding tha t § 2-302 applies to sales but not to security transactions); 
Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin . Co .. 79 N.M. 673. 448 P.2d 474 (1 968) (holding th at~ 2-302 applies to 
sa les but not to security transactions): c( Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189. 298 N.Y.S . 
2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (in which an attempt to make the sa les contract into a security agreement 
failed). See also E. F. Lynch, Inc. v. Piccirilli , 28 Mass . App. Dec. 49 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1964) (l ease 
agreement : reversed beca use tria l court failed to hold a hearing on unconscionability): United 
States Leas ing Corp . v. Franklin Plaza Apartments , Inc .. 31 9 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 
197 1) (l ease agreement : plaintiffs motion for summ ary judgment denied because a hearing on the 
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Their exclusion from this article means only that the results in these 
cases may or may not be dictated by factors relevant to 2-302 and this, 
at least in the first instance, may be misleading when isolating the 
indicators for unconscionability under 2-302. 
Contracts involving sales between merchants also will not be consi-
dered except for the following discussion on how to determine whether 
the contract concerns a "consumer" or a "between merchants" sale. 
·The merchant is a person with special knowledge or skill peculiar to the 
practices or goods involved in the transaction.8 The "between mer-
chants" transaction occurs when both parties are chargeable with the 
knowledge or skill of merchants.9 The indicators in a "between mer-
chants" case, because of knowledge and skill of both contracting 
parties,may be slightly different from those in the consumer-merchant 
situation and may instill a possible source of distortion, and therefore 
are excluded from consideration.10 
unconscionab ili ty issue was necessary); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. George Umbrella Co .. 8 UCC 
REP. SERV. 184 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1970) (lease agreement: reversed because trial court 
fatled to hold a hearing on unconscionability); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 UCC REP. 
SERV. I 18 1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1970) (lease agreement for coffee machines); Kaye v. 
Coughlin, 443 S.W. 2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.--Eastland 1969, no writ) (contract for sale of real es -
tate: no unconscionable provision). 
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code§ 5.108 is similar to UCC § 2-302 but is applicable to 
consu mer credit sales, consumer leases, and consumer loans. It provides: 
(I) With respect to a consumer credit sa le, consumer lease, or consumer loan. if 
the court as a matter of law finds the agreement or any clause of the agreement to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce 
the agreement, or it may enforce the remainder of the agreement without the uncon-
scionab le clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as 
to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) If it is claimed or appears to the court that the agreement or any clause there-
of may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the 
determination. 
(3) For the purpose of this section, a charge or practice expressly permitted by 
this Act is not in itself unconscionable. --8. A "merchant" is defined by the Code to be "a person who deals in goods of the kind or 
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or ski ll peculiar to the practices 
?r goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his 
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out 
as having such knowledge or ski ll." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-104(1). 
9. I d. § 2- I 04(3). 
& 10. Several illustra tions of merchant-merchant cases are: County Asphalt. Inc. v. Lewis Welding 
Eng'r Corp. , 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Romine, Inc. v. Savannah Steel Co., 117 Ga. 
~3Pp. 353, 160 S.E.2d 659 (1968); Architectual Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc. , 70 Misc. 2d 495, 3 N.Y .S.2d 8 18 (Sup. Ct .. N.Y. County 1972); Division of Triple T. Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil 
~orp., 60 Misc. 2d 720,304 N.Y-S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County 1969); Whitestone Credit 
5
orp .. ~· Barbary Realty Corp., 5 UCC REP. SERV. 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Queens County 1968); 
ln~olt Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co .. 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct., 
~8uttolk County 1966); Central Ohio Co-op Milk Producers, Inc. v. Rowland. 29 Ohio App. 2d 236, I N.E.2d 42 (1972). 
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It is important to note at this juncture that the cases that have 
raised the unconscionability argument fall into several factual patterns. 
The most common involves a merchant who has sold goods to a 
consumer on a time payment contract. The consumer makes a number 
of payments and then fails to make the next payment when due. The 
merchant brings a contract action against the consumer for the balance 
due or to recover the goods. The consumer answers by raising the 
unconscionability of the price term as a defense to the contract action. 11 
Under these same facts, the consumer need not wait for the mer-
chant to sue. The consumer may take the initiative. He could bring suit 
against the merchant to reform the price term so that the contract sales 
price (and service charges) would correlate to the price paid. By these 
tactics, the consumer could retain the merchandise and free himself 
from making further payments} 2 While these two illustrations refer to 
the unconscionability of the price term, other terms, as will be dis-
cussed later, may be unconscionable as well. 
I. THE CHECK-LISTS 
The text of the Code, by its silence in defining what are unconscio-
nable contracts and clauses, has led to uncertainty and speculation con-
cerning definition. A number of cases, by being merely conclusionary, 
shed no light on the definition and its components.13 A few other cases 
do refer to definitions. Two similar yet different formulations currently 
J I. E.g., Tokerv. Westerman, J 13 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970); Jefferson 
Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969); Frostifresh Corp. v. 
Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S .2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev 'd on the damage issue, 54 Misc. 
2d 119,281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967). 
12. E.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp. , 59 Misc. 2d 189,298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Coun-
ty 1969). 
13. E .g .. In re Jackson , Bankruptcy No. 40666, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 1152 (W.O. Mo. 1971) (title 
retention provisions of a charge-all agreement for the entire amount was unconscionable); Dean v. 
Universal C.l.T. Credit Corp., 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1113 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1971) (dictum 
stated that a clause not to assert defenses against an assignee and a clause providing a 5-day time 
limit for claiming collateral in a repossessed automobile were unconscionable); Kosches v. Nichols. 
327 N.Y.S .2d 968 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1971) (dictum stated that clauses limiting the right of the 
consumer to move, or perm iting the merchant to declare a default if the consumer dies or the mer-
chant with reasonable cause determines the goods to be in jeopardy, or giving the merchant the 
right to enter a consumer's residence and seize the goods without a court order, may be uncon-
scionable) ; Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 66 Misc. 2d 974, 323 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. 
County 1971)(credit contract not unconscionable); Paragon Homes of New England, Inc., v. Lang-
lois. 4 UCC REP. SERV. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (dictum stated that a clause specifying jurisdic-
tion for litigation purposes would have been unconscionable were not the action dismissed on 
other grounds). 
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are developing: one emanates from the comments to the Code and the 
other from the pre-Code case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co.14 In the following material these formulations will be isolated and 
discussed separately and then brought together and compared for simi-
larities and differences. 
A. The Comment 1 Formulation 
The closest the Code comes to a definition for unconscionability is 
in the comments to 2-302. Comment 1 provides the following circular 
and somewhat obscure statement: 
"The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial 
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or 
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable 
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the 
contract ... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and 
unfair surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks be-
cause of superior bargaining power." 15 
Based on this language and the cases which will be discussed subse-
quently, the following check-list for unconscionability can be devel-
oped: 
1. Identify the one-sided clause. This will be a term for which the 
merchant is bargaining. 
2. Identify the general commercial background (also known as the 
commercial setting) at the time of the contracting. Include facts about 
this contract and related contracts and dealings between the parties. 
3. Identify the commercial needs of the particular trade or case at 
the time of contracting. Include facts which explain or tend to justify 
the merchant's position regarding the one-sided clause. 
14. 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Taker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct.l970), refers 
to neither Comment l nor Walker-Thomas. Instead it refers to the following passage in Carter v. 
Boone County Trust Co., 338 Mo. 629, 92 S.W.2d 647, 657 (1936), which appears in WORDS 
AND PHRASES. An unconscionable contract has been defined as: 
one such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on the one 
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other. To what extent in-
adequacy of consideration must go to make a contract unconscionable is difficult to 
state, except in abstract terms, which gives but little practical help. It has been said 
that there must be an inequality so strong, gross, and manifest that it must be im-
possible to state it to a man of common sense without producing an exclamation at 
the inequality of it. 
In Toker, a price term with a price-value disparity of 2.2 or more to 1 was held to be unconscion -
able. 
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1. For criticism of this test , see 1. 
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 116 (1972). 
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4. Evaluate the one-sided ness of the clause in the light of the gener-
al commercial background and the commercial needs of the trade or 
case. Was the clause a product of the merchant's oppressive practices 
and, if so, would the clause shock the conscience of the court? 
Based on the limited number of consumer-merchant sales cases 
which have discussed Comment 1,16 the following materials develop and 
illustrate the check-list's rough guidelines. The first, and probably the 
simplest step, is the identification of those clauses that the consumer 
will claim to be one-sided in favor of the merchant. These are the claus-
es for which the merchant was bargaining. Illustrative are price terms, 
conditions precedent to warranties, waivers of defenses, and title reten-
tion provisions. 
Next, identify the general commercial background at the time of 
contracting. The commercial background or commercial setting should 
include the events leading up to the contracting, and will help to ex-
plain how and why the one-sided term found its way into the contract. 
For example, in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso:7 the contract for the re-
frigerator-freezer was negotiated orally in Spanish between the 
consumers and a Spanish speaking salesman representing the mer-
chant. In that conversation the consumer husband told the salesman 
that he had but one week left on his job and he could not afford to buy 
the appliance. The salesman distracted and deluded the consumers by 
advising them that the appliance would cost them nothing because they 
would be paid bonuses or commissions of $25 each on the numerous 
sales that would be made to their neighbors and friends. Thereafter the 
consumers signed a retail installment contract entirely in English, which 
was neither translated nor explained to them. In that contract there 
was a cash sales price of $900 and a credit charge of $245.88, making a 
total oJ $1145.88. The refrigerator-fre~zer cost the merchant $348. 
The commercial background need not be limited to the one contract 
in which the one-sided term appears. It may include related contracts 
and dealings between the parties. If the consumer desires to go beyond 
the one contract, then he must supply facts wh ich show that this extrin-
sic material is relevant. Milford Finance Corp. v. Lucas18presents an ex-
cellent illustration of the expansion of the scope of the general com-
mercial background beyond the single contract in question. In Milford 
. 16. Milford Fin. Corp. v. Lucas, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass . App. Div. 1970) (judgment fm 
merchant's assignee reversed since the trial court erred in excluding evidence of commercial back-
ground relevant to the decision of unconscionability); Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb. 522, 
198 N.W.2d 57 (1972); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist . Ct. 
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1%7). 
17. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966). 
18. 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass. App. Div. 1970). 
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Finance the consumers (husband and wife), in response to a post card 
informing them that they had "won a free Miami Beach vacation for 
two," called a telephone number to redeem the vacation. They were 
subsequently visited by a salesman for Northeast Food Service. He 
inquired how much they spent each week on meat for the family .and if 
they might be interested in a frozen food plan. He stated that Northeast 
would supply them with the finest choice of meats delivered to their 
home for $12 per week, or 20f6 per week more than they had been pay-
ing. The consumers asked how often the meats were delivered and were 
told every six months. When they said that the freezer section of their 
refrigerator was not capable of holding such a large quantity of food, 
the salesman said that if they agreed to purchase frozen meat from 
Northeast for three years, they would be supplied a freezer at no extra 
charge. 
The salesman presented the consumers with a Northeast Food Ser-
vice Membership Bond and Guarantee and then produced two docu-
ments which he requested the consumers to execute. One was entitled 
"consumer note" and was in the amount of $195.24, payable in four 
equal payments of $48.81. The other was the retail installment sales 
agreement in the amount of $1,050.84 payable in 36 equal payments of 
$29.19. When the consumers saw the latter they said it was too much to 
pay for a freezer. The salesman said the freezer payments were inclu-
ded in the food payments and both amounted to $12 per week. The 
~alesman said the only reason that they were required to sign the retail 
Installment sales agreement was to insure that they purchased their 
meats from Northeast for at least three years. The consumers subse-
quently paid $624 ($12 x 52 weeks) and received one year's supply of 
meat. Northeast then went out of business and no further meat deliver-
ies were made. 
In the interim, the installment sales agreement had been assigned 
from Northeast to Milford Finance. When the consumers did not re-
ceive deliveries, they refused to make any further payments and re-
quested that Milford Finance remove the freezer. Milford, as assignee 
of the freezer contract, brought action against the consumers for the 
unpaid balance. The consumers contended that the total time sales 
price of $1,050.84 was so excessively high as to make the entire retail 
~~tallment sales agreement unconscionable and unenforceable. From 
Liford Finance it may be seen that evidence is relevant to expand the 
scope of the hearing from the one contract being challenged to include 
other contracts and other dealings between the parties which comprise 
a greater transaction. 
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In Milford Finance, the following acts demonstrated that the scope 
should be expanded. The post card which informed the consumers that 
they had "won a free Miami Beach vacation for two"; the subsequent 
visit by a salesman for Northeast; the lead into the frozen food plan; 
the signing of the note, bond and guarantee and the sales agreement, 
all on the same day; and the fact that the food was a necessary require-
ment of the freezer contract, demonstrated that the contract for the 
freezer was an integral part of the food contract. The evidence sur-
rounding the manner in which the consumers were induced to sign up 
for the food service and for the purchase of the freezer was admissible, 
to show that the freezer payments were included in the food payments. 
The evidence concerning the Northeast Food Service Membership Bond 
and guarantee was introduced to show that Northeast's agent was not 
merely selling a freezer unit to the consumers, but also that he had 
made certain representations about a frozen food plan, upon which 
representations the consumers had relied. Once the scope was 
expanded, evidence surrounding the manner in which the consumers 
were induced to become involved with any aspect of the whole transac-
tion was relevant to show that the merchant had engaged in deceptive 
practices during the negotiation of the freezer contract. Finally, the fact 
that the consumers paid the monthly payments up until the time that 
they were unable to procure any more food demonstrated their good 
faith. 
Next, identify the commercial needs of the particular trade or case 
at the time of contracting. These facts will be used to explain the mer-
chant's position regarding the one-sided clause. Are there facts that 
justify such a clause? Consider, for example, the commercial needs that 
influence the setting of the ultimate price to the consumer. Included 
are the net cost of the goods to the merchant, a reasonable profit, com-
missions to be paid to salesmen, possible collection and legal fees, 
trucking and service charges necessarily incurred, reasonable finance 
charges, and other matters of overhead.I9 
Finally, evaluate the one-sidedness of the clauses in the light of the 
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the trade 
or case. Was the clause so one-sided at the time of contracting as to be 
unconscionable? Comment 1 states that a finding of unconscionability 
will lie only when it is necessary to prevent oppression and unfair sur-
prise. While this language is conjunctive -- "oppression and unfair 
19. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 54 Misc. 2d 119,281 N.Y.S.2d %4 (App. T. 1%7). 
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suprise" -- the cases refer only to oppression and thus treat the terms as 
disjunctive?0 
Most cases provide little help in evaluating whether a clause is so 
one-sided as to be unconscionable~ 1 Of the few that have referred to the 
Comment 1 formulation, some have been cases where the trial court 
has erroneously excluded evidence relevant to the unconscionability 
finding, and therefore are of little help in pinpointing unconscionability. 
Two cases, M elcher v. Boesch Motor Co~2and Frostifresh v. R eynoso, do 
shed some light on the application of the Comment 1 formul ation. In 
M elcher, a consumer purchased a new pickup truck from a dealer. 
From the beginning, the truck used an abnormal amount of oil. When 
it had been driven nearly 25,000 miles, it threw a connecting rod and 
destroyed the engine. The consumer brought action against the dealer 
and the manufacturer for damages for breach of the manufacturer's 
express warranty that the vehicle was free from defects in material and 
workmanship. The dealer and the manufacturer defended on the 
ground that the consumer had failed to comply with the conditions pre-
cedent to the warranty -- that is , the service requirements and the re-
quired certification of such compliance. The consumer replied that he 
had performed the required maintenance and that the requirement that 
he obtain from the dealer a certification of compliance was unconscion-
able and unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. 
After quoting the Comment 1 formulation , the court held that the 
certification requirement was not unconscionable. It must be 
emphasized that the court found the requirement not unconscionable, 
not by discussing whether it was "oppressive" or led to "unfair sur- . 
prise", but instead by whether it was "unreasonable." In finding the 
basis for the certification clearly reasonable, the court noted that the 
requirement of a consumer that he maintain the engine of his vehicle 
properly, in exchange for a warranty that the vehicle be free of defect in 
material and workmanship at time of delivery, go hand-in-hand. Also, 
~he requ ired certification did not put the manufacturer and the dealer 
In the position of sole arbiters as to what is sufficient maintenance. The 
lllanufacturer and the dealer did not have the unqualified right under 
the clause to refuse the certification and defeat the consumer's claim. 
--20. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966). For a dis· 
;u;ston of "unfair surprise" and "oppression," see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
''c.MEDIES 710-12 (1973) . 
. 21. Milford Fin. Corp. v. Lucas, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass. App. Div. 1970) (Based on the 
dtscussion on appeal, the unconscionability decision would appear to hinge on the merchant's de-
cep2ttve practices versus the consumer's good faith). 
2. Supra note 16. 
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While the consumer must furnish the dealer with evidence of perfor-
mance of the required maintenance services, the dealer may not unrea-
sonably withhold the certification. If the · manufacturer and the dealer 
could arbitrarily refuse to recognize the fact that the service was pro-
perly performed and thus deny the certification, the certification re-
quirement would be unreasonable and the condition precedent that the 
consumer obtain the certification would be waived. Thus construed, the 
certification provision is not unreasonable. 
While the Melcher contract was not unconscionable, the Frostifresh 
contract was. Frostifresh provides the following clue to unconscionabil-
ity: It is not oppression alone, according to the Comment 1 formula-
tion, that causes a contract to be unconscionable. If it were, then the 
problem would seem to revert to a reallocation of the risk, which Com-
ment 1 expressly rejects. Instead, it is oppression that shocks the con-
science of the court. In Frostifresh, the court noted that the service 
charge ($245.88), which almost equalled the price of the refrigerator-
freezer ($348), was in and of itself indicative of the oppression which 
was practiced on the consumers. In addition , the consumers were 
handicapped by a lack of knowledge both as to the commercial situa-
tion and as to the nature and terms of the contract, which was submit-
ted in a language foreign to them. These oppressive practices led the 
court to conclude that the contract was "too hard a bargain". The sale 
of the appliance at the contract price was shocking to the conscience of 
the court. The conscience of the court would not permit the enforce-
ment of the contract as writtenP 
B. The Walker-Thomas Formulation 
The more commonly cited formulation, emanating from the case of 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., defines unconscionability 
as including an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the 
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable 
to the other party!4 The following check-list directs attention to the rele-
vant factors: 
1. The consumer must have had a meaningful choice at the time of 
contracting. 
a. The consumer must have had a reasonable opportunity to 
understand the contract terms. An important term must not have been 
hidden in a maze of fine print; nor must an important term have been 
23. Frostifresh v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S .2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966); cf Star Credit 
Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1%9) (consumer failed 
to submit evidence of the freezer's actual value, which made a determination of the unconsCion-
ability of the price term impossible). 
24. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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obscured by deceptive sales practices; nor must the consumer have 
been denied the opportunity to understand the term due to a lack of 
education or some other disability. ' 
b. In addition, the consumer must have had the power to bar-
gain about the term. He must not have lacked the power to shop com-
paratively due to limited financial resources or because all merchants 
dealing in the desired item uniformly use the same commercial form or 
charge the same price. 
c. If the consumer lacked a meaningful choice at the time of 
contracting, then an inequality of bargaining power existed. However, 
only a gross inequality of bargaining power will constitute the requisite 
absence of meaningful choice. Was the inequality of bargaining power 
gross? 
2. The merchant must not have taken advantage of the customer's 
absence of meaningful choice by including a term unreasonably favor-
able to himself in the contract. 
a. Identify the favorable term. This will be a term for which the 
merchant is bargaining. 
b. Identify the circumstances that existed at the time of con-
tracting. Did these circumstances make the favorable term unreason-
ably favorable to the merchant? Specifically, did the merchant know-
ingly take advantage of the consumer's absence of meaningful choice? 
Considering only the consumer's evidence of circumstances, does this 
advantage appear unreasonable? Were there commercial needs for the 
particular trade or case that justified the merchant in including into the 
contract what appeared to be an unreasonably favorable term? If the 
advantage appears unreasonable and there are no commercial needs 
that justify the merchant's position, then the term is unconscionable. 
The following materials develop and illustrate the rough guidelines 
of the check-list: (1) For unconscionability, the consumer must lack a 
meaningful choice at the time of contracting. (2) Whether a meaningful 
choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by consi-
dering all the circumstances surrounding the transaction:S (3) Meaning-
~ul choice is directly related to bargaining power, and bargaining power 
ts a . composite of knowing what to bargain for and the ability to 
bargain for it. 
The consumer, when signing the contract, must at least have had a 
reasonable opportunity to know and understand its terms. This --Th25· I d. The consumer is entitled to a hearing to present evidence as to the commercial setting. 
53 M:fore, the merchant is not entitled to a summary judgment. Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, Jsc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1967). 
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opportunity may not exist if the important terms are hidden in a maze 
of fine print, or if they are minimized or obscured by deceptive sales 
practices. An example of the latter occurred in Toker v. Perl/ 6 where 
the merchant's salesman arrived at the consumer's home for a prear-
ranged appointment. For the first two and one-half hours of the three 
hour interview, the discussion centered around food plans that could be 
arranged by the merchant. No mention was made of a freezer. Some-
time within the last one-half hour, when it became apparent that the 
plan called for the purchase of 18 weeks of food at a time, the 
consumers mentioned that they had no facilities to store such a large 
quantity of food . T he salesman replied that a freezer was included in 
the food plan. Following the explanation of the food plan, the salesman 
presented three forms for signing. He informed the consumers that the 
documents were for 18 weeks of food. The forms were placed one on 
top of the other, leaving visible only the signature line on the lower two 
form s. The top page was the food plan contract. The next day when the 
consumers examined the papers, they discovered that in addition to the 
food plan they had signed a financing application and an installment 
contract for a freezer. 
The opportunity to understand the terms may not exist when the 
consumer suffers from a lack of education or a language barrier. For 
example, a Spanish-speaking consumer, with at best a sketchy know-
ledge of the English language, may neither know nor understand when 
he signs a contract printed entirely in English that he is waiving all 
implied warranties, despite the fact that the waiver is printed in the 
contract in large black type?7 At times even a consumer with a sound 
basic education and without language problems may be unable to 
understand the contract even if he reads it, due to the drafting skill of 
the merchant's form writer:8 In either case, the consumer who signs the 
contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, signs without choice.29 
A "smart" consumer knows and understands what is in the con-
tract. But what terms can this consumer get? Is the consumer free to 
indulge in comparative shopping? The answer may be that he is 
physically able but, due to his very limited financial resources30 or the 
fact that all merchants dealing in the desired items uniformly use 
the same commercial form, or charge the same price,31 comparative 
26. 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), a.ffd on other grounds, 108 N.J. Super. 
129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970). 
· 27. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138,302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969). 
28. Urd ang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971). 
29. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
30. Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972), Jones v. Star Credit 
Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969). 
31. Urd ang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971). 
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shopping is not practiced. Or, the consumer may be physically able to 
shop comparatively, but be psychologically unable to do so because the 
merchant calls on the consumer in the consumer's own home.32 Without 
the power to do effective comparison shopping, the consumer has little 
bargaining power, little real choice. 
Only a gross inequality of bargaining power will constitute the re-
quisite absence of meaningful choice!3 Although our research did not 
uncover a case which defined the distinction between gross and 
less-than-gross inequality of bargaining power, some guidance can be 
gleaned from the ultimate conclusions of the courts on the unconscion-
ability issue. It appears from these cases that only one of the factors 
from the check-list is necessary for the inequality of bargaining power 
~o be gross.34 If more than one factor is present at the time of contract-
Ing, all the better: What is critical is the severity of the inequality de-
veloped within that factor. Showings of deceptive sales practices, lan-
guage barriers, and limited financial resources have been sufficient to 
support conclusions of unconscionability; but it appears that the psych-
ological factor of being trapped by a salesman in one's own home is not 
strong enough by itself to be relied upon to show gross inequality, and 
should only be used in conjunction with another factor to strengthen 
that other factor. 
Absence of meaningful choice alone will not warrant a finding of 
unconscionability. Absence of meaningful choice is only one-half of the 
two-pronged Walker- Thomas test. For a clause to be unconscionable, 
the merchant must knowingly have taken advantage of the consumer's 
absence of meaningful choice by including in the contract a term 
unreasonably favorable to the seller. 
Was the term favorable to the merchant? Illustrative are such terms 
as waiver of implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a 
Particular purpose, acceleration clauses, and price terms. The mer-
chan~_b!!nefits at the consumer's expense. 
A term f~vorable to the merchant does not automatically make the 
term unconscionable. Freedom to contract permits and encourages --p 3?· See Jones v. Star Credit Corp .• 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Toker v. 
2~Q AI03 N.J. Super. 500,247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), a.ffd on othergrounds,108 N.J. Super. 129, 
3 .2d 244 (App. Div. 1970). Cr ~ : Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1%5); Jones v. Star 
~ tt Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N. Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1 %9). 
un 4· I~ Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), the price term was found 
v ~nsctonable since it had been obscured by deceptive sales practices. In Jefferson Credit Corp. 
u.n arcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969), the waiver of warranties was found 
du consctonable because the consumer was denied the opportunity to understand the waiver clause 
2~ to a lack of education in English. In Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S .2d 
had (Sup. Ct. 1969), the price term was held unconscionable as the consumer, a welfare recipient, 
only very limited financial resources. 
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e.ach contracting party to bargain for terms most favorable to himself. · 
The limitation (in addition to good faith)Js is that circumstances must 
not exist at the time of contracting which would make the favorable 
term unreasonably favorable to the merchant. In determining reason-
ableness or fairness of the terms, the primary concern must be with the 
terms of the contract considered in light of the circumstances existing 
when the contract was made. Existing circumstances encompass the 
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the parti-
cular trade or case!6 Did the merchant knowingly take advantage of the 
consumer's absence of meaningful choice? 37 The merchant knowingly 
takes advantage when he leads the consumer to believe that his signa-
ture to a contract is not for the purchase of merchandise, when in fact 
it is?8 Knowingly taking advantage may be implied when a merchant, 
dealing at arms length with the consumer who has a severe language 
barrier, fails to explain the terms favorable to the merchant so the con-
sumer can understand . Or it may be implied from the price-value dis-
parity when the merchant knows that the consumer's limited financial 
resources make it impossible for him to buy from others. 
Considering only the consumer's evidence of circumstances, does 
the advantage gained by the merchant appear unreasonable? In Jones 
v. Star Credit Corp.;9 a price-term case, the court considered whether 
the mathematical price-value disparity was exhorbitant on its face and 
concluded that it was oppressive. The court then used the language that 
the price imposed on these consumers for this appliance shocked the 
conscience of the court. This occurred when the price-value disparity 
was in excess of 2.5 to 1. 
Commercial needs provide the merchant with an opportunity to 
justify the existence of favorable terms. When the challenged term is 
price, the merchant's defense may be based on the necessity and even 
the desirability of installment sales and the extension of credit. There 
are many, including but not necessarily limited to the poorest members 
35. The Code provides that "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation· <?f 
good faith in its performance or enforcement." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 1-203. ThiS 
obligation of good faith underpins the entire Code. The consumer's obligation of good faith means 
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned ." Jd. § 1-201(19). The merchant has a 
higher obligation . "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." !d. § 2-103(1 Xb). 
36. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
37. Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 
Misc. 2d 189,298 N.Y.S .2d 264 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1969). 
38. Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), affd on other grounds , 108 
N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970). 
39. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); accord, Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.~ 
78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) (2.2-2.5 to 1); Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. D1v. 
1968) (2.7 to 1). Contra, Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co.; 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. 
App. 1971) (2.5 to 1 was not unconscionable). 
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of the community, who would be deprived of even the most basic con-
veniences without the use of these de-yices. Similarly, the retail mer-
chant selling on installment or extending credit is expected to establish 
a pricing factor which will afford a degree of protection commensurate 
with the risk of selling to those who might be default-prone:W In addi-
tion, mark-ups vary from industry to industry. A high mark-up in one 
industry might be low in another.41 To be successful in his unconscion-
ability claim, a consumer must know the mores and business practices 
of the time and place or the merchan~ may readily justify his favorable 
term. 
C. A Comparison 
The Comment 1 and the Walker-Thomas formulations are similar 
in that both focus on the term favorable to the merchant. Under both, 
the favorable term must be considered in light of the circumstances 
existing at the time of contracting that would make the favorable term 
so oppressive or unreasonably favorable to the merchant that the con-
science of the court is shocked. In both, the merchant is given an op-
portunity to present evidence of the circumstances that would justify his 
Inclusion into the contract of what appears to be an oppressive or un-
reasonably favorable term. 
The difference between the formulations is that the Comment 1 test 
appears to end with what already has been said. The Walker-Thomas 
test adds a second area of consideration which must be considered even 
before the favorable term: There must be an absence of meanin'gful 
choice. The merchant, when including the unreasonably favorable term 
must have done so in the spirit of knowingly taking advantage of the 
consumer's lack of meaningful choice. Therefore, in comparison, the 
Walker-Thomas test appears more restrictive. 
. What significance does this have for the consumer who is attempt-
Ing to raise a defense of unconscionability? Based on the limited num-
--v 'W· Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1%9); accord, Toker 
n~ hesterman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) (less overhead due to door-to-door salesmen and 
s owroom or store). 
rn 41. Mo~ris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971). Before a 
ti~rchant IS required to divulge his pricing policies through interrogatories or through the produc-
v W of records m court, the consumer must assert his claim with some degree of detail. Patterson 
· alker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971). 
giv Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1972), 
es some pointers in the warranty area: 
There is obviously a point at which the warranty limitation must be considered un-
co_nscionable--for example if, due to defective manufacture or failure to repair by 
fa11ing to place a 25 cent nut on the proper bolt, the brakes fail and a collision oc-
curs resulting in heavy property damage and personal injury, courts might well be 
loath to limit the manufacturer's or seller's liability to the sum of twenty five cents. 
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ber of reported decisions, the choice of tests does not appear to be juris-
dictional. The same courts have used both formulations on different 
occasions~2 Nor does the choice appear to be based on the type of term 
being challenged. Both tests have been used for price terms43 and for 
non-price terms:"' 
Does this mean that there is only one test -- a test which requires 
the merchant to have included the unreasonably favorable term in the 
spirit of knowingly taking advantage of the consumer's lack of mean-
ingful choice? Based on the three cases that have used the Comment 1 
test, all would come to the same result under Walker-Thomas. In 
Milford Finance, the food plan/freezer case, the consumers lacked a 
meaningful choice at the time of contracting since the price term was 
obscured by deceptive sales practices. In Frostifresh Corp., the refriger-
ator-freezer case, the consumers lacked a meaningful choice at the time 
of contracting since they could not understand the contract terms due 
to a lack of education. In Melcher, the automobile warranty case, the 
consumer lacked a meaningful choice since he did not have the power 
to do comparison shopping, due to the fact that all merchants dealing 
in the desired item uniformly used the same commercial form. Unlike 
the other two cases, the advantage gained by the merchant in Melcher 
was not unreasonable under the circumstances. The certification, which 
was the condition precedent to the validity of the warranty, could not 
be denied arbitrarily. 
The consumer would be well advised to plead and prove both 
absence of meaningful choice and unreasonable terms~5 This will avoid 
the consumer's predicament in Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
42. New York Supreme Court, Nassau County: compare Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 
2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Comment 1 formulation) with Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 
59 Misc. 2d 189,298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (Walker-Thomas formulation). 
43. Comment 1 formulation: Milford Fin. Corp. v. Lucas, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass. App. 
Div. 1970); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1%6). Waf· 
ker-Thomas formulation : Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. 
App. 1971); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1 %9); Toker 
v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1 %8). 
44. Comment 1 formulation: Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb. 522 (1972) (condition pre-
cedent to the validity of a warranty). Walker-Thomas formu lation : Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Mar-
cano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (waiver of implied warranty); Urdang v. 
Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971) (acceleration clause). 
45. Unconscionability, when used as an affirmative defense, must be pleaded by the defendent. 
Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting Co., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 293, 296 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Butler 
County 1965). A sufficient factual predicate for the defense must be alleged before wholesale dis-
covery will be allowed. An unsupported conclusory allegation in the answer that a contract is un· 
enforceable as unconscionable is not enough. Sufficient facts which surround the commercial set· 
ting of the contract at the time it was made should be alleged so that the court may form a judg· 
ment as to the existence of a valid claim of unconscionability and the extent to which discovery of 
evidence to support that claim should be allowed . Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 
A.2d 111, 114 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (the answer asserted the affirmative defense of unconscion-
ability only on the basis of a stated conclusion that the price was excessive--held insufficient). 
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Co.46 There the consumer alleged only the unreasonable term. The court 
held that without alleging absence of meaningful choice, the allegations 
were insufficient to state a claim of unconscionability. 
II. THE CONSUMER'S POSITION IN CALIFORNIA: CAN 
THERE BE PROTECTION FROM UNCONSCIONABILITY 
WITHOUT LEGISLATION? 
Section 2-302 of the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial 
Code was omitted from the California version~7 A California State Bar 
Committee explained that the decision to delete was based on the belief 
that giving courts unqualified power to strike down terms they might 
consider unconscionable could result in the renegotiation of contracts 
in every case of disagreement with the fairness of the provisions the 
parties had accepted.48 
Are the California consumers severely hampered by the legislature's 
rejection of 2-302 -- action which prevents the California courts from 
ruling openly on unconscionability? Naturally, the deletion of 2-302 
may dictate that the courts will proceed with caution when faced with a 
situation which requires an expansion of their power. On the other 
?and, the courts need not refrain from doing what they have been do-
Ing, or from taking advantage of the provisions in the Code which have 
not been deleted. Case law exists in California that indicates uncon-
scionability, as a public policy doctrine, was a part of California's com-
mon law prior to the legislature's adoption of the Code~9 
--2846. 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); accord, Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 
0 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), affd. 8 UCC REP. SERV. 321 (D.C. Gen Sess. 1970). It should 
~noted that these cases are from the District· of Columbia, the same jurisdiction as Williams v. 
alker-Thomas Furniture Co. This may explain the court's precision concerning the allegation 
and proof of an absence of meaningful choice. 
47 .. CAL. COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2302 (West 1964). North Carolina originally deleted§ 2-302 
~NIts version of the UCC. N. CAR. GEN. STAT.§ 25-2-302 (1%5); Clifford, Article Two: Sales, 
S ·CAR. L. REV. 539, 562-64 (1%6). In 1971, North Carolina added it back. N. CAR. GEN. 
t '!AT.§ 25-2-302 (Supt. 1971). Louisiana has not enacted the Code. All other states and the Dis-
net of Columbia have 2-302. 
C 48. California State ar Committee on the Commercial Code, A Special Report, The Uniform 
t ornrnercial Code, 37 CAL. B. J. 117, 135-36 (1 %2). § 2-302 was defended on the ground that 
torm contracts were not negotiated in any real sense and therefore the courts must have the power 
ko prevent the merchant from overreaching when dealing with a consumer who has neither the 
t nowledge nor the bargaining position to influence the contract terms. /d. at 135. A compromise 
bo place s<;>me limitations on the court's power by requiring the contract to be a form contract and 
/· e~cludtng the "between merchants" situations (since they presumably are of more equal bar-
(Wnmg power) f~iled. See CAL COMME_RCI~L CODE§ 2302, c.al. Code Commen~ .at 197-98 
rn es~ 1964); ProJect, A Compar1son of California Sales Law and Article Two of the Uniform Com-
e.[9lal Code, 10 U.C.LA. L. REV. 1087, 1130-32 (1%3). 
no : S~anson v. Hempstead, 64 Cal. App. 2d 681, 149 P.2d 404, 407-08 (1964) (the evidence did se: JUshfy a finding that the attorney's contingent fee contract was unconscionable); accord, 
zer v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 2d 213, 368 P.2d 124, 18 Cal. Rptr. 524, 527 (1%2); Youngblood v. 
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While the legislature has expressly excluded 2-302, the fears that 
premised its exclusion have not proven correct. The courts in other 
states have not run roughshod over negotiated contract rights. This, 
then, would give the courts some leeway to continue to follow their 
common law unconscionability doctrine. In addition, there seems to be 
no reason why the courts could not pattern their common law uncon-
scionability doctrine after that emanating from 2-302. Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., the leading case in the area, was itself a 
pre-Code common law unconscionability case:x> The impact of the exis-
tence of the doctrine, while not dramatic under the restrictive Walker-
Thomas formulation, would be something that could be useful to the 
consumer, at least in limited cases. 
Besides this frontal attempt to incorporate 2-302. into California 
law, there are more subtle approaches. For example, California courts 
have, by construction and interpretation of contract terms, avoided .en-
forcement of harsh bargains~ 1 They also have manipulated the rules of 
offer, acceptance and consideration to reach pro-consumer results:2 An-
other approach is the recognition of unconscionability as an aspect of 
good faith -- a concept that has not been deleted in California and 
Higgins, 146 Cal. App. 2d 3SO, 303 P.2d 637, 639 (1956). The Swanson case defined an "uncon-
_scionable contract" as one "such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on 
the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other." Swanson v. Hempstead, 
64 Cal. App. 2d 681, 149 P.2d 404, 407 (1964). Authority exists for the premise that§ 2-302 codi-
·fies the common law doctrine of unconscionability. In re Jackson, Bankruptcy No. 40666, 9 UCC 
REP. SERV. (W.O. Mo. 1971); American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maciver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 
A.2d 886 (1964) (construction contract); Unico v. Owen, SO N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405, 418 (1967). 
SO. Althou~h the Code (including§ 2-302) had been adopted in the District of Columbia at the 
time of litigatiOn, it was not enacted until after Williams had contracted. This, the time of con-
tracting, was the critical time for determining whether the Code applied. Therefore the Code did 
not control the decision . The Walker-Thomas court looked to legislative history (i.e., Congress' 
enactment of the Code and § 2-302) and held that this was the way it ought, at common law, to be. 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3SO F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
51. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041, 1047 (1954) (strict construe· 
tion of a disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantable quality). · 
52. E.g., Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (19SO) (estoppel); State Fin. Co. v. 
Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 112 P.2d 901 (1941) (gross inequality of consideration was evidence of 
fraud). Corbin stated: 
There is sufficient flexibility in the concepts of fraud, duress , misrepresentation, and 
undue influence, not to mention differences in economic bargaining power, to enable 
the courts to avoid enforcement of a barl;lain that is shown to be unconscionable by 
reason of gross inadequacy of consideration accompanied by other relevant factors. 
I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 128 (1963). (footnote omitted) 
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which underpins the entire Code;3 While achieving results by direction 
rather than by indirection is desirable, .. the legislature's rejection of 
2-302 has left the consumer and the courts with little alternative.54 
CONCLUSION 
The consumer-merchant relationship in the sale of goods area has 
not been greatly affected by 2-302. Only a few reported cases illustrate 
that the consumer has been benefited by 2-302. Unconscionability, 
under the Walker-Thomas formulation , works little magic for the 
consumer. The Comment 1 formulation, while appearing to be more 
readily available to the consumer, may in fact contain (although not 
verbalized) the same considerations as those found in Walker-Thomas. 
On the other hand, unconscionability does play an important role in 
those cases which do not fit the established doctrine -- such as fraud, 
duress and usury -- but which are still so oppressive as to shock the 
conscience of the court. 
One final point needs some reflection. For a consumer who can 
establish that the contract or clause was unconscionable at the time of 
contracting, some care must be taken in selecting his remedy. For ex-
ample, where the price term is unconscionable, does the consumer want 
--te;/ .For a discussion of good faith , see note 35 su~ra. An unconscionable contract is inconsis-
M With good faith . ln re Jackson, Bankruptcy No. 40666, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 1152, 1158 (W.O. 
gr~ · !971). "While the uncon~cionabil_ity referred to in § 2-30_2 may be conduct w~rse i~ SOJ?e de-
fa i e tha~ the lack of good fatth prohtbited by § 1-203, both tmpose the same baste obltgattons of 
o 9r7f~ahng in commercial transactions." Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J . Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397, 401 
coo California has not deleted all reference to unconscionability. See CAL. COMMERCIAL 
E § 2719(3) (West 1964). 
de~· See CAL. COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2302, Cal. Code Comment 197 (West 1964). For furth er 
u atls concerning California see Comment A R eevaluation of the Decision Not To Adopt the 
~EVnscionability Provision ~f the Uniform' Co1n;m ercial Code in California, ? SAN. DI~GO L. 
a d. · 289 0970). It should be noted that Califorma does have consumer protectton legtslatton. For 
R.Ezycussion see Project, L egislative Regulation of R etail Installment Financing, 7 U.C.L.A. L. 
. 618 0960). 
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to return the goods and get his money back, keep the goods and pay 
what they are worth, or keep the goods and not pay any more (which · 
already may be more than the goods are worth)? Failure to position 
himself properly before litigation may mean that a finding of uncon-
scionability may not have the potency for the consumer that it could 
have had. He will not get his full measure of relief. 55 
55. In the price cases, if the consumer returns the goods, he may be able to get his money back. 
On the other hand, if he keeps the goods, he may find himself paying what it was worth or possibly 
more. This may depend on the amount already paid. For example, in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 
54 Misc. 2d 119,281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967), reversing on the damage issue, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 
274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), the consumer had paid only the down payment of $32. He did 
not attempt to return the refrigerator-freezer. The cost to the merchant was $348 and the cash 
sales price was $900 plus charges bringing the total to $1145.88. The trial court held the price 
term unconscionable and gave the merchant judgment for $348 (his cost) with interest, less the $32 
(paid by consumer). The appeals court reversed the damage issue (still held unconscionable) but 
permitted the merchant to recover more (merchant should recover his net cost for the appliance 
plus a reasonable profit, in addition to trucking and service charges necessarily incurred and rea-
sonable finance charges). 
In Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County 
1969), the consumer did not ask for a set-off and thus paid more for his freezer than did the con-
·sumer in Frostifresh. The maximum retail value (including a reasonable profit margin) was $300. 
The consumer had paid $619.88 on a contract which called for a cash sales price of $900 and a 
total price of $1234.80. The court said that the merchant had already been amply compensated 
and reformed the price term to coincide with the amount paid. Should the consumer have been 
entitled to a refund of $319.88 (the difference between what he paid and the maximum retail value 
including a reasonable profit margin) less a reasonable finance charge? The additional amount the 
consumer paid ($319) was still more than the entire difference between total price and the cash 
sales price. Accord, Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970); cf Urdang v. Muse, 
114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971). 
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THE PONTIAC PROSPECTUS 
Arthur Allen Left* 
I have just, for the first time in eight years, bought a car. It wasn't 
a particularly ugly experience. I used Consumer Reports, word-of-
mouth, pre-bargaining pep talks from my wife, and a great deal of 
anxiety and time. Maybe I got the right brand and model for my 
present needs, for about as good a price as I could expect. But I really 
can't tell; despite my compulsive care I simply could not get enough in-
formation to make a fully-educated choice. What I do now know is that 
the whole process of retail distribution of automobiles in America, 
upon which a large chunk of this country's retail sales directly or 
indirectly depend, could be easily, vastly, and inexpensively improved. 
Carrying out the idea, however, would demand some governmental 
coercion, and I've spent enough time looking at, say, welfare and public 
housing, to think that by now such governmental intervention always 
demands some justification, which I will presently try to supply. But let 
me say first what I think ought to be done, before explaining why. 
What I propose is this: Let the government require that there be 
available each year, no later than the time when the new year's auto-
mobiles may be bought by the public, a "Prospectus" setting forth a 
huge amount of data about every vehicle sold by a particular manufac-
turer. Whatever this data is (and I'm coming to that), it should be in 
such form as to make it easily comparable with data about other 
vehicles, both of the same manufacture and others. The Prospectus 
should be available free in showrooms, and by mail for at most the cost 
of postage from the manufacturers and an agency of government. They 
should be so designed that a car shopper can gather a Prospectus from 
each manufacturer, put them tog~ther on the same table, and find data 
about the same thing on the same page of each. 
I. WHAT THE PROSPECTUS SHOULD CONTAIN 
A. Mechanical Specifications and Performance Data 
. What should this Prospectus contain? Some things are easy. First, 
1! should contain the measurable physical and mechanical specifica-
tions of the car. That is so easy to do that it's already done by each 
* Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A. 1956, Amherst College; LL.B. 1959, Harvard University. --b I. An alternative scheme would have all the information gathered in one prospectus. But the 
ulk of information involved, often about alternatives of no real interest to the particular buyer, 
lllakes that move ostentatiously unattractive, at least on first shuddering contemplation. 
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manufacturer, though generally model by model and at levels of com-
pleteness varying from the usual back-page box on the "ear-in-the-
meadow" brochure to Ford's send-for-it-specially big fat book. Consu-
mer Reports does it pretty nicely for some proportion of all cars. All 
that would be necessary to effect this proposed extension would be to 
pick and standardize the categories and vocabulary of comparison. If 
the Securities and Exchange Commission can try that for financial 
statements (a harder job, by the way),2 our own little "Automotive Mar-
keting Board" (God protect us, I'm pushing another agency) can do it 
for the physical specs. The information is essentially free; it's a "by-
product" of the manufacturing process which is presently thrown away, 
at least so far as consumers are concerned.3 But to what may be a large 
number of consumers more engine-smart than me and my friends, such 
information could be of critical interest. 
Then, of course, there should be performance characteristics. 
That's harder. A car is what it is. But it is also what it does, and it does 
so many different things that you can't specify its dynamic reality over 
the whole spectrum of potential possibility. It stops (or doesn't) on dry 
pavement and wet, from 60 mph and from 10, with twenty miles on the 
brakes and with twenty thousand. It corners at various speeds, tucks in 
at some speeds and out at others, and at still others goes straight 
through the guard rails. With you in the car it zaps; with you, your 
kids, and your fat inlaws along, it may yaw and wiggle. All you can do 
is choose some probabilities out of the welter of infinite possibility and 
put tested numbers on those. "Fully loaded", "pulling a trailer", and 
"just the driver" hardly describe all the states of being and becoming, 
even of a car; and while extrapolating and interpolating may be hazard-
ous, it can't be better to know nothing.4 If getting this information and 
standardizing its presentation were difficult and expensive, one might 
justly howl. But it isn't, so one can't.5 
2. Observe the bulk and complexity of Regulation S-X, governing financial accounting under 
the various securities acts, 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 9 68,501 et. seq. 
3. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCfiON--THEORY IN USE 
308-10 (1969) on joint products with common costs. 
4. That is not quite true. There is always the "Theory of the Second Best" which in broadest 
form " ... takes the position that if some of the conditions needed for optimal resource allocation 
are not being met, one cannot show that meeting the other conditions will be a good thing in terms 
of resource allocation." G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 86 (1970). 
That means that an action taken in the right direction is not necessarily the right action to 
take. For instance, one does not improve his wealth position in swimming from a barren riverbank 
toward a lush one unless one makes it all the way across. Thus, strictly speaking, it could be better 
to know nothing; it just doesn't seem very likely in this instance. 
5. The manufacturers not only do a great deal of product-testing already, they are set up to do 
a great deal more. Competitors can therefore easily test each other's cars, as well as their own, just 
to keep each other honest. And if Consumer Reports can afford to spot-check cars, the United 
States government can manage it too. See text at note 15, infra. 
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B. The "Contract" as a Purchased "Product" 
So now we've got some cheap and useful information on the car as 
a mechanical thing. But it isn't just a car you buy when you trade 
money and promises to a smiling dealer; it's (not surprisingly) a deal 
that you buy. That little old piece of paper that goes along with the 
chunk of steel and technology, the "contract" (as it's laughingly la-
belled), is another purchased product. In fact, if one defines a "pro-
duct" as "an immutable already-made object" and a "contract" as 
"something created by both the parties", the piece of paper is more a 
"product" than the car itself, for at least the latter has options.6 You 
can, within limits, negotiate the presented reality of the car ("ok, roof 
frescoes instead of disc brakes"), but if you try to modify any clause in 
~he contract, you have your choice in seller response between giggling 
lllcredulity and icy hostility. Well, if it's a product you're buying when 
you "buy" the contract, why not have those "specifications" disclosed 
too -- again in understandable and comparable form. 
A typical contract might say: 
It is expressly agreed that there are no warranties, express or im-
plied, made by either the dealer or the manufacturer on the motor 
vehicle, chassis, or parts furnished hereunder except as follows. 
The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle (including origi-
nal equipment placed thereon by the manufacturer except tires), 
chassis or parts manufactured by it to be free from defects in mater-
ial or workmanship under normal use and service. Its obligation 
under this warranty being limited to making good at its factory any 
part or parts thereof which shall, within one (1) year after delivery of 
such vehicle to the original purchaser or before such vehicle has been · 
driven 12,000 miles, whichever event shall first occur, be returned to 
it with transportation charges prepaid and which its examination 
shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective; this 
warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or 
implied, including the implied warranties of merchantability and fit-
ness for a particular purpose and all other obligations or liabilities 
. 7 on tts part. 
--tne 6: S.ee Leff, Contract As Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970) for a more extended develop-
nt of these ideas. 
N 1\ The quoted disclaimer is based on the famous one in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 rn~ · 58,367, 161 A.2d 69, 74 (1960). It would, by the way, satisfy, at least in form, the require-
nts of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-316 on disclaimers of warranty. 
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Would it be so awful if the booklet said: 
If you get problems with the car, for 12,000 miles or one year we'II 
supply new parts and corkscrew some grudging labor out of your 
dealer. But we'll decide if it's necessary. And if the car cracks up 
and you get maimed or killed, we're still only responsible for the 
parts and the labor; don't expect to recover from us for property 
damage or personal injuries. We suggest you insure yourself, because 
we sure aren't going to insure you. 
Of course, put that way it does look a little nasty. But if that is the 
way it is,8 and if actually writing down the actual nastiness is too horri-
fying for the vice-president in charge of sales, he can get the actuality 
changed rather than the language. He might, for instance, suggest as a 
competitive device changing things so that his company does insure 
you, if only for a year and for a special extra premium. And it would 
not hurt if the Prospectus demystified a few other "mechanical" aspects 
of this contract-product. For instance: 
You know that bit about "repossession" in the contract? Well, that 
means that if you miss a payment we can take back the car and re-
seii it, and if we do the chances are that you'II end up without the 
car, without the money you already paid us, and maybe you'Il actual-
ly still owe us some. 
C. Pedigree and Track Record 
Thus far, our proposed Prospectus has carried current information 
about the actual car-and-deal being bought. A trickier question involves 
the relevance of the past. To pick a problem hardly at random, what of 
defects in, and callbacks of, previous years' models? After all, you're 
buying the current Tyrannosaurus, not last year's. What if all of the 
earlier model had to be recalled to put the brake pedal into communi-
cation with the fluid and shoes? Does that have any bearing on this 
year's model, in the making of which that particular jolly oversight was 
not indulged? 
The question is not, despite my tone, a simple one. It would seem 
that you could learn what kind of outfit a company is by seeing a 
longer-term pattern; if Company A for the past five years had had call-
backs of many more cars with much more serious faults than Company 
B, it is a natural inference that Company A is a "sloppier company" 
than B. Certainly the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) seems to 
8. With respect to personal injuries, any such language would by now most likely be insuffi · 
cient to preclude liability in the majority of jurisdictons. See W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF 
TORTS 656-658 (4th ed . 1971). When that is the case, of course, it too ought accurately to be des· 
cribed. 
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think that a company's last five years' earnings are of justified interest 
to a securities buyer.9 
The trouble is, the idea that you can tell about this year by study-
ing the past, no matter how logical it seems, may be twaddle. I have 
very intelligent colleagues who tell me that reading five-year financials 
to descry a "trend" is really concealed "chartism", the astrology of 
financial analysis.10 Admittedly, a ballplayer who has hit .220 for five 
seasons is less likely in the sixth suddenly to learn about curve balls; 
and whatever that tells me about baseball and learning processess 
carries over, some, into business. 
But there may even be an inverse relationship between a naughty 
past and a problematic present. The accumulation of prior failures may 
eventually stimulate remedial action. 220 hitters eventually get fired. 
The question is, even assuming that a company with a higher call-back 
t?tal was less reliable during that period, is it still so today? My inclina-
tion would be to include prior call -back information insofar as that 
data would act as a sanction against loose quality control, but such a 
sanction may work by fostering irrational factual conclusions, and that 
makes me exceedingly nervous. 
D. Sticker Price and Terms 
What else should go into the Prospectus? Certainly the sticker 
price of every car and every option. That would help a lot to cope when 
faced with the common salesman pitch : "You think that's too high? 
You think you can't afford $4600? Tell you what I'm gonna do. I'm 
going to throw in laser-beam headlights and a spring-gun for your glove 
compartment (our 'aggression -- defense package') and take out the 
~lectrical ego booster, and all for the same price." With the sticker 
Information one would at least have a prayer of figuring out if you were 
gaining or losing ground. (Of course, you'd know a lot more if you also 
got the dealer's cost for each item, but I see no present reason to give 
the sellers a corporate coronary by suggesting that.) 
--p 9. See Item 6 (Summary of Earnings) of Form S-1, the usual form governing the content of 
rospectuses distributed pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. 
(S 10. q: Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21(5) FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 55 
lielpt.-Oct. 1965), reprinted in V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 
2 0972). 
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E. Other Things 
I suppose I could imagine other cheap and relevant information 
for this kind of Prospectus: 1 but it seems to me unnecessary to work out 
further details now. What does seem to me to be critically important to 
recognize from the beginning is that more information does not neces-
sarily mean a better aggregate message. The danger in mandating a 
new communications medium is that at any given moment it looks as if 
every information addition to be carried on that channel has a nearly-
nil marginal cose 2 But, in fact, too much information on a wavelength 
causes static. The new messages not only fail to get through, but they 
garble the intelligible and relevant messages already there; and one of 
the normal results of sensory overload in a commercial context is im-
1 b 
. 13 pu se uymg. 
Thus it would seem wise to be chary of too much. Specifically, one 
should stick to the car as a car and play down (by exclusion) things like 
emotional puffery (which by its nature is not set up for comparability 
anyway) and data about matters like the social, moral and political 
views of the manufacturers. Arguments in the form of."Don't buy those 
commie carrots" aren't particularly attractive anyway.
14 
II. THE PROSPECTUS PRICE TAG; OR, WHAT PRICE KNOW-
LEDGE? 
Much of the beauty of this proposed auto Prospectus requirement 
lies in its cheapness and cost-effectiveness. The expense of information 
is a function of the cost of getting it, the cost of rendering it communi-
cable, the cost of disseminating it, and the cost of metering its accuracy. 
In this case, most of the information will already exist, and will usually 
already be in communicable and easily comparable form . As I said 
earlier, the "messages" are cheap because they have for the most part 
already arisen as "by-products" of the manufacturing and distribution 
process. 
As for printing cost, given all the informationless color gravure car 
buyers already get, it's hard to weep over requiring a cheaper booklet to 
sell a large-ticket item like a car. But much more important, the media 
11. One of my students has indeed explored the question of includable information in greater 
detail. G. Neigher, Automobile Merchandizing: Prospects For a Prospectus (1971). A copy of his 
unpublished paper is in my possession. 
12. See text at note I 5, infra. 
13. See BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE FOUNDATIONS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (J. Cohen 
ed. 1972); and PERSPECTIVES IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (H. Kassarjian & T. Robertson 
eds. 1968) for collections of recent essays devoted to the complexity of consumer choice, especially 
its tendency not to be improved as a sole function of information bulk. Cf note 4, supra. 
14. See. e.g .. Hampden-Turner, A Proposal For Political Marketing , I YALE REV. OF L. & 
SOC. ACTION 93 (1970) for a typical suggestion that product-purchase decisions take account of 
the morals of the makers. 
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channels have already been bought. Having established at great 
expense all those selling showrooms and already arranged to fill them 
with "literature", the per unit marginal cost of distributing additional 
or different information is close to nil. And since, by this distribution 
technique, the information goes only to those interested in it, it is even 
better as a cost-benefit matter: this is not like an abortion service ad-
vertised in The Diocesan Weekly, or even in Reader's Digest; this goes 
right into Women's Freedom Now. In brief, it's getting the right chan-
nel that costs the most, but once you've bought it, it is very efficient to 
fill the pipe. 
The administration could also be very, very cheap. Our Automo-
tive Marketing Board could be a little teeny agency, having only to set 
standards of comparability of language and breadth of subject inclu-
siveness. After all, it's not like the SEC prospectus people trying to cope 
with every "public" corporation. There are, after all, a maximum of 
what-- a score of major auto manufacturers worldwide? And, the accu-
racy of the data furnished is easy to monitor. The agency might do spot 
checks (the information is pretty objective and the tests replicatable) 
~nd so could independent consumers and consumer groups. And most 
Important, so could and would competitors. 
. For once the selling is done on comparative information, everyone 
Is going to try to make sure no one else is fibbing, and in this case 
e~eryone has the wherewithal to try. Just make the penalty for falsity 
htg and economic --say, $1,000,000 per error and the duty to put a cor-
rective label on the prospectus -- and people will be careful. Well-
heeled enemies are watching, and they watch hard . 
III. IS THIS TRIP NECESSARY? 
Let us then say that this auto prospectus is a feasible proposition, 
mechanically easy and relatively cheap. Still, why do it? After all, we do 
hav~ a lot of ugly experience on what happens when the government 
d~ctdes to coerce people to efficiency and/or virtue. Why should it be 
dtfferent in this case? 15 
--15. At this point, it might as well be confessed that something similar to the Prospectus (and 
not really ugly at all) already exists for airplanes. By Federal Regulation, every private plane must 
cyme equtpped with a little manual filled with details as to both the physical characteristiCs of the 
fane ~~d proper operatingfrocedures. See 14 C.F.R. !\ 23, pts. 18-23 0972). The pilot is expected (? famthartze him or herse l with such information before flying the plane. 14 C.F.R. § 91.S(b)(l) 
th9?2l. While the obstensible purpose of requiring these manuals is to insure that airplanes. and 
s etr .Passengers, return to earth in substantially the same condition as when they took off, pro-
le~tt.ve purchasers of aircraft are well advised to consult the manuals for various makes before 
ti~Ctdtng which one to buy. Not only do the manuals contain information relevant to the buyer, 
ey also demonstate the feasibility of their contents being regulated by a governmental agency. 
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As Nader knows (presumably God too), one of the critical pressure 
points for optimizing the distribution of goods is information. If 
information is defective, the "market" will be too, even if people can 
and do act freely and rationally in "buying", and this is true whether 
the "product" is a washing machine or a president. If the world were 
gracious enough to accord with even elegant theories about it, the idea 
of having the government coerce better information would be wholly 
gratuitous and sublimely insane. 
For THE THEORY says that everyone should always be getting 
about what he wants (within the constraints of his wherewithal). THE 
MARKET (so the argument goes) will handle it, by facilitating not only 
the exchange of goods, but the exchange of information too. In this 
market, as in the political "market", everyone "votes": but the econo-
mic voting is with an almost infinitely divisible medium -- money -- that 
facilitates the expression not merely of preferences, but the intensity of 
those preferences. If one can make safe goods as cheaply as dangerous 
ones, one will capture the market by offering more utility for the same 
outlay. If people will pay extra for safety, they will be serviced. The 
mechanism is competition: if oaf-like X, a clumsy sort, won't respond 
to his potential customers' desires for safety and quality, then clever Y 
will make clear that he will, thereby taking X's customers away and 
putting X (justly) out of business. 
But even if X doesn't go out of business, that's all right too. He 
may not, after all, be such a clod. His customers may prefer chrome to 
safety, sexual innuendo to durability. That's not just all right, as THE 
THEORY has it, that's superkeen. For at the wrist-bone of the whole 
invisible-hand conception is the ethical belief that a man is entitled to 
get from it whatever it is he wants, be it ("objectively") a pinch or a 
tickle. The idea is that if everyone's individual desires are satisfied, the 
result will be the highest valued use of all of the assets of the entire 
The Federal Aviation Agency requires aircraft manufacturers to include in their "Airplane 
Flight Manuals", among other things, the following information; airspeed limitations (i.e. , how 
fast the plane can be flown before it will part company with its wings), takeoff weight limitati~ns 
(including temperature and altitude factors) and the methods used by the manufacturer in obtam· 
ing such information , climb and landing configurations and performance figures, proper opera-
ting procedures, explanations of "significant or unusual flight or ground handling characteristics" 
(one might hesitate to think what that could involve), and the location of the plane's center of g:a· 
vity (so that it can be properly balanced when loaded). Certain emergency procedures are also tn· 
eluded in the manuals, such as how to restart turbine engines in flight, and, one might suppose, 
how to affix a spare propeller at 15,000 feet. Airplanes are even req_~ired to provide a space, acces· 
sible to the pilot, in whtch the manual can be stowed. 42 C.F.R. §9 23 (pts. 18-23), 23.1581 · 89 
(1972). 
All of the required information can be neatly tucked into a surprisingly compact booklet 
(available from dealers and also from rental agencies, who prefer that renters bring their planes 
back as intact as possible). Aircraft manufacturers like to see people with copies of these booklets 
because they make for safer flying, and also because the manufacturers could conceivably be held 
civilly liable for failure to warn users of the airplane ade9uately as to its potential hazards. See 
L.S. KREINDLER. AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, pt. 1, § 7.01, 7.02(3), and 7.02(4) (1972). 
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community. That's known as "Pareto optimality",16 and for many eco-
nomists that's a situation right up there with God and country, and 
considerably ahead of Yale. · 
But information, of course, is not a free good. Nothing is. Someone 
will have to pay to produce and distribute it, and no one is crazy 
enough to pay for perfection in that or any other product. That still 
does not mean the market mechanism could not, in theory, cope with 
information production problems. If you make a car that goes from 
0-60 in eight seconds and back again in four (in both cases without 
killing the driver), lasts seventeen years, produces a pretty fair orgasm 
(wh~ther you have a passenger or not), includes in its warranty total 
protection against all the small disappointments of life, keeps you safe 
In head-ons with cement trucks, and costs about as much as a steam 
iron, you are competitively impelled to get the word across. You are 
even impelled, if necessary, to bad-mouth your competitor's 8-cylinder 
feh. 
But the fact that information can be seen as a market commodity 
~lso implies that it is subject, like any other, to market failure.17 And 
In?eed, there are reasons why the supply of information is not opti-
nuzed, even in a market unconstrained by regulation. First of all, ones 
competitive product advantage is rarely as mouth-watering as the one 
described above. The discriminations you will have to make and then 
convey are likely to be demanding of far subtler selling speech. This is 
e~pecially so because the nice things about a product tend to be contra-
dictory: great heavy lunkers of sheet steel off of which large meteorites 
bounce do not go so easily from 0 to 60; and if they do, they get about 
~o miles per gallon. Thus, to advertise an advantage is frequently to 
give screaming currency to a disadvantage.18 And if your actual advan-
tages (and disadvantages) are slight (and that is likely, for there are 
good technological reasons why the gap between competitive products 
tends to be undramatic), it is hard to get any impact for them. So it's 0 
to 60 in 10 seconds rather than 12. So your warranty covers rubber ---221(~9 See, e.g., Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization , 47 AMER. ECON. REV. 
57). aJk See. e.g., Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958), reprinted in, 
DINGS IN MICROECONOMICS 457 (W. Breit & H. Hochman eds. 1968). 
cl 18. This is particularly dramatic when there is one body of information about a good without 
tl ose substitutes which is incandescently unpleasant to all producers thereof, e.g., the cunning lit · 
SD~xtra costs of cigarette smoking. SeeR. WINTER, JR., THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE VER-
THE CONSUMER 12-13 (1972). 
on The obverse situation involves information which benefits one's competitors as much as 
cr eself. It is hard to get a property interest in information. Thus one is insufficiently motivated to 
sea~ "public goods" at one's own expense if everyone gets the whole benefit of it along with you. 
st:en · ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, op. ci!. sup!'a. note~· at 164-165 •. 251 -53. It is arguable, .for. i.n-
in ce, that there would be more safe-dnving mformat10n produced tf there were only one habthty 
surer. 
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parts as well as power trains. So what? -- especially if the extra goodies 
cost extra. 
Then there is the cost-of-learning problem.19 If one buys an auto-
mobile whose steering wheel is given to casual driver-evisceration, one 
will learn. "I'm not going to buy that model again," say you, trying 
neatly to refold and repack the last 17 feet of disheveled intestine. "If 
those guys at Pterodactyl Motors aren't going to level with me, that's 
the last time they see any of my money." Well, I suppose so, but that's 
a pretty expensive bit of information to shove into your personal com-
puter for future ref~rence. And though there are mechanisms beside 
the market (warranty and tort law, for instance) which theoretically 
should change the ultimate nesting place of that little information cost, 
they have their own complexities, costs, and risks?0 
In addition, there are the time-lag and "research" problems. As a 
long-run competitive device, lying is most likely a bad idea. But not all 
competition has as its most significant span any particularly long run. 
The word that Hymie spits in his pickles might do in Hymie in favor of 
Moe, even if Moe is actually the one who does the spitting and the ly-
ing. More than that, even if Moe spits but doesn't lie, how is Hymie to 
get at Moe's barrel to know? Moe has an interest in keeping Hymie 
from knowing that particular bacillus count. Fraud doth often prosper, 
and over a long enough time-span to justify the existence of fraud law. 
But most important, Moe has a strong interest in preventing 
Hymie from coming up with a way to present his information in com-
parable form. When it comes to commerce, it is mostly the symbols we 
manipulate, not the things themselves. The things are eventually 
shipped out and variously transferred, but the deals are mostly over the 
labels. Those labels, however, aren't worth a damn unless one can com-
pare their messages. A badly situated seller has no interest in making 
telling comparisons easy for his competitors; and it's not easy for his 
competitors (who are, after all, each other's competitors too, and who 
in addition have anti-trust laws to sweat about) to agree and combine 
on an informational matrix that they can impose on him. That is, what , 
one needs is a stabilized comparable vocabulary, and even a reasonably 
competitive market may not be able to supply it. Even in the absence of 
"monopoly" it may be. more efficient to allow the government, as grand 
lexiocographer, to supply the vocabulary of comparison and impose is 
on the market.21 Indeed, the most unambiguously successful "consumer 
19. Cf R. WINTER, JR., op cit. supra. note 18, at 12. 
20. See G. CALABRESI, op. cit. supra. note 4, passim. 
21. Let m. e emphasize here that I am not justifying this proposed governmental incursion int_o 
information marketing on the ground that the auto companies form a "shared monopoly" or "oh-
gopoly." It can be argued that since monopolists tend to res!rict production of goods, and 
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protection" job ever done by government was its mandatory standardi-
zation, from a very early period, of. labels for weights, measures and 
quantities; it is , after all, very tempting as a short-run competitive 
device to sell eleven -ounce "pounds". 
IV. PROSPECTUS PERSPECTIVE 
Now, there are at least two things that should not be adduced from 
the above. The first is the fantasy (as bizarre as the perfect-market one) 
that the market doesn't work at all; either in general, or specifically 
with respect to information. Without my wanting to get into a scream-
ing match with anyone, I suggest that it works pretty well, especially 
considering the alternatives. The second unwarranted belief is that 
since it works pretty well, it has to work worse if the government med-
dles with it. It frequently turns out this way, but sometimes it doesn't. 
After all, the market imperfecting mechanisms described above are so 
common in practical economic thought that they all even have pet 
names, like "externality", "free-rider", "public goods under-invest-
ment", and "hold-out" Y What I'm asking is this: If, as I suspect the 
case is here, the costs of all shapes of government intervention -- direct, 
?ureaucratic, political, and spiritual -- are less than the value of repair-
tng the market mechanism, then why not make the necessary repairs? 
For it might even work. -- Not to make cars, or the process of 
shopping for them, "perfect" (whatever that might mean), but at a very 
low cost (economic, psychic, and political) to make it very much more 
nearly perfect in getting people what they want. This will not stop them 
from wanting what you or I or Ralph Nader think they ought not to 
want, but that really isn't so terrible. For a government to try to design 
high-quality information is much cheaper than its trying to design high-
quality goods,and much better than its trying to design high-quality 
people. 
int:ormation is a good, oligopolists wil l also tend to restrict production of goods. including 
Information, and that this suboptimal production requires governmental repair. The trouble with 
the argument is (a) monopolists don't always restrict production in order to maximize; (b) 
ohgopol ists are not monopolists. Thus we have really no idea what their inform ation-production 
I u net ion is . 
More important, however, I do not rely on any oligopoly theory to justify this lexicographic 
governmental role because I think it is as much needed in competitive industries as in concentra-
ted ones. Indeed it can be argued that it is more needed the less concentrated the industry. A few 
firm s would seem to have less trouble, i.e., lower transaction costs, than many firms in reaching a 
standardized linguistic product. because of their greater ease of collusion, and of their greater 
probability of each guessing what each of the others would guess. See A. RAPOPORT, FIGHTS, 
GAMES, AND DEBATES 213-25 (1960). One might, in fact, fairly describe my proposal as a sug-
gestion that the government create and coordinate a limited cartel in the production of certain 
standardized commercial language. But then again, isn't the creation and coordination of cartels 
~hat regulatory agencies are all and always about? See, e.g .. Coase, The Federal Communications 
~on, 21. LAW & ECON. I (1959). 
22. See Bator, op. cit. supra. note 14. 
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The literature of privacy was born in an 1890 Harvard Law 
Review article by Warren and Brandeis. 1 For three-quarters of a 
century it led a modest existence, characterized by a focus on the legal 
status of the evolving tort of invasion of privacy.2 In the middle 1960's, 
however, the production of privacy literature entered a take-off stage. 
Fuelled by concern for the potential uses of computer telhnology and a 
dramatic, if not apocalyptic, awareness of the approaching Orwellian 
deadline, the new generation of privacy writers took aim on all manner 
of privacy intrusions, from wiretaps to census forms, lie detectors to 
computer data banks, junk mail to credit investigations. Much of the 
writing was marked more by an unsystematic and heated concern with 
the various manifestations of the "assault on privacy" than by dispas-
sionate analysis of the complex public policy problems involved in 
shaping institutions to protect privacy.4 Despite the literary clanging of 
alarms, the only federal legislation to emerge with the specific purpose 
of protecting privacy has been the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).5 
Dissatisfied with the rather cosmic style of the new privacy literature 
and hoping that a systematic empirical analysis of one area of the 
assault on privacy would yield workable leads for privacy protection 
legislation, the author approached the American Bar Foundation ·with 
a proposal to study the personal information market in Chicago, in 
order to evaluate the impact of the FCRA. A small grant was arranged 
to cover the costs of information gathering.6 --* A.B .. Brandeis University, 1966; 
M.A., Washington University, 1967; 
J.D., Ul!lverilly Qf Chicago, 1973. 
I. Th e Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
2. See, e.g .. Prosser, Privacy. 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
Fn 3. See, e.g., V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND 
"EEDOM (1967); and A. MILLER. THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971). 
AN 4. But sec the highly specific essays collected by Stanton Wheeler in ON RECORD: FILES 
I D DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE (1969). Professor Westin's forthcoming DATA BANKS 
N A FREE SOCIETY promises to add a new scientific dimension to privacy literature. 
~ S. Title VI of Pub. L. 91 -508; 84 Stat. 1127; Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970); [Hereinafter 
re erred to as the FCRA]. 
th 6. The analyses, conclusions, and opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of 
the ~oundation, its officers, directors or others associated with its work. A description of the Au-
or s methodology and approach in researching this project may be found in Appendix Ten. 
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The personal information market may be defined as an area of the 
private sector of the economy within which financial, public record, and 
reputational information about identifiable individuals is gathered and 
disseminated on a regular basis for purposes of commercially-related 
decision-making. The market includes credit bureaus, insurance inspec-
tion bureaus, insurance claims investigators, detective agencies, execu-
tive search organizations,7 mail list brokers,8 income tax preparation 
firms,9 intercompany data banks used by insurance companies,10 and 
perhaps others.11 The primary users of the personal information provided 
by these agencies are insurance companies, retailers, financial institu-
tions (including finance companies and small loan companies), 
employers, landlords, and government agencies. Many of these entities 
were consulted during the course of the study, but because the FCRA 
was directed primarily at credit bureaus and inspection bureaus, these 
were the primary subjects of study in this article. 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act went into effect in April, 1971. In 
essence, it provides that when a consumer is denied credit, insurance, 
or employment in whole or in part because of information in a consu-
mer report, the user of the consumer report must inform the consumer 
of this fact, and must provide the consumer with the name and address 
of the consumer reporting agency which furnished the report. The con-
sumer (whether or not adverse action was taken against him) has the 
right to obtain disclosure of the substance of the information in the 
reporting agency's file. If he takes issue with the information, the 
agency must reinvestigate and make any indicated changes. There are 
other aspects to the FCRA dealing with permissible purposes ofreports, 
investigative consumer reports, obsolete information, and confidential-
ity. These will be introduced at a later point. Two definitions are of 
particular importance: 
The term "consumer reporting agency" means any person which, 
for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly 
7. E.g. , Heidrick & Struggles, profiled in Appendix One. 
B. Direct mail list brokers have lists which may include information on the publications a.n 
individual reads, the charities to which he contributes, candidates he supports financially , and h1s 
stand on political issues. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, DOLLAR POLITICS 5 (1971). See 
Comment, Commercial Information Brokers, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 203,212 
(1972). 
9. The FTC alleged in 1971 that data obtained for tax returns was given by H & R Block to a 
wholly-owned subsidiary which compiled mailing lists. Comment, Commercial Information Bro· 
kers, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 203,216 (1972). 
10. E.g., the Medical Information Bureau, described below in text at note 138. . 
II. E.g., two organizations headquartered in the Chicago area, The American Security Counctl 
and the Church League of America, are reported to maintain files on "peaceniks, draft-card burn· 
ers, pseudo-intellectuals," and other troublesome individuals, which are allegedly at the service of 
corporate hiring executives. AFL-CIO MARITIME TRADES DEPT., CREDIT BUREAUS: A 
PRIVATE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK 33-34 (1971). Both organizations deny that they are 
presently engaged in the alleged activities. 
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engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evalua-
ting consumer credit information or other information on consumers 
for the purpose of furnishing consume'r reports to third parties, and 
which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the pur-
pose of preparing or furnishing consumer reportsP 
39 
This leads, in what will be seen to be circular fashion, to the statu-
tory definition of ~·consumer report," which means, 
.. . any written, oral, or other communication of any information 
by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit 
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general repu -
tation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or 
expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose 
of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for (1) 
credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes, or (2) employment purposes, or (3) other pur-
poses authorized under section 604. 13 
In context, section 604 can be read to include the purpose of the govern-
ment in determining the consumer's eligibility for a license or other 
?enefit where the law requires that an applicant's financial responsibil-
Ity or status be considered, and the purpose of anyone with a "legiti-
mate business need" for the information in connection with a business 
transaction involving the consumer. 
A thorough study of the flow of personal information within a single 
community or the nation at large has yet to be made. Even with the 
results of the project here reported, only an educated guess can be 
made as to the amount of consumer reporting taking place in Chicago 
(where most of the research for this project was conducted). The· au-
thor's best estimate of the number of files kept by the approximately 20 
cr~dit bureaus serving the 6. 7 million population of the Chicago, Illi-
~Ois/Northwestern Indiana Urbanized Area is 20 million. This does not 
Imply that 20 million individuals are on file in credit bureaus; there is 
obviously much overlap, and the same individual may be covered by 5 
or more credit bureaus.14 Moreover, some of these files go back many --:2· FCRA, supra note 5, § 603(0. 
irn 3· FCRA, supra note 5, § 603(d). The statutory definition also includes three exceptions, not 
POrtant at this point. 
a~4j qbviously some people are more likely to have files in credit bureau~ than others. For ex-
MlNe, In 1970, 49o/o of American families had installment debts outstandmg. G. LATONA , L. 
ca DELL, & J. SCHMIEDESKAMP, 1970 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES, 21. Credit 
fa rds are used by SO% of American families. /d. at 32. Mortgages were held by 58% of all non -
nerrn homeowning families, /d. at 44, and in 1969 approximately So/o of non-farm families bought 
fa;· or used houses for their occupancy, 87% of which incurred mortgages. /d. at 35. All of these 
lap?tlTtes would be represented in the credit bureaus; but to what extent to the various groups over-
. he 6. 7 million population figure is taken from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 CENSUS 
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years, and relate to individuals who no longer live in the area. The 
author estimates the number of credit reports covered by the FCRA, 
sold in 1972 in the same area, to be 7 million. 
As for insurance inspections and employment investigations under-
taken by the inspection bureaus, approximately 700,000 were made in 
1972 in the Chicago, Illinois/Northwestern Indiana Urbanized Area.l 5 It 
must be noted that some of these inspections are relatively abbreviated 
and do not involve street investigations, some are made on commercial 
enterprises rather than individuals, and some individuals are inspected 
more than once during a year because they apply for more than one 
type of insurance. Taking these factors into account, a rough estimate 
of the number of individuals actually investigated in 1972 by insurance 
inspectors in the Chicago area is about 400,000.16 
These figures-- 400,000 individuals investigated and 7 million credit 
bureau reports prepared in a single metropolitan area in a single year --
do not imply very much in themselves about the threat to privacy. 
Because nearly all consumer reports (with some exceptions in the 
personnel reporting area) are initiated by an individual 's application for 
some benefit, it can be assumed that most individuals are at least 
vaguely aware that they are reported on. Whether they are sensitive to 
the nature and quantity of reporting affecting their lives, however, 
remains an open question . Despite the fact that so many Americans are 
profiled, and their records bought and sold, the personal information 
market has barely been touched by researchers. 
This article begins with a description of the market, giving both a 
national overview and a more specific view of the market in the single 
metropolis of Chicago. In a second section, the effectiveness of the 
FCRA is evaluated in terms of the law's ability to cope with seven 
particular abuses which Congress found to be present in the personal 
information market prior to passage of the FCRA. A final section sets 
out and weighs various suggested strategies for reform. 
OF THE POPULATION, (Illinois) 15-33. Area includes parts of Cook, Du Page, Lake and Will 
Counties in Illinois and parts of Lake and Porter Counties in Indiana. 
I 5. This figure is obtained by approximating the number of full-time inspectors working in the 
area (including 20"7o of part-time inspectors), 215. and multiplying by an average of 15 reports a 
day (a conservative figure), 5 days a week, SO weeks a year. 
16. Retail Credit Co., the largest inspection bureau in Chicago and the nation, retains 400,000 
files in Chicago, even though the majority of files are destroyed 13 months after an invest igatiOf!· 
Interview with T. Linnen, Manager-Operations, Retail Credit Co., Chicago, Jan. 20, 1972. Retatl 
Credit Co. a lleged ly reported on 750,000 people in Los Angeles in 1971. Auerbach, Credit Probers, 
Los Angeles Times, Aug. 22, 1972 at I, col. I. Nationally, Retail Credit produced approximately 
40 million reports in 1970. Listing Application A-30695 to New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Mar. 
1, 1971. 
1974] PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET 41 
I. A PROFILE OF THE PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET 
A. DIRECT REPORTING 
The most frequent type of communication to be found in the per-
sonal information market is the so-called direct report, 17 which is also 
referred to as a report of ledger experience. The direct report is exemp-
lified by the response of a retailer when a local banker telephones him 
for information about one of his customers, or when a potential em-
ployer asks a former employer about his experience with a present job 
applicant. The essential element of the direct report is that the person 
giving information has had dealings with the person reported on; there 
is no intermediary. A direct report will rarely be made unless the sub-
ject of the report has initiated matters by seeking a benefit from a 
decision-maker. Indeed, the direct reporter is usually identified for the 
decision-maker by the subject himself. . 
For the most part, direct reporting is handled in an informal man-
~er, although where large numbers of reports are involved, special 
Internal systems may be established.18 Most direct inquiries are made by 
telephone. Identification procedures are uneven, with the majority of 
direct reporters apparently willing to respond to any telephone inquiry 
~hich appears on the surface to be legitimate. Records of direct inquir-
Ies and responses are rarely maintained~ 9 
The most frequent use of direct reports appears to be for the pur-
pose of learning whether a customer has an account with a particular 
creditor and if that customer pays his bills on time. A second important 
use is for verification of employmene0 or to obtain a former employer's 
evaluation of a present employment applicant. Among the major users 
of direct reports are credit bureaus (defined and discussed below)/' 
8 
17. Approximately 75o/o of credit grantors use credit bureaus in order to evaluate appli~ations. 
1% make their own direct inquiries . either to supplement the credit bureau report or in place of 
such a report. Credit grantors with larger numbers of applications have a greater tendency to rely 
on dtrect checking in addition to credit bureau reporting. ASSOCIATED CREDIT BUREAUS, 
INC. , ATTITUDES OF LOCAL CREDIT GRANTERS TOWARD ACB MEMBER SERVICES, 
1,3(1971). 
18. E.g., a Chicago appliance discount chain with 20 stores has 8 employees whose full-time 
occupation is to answer the I ,500 to 2,000 direct inquiries received each week. 
R 19. Information supplied by consumer report users supports a point made by Michael Baker in 
H ecord Privacy as a Marginal Problem: Th e Limits of Consciousness and Concem, 4 COLUM. 
U~AN RIGHTS L. REV. 88, 91 (1972): "[R]ecord-keeping is a means for most organizations 
~nd tn some respects goes on in the background of the organization 's daily activities." As such ,. 
aker says, much of the record-keeping which affects individuals goes on in the background of 
soc1al hfe and is of low visibility to the individua ls concerned. 
29. To reduce the amount of time consumed in the verification of employment. centra lized re-
POSitories sometimes exist. See the profile of The Consolidated Employee Index in Appendix One . 
. 21. One respondent, a medium-sized womens wear shop in Chicago which handles about 20 
dl~ect inquiries per month, est imates the sources of inquiry to be: credit bureaus, 25%; small re-
~llers, 25%; fin ance companies, SO%. Other respondents state that they receive many inquiries 
· om banks, as well. 
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which often need to up-date information for supplementation of what is 
already on file. In fact, the primary source of credit bureau information 
can be said to be direct reports, since most subscribers to credit bureaus 
are contractually bound to transmit their credit accounts periodically to 
the bureau. 
Until the FCRA, the content of a direct report was limited only by 
the sense of propriety of the reporter. The FCRA, however, has had an 
indirect impact upon content. The term "consumer report" was defined 
in the FCRA to exclude "any report containing information solely as to 
transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person 
making the report." "This exception," advises the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) staff, "was designed to cover so-called trade experi-
ence furnished by a creditor to other creditors of the consumer. It also 
covers verification of past and present employers, salary, and other 
items included by the consumer on his application for credit." 22 
To report hearsay information regularly would bring the direct 
reporter under the definition of a consumer reporting agency. This 
would be undesirable for one not in the full-time business of consumer 
reporting,23 and, consequently, most companies which give direct reports 
on request are now taking care to limit the information they furnish. 
It is difficult to believe that a direct reporter would be prosecuted 
for failing to comply with the FCRA. The informal nature of this kind 
of information exchange does not leave enough tracks 24 for the FTC or 
an injured consumer to build the evidence necessary to prove that the 
direct reporter "regularly engages" in the practice of assembling or 
evaluating information on consumers "for the purpose of furnishing 
consumer reports to third parties." 25 
22. 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDES 11,312 at 59,804. [Hereinafter, CCH CCG.] 
23. The consequences of being classified as a consumer reporting agency include: being permit-
ted to provide consumer reports only under specified circumstances; having to disclose reports and 
other file data to any file subject; having to re-investigate in case of disputed information; civil 
liability for willful or negligent noncompliance with the FCRA; and criminal sanctions for unau-
thorized disclosures of information. 
24. Under FCRA, supra note 5, § 615(b), when consumer credit is denied or the charge is in-
creased because of information about the consumer obtained in a direct report. the user of the 
report shall. upon written request by the consumer, disclose the nature of the information to the 
consumer. The source of the information need not be disclosed. Note also that this requirement of 
disclosure, minimal as it is, does not apply to direct reports made for insurance, rental, or employ-
ment purposes. 
25. FCRA. supra note 5, § 603(f). The FCRA aside, a consumer who is wrongfully damaged by 
a direct report may sue the direct reporter for libel, but because of the conditional privilege which 
exists in most jurisdictions, he would have the difficult task of proving malice to recover. See 
Ullman, Liability of Credit Bureaus After the Fair Credit R eporting Act: The Need f or Further 
Reform, 17 V1LL. L. REV. 44 (1971); Comment, The Future of Common-Law Libel Actions Under 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 21 CATHOLIC U.L. REV . 201 (1971). 
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B. FOUR TYPES OF CREDIT BUREAUS 
The word " credit bureau" is often used imprecisely. Sometimes it is 
confused with "inspection bureau," 26 possibly because the dominant 
inspection bureau bears the name Retail Credit Co., which hints of a 
credit bureau?7 Credit bureaus tend to have clients who are involved in 
credit business; inspection bureaus generally work for insurance 
companies. The main area of overlap involves employment reporting, 
although here the two types of consumer reporting agencies may be 
distinguished by their methods of gathering information. Credit be-
reaus generally rely on their files, supplemented by the telephone and 
written correspondence. Inspection bureaus tend to use their files only 
for leads, and build most of their information in personal interviews 
carried out by investigators. This study will characterize four types of 
credit bureaus: those which serve a limited purpose, full-service bu-
reaus, credit agencies, and mercantile agencies. 28 
1. Limited-Purpose Credit Bureaus 
Many credit bureaus began life with a limited purpose. For instance, 
what is now the largest full-service bureau in Chicago began as a 
forma lized exchange of account information by the State Street mer-
chants.29 TRW Credit Data, which is still classifiable as a limited-
purpose operation, may soon qualify as a full -service credit bureau.30 At 
present, the bulk of the information TRW supplies is objective trade 
experience data, turned over to the computer periodically from the 
accounts of TRW's subscribers. However, as the relatively young TRW 
Credit Data firm grows it will probably assemble more kinds of infor-
mation, including public record data, and prepare a greater variety of 
reports, thereby being able to serve a wider clientele. 
A limited-purpose credit bureau is distinguished by the fact that it 
serves only a particular seg~ent of the commercial community, or 
serves many segments with only a relatively limited variety of informa-
tion. 
If TRW Credit Data appears to be approaching the border-line of 
full service, two other credit bureau operations will give a clear idea of 
26. See Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 STAN. L. REV. 550 (1972). 
27. This is not to suggest that Reta il Credit Co. is hiding behind a fa lse name. The company 
began life as a credit bureau in 1899 in Atlanta, Ga. It moved into inspection work for the insur-
ance companies in 1901. Today it is the owner of the largest chain of credit bureaus in the country. 
tncluding both full -service bureaus and credit agencies . In the Matter o Retail Credit Co .. FTC 
Proposed Complaint, 3 CCH TRADE REG . REP. , S 20.140 (Nov. 13, 1972). Note, this complaint 
was later issued formally; 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP., S 20,268 (Mar. 9, 1973). 
28. General sources on credit bureaus include : ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN 
AMERICAN LIFE. ch . 5 (S. Wheeler, ed ., 1969); M. WARNER & M. STONE. THE DATA 
BANK SOCIETY (1970); J. SHARP, CREDIT REPORTING AND PRIVACY (1970). 
29. See Appendix One for profile of the Credit Information Corporation of Chicago. 
30. For profile of TRW Credit Data see Appendix One. 
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what is meant by limited purpose. The Chicago Lenders Exchange31 
serves only the small loan companies of the Chicago area, providing 
them little more than a listing of other small loan companies with loans 
outstanding to a particular borrower. The Hooper-Holmes Credit Inde,tl2 
serves a broader public, though its subscribers tend to be national firms 
such as oil companies with credit card programs. The Hooper-Holmes 
computer contains only what is termed "derogatory" information~3 
mainly records of bad debts, and cannot be used to establish good 
credit. Businesses with large numbers of credit applications from all 
over the country use the Hooper-Holmes Index to screen out bad credit 
risks. Where no information is on file (80 to 85 per cent of the tim~\ 
the subscriber obtains a standard credit report from a local full-service 
credit bureau. Both TRW Credit Data and the Hooper-Holmes Credit 
Index are covered by the FCRA. 
Controversy exists, however, as to whether a lenders' exchange 
should be considered under the statute. Exchanges argue that if an ex-
change only identifies creditors with whom a consumer has outstanding 
accounts and the prospective lender then contacts such creditors direct-
ly for more detailed information, the lenders exchange is not a consu-
mer reporting agency. The FTC staff takes the position that when a 
loan exchange furnishes the names of a consumer's current creditors 
the exchange is making an FCRA consumer report.35 If the staff inter-
pretation is formally accepted by the Commission, the effect will be to 
allow consumers who are denied a loan from a small loan company to 
contact the lenders exchange and learn what is in their file . Since the 
lenders exchanges commonly have a rule that a member must follow up 
on information received from the exchange,36 calling the other loan 
companies listed, the impact of applying the FCRA to lenders ex-
changes can be expected to be minimal. Only in the rare case where a 
consumer is mistakenly listed for outstanding loans and the potential 
lender is too little interested in placing a loan to attempt to verify the 
listing will the FCRA be utilized. 
31. For profile of the Chicago Lenders Exchange see Appendix One. 
32. For profile of the Hooper-Holmes Credit Index , see Appendix One. 
33. "Derogatory" is used to indicate that the data bank carries only negative types of informa-
tion. The information itself is of an objective nature. Whether information is meaningfully deroga-
tory, of course, depends upon the evaluation of the decision-maker. In some credit situations neu-
tral information, such as length of employment, may be weighed against the applicant. On the 
other hand, information that a consumer has recently been through bankruptcy proceedings is 
considered positive by some creditors, because of the guarantee against further bankruptcy for six 
years. 
34. Interview with E. William Carney, Regional Manager, Hooper-Holmes Credit Index, Chica-
go. Jan . 28, 1972. 
35. FTC News Release, June 16, 1972. 
36. Interview (telephone) with R.W. Hahne, President, Chicago Lenders Exchange, Chicago, 
Jan. 26, 1972. 
1974] PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET 45 
2. Full-Service Credit Bureaus 
The full-service credit bureau serves the entire consumer credit com-
munity and provides a wider range of information than the limited -
purpose bureaus. In addition to trade experience data, filed informa-
tion usually includes material culled from public records and newspa-
pers. Reports may include reputational information occasionally, but 
this will normally be obtained by use of the telephone or mail and will 
not entail street investigations. 
Some full-service bureaus have debt collection divisions 37 and "wel-
come wagon" operations38; some publish credit guides and protective 
~ulletins.39 While the schedule of reporting services and prices of a par-
ticular credit bureau may list as many as 14 distinct services,40 credit 
bureau reports generally fall into four fairly well-defined categories: 
a. Consumer credit. The simple "credit report," or "in-
file clearance," contains trade experience information obtained from 
the bureau's subscribers, plus public record information. Besides court 
records and newspaper clippings, some credit. bureaus (and inspection 
?ureaus) include criminal record and arrest record information obtained 
Informally from police sources.41 A "developed" report might also in-
~lude employment verification and a telephone check to assure that all 
Information is up-to-date. 
--43~?- Only two credit bureaus in Chicago have collection departments, but the national figure is 
, . 
0
• Th e Credit Industry, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopo(y, Com· 
ir llt'!e of the Judiciary. U.S. Senate, 90th Con g., 2d Sess. 45 (1968) [henceforth , Hart Hgs.]. For 
RCISive testimony concerning abuses in the credit bureau - debt collection tandem , see Fair eredit 
C~~ort111g, Hearing Before the Subcommittee ,on Consumer Affairs. Committee on Banking and 
rency on H.R. /6340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 303 (1970) [henceforth, Sullivan Hgs.] . 
lh38: Over :JWoof credit grantors. nationally, utilize newcomer services. -ACB, note 17 supra, at 7. 
a e 1~ea of a welcome wagon service seems to be twofold. The neighborly employee of the service 
i~quaints the newcomer with the local merchants and at the same time makes notes on furnish-
68gs, mode of living, and consumer needs, for use by the merchants. N.Y. Times, May 21 , 1969, at 
Cr"b col, 7. As used herein, the term "welcome wagon" refers generally to the type of service des-
~ ed and does not refer to the company of the same name. 
Cod 9· Th~ credit guide is usually an alphabetical listing of consumers in the community. with 
sorned ratings. The protective bulletin lists consumers who have issued worthless checks or who for 
iar e oth~r reason are not deemed credit worthy, or whose alleged personal characteristics or affil-
ar Ions disqualify them from employment. Only one such publication was found in the Chicago 
fo~a, a _credit bulletin of the Credit Bureau of East Chicago, Ind. The FTC is expected to issue a 
M rna! Interpretation of the extent of coverage of these publications under the FCRA. FTC News, 
:r. 8, 1972 and June 16, 1972. 
4 ?· Credit Information Corporation of Chicago. See Appendix One for profile. qua t Typically, criminal and arrest records were obtained from file girls at Chicago police head-
are r ers for $2 - $5. This practice stopped in June, 1972, when the files went on computer; there 
Wi!~ot enough people wandering around any more with access to the information. Interview with 
arre Iarn Dorf, President, Illinois Service Bureau, Nov. 14, 1972. On the propriety of circulating 
1\rr st records, not followed by conviction, see Comment, Discriminatory Hiring Practices Due to 
8a esr R ecords -- Private Rem edies, 17 VILL. L. REV. 110 (1971); Note, Discrimination on the 
sts qfArrest Records, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 470 (1971). 
46 Consumer Journal [Vol. Il:37 
b. Mortgage. The "mortgage report", when prepared 
for the Veterans Administration or the Federal Housing Authority:2 
generally includes information on the potential mortgagor's age, his 
wife and children, residence, employment, assets, references, and litiga-
tion record .43 Some conventional mortgage reports may go into more 
personal areas, such as reputation for marital stability. Mortgage re-
ports are also prepared by credit agencies, especially where larger loans 
are involved. 
c. Tenant. "Tenant" (or "rental") reports, like others, 
can be more or less probing, depending upon the needs and pocketbook 
of the report user. Sometimes a tenant report is nothing more than a 
consumer credit report, sold to a landlord. Often, however, it includes 
information gained from previous landlords. The rental report sold by 
the Credit Information Corporation of Chicago for $6 includes family 
status, employment verification, trade clearances, character investiga-
tions, previous rental history, and court record review.44 
d. Employment. The "employment" (or "personnel") 
report also varies according to the practices of the particular bureau 
and the desires of the particular employer requesting the report. The 
more thorough employment investigations are usually handled by insur-
ance inspection bureaus, personnel reporting bureaus, or detective 
agencies. However, for a minimum of $5, the Chicago Credit Bureau 
offers a report 
designed to furnish information on an individual to determine his 
or her desirability as an employee. It contains previous employment 
records, personal history, character, integrity, credit record, and 
health. 45 
Appendix One provides profiles of many of the full-service credit 
bureaus operating in metropolitan Chicago. The Chicago area (with two 
regional full-service credit bureaus, a competitive limited-purpose 
bureau, and a host of limited-area, full-service credit bureaus speciali-
zing in particular suburbs or areas of the city) has more competition 
than is normal. The national trend of the credit reporting industry is 
toward control by regional computer centers.46 Many small credit 
42. Interview with Ruth Studer, FHA attorney. Chicago, Feb. 17, 1972. . 
43. The Sc hedule of Reporting Services and Prices for the Credit Information Corporation of 
Chicago lists a conventional mortgage report for $8, including family status. employment veriftca· 
tion. trade clearances . verifica tion of resources , and subject in terview. The FHA or VA mortgage 
report contains the same items, plus a court record review, and sell s for $10. 
44. Schedule of Reporting Services and Prices, supplied Nov. 17, 1972. 
45. Schedule of Rates and Services, supplied Jan. I 9, 1972. . 
46. D.E. Rutherford, the pres ident of Retail Credit Co.'s credit bureau affili ates , testified 10 
deposition that the automation or computeriza tion of credit fil es has caused an accelerated rate of 
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bureaus have been selling out to national corporations which can afford 
to computerize, and what was once a ' highly localized industry is be-
ginning to be replaced by a series of national chains owned by large 
corporations and conglomerates. The largest chain, the 114 credit bu-
reaus owned by Retail Credit Co., is three times larger than any other, 
but its growth appears to be temporarily halted by a couple of antitrust 
actions~7 The credit bureaus are served by one trade association, Associ-
ated Credit Bureaus, Inc., which has over 2,000 members.48 
3. Credit Agencies 
The third type of credit bureau, called a credit agency, is distin-
~uished from the first two types by its emphasis on telephone investiga-
tion, rather than reliance on a pre-existing data bank. Several other 
factors also serve to differentiate the credit agency. For example, where 
the reports of other credit bureaus are often made orally or in a "com-
mon language" coded communication, the credit agency's reports tend 
to be written out in narrative form. Where the bulk of reports of the 
limited-purpose and full-service credit bureaus deal with matters of 
consumer credit, many of the reports of credit agencies pertain to busi -
nesses primarily, and to individuals only incidentally. When the credit 
agencies report on individuals, it is usually in relation to transactions 
where relatively large amounts of money are involved, such that the 
credit grantor would not be satisfied with the relatively shallow report 
of a limited-purpose or full-service bureau. 
The major credit agencies in Chicago are Hale-Prietsch, an inde-
pe~dent firm which primarily serves banks and savings and loan insti -
tutions; and Retailers Commercial Agency, which has offices in over 
100 metropolitan areas in the U.S.49 Retailers Commercial Agency_ is a 
Wholly-owned subsidiary of Retai~ Credit Co. 
The FCRA does cover credit agency reports on consumers. 
~rectit bureau acquisitions. A credit reporting firm owning a computerized facility in a large met-
10)0htan area can secure sufficient credit data in a relatively short time on individuals to serve not 
~n ~ credit grantors doing business within that metropolitan area, but also credit grantors doing 
b~slnes~ over a wide geographic region surrounding the computerized fac ility. Fear of the poss i-
t ll(y of competit ion with a regional computer center has led owners of some small credit bureaus 
8° ~ell o_ut before their investment is actually diminished by such competition . Brief for Plaintiff at tii red1t Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., Civ. Act. 70-H-1157 (S.D. Texas, Houston Div .. 1 ed Nov. S. 1971). --47· See text at note 62, infra. 
be~8. It is estimated that only 100-150 credit bureaus, man)' of w_hom are in small towns_. do not 
R. ong to the ACB. Testimony of John L. Spafford, Executive V1ce-Pres1dent, ACB, Fatr Credit 
a e~ortmg, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial institutions, Committee on Banking 
a;' Currency. U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1969) [henceforth, Proxmire Hgs. ]. It should 
offlo be_ noted tha t Retailers Commerdal Agency, a subsidiary of Retail Credit Co. with over 100 
4
ces 111 the U.S., is not a member of the ACB. 
9· For profiles of Hale-Prietsch and Retailers Commercial Agency, see Appendix One. 
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4. M ercantile Agencies 
The m ercantile agency, or commercial credit bureau, is primarily 
engaged in preparing reports on businesses rather than individuals. 
The largest mercantile agency, in Chicago and nationally, is Dun & 
Bradstreet:O Less than one-half of one percent of Dun & Bradstreet's 
reports are prepared on consumers, and these are mostly mortgage 
reports requested by lending institutions. The typical commercial report 
will contain a limited amount of personal information about individu-
al s. and includes identification of the proprietor, partners, or officers of 
a business. plus birth date, marital status, education , work history, 
military service, and public record data. 
The extent to which the FCRA covers commercial reports is open to 
controversy. It is clear from the little legislative history which exists for 
the FCRA that the Jaw was not intended to regulate business reports; ' 
Nonetheless, in one of the few cases decided since the FCRA became 
effective, a court has held that under sec. 605, pertaining to obsolete 
data. Dun & Bradstreet was not allowed to report the 20-year old con-
viction (and subsequent exoneration) of an individual doing business as 
a corporation :2 
The question also arises in regard to independent contractors. The 
advisability of legislating to protect the privacy of individuals reported 
on during the course of a business investigation cannot be determined 
without additional information as to the potential commercial advan-
tages and disadvantages. For example, if a mercantile agency could not 
report all information available on an individual doing business as a 
corporation or an independent contractor, this might disadvantage that 
individual in competition with other businesses for commercial credit. 
C. THE NON-LOCAL MARKET 
In a mobile society where people often change residences, and 
where consumers in one city often desire credit from companies located 
at a distance, it is necessary to have mechanisms for the long-distance 
communication of credit information. There are in fact four major 
routes by which a credit grantor in Chicago may obtain information 
about a consumer who lives now, or formerly lived, in another area: 
1. Direct sales. The credit grantor could establish his own 
direct contact with a credit bureau in the consumer's locale. This is 
somewhat inconvenient, and the credit grantor has to pay a higher rate 
50. For a profile of Dun & Bradstreet , see Appendix One. 
51. S. REP. NO. 91-5 17. 91 st Cong .. 1st Sess. I (1969). See Comment. Th e Fair Credit R eport · 
ing A ct: Are Business Credit R eports R egulated. 1971 DUKE L. J. 1229 (1971). 
52. Anonymous v. Dun & Bradstreet, 40 U.S .L.W. 21 62 (N .Y. Sup. Ct .. N.Y. City, Sept. 28. 
197 1). 
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than would a regular subscriber to the foreign bureau's services. Never-
the less, in 1970, direct sales accounted for about 19 per cent of the $40 
million national non-local credit reporting markee 3 
2. National network. The Chicago credit grantor could 
obtain information through the national networks of such organizations 
as TRW Credit Data, Hooper-Holmes Credit Index, or the Retail 
Credit Co.-Retailers Commercial Agency tandem. These accounted for 
about 30 per cent of the non-local market in 1970.54 
3. Brokerage. The third choice open to the Chicago credit 
grantor would be to request a local full-service credit bureau to obtain 
the information for him. This transaction is usually managed through 
the Interbureau Reporting System of the Associated Credit Bureaus, 
Inc., which accounted for 7 per cent of the non-local market in 1970;5 
This system operates through pre-purchased inter-bureau coupons 
which allow credit bureaus to exchange reports without worry about 
billing procedures or price differentials.56 
4. Sales. Finally, a Chicago credit grantor could purchase a 
report through Credit Bureau Reports , Inc. , a company which sells the 
reports of over 2,000 local credit bureaus for a commission. CBR's 
clients tend to be large credit grantors doing business over a wide area, 
such as oil companies, mail-order houses, and bank charge-card sys-
tems, who do not want to deal with hundreds of local credit bureaus 
having different kinds of reports, different prices, and different billing 
practices.s·, CBR accounted for nearly 39 per cent of the non-local mar-
ket in 1970.58 
Recently, the Associated Credit Bureaus entered the sales field in 
competition with CBR by setting up Credit Services International to sell 
to the same companies. When this occurred , CBR sought to move into 
the interbureau field, announcing that it would provide tickets to the 
bureaus, instead of coupons, · and that these would not have to be pre-
purchased.59 Shortly thereafter, the Justice Department cited the Associ-
ated Credit Bureaus, Inc., for violating a 1933 antitrust consent decree60 
53. Brief for Plain tiff a t 52. note 46 supra. 
54. !d. Retail Credit Co. a nd Retailers Commercial Agency together accounte•;l for about 17o/o. 
ld, 
55. !d. ' 
56. " [I)f a n ACB member bureau in Houston needed a report on a Chicago resident , the choice 
of. which Chicago bureau (CIC or CCB) to go to would rest with the Houston ma nager and ... by 
Ultltzmg the coupon system, the Houston bureau would pay the same amoun t whichever burea u he 
se lected ." Letter to U. CHI. L. REV., from D. Barry Connelly, Director of Public Affairs, ACB , 
Feb. 28, 1972. 
57. Brief for Plaintiff a t 11 , note 46 supra . 
58. ld., at 52. 
59. Telephone interview with Barbara Morris, Office Ma nager, CBR, Chicago, Jan. 26, 1972. 
W
60. See Weitzman, The Fair Credit R eporting A ct and the NCRA Consent Decree, 59 CREDIT 
ORLD 7 (1971). 
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by requiring its members to use the ACB Interbureau Reporting System 
exclusively, under threat of expulsion from the trade association.61 
Meanwhile, Retail Credit Co. , which owns 114 credit bureaus in the 
U.S. and participates in the non-local market through Retailers Com-
mercial Agency, attempted to enter the sales field by creating Credit 
Marketing Services, Inc. The plan was enjoined for a period of three 
years when a U.S. District Court found that Retail Credit Co. planned 
to operate its new subsidiary at an expected Joss until it had forced 
CBR out of the market. The Court also enjoined Retail Credit Co. from 
acquiring additional credit bureaus for a period of S years because, 
"With an organization like CMS available, it defies common sense to 
say that RCC-controlled bureaus will depend on any entity other than 
CMS to reach the non-local credit reporting market." 62 To round out 
the present picture of the non-local market, it must also be mentioned 
that the FTC has published a proposed complaint against the Retail 
Credit Co., alleging in part that Retail Credit Co.'s acquisition of 45 
credit bureaus since January, 1970, has lessened effective competition 
in the non-local market.63 The FTC is seeking a consent decree which 
would result in the divestiture of the acquired credit bureaus.64 
D. INSURANCE INSPECTION BUREAUS 
To speak of "insurance inspection bureaus" is to adopt the nomen-
clature of the industry. Historically, the inspection bureaus grew in 
close alliance with insurance companies, providing the information 
which underwriters deemed necessary for evaluating insurance risks~5 
But as the general business community's need for personal information 
grew, some of the larger inspection bureaus branched into employment 
reporting and other areas of investigation. Retail Credit Co. now has 
nine distinct lines of informational services: life and health insurance 
reporting; fire and casualty insurance reporting; personnel reporting; 
insurance claims investigations; insurance claims adjustments; para-
medical services; credit and commercial reporting; audit, inspection, 
and Joss control; and marketing information service. 66 
It is not always easy to distinguish an informational supermarket 
like Retail Credit Co. from large detective agencies. Retail Credit Co.'s 
61. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 17, 1971, at 3, col. 2. 
62. Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. , v. Retail Credit Co., CCH 1972 TRADE CASES. 9 73-813, 
(S.D. Texas . 197 1). Affirmed, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP., g 74-450 (April 11 , 1973). 
63. In the Matter of Reta il Credit Co. , proposed FTC complaint, supra note 27 . 
64. /d.: see Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14, 1972, at 3, col. 2. 
65. The only work detailing the history of the inspection industry is W.A. FLINN, HISTORY 
O F RET AIL CR EDIT COMPANY, a 1959 Ph .D. dissertation in economics at Ohio State Univer-
si ty. ava il able from Un iversity Microfilm s, Ann Arbor, Michiga n. Flinn 's perspective , highly favor-
able to his subject , does not lead him to consider the company's iml?act on privacy. 
66. RET AIL CREDIT CO. ANNUAL REPORT, 1971 at 8 (1 971). 
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Competitor Index, a confidential internal document, includes analyses 
of how to sell the company's services ~n the face of competition from 
Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc., Wackenhut Corporation, 
and other detective agencies. The main areas of overlap are claims 
investigations and personnel reports. Major points for differentiation 
include: (1) the detective agencies do not engage in insurance inspec-
tions; (2) the inspection bureaus do not engage in surveillance in "mat-
rimonial" casesY(3) inspection bureaus place greater emphasis on the 
creation and use of data banks; and (4) detective agencies are subject to 
much more state regulation than are inspection bureaus.68 
Inspection bureaus may be divided into two categories: the nation-
als and the local independents. The largest national inspection bureaus 
are Retail Credit Co., Hooper-Holmes Bureau, American Service Bu-
reau, National Inspection Bureau (O'Hanlon's Reports), and Service 
Review. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S. is the only 
insurance company with a fully internal inspection operation. Most 
insurance companies believe that they will be better served if inspectors 
are not employed directly by the insurance company. In part, this is 
because the independent inspector can be more objective in his reports, 
and in part, it is because of history. Individual insurance companies did 
not generate enough inspection business to allow them to retain a 
broad network of inspectors,69 and by the time most insurance compa-
nies had reached a size where they could internalize if they desired , an 
entrenched inspection industry was already available and adequate?0 
-67. "Matrimonial cases" are estimated to account for 40- 75% of the average private investiga-
tor's work. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 111 (1967). · 
68. Retail Credit Co. is registered as a private investigation agency in N.Y., Calif., Conn .. Nev .. 
and Fla. Letter from David P. Weinberger, b,ased on a personal survey, to U. CHI. L. REV. , April 
30, 1972. For denials that Retail Credit Co. is a detective agency, see Retail Credit Co. of Atlanta, 
Ga., Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1968); Hart Hgs .. supra note 37, at 99; Proxmire Hgs., supra note 37, at 180; 
and Sullivan Hgs. supra note 37, at 473. It is difficult to understand why some states do not require 
~etail Credit Co. and other inspection bureaus to register under existing legislation. See ILL REV. 
TAT. 1971 , ch . 38, §§ 201- 1,201-2, and 201 -3, a detective statute which on its face would appear 
to e~empt credit bureaus, but not inspection bureaus. Not only do inspection bureaus report on 
habits , conduct, associations, reputation and character, for purposes other than describing busi-
ness or financial standing (as coverage by the Illinois st-atute would require) but many engage in 
~ther traditional detective activities as well. E.g., Retail Credit Co. tracks missing persons: the 
1 
eterans Administration estimates that it paid Retail Credit Co. $57,000 in fiscal 1971 for "skip-
~ate" reports on persons the VA was unable to locate, where there was a debt in excess of $300. 
tter from Howard M. Denney, Assistant General Counsel, VA, to U. CHI. L. REV., Feb. 17, 
1972, reproduced in Appendix Six. It is also clear from Retail Credit Co.'s Manager's Manual that 
th7 company's inspectors serve as paid witnesses for insurance companies, based upon knowledge 
ga ined in investigations. . 
69. FLINN, note 65 supra, at 133 et seq. 
70. Equitable Life Assurance Society instituted its inspection system in 1870. FLINN, note 65 
S~Jpra, a t I 58. Equitable works through a combination of salaried inspectors and part-time corres-
~ndents working on a fee basis. Interview (telephone) with Paul Patterson, Regional Inspection 
anager, Equitable, Feb. IS, 1972. See Appendix One. 
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The national inspection bureaus are dominated by Retail Credit Co. 
In the two major insurance submarkets, life and health insurance re-
porting and fire and casualty (including automobile) insurance report-
ing, Retail Credit Co. controls 80 and 50-60 percent of the volume, 
respectively?1 The life and health submarket is particularly concentra-
ted: Retail Credit, Hooper-Holmes, and American Service Bureau 
accounted for 90-95 per cent of the 1970 industry volume of $55-60 
million?2 The $120-130 million fire and casualty submarket is somewhat 
more fragmented, since the leading three firms had only an estimated 
60-70 per cent in 1970. The third important submarket in which some 
of the national inspection bureaus participate, personnel reporting, will 
be discussed later.73 
The local independent inspection bureaus, being shut out of the life 
and health submarket, tend to cluster in the fire and casualty area, 
reporting on applicants for automobile insurance, fire insurance, and 
other types of property insurance. Local independents vary in size from 
one-man out-of-the-basement operations, to fairly sophisticated organi-
zations well able to compete (at least in the fire and casualty field) with 
the nationals on a local (and in a few cases statewide) basis. Most local 
independents were formed by inspectors who had received their training 
from the nationals, and it is understandable that their operations tend 
to follow the patterns set by the nationals. Unlike the nationals, how-
ever, a number of the local independents around the country have 
formed a trade association, Associated Reporting Companies. To date, 
the association has produced little in the way of training, marketing, or 
leadership, and must be considered insignificant?4 
Appendix One provides profiles of ten inspection bureaus, national 
and local independents, with offices in Chicago. A fuller discussion of 
what inspection bureaus do and how they do it occurs in a later section 
evaluating the impact ofthe FCRA on investigations?5 
Inspection bureaus are generally covered by the FCRA's definition 
of a consumer reporting agency, with the chief exception that reports 
drawn on businesses are exempt. 
71. In the Matter of Retail Credit Co., FTC Proposed Complaint, supra note 27. 
72. ld. 
73. See text at notes 76 and 233, i11jra. 
74. Interview with William Dorf, President, Illinois Service Bureau, Mar. 24, 1972. Members of 
Associated Reporting Companies in Chicago are Illinois Service Bureau, Jasper's Reports, and 
Underwriters Reports, Inc. ARCO Directory, 1971. 
75. See text at notes-209 et seq., info. 
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E. PERSONNEL REPORTING 
Personnel reporting is handled by credit bureaus, inspection bu-
reaus, special personnel reporting agencies such as Fidelifacts7~ detec-
tive agencies, and (in relatively small numbers) by executive search 
organizations. In addition, a substantial proportion of personnel inves-
tigating is carried on in-house by employers through their own person-
nel or security sections?7 This means that the personnel reporting 
market is more highly fragmented than the insurance reporting market. 
Based on its own information and a survey it conducted, Retail Credit 
Co. estimates that 40 per cent of all employment screening is done by 
companies' own people and that about 10 per cent of employment 
applications are simply not inspected. Retail Credit estimates that it 
received about 20 per cent of such assignments and its competition 
~bout 30 per cent?B The FTC merely states that Retail Credit is a "lead-
Ing factor" in the $25-35 million personnel reporting market?9 
Coverage of personnel reporting by the FCRA is rather spotty, and 
will be discussed in detail at a later point.80 
ll. IMPACT OF THE FCRA 
. Prior to passage of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the participants 
In the personal information market were free of governmental scrutiny. 
Detective agencies, it is true, were often subject to state regulation, but 
this was widely believed to be a mere formality.81 The most important 
control was the private remedy of a libel action by a damaged consu-
~er; but this was of little practical value because credit reports and 
Inspection reports were traditionally held to be qualifiedly privileged in 
the public interest of expediting commerce, and the problem of proving 
~alice was so great that reporting agencies had all but an absolute 
tmmunity.82 
In the absence of regulation, a variety of abuses developed, and by 
the middle and late 1960's critics of the personal information market 
were calling for reform, in the name of personal privacy.83 Congressional --76. See profile in Appendix One. 
S~7. See T. WALSH. SCREENING OF EMPLOYEES IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRIAL i
8
URITY: PRACTICAL LEGAL PROBLEMS, (2d ed., 1972). 
· Plaintiffs Brief at 6, note 46 supra. 
8
79. In the Matter of Retail Credit Co., FTC Proposed Complaint, supra note 27. 
0. See text at note 248 infra. 
t 8!. See S. DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959), especially pages 216-230, dealing with de-
ecttve practices in Chicago. 
SO 8
9
2. Note, Credit Investigations and the Right of Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 GEO. L. J . 
. 516 (1959). 
(I 83. See the books cited in note 3 supra; See also, M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 
R. ?64>; Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Computer to Individual Freedom and the 
'Cht of Privacy, 33 GEO. WASI-l. L. REV. 270 (1964); Karst, "The Files" Legal Controls Over 
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hearings produced lurid examples of disregard for privacy values,84 and 
the pressure for legislation grew so strong that most of the consumer 
credit industry chose to participate in the legislative drafting rather 
than stand in opposition.85 
In the Senate Report for Senator Proxmire's S.823,86 which with very 
minimal changes became the Fair Credit Reporting Act, seven aspects 
of the credit reporting industry were perceived as abuses requiring leg-
islative control. These may be summarized as: 
1. The inability of a consumer to know he is being damaged 
by an adverse report; 
2. Difficulty in obtaining access to information in a consu-
mer's file; 
3. Obstacles blocking correction of inaccurate information; 
4. Failure of consumer reporting agencies to keep informa-
tion confidential;_ 
5. The reporting of public record information that is out-of-
date or incomplete; 
6. Unfairness in burdening a consumer for life with a bad 
credit record if he has later improved his performance; and 
7. Intrusions on privacy due to the gathering of highly sen-
sitive and personal information about a person's private life. 
To cope with these abuses, Congress passed, and President Nixon 
signed into law, the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The FCRA has been in 
effect for more than a year and a half at this writing, and it seems pro-
per at this time, before Congress considers any amendments, to analyze 
the FCRA in terms of its effectiveness in correcting the perceived 
abuses. 
the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 342 
(1 %6); 1. SHARP CREDIT REPORTING AND PRIVACY (1970). 
84. See hearings cited supra in notes 37, 48, and 68. 
85. See the statements of various industry representatives in Sullivan Hgs., supra note 37. 
86. S. REP. NO. 91·517, supra note 51, accompanying S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1%9). S. 
823, Senator Proxmire's bill, was approved in the Senate on Nov. 6, 1%9 and was sent to the 
House. It, along with several House bills of similar concern (including its companion bill, H.R. 
10,139, and Congresswoman Sullivan's bills, H.R. 16,340 and H.R. 19,403), was hopelessly bottled 
up in committee and none of these bills was ever voted upon in the House. However, the basic pro-
visions of S. 823 were later attached as a rider to another bill in the Senate which had already 
passed the House (H.R. 15,073). The conglomerate bill was later approved in Conference Commit-
tee, with slight modifications to the credit reporting section , and then passed the House. See Den-
ney, Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. 88 BANKING L. J. 579 (1971); and R. CLONTZ, FAIR 
CREDIT REPORTING ACT MANUAL (1971). Debate on the FCRA was minimal. See 116 
CONG. REC. 36569-77 (1970). Senator Proxmire's paternity of the FCRA is memorialized by the 
consumer reporting agencies in their creation of the verb phrase "to give a Proxmire," which 
means, to provide a consumer disclosure under the FCRA. 
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A. NOTIFICATION 
The first problem noted in the Senate Report was that the consumer 
was often unaware that he was being damaged by an adverse credit 
report.87 This resulted, in large part, from the fear of reporting agencies 
that if their role were known to the public and consumers could learn 
of the source and content of adverse reports the reporting industry 
would be deluged by litigation. Standard agreements between credit 
reporting agencies and their clients prohibited the user from disclosing 
the contents of a report to the consumer.88 
Retail Credit Co.'s Manager Manual instructed the inspection 
bureau manager who received a complaint from a report subject to 
"Neither deny nor admit making report . .. Draw your caller out, tact-
fully eliciting information as to source of leak." In case an unfavorable 
report had been made, the manager was to "[A]void the personal con-
tact, if possible. At any rate, do not commit yourself, the inspector, or 
the Retail Credit Company." 89 As a result of this attitude of secrecy, an 
individual could fall into a situation where he wouldn't be able to 
obtain credit, insurance, or a job--and wouldn't have any way of finding 
out why. 
The FCRA has been successful in remedying this abuse. Under sec-
tion 61S(a), when adverse action is taken against a consumer either 
wholly or in part because of information in a consumer report, the 
report user must advise the consumer and supply the name and ad-
dress of the consumer reporting agency which made the report. Adverse 
action is defined as the denial to the consumer of credit or insurance 
for personal, family, or household purposes; or acceptance at an in-
creased, or above standard, charge for credit or insurance; or the denial 
~~~~me~~ · 
To comply with this provision, consumer report users (informed of 
their legal obligation in their service contracts with the reporting 
agencies) generally use form letters to notify consumers when adverse 
action has been taken?1 The law does not requre that notification be 
tnade in writing, however, and some consumer repott users, particular-
ly finance companies, prefer to give oral notification?2 --8887. S. REP. NO. 91-517, 91 st Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1 %9) . 
. ld. 
90
89. Retail Credit Co. Manager Manual, page C-39, dated Oct. 1%3, now being revised. 
· FCRA, supra note 5, § 615(a). 
91. For examples of the form letters used, see Appendix Two. 
92. The finance companies interviewed claimed that they prefer to communicate orally with a 
~rson who is not granted a loan because this is the best way to smooth ruffled feathers. There is 
fr? reason, however, why a consumer report user couldn't supplement a written notification by a 
lendly oral communication. 
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A measurement of the effectiveness of the FCRA notification provi-
sion may be found in Appendix Three, where figures are given for the 
number of disclosures of report content to consumers by Chicago area 
consumer reporting agencies, both before and after passage of the 
FCRA. As a generalization, it can be said that prior to the FCRA, 
credit bureaus made some disclosures to consumers, and that the num-
ber of disclosures after the effective date of the FCRA multiplied by a 
factor of from 2 to 20. In the case of the largest credit bureau in Chica-
go, disclosures are made an average of 4,000 times per month, on a 
volume of approximately 250,000 reports per month, or of 1 for every 
62 reports?3 Considering that some of the 250,000 reports per month are 
probably repeats for the same consumer, drawn by different subscri-
bers, one might estimate that about 2 per cent of this credit bureau's 
report subjects seek disclosures of their files. 
The experience of inspection bureaus is somewhat different, because 
none of the inspection bureaus interviewed made disclosures to consu-
mers prior to the FCRA. Since the FCRA, all have adopted procedures 
so that consumers can obtain disclosure, but relatively few consumers 
seem to be taking advantage of these procedures. For instance, the 
American Service Bureau reports on approximately 112,000 individuals 
a year, or 9,333 a month, in Chicago; but only 10 to 15 per month seek 
d iscl os u re.94 
While it seems true that the FCRA notification process has made 
consumers more aware of the mechanisms of consumer reporting, there 
is reason to believe the notification provision ought to be strengthened. 
For example, American Service Bureau's business is mainly in life and 
health insurance reporting; it averages roughly 8,600 of these reports 
per month?5 But if only 15 consumers seek disclosure, this is less than 
0.2 per cent of those reported on. Yet the latest industry figures say 
that 3 per cent of all ordinary life insurance applicants are turned down, 
and that another 6 per cent are given extra-risk rates.96 Certainly many 
93. Letter from T.E. Sheahen, Vice President, Credit Information Corporation of Chicago, to U. 
CHI. L. REV. , Nov. 17, 1972. CIC is used as the example because it appears to keep the most 
careful statistics concerning the FCRA. The figures cited remained unchanged from Jan. 25, !972 
to Nov. 17, 1972. 
94. Letter from Claude H. Tinsley, Jr., Exec. Vice President, American Service Bureau, to U. 
CHI. L. REV., Dec. 8, 1972. Retail Credit Co. branch offices have averaged four consumer con· 
tacts per week since the inception of the FCRA. A company study shows that of 1192 consumers 
who received adverse action notifications, 1031 did not contact the inspection bureau. 114 made 
contact but agreed with the report content. 47 made contact and questioned the information in the 
report. Of these 47, 34 resulted in reconfirmation of the original information. In the other _13 
cases , the original information could not be reconfirmed. In two of these cases, contirmauon 
hinged on city records unavailable to the public. Retail Credit Co., The Fair Credit Reporting Act. 
A Progress Report, dated October 1972. · 
95. /d. 
96. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACf BOOK, 1972 at 95(1972). 
Figures are for 1967, wnen JO,I9U,U00ordinary life policies were purchased in the U.S. "Of the 
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of those turned down or up-rated expected as much; but of the remain-
der, can it really be that so few are curious enough to contact the con-
sumer reporting agency? 
One reason for the low turnout rate may be that the FCRA merely 
requires that the consumer be notified of the fact of adverse action, and 
be supplied the name and address of the reporting agency. No effort is 
made to inform the consumer of his rights under the law, with the ap-
parent result that the consumer frequently does not know that he has a 
right to be informed of the contents of his record or that he can chal-
lenge the information in the file. 
Moreover, the notification rarely explains why adverse action was 
taken. Since adverse action often occurs for reasons which have nothing 
to do with a "bad" record~7consumers have sometimes found themselves 
shuffled back and forth between a reporting agency which gives disclo-
sure but no hint of why adverse action was taken, and a consumer 
report user who doesn't want to explain his credit policies?8 .. 
To remedy these defects, it is suggested that the FCRA be amended 
to require (a) that adverse action notifications be written, (b) and that 
they include a brief summary of the consumer's legal rights under the 
FCRA, and (c) a brief, possibly check-off, explanation for the consumer 
report user's decision to take adverse action. 
A frequent criticism of the FCRA notification provision is that the 
consumer is not able to learn of the existence of his file until after the 
damage is already done. This is not precisely true, because the consu-
mer is given the right, under section 609, to obtain disclosure, regard-
less of whether adverse action has been taken against him. In practice, 
however, most consumers are not aware that a file exists or which 
~% 0~ applications that were not acceptable, less than three-fifths were related to serious health 
!tnpatrments and the rest to other factors, including extremely hazardous jobs." /d. Reasons for 
extra-rating were: heart disease or its symptoms, 33%; weight problem, 16%; other medical rea-
~~lns, 29%; occupation, 12o/o; other reasons, 10o/o. /d. This is the sum total of published informa-
Ron ~ocated which throws light on the possible impact of insurance inspection reports. However, a 
rat I Credit Co. manager testified that inspection reports contribute to the declination of 1 - 2o/o 
0 tnsurance applications, and to the rating-up of another 3 - 4%. Testimony of A. Freeman, Man-
D~er,_Retail Credit Co., Oklahoma City, Okla., in Retail Credit Co. v. Derryberry, No. CJ-72-36, 
tstnct Court of Oklahoma County, Okla., April 24, 1972. --f 97. E.g., the consumer might not meet the minimum income or employment tenure standards 
0 the credit grantor. 
D 98. The ACB, in its widely circulated pamphlet HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE FAIR CRE-
thiT RE~ORTING ACT (1971), recommended that ~redit _grantors m!lke noti!Jcati<?n whe!lev~r 
ey obtatn a credit report and subsequently deny credtt. A hteral followtng of thts advtce, whtch ts 
company policy for at least one of the major national retailing chains headquartered in Chicago, 
means that many consumers who are turned down for credit are shunted to the credit bureau, 
even though the credit grantor knows the bureau report is "clean." This creates bad feelings and a 
~e!lse that someone is lying, both of which could be avoided if the adverse action notification con-
atned a check-list of common reasons for credit denial. 
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agency has it until adverse action has occurred~ In view of this, Senator 
Hatfield has proposed an amendment to the FCRA which states: 
"When any consumer reporting agency proposes to furnish a consumer 
report. .. that agency shall mail, or otherwise deliver, a copy of such 
report to the consumer to whom it relates." 100 
The cost of the Hatfield proposal would probably be great. One 
credit bureau in Chicago which sells over a million reports a year esti-
mates that the cost of preparing a copy of each report (paying a clerk to 
handle the job, and purchasing envelopes and stamps) would be about 
$1.30 per report.101 This may be a high estimate, but the point is clear 
that the costs of the Hatfield amendment could put many credit bureaus 
out of business. Equally important, the amendment would make it 
impossible for a credit bureau to furnish an oral report and would con-
siderably slow a process which serves consumers as well as credit grant-
ors by its speed. 
Somewhat different considerations might affect the reports of in-
spection bureaus!02 A much smaller absolute number of reports is in-
volved and the cost of sending a copy would represent a smaller propor-
tion of the price of a report. An inspection report, moreover, is general-
ly capable of causing more harm for a consumer than most standard 
credit bureau reports; not getting insurance can be far more damaging 
than not getting a charge card. Nevertheless, speed in inspections is a 
matter of importance to consumers as well as to insurance companies 
and their agents,and the disadvantages of any reform which would sub-
stantially slow the process of obtaining insurance must be considered. 
99. Since a consumer reporting agency is allowed to make a charge for a disclosure in cases 
where the consumer has not received an adverse action notification within the past 30 days (FCRA. 
supra noteS,§ 612), many agencies have records available on how many consumers seek disclosure 
purely "for curiousity." The figure is generally less than 10%. Ninety-five percent of the consumers 
who have contacted Retail Credit Co. branch offices have done so as the result of adverse actwn 
notices. Retail Credit Co., The Fair Credit Reporting Act, A Progress Report, dated October 1972-
100. S. 968, 92nd Con g., 1st Sess. (1970). A similar statute exists for credit reports in Oklahoma 
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 81, 82 (West, 1955)), but it has never been enforced. A state court 
ruled in May 1972 that this statute applies to the credit reports, but not the insurance inspections. 
of Retail Credit Co. Tulsa World, May 25, 1972. Appeal is pending. 
101. Interview with Milton I. Deutsch, President, Chicago Credit Bureau, Jan. 19, 1972. 
102. Note that the FCRA distinguishes between simple consumer reports of the type generally_ 
prepared by credit bureaus, and "investigative consumer reports" , corresponding to the output of 
inspection bureaus. The latter are defined in FCRA section 603(e), (supra note 5), to mean: 
a consumer report or portion thereof in which information on a consumer's charac-
ter, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is obtained 
through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or associates of the consumer 
reported on or with others with whom he is acquainted or who may have knowledge 
concerning any such items of information. 
A discussion of the significance of this distinction begins in the text at note 241, infra. 
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Finally, in weighing the Hatfield proposal one should consider the 
fact that the majority of consumer reports--possibly a large majority10!-
do not lead to adverse action. This being true, delivery of a copy of each 
proposed consumer report to the consumer-subject would have little 
practical effect and would likely represent much economic waste. Unless 
the consumer were, in effect, given the power to enjoin a consumer 
reporting agency from selling a report about the consumer because the 
consumer objects to the content, the only benefit of the Hatfield pro-
posal would be to allow a consumer to try to convince the reporting 
agency, prior to dissemination, that the report is in error. But the 
FCRA already permits errors to be corrected, and it stands to reason 
that a credit grantor or insurance company which is in business to give 
credit and to sell insurance will reconsider an adverse action once it is 
called to their attention that the information upon which the adverse 
decision was based was erroneous. Although this conclusion can not 
actually be viewed at this time, indications that this reasoning is incor-
rect did not appear during this course of this study. 
B. ACCESS 
A second problem noted by the Senate Report was that if a consu-
mer learned about the existence of his file he was generally not given 
access to the information in ie04 Retail Credit Co., for example, had a 
Policy which directed managers not to show a report to its subject: "In-
formation involving rumors or third-party hazard or that the average 
P~rson would resent or that might expose our informants, cannot be 
d1scussed with the subject."105Some credit bureaus, the Senate Report 
found, discouraged consumer interviews "by placing a nuisance charge 
on the investigation, or merely placing the date of the interview as 
lll_uch as 2 weeks away:'106'J'he FCRA's response to the access problem 
Wtll be discussed in relation to five questions: (1) who should have access 
to file information? (2) when should access occur? (3) what types of 
Physical contact with the record should be permitted? (4) to what extent 
should information be disclosed? and (S) how should the cost of access 
be allocated? --I OJ. ~ee note 96 supra. The precise influence of consumer reports upon credit grantors defies 
~enerahzation. E.g .. one large national finance company rejects 70'Vo of its loan applicants but 
r raws credit reports on only 40 - SO% of all applicants, and lacks figures on the impact of credit 
~ports. A competing finance company draws reports on lOO'Vo of applicants, denies SO%, and esti-
ll ~tes that 20'Vo of the denials are based on credit reports. The installment loan department of a 
tl~tghbor~ood-type bank draws reports on 100'Vo of its loan applicants, rejects 10%, and estimates 
bat credtt reports account for SO- 75"7o of the rejections. A systematic survey seems required to go 
~~nd these samplings to establish the impact of credit reports. 
IO · S. REP. NO. 91-517, supra note 51, at 3. 
W'th5. Retail Credit Co. Ma11ager Ma11ual page C-75, dated Oct. 1%3. Present policy is in accord 
F'~R F'CRA requirements. See Retail Credit Co. memorandum concerning compliance with the 
1 A, dated June 18, 1971. 06. S. REP. NO. 91-517, supra note 51, at 3. 
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1. Who Should Have Access to File Information? 
The FCRA requires disclosure of file content to the appropriate 
consumer either in person or by telephone, if he first furnishes "proper" 
identification~07 If there is a personal interview, the consumer may be 
accompanied by one other person of his choosing, who must furnish 
"reasonable" identification~08 
The concepts of "proper" and "reasonable" identification have 
occasionally been stretched by the consumer reporting agencies to 
create an obstacle for consumers. For example, the American Service 
Bureau has a form, reproduced in Appendix Four, which must be filled 
out before the consumer will be given disclosure over the telephone. 
Many of the questions leave the clear impression that the form was 
intended for the collection of information rather than for simple identi-
fication. In addition to the identification form, many reporting agencies 
require the consumer to sign a waiver agreement prior to disclosure. 
The waiver, an example of which is found in Appendix Four, often im-
presses consumers as an implied threat that the reporting agency will 
investigate anyone who causes trouble. Such a waiver is both premature, 
in that only a small portion of disclosures result in further investiga-
tion;109and overly broad, since it can be used, for example, to authorize 
a doctor to disclose confidential medical records even though the item 
of information called into question by the consumer may be non-
medical~10 It is suggested that the FTC, which has enforcement powers 
under section 621 of the FCRA, should render a formal interpretation 
that such "chilling" .identification and waiver forms violate the intent 
of section 610, which provides for disclosures to consumers. 
2. When Should Access Occur? 
The FCRA requires only that disclosure be made "during normal 
business hours and on reasonable notice."lll A recommendation that 
certain off-business hours be provided to facilitate access for working 
people112 was rejected by Congress. No Chicago reporting agency has 
voluntarily established special hours. Rather than take time off from 
107. FCRA, supra note 5, § 6IO(b). 
108. FCRA, supra note 5, § 610(d). 
109. E.g., the Chicago office of Retail Credit Co. has conducted re·investigations as a result of 
only 1'11% of its disclosures. Letter from Henry McQuade, Retail Credit Co., to U. CHI. L. REV .. 
Feb. 23, 1972. 
110. The purpose of a waiver is not clear. If authorization is needed for re-investigation, on what 
authority was the original investigation carried out? 
Ill. FCRA, supra note 5, § 6IO(a). 
112. See testimony of Virginia Knauer on behalf of the Administration, Sullivan Hgs .. supra 
note 37, at 556. 
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work to visit a consumer reporting agency, many consumers have relied 
on telephone disclosure.113 
The "reasonable notice" provision · seems to be complied with in 
satisfactory fashion by most consumer reporting agencies visited in Chi-
cago. In many instances, a consumer can walk in off the street without 
giving previous notice and receive prompt attention! 14 A few agencies, 
~owever, have set up obstacles by telling the consumer his file is located 
tn another city or that disclosure can only be made by a particular exec-
utive who happens to be out of town.115 
3. What Types of Physical Contact With the Record? 
The FCRA pointedly does not give the consumer a right to see or 
hold his file, saying only that the reporting agency must "disclose" 
"fully and accurately" the "nature and substance" of the file~ 16 This has 
been one of the most controversial provisions in the law, with many 
consumers complaining that reporting agencies do not disclose every-
thing in their files~ 17 There is no way to confirm how often selective dis-
closure actually occurs,' 18 but the widespread belief that the practice 
takes place makes it necessary to reconsider the wisdom of forcing the 
c.onsumer to take the reporting agency's word that it is not hiding sensi-
tive materials to avoid embarrassment or possible litigation.119 
113. The extent of reliance upon the telephone for disclosures varies greatly from reporting 
afency to reporting agency. The Chicago office of Retail Credit Co. estimates that half of its dis-
c osures are by phone, half in person. Interview, Tom Linnen, Manager-Operations, Jan. 20, 1972. 
!he Credit Information Corporation of Chicago handles 22o/o of its disclosures by telephone, 8% 
Y personal interview, and 70o/o by mail. Letter from T.E. Sheahen, Vice President, Nov. 17, 1972. 
¢hhough the mailing procedure does not appear to be permissible under section 610 of the FCRA, 
: ~s probably the method best serving the interests of the consumer, provided that all codes and 
ei~1 S are put in layman's language. Section 610 should be amended to reflect this possibility. 
J 4. See Star. Who Knows What Evil Lurks in Your Credit File, Chicago Tribune Magazine, une 18, 1972. 
RI IS. This generalization is based upon several letters received by the University of Chicago Law 
0evtew from consumers outside of Chicago, ·and upon experience of the author in Washington, .C. One problem seems to be that national inspection bureaus have sub-offices where trained 
Personnel, required by section 610 to be provided in order to explain information disclosed to a 
~onsumer , are not available. Retail Credit Co. takes the position that sub-offices are not required C ha.ve trained personnel on hand for disclosures at all times during normal business hours. Retail 
[edtt Co. memorandum concerning FCRA section 610, dated Feb. 26, 1971. 
1
16. FCRA, supra note 5, § 609. Certain exceptions are explored in the text at note 127 infra. 
D 
17. Telephone interview with Erma Angevine, Exec. Dir. , Consumers Federation of America, 
ec. 27, 1971. 
1 lt8 .. One example: James Millstone, assistant managing editor of the St. Louis Post Dispatch, t~s t hts automobile insurance as a result of an inspection report which said, among other things. 
1 at he was a hippie-type person, disliked by his neighbors, who used drugs and put up out-of-aown demonstrators all over his house. Millstone twice obtained disclosure from the reporting 
wgency, National Inspection Bureau. Not satisfied that everything had been disclosed, Millstone 
wrote to .t~e headquarters of the Bureau. Six days later he received a letter advising him that there 
fa~~ addtttonal material in his file, some of it adverse, which the reporting agency "inadvertently 
1<}7;d to disclose" during the interviews. Letter to Millstone from David B. Slayback, Jan. 20, 
11 · See St. Louis Post Dispatch, April II, 1972, at JA, col. I. th 9· Retail Credit Co. emphasizes to its employees that disclosures will be made upon request of 
Yoe ~onsumer, and states that there are three requests which the consumer may make: what do 
u ave on file about me? who told you that? and, to whom did you send that information? The 
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Why should the consumer not be allowed to read his own file? The 
principal answers given by the reporting agencies will be considered one 
at a time. First, it is said~20 if the consumer can get his hands on the file, 
he might destroy it. This problem could be circumvented by offering to 
provide a copy of the file. (Most investigative files contain only one or 
two sheets.) 121 
But if the consumer is furnished with a copy of his report, it is then 
argued,122 he might counterfeit or falsify the report, thereby leading to 
poor business decisions and an erosion of confidence in the integrity of 
the reporting system. Morever, the argument continues, agencies will 
not be called upon to sell more than one report on an individual, be-
cause after the first report is prepared consumer report users will seek 
copies of the report from the consumer, thereby saving the expense of 
obtaining reports from the agencies! 23This seems to assume that consu-
mers will carry around copies of their reports like references, and that 
credit grantors, insurance companies, and employers will be too dull to 
recognize the possibility of falsification. In reality, it is precisely the 
desire for independent sources of information which leads consumer 
report users to buy reports, and it is difficult to believe that many 
present users would want to take the consumer's word that his copy is 
up-to-date and authentic. 
Another argument contends that if the consumer were given a copy 
of his report, others, including employers, police, or the Internal Reve-
nue Service, could require the consumer to provide that copy as a pre-
requisite for various benefits. Despite these crocodile tears for the con-
sumer's privacy:24section 604(2) of the FCRA already allows a reporting 
agency to furnish reports "in accordance with the written instructions 
of the consumer to whom it relates." 
A fourth argument states that if the consumer had a copy of his 
report he could learn the code numbers for various subscribers, and 
might be enabled to use these codes to obtain unauthorized releases of 
information about other consumers. This argument has merit; but it 
first question (or words to its effect) initiates disclosure of the nature and substance of the file . Th_e 
second and third questions must be asked each time the consumer wants the information. Retatl 
Credit Co. memorandum concerning compliance with FCRA section 609, dated June 18, 1971. 
This would present the possibility of disclosing less than everything that would be important to the 
consumer, especially if the consumer is unaware that he is involved in a guessing game. 
120. Sullivan Hgs . .- supra note 37, at 110. 
121. Testimony of Retail Credit Co., Sullivan Hgs .. supra note 37, at 474. 
122. Retail Credit Co. flyer, Hazards in Giving Subject a Copy of Report. 
123. It has been suggested that allowing copies to circulate would reduce reporting agency sales, 
and that this would be a deprivation of property without just compensation. /d. 
124. Proxmire Hgs., supra note 48, at 232. 
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only applies to credit bureaus, since inspection bureaus don't operate 
on the same kind of code system. Accepting this argument in regard to 
credit bureau reports would not entail that inspection bureaus, as well, 
should not release copies of reports. 
A fifth argument against furnishing the subject with a copy of his 
report is that this practice would invite nuisance lawsuits.125 There are 
two answers to this. First, if disclosure is as full and accurate as the 
FCRA requires there is already sufficient possibility of litigation, and 
this would not be augmented by the fact that the consumer has a copy. 
Indeed, the consumer is presently permitted to take notes during dis-
closure, and, if he desires, be accompanied by an attorney. 
Second, the FCRA protects the consumer reporting agencies suffi-
ciently under section 610(e), which states that unless there is negligent 
or willfull noncompliance with the FCRA, 
no consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of 
defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the 
reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency, any 
user of information, or any person who furnishes information to a 
consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed (under 
the FCRA), except as to fa lse information furnished with malice or 
willfu ll intent to injure such consumer. 126 
Finally, it is argued, providing a copy of a report to the consumer 
would allow him to learn about certain items of information which 
public policy dictates should not be revealed . This argument can best 
?e considered in answer to the next question; "to what extent should 
Information be disclosed?" 
4. To What Extent Should Information Be Disclosed? 
The meat of the FCRA disclosure requirement is found in section 
609, wh ich states that the consumer reporting agency shall "clearly and 
accurately disclose ... the nature and substance of all information 
(except medical information) in its files on the consumer at the time of 
~~e request." This includes identification of the sources of information, 
except that the sources of information acquired solely for use in pre-
Paring an investigative consumer report and actually used for no other 
Purpose need not be disclosed:' 127Finally, section 609 provides an "audit 
trail," stipulating that disclosure shall include the names of recipients --:zs. Flyer, note 122 supra. 
26. See articles cited in note 25 supra. 
1 ~7. FCRA, supra noteS,§ 609(aX2). The section continues, "Provided, That in the event an 
ac~Ion is brought under [the FCRA], such sources shall be available to the plaintiff under appro-
Priate discovery procedures in the court in which the action is brought." (Emphasis added). 
64 Consumer Journal [Vol. II:37 
of any consumer report on the consumer which was furnished in the 
past six months, or two years in the case of employment reports. 
a. Medical Information. A consumer reporting agency 
is not required to disclose medical information. This is a potentially 
important exception in the law, and its evaluation requires additional 
background about the personal information market. Four informational 
systems will be described. 
The need for medical information in underwriting life and health 
insurance is obvious and widely accepted by the public.128 The best 
known method by which underwriters obtain medical information is 
through medical examinations, usually carried out by physicians re-
tained by the insurance company. Medical examination information 
traditionally moves directly to the underwriter, without intermediary. 
Retail Credit Co. is now entering this area by establishing a chain of 
paramedical service centers. According to the 1971 Retail Credit Co. 
Annual Report, a subsidiary, 
Physical Measurements, Inc., will accelerate expansion in 1972. 
This chain of health history gathering centers, formerly known as 
Medical Service Centers, was established to free physicians from 
laborious technical tasks and to speed processing of life and health 
insurance applications ... They are staffed by technicians trained to 
receive medical history, perform certain laboratory tests and take the 
physical measurements of applicants for life and health insurance. 
The centers now. produce 4,000 reports per month. While we have 
not yet officially entered the pre-employment or employee market, 
we are already doing these measurements for several insurance com-
panies' agency departments ... Our plan is to establish 100 centers 
as quickly as feasible. '129 
Presumably a copy of each report would be retained by the para-
medical center in case the original gets lost. If these copies were to be 
made available to the parent company's inspectors for future insurance 
or employment reports, the paramedical centers would open up a vast 
new resource of information to the world's largest private investigating 
company. 
To supplement the information in the application for insurance and 
in the medical examination (if one is required), the underwriter maY 
128. In 1970, Retail Credit Co. commissioned the Opinion Research Corporation to study public 
attitudes toward certain investigations. One question asked. "If a person applies for a life insu~­
ance policy. do you agree or disagree that the life insurance company has a right to investigate thts 
person on . . . his health and medical history?" Ninety-two per cent of the sample agreed. In 1972. 
a similar study showed that 90"7o agreed. ORC Study, 6. 
129. /d., at 7. 
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obtain an Attending Physician's Statement (APS) from the applicant's 
doctor. The APS is usually purchased from the physician, who mails it 
directly to the underwriter. In 1971, approximately 4.7 million APS's 
were obtained in the U.S. 130 
When an insurance company deals directly with an attending physi-
cian it often takes from 18 to 20 days to get the health information!31To 
cut down on the time and on the hidden costs, many insurance compa-
nies are turning to Retail Credit Co.'s Underwriting Medical History 
(UMH) service. UMH claims that it can reduce the time to an average 
of 9 days and can reduce the total cost to the insurer from about $12 to 
slightly more than $10.132 According to Inspection News, the in-house 
magazine of the Retail Credit Co., the selling of UMH services was the 
number one sales priority for 1972~33 In June 1972, Retail Credit's offices 
handled over 26,000 APS reports.t 34 When Retail Credit Co. obtains an 
~PS it keeps a copy for its files, to be used as a lead in futu re inspec-
hons.1 35 
As has already been noted, most insurance companies employ inde-
~endent inspection bureaus to bolster their other sources of informa-
tion. H. Laurence Ross, in an essay titled "Personal Information in 
Insurance Files," observed: 
Limitations imposed by the abilities of the inspectors and the ade-
quacy of their sources of information minimize the amount of medi-
cal information that can be obtained reliably; gross matters such as 
blindness and amputations are the principal items concerning which 
reports can be made.136 
Further examples, not so "gross" as Ross suggested, may be found in a 
typical Form 930, a record of "significant" information obtained by a 
Retail Credit Co. inspector during his working day; e.g., "spleen prob-
~em," "polio--age 25, right arm;" "wife's colonitis--nerves," "eye in-
JUry," etc. This information remains in the inspection bureau's files for 
future use. 
. The fourth source of medical information for underwriters is an 
Intercompany data bank known as the Medical Information Bureau 
(MJB), which serves more than 700 life insurance companies, some of ---:~o. Trotochaud, UMH. A Marketing Miracle. INSPECTION NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 1972 at 9. 
!. ld 
a 132. 1i The article relates that Retail Credit Co. paid doctors' fees on only 42.3"1o of the APS's, 
~e3r3aging $7.18 per payment . . ld 
134. li 
~~~~: Interview with Tom Linnen, Manager-Operations, Retail Credit Co., Chicago, Jan. 20, 
136. In ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE, supra note 28, at 207. 
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which also issue health insurance. Medical backgrounds on 12 million 
individuals are in MIB computers in Boston.137 
MIB was founded in 1902. Not listed in the Boston telephone direc-
tory and unknown to most physicians and patients, it grows by 400,000 
files a year and answers 80,000 queries a day.138 Data enters the MIB 
when an underwriter finds a reportable condition during his review of 
an application (including the supplementary informational materials). 
The underwriter reports the condition in code. Only selected officials at 
the member insurance companies have access to the code book, and 
clerical personnel at the MIB are said to be ignorant of the meaning of 
the codes.139 
The MIB is needed, according to the insurance companies, so that 
the effects of lying or forgetfullness by insurance applicants can be min-
imized. Member companies are not allowed to deny an applicant or 
assign an extra rate solely on the basis of MIB information. The MIB's 
rules require that information be verified through current medical 
examinations and inspections~40 Violation of the rules can lead to direct 
sanctions, including expulsion. The rules are enforced by medical pro-
fessionals who are pledged to their enforcement. The fact that insurance 
companies are competitive and see no benefit in rejecting potentially 
profitable business without proof of hazard is believed to be a third 
strong reason for the MIB rules to be followed.141 
Most of the codes in the MIB refer to physical diagnoses. However, 
there are also codes for psychiatric disorder, attempted suicide, anxiety 
reaction and reactive depression, nonconformity (e.g., drinking), envi-
ronment (e.g., condition of the home and status of the neighborhood), 
and individuals "who are predatory and follow more or less criminal 
pursuits, such as racketeers, dishonest gamblers, prostitutes,and dope 
peddlers. " 142 An underwriter desiring more detail than provided by the 
code may request the MIB to get it from the source. 
Like inspection reports, the insurance companies attempt to keep 
the MIB reports confidential. An Aetna Life and Casualty underwriting 
manual notes, 
137. See, Insurance Data Bank Attacked as Abuse of Confidentiality, HOSPITAL PRACTIC~. 
47 (Aug. 1972). The article is based on Hearings, not yet published, of the Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, concerning the health and accident 
insurance industry, May 1972. See also, Ross essay, supra note 136 at 208. 
138. /d. 
139. /d. 
140. Where an insurance company is put on warning about an applicant by an MIB code, if the 
company does not carry out an investigation it may be estopped from objecting to a later claim on 
the ground that the application was false. Major Oil Corp. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S .. 
457 F.2d 596 (lOth Cir., 1972). 
141. Ross essay, supra note 136 at 211. 
142. /d., 209-10; HOSPITAL PRACTICE, 139 (Aug. 1972). 
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Confidential information received from any source, and in particular 
from Company medical examiners, applicants, attending physicians, 
veterans medical records, letters from ather companies and the MIB 
must be treated as highly confidential. Neither the source nor the 
nature of the information may be revealed to the field office, agent 
or applicant. in any manner. 143 
67 
Occidental Life, in its health insurance underwriting supplement, tells 
underwriters that MIB 
I 
Codes are confidential in nature and neither the details nor the fact 
that information was obtained from a code bureau is to be disclosed 
to anyone except an authorized person within the Company ... No 
written interpretation of codes is to be made in the [applicant's] file:44 
The importance of the MIB in underwriting is difficult to evaluate, 
because it is not known how much significant information would have 
turned up from other sources without benefit of the MIB's " red-flag" 
function. In 1971, however, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company paid 
$183,307 for services from MIB's computer~ 45 1t received 145,000 appli-
cations for individual health insurance; for the 145,000, the MIB yielded 
significant "unadmitted" information on 3,000 applications, which led 
to special inspections; as a result, 1,800 applicants were refused poli-
cies!46 
. While the FTC has not made an official interpretation of the FCRA 
In regard to its coverage of the MIB, there are indications that the FTC 
staff considers the MIB to be exempt under the medical information 
exception in section 609~47If so, it will be argued that the FTC staff is in 
error. 
The MIB fits under the section 603(0 definition of a consumer re-
P~rting agency as a regular assembler of consumer information for .dis-
tnbution to third parties (insurance companies) for insurance purposes. 
The question is whether the MIB finds an exception because a consu-
mer reporting agency doesn't have to disclose medical information. 
Section 603(i) states, 
The term "medical information" means information or records ob-
tained, with the consent of the individual to whom it relates, from 
licensed physicians or medical practitioners, hospitals, clinics, or 
other medical or medically related facilities. --b 1 ~3. Information supplied by staff of Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. U.S. Senate, 
eheved to be up-to-date. 
144. ld. 
l4S. HOSPITAL PRACfiCE, 139 (Aug. 1972). This compares to $4.4 million expended on in -
~ection report fees. Annual Statement for the Year of 1971 of the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
0. 
146. ld. 
147. ld. at 143. 
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The FTC staff has unofficially advised, "Medical information in-
cludes records from physicians and medical facilities, and does not 
include comments on a consumer's health by non-medical personnel:'148 
The legislative history adds no further gloss: the medical information 
exception was added at the last moment, in conference committee, on 
the theory that medical information should only be tendered with coun-
sel of a physician!49 
In approaching the MIB, three points ought to be kept in mind. (1) 
At least some of the information retained in the computer is not medi-
cal within the statutory difinition. This would have to be made available 
to the consumer under the FCRA. (2) Some of the information probably 
did not derive from medical sources, i.e. it may have been supplied by 
the applicant, agent, inspector, or underwriter. This would not meet the 
statutory exemption standard. Query: would information originally 
obtained from a physician, but which passed through various clerks 
and underwriters who selected particular aspects and converted what 
may have been complex data into a simple code, be considered "from a 
licensed physician" within the statute? (3) The statute carefully includes 
the element of consent. But if the individual is not aware of the MIB's 
existence and believes that his authorization for disclosure of medical 
records was given to one insurance company for one purpose, can it 
really be argued that he has consented to the circulation of this medical 
history to a potential 700 insurance companies? 
It is suggested that the FTC interpret section 603(i) to imply know-
ing consent. This would have several effects. First, it would give the 
individual access to the MIB file so that he could be aware of and, if 
necessary, challenge his record. Second, it would give the individual 
access to APS data in an insurance inspection bureau file. Third, it 
would give the individual access to paramedical reports which might 
find their way into an inspection bureau's file. 
But, it may be asked, if the individual is to have access to all this 
information, what purpose is served by retaining a medical information 
exception? It is possible, of course, that a consumer reporting agency 
might learn that a particular consumer has a dreadful disease about 
which the consumer has not been informed. The medical information 
exception might be justified in such a situation. However, such a situa-
tion must surely be rare, and it could be handled tactfully by referring 
the consumer to his physician. As the law presently reads, a reporting 
agency wouldn't have to disclose medical information even to the consu-
mer's physician--even if the consumer authorizes such a disclosure in 
148. 4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, 9 11,306 at 59,793. 
149. H. R. CONF. REP. NO. 91-1587, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
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writing. The medical information exception should be replaced by a 
permissive provision allowing the consumer reporting agency to make 
disclosure of medical information to the. consumer's physician, instead 
of directly to the consumer, provided that the consumer is informed (a) 
that there is medical information being withheld and (b) this informa-
tion will be disclosed to a physician designated by the consumer. 
b. Sources of Investigative Consumer Reports. Section 
609 (a) of the FCRA requires that the consumer reporting agency dis-
close sources of information, except where the information is acquired 
for use in an investigtive consumer report. In practice this means that a 
consumer can learn of the institutional sources of a credit bureau report 
but cannot learn of the sources of relatively subjective information 
found in an inspection bureau report. In a real sense the exemption of 
sources of investigative consumer reports deprives the consumer of the 
opportunity to confront his accusers; yet the opposite position, that all 
sources should be disclosed at the outset (rather than during litigation), 
is not without merit. Indeed, it is argued by the inspection bureaus that 
disclosure of sources of investigative reports would put them out of bus-
iness. If this is true, then the real question is not what to do with 
sources, but whether inspection bureaus serve a valid purpose. 
In fact, one doesn't have to choose between extremes. It is probably 
true that the man on the street would be less willing to make truthful 
negative statements about his associates if he knew that his comments 
to an investigator might ultimately be disclosed to the subject. It is also 
probably true that some sources might suffer reprisals, even violence, if 
source identification is revealed. However, even under the FCRA as it 
exists, the possiblity of disclosure of sources is real. Sources may be 
identified by inference from other information that is disclosed tinder 
section 609. 
If there is a re-investigation due to a consumer's challenge of report-
ed information, the source will probably be put on notice that his earlier 
~tatements had been questioned. The FTC informally advises that re-
Investigations might include returning to the original source, in which 
case "it is only fair, both to the sources and the consumer, to warn the 
sources that their names could be discovered if litigation should en-
sue:'150Nonetheless, disclosure of sources prior to litigation would prob-
ably have a significant impact on the awareness of informants that their 
names could be discovered, and would probably lead to the much-feared 
·:drying up" of the flow of information. The pro's and con's of elimina-
ting the source exception are difficult to weigh, and it would probably ---ISO. 4 CCH CCG. supra note 22, 9 11 ,306 at 59,796. 
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be premature to take this step, which could wipe out a useful industry, 
without more information, especially when the consumer has the alter-
native of litigation where the withholding of source identification ap-
pears· to be causing significant damage. 
Even if full disclosure of sources is rejected, the fear of revealing 
sources is no justification for failing to require the provision of a copy 
of an investigative report to the consumer. The usual procedure for in-
spection bureaus is to include in a report the number of informants and 
the length of time informants have known the subject, but not the 
actual identity of informants. Where such identity is retained for the 
file (and it isn't always retained), it is usually written on the back of the 
file copy of the report. A reproduction of the file copy would not dis-
close the source. Moreover, if the medical information exception is in-
terpreted as suggested (i.e., to stress knowing consent) there would be 
little likelihood of a copy of a report disclosing exempted medical infor-
mation. 
Inspection bureaus should be required to disclose a copy of all re-
ports that have been made on the consumer. This recommendation 
might lead some reporting agencies to avoid putting sensitive informa-
tion into writing by transmitting such information orally.151Enforcement 
might be difficult, but the FCRA should be amended to require that all 
investigative consumer reports be reduced to writing. In order to insure 
that sources are available to a consumer during litigation, the FCRA 
should be amended to require that the identity of all investigative 
sources be retained in-}ilefor a reasonable length of time, e.g. one year. 
5. How Should the Cost of Access Be Allocated? 
Disclosure of file content involves certain economic costs. Most 
credit bureaus have had to hire additional employees to staff a consu-
mer relation division which can cope with the new flow of consumers 
seeking disclosure. Inspection bureaus, which generally require disclo-
sures to be made by high-ranking executives, must consider the cost of 
executive time taken up in consumer contacts. Time to pull a file, read 
it to a consumer, and perhaps counsel the consumer on how to improve 
his record:52all cost enough to make increased rates a possibility. 
I 51. "It is sometimes unwise to submit an unfavorable report in writing, where the informati?n 
is difficult to prove legally, to a small or new local account or to an account of unknown qualtty 
even in another city." Retail Credit Co. Manager Manual, page C-27, dated Oct. 1963. In reply t_o 
the question, "Under what circumstances do you transmit reports orally to clients?" Retail Credtt 
Co. responded, "Only when customer needs rush handling. Field Representatives would call the 
customer and give the information orally, but this is always followed by a written report. Would 
apply to well under l o/o of our reports." Letter from Henry A. McQuade, to U. CHI. L. REV .. Feb. 
23, 1972. . 
I 52. A common example of such counselling involves explaining the procedure for filing a ~ott~~ 
of judgment satisfaction at the court in order to clear the record of a paid-up debt which ts stl 
officially outstanding. 
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The FCRA permits the consumer reporting agency to make "reason-
able" charge to any consumer who was not the subject of adverse action 
within thirty days~53This charge averages $5,154but because very few con-
sumers seek disclosure merely because of curiosity:55the reporting agen-
cies have absorbed most of the cost of disclosure. This seems equitable, 
since the reporting agencies (and if prices are raised, their clients) 
should consider the consumer's well-being a part of the cost of engaging 
in a business which necessarily carries with it the possibility of harming 
consumers. But if this is true, why should any consumer bear the cost 
of disclosure? 
C. CORRECTIONS 
A third problem pointed out in the Senate Report was that consu-
mers sometimes had difficulty in correcting inaccurate information in 
their files: 
Some credit reporting agencies proceed on the assumption that an 
individual is guilty until proven innocent and refuse to delete infor-
mation which is no longer verifiable unless the consumer can prove 
otherwise. In other cases, the consumer may have difficulty in getting 
his version of a legitimate dispute recorded in his credit file.156 
The FCRA attacked this problem by stating in section 611 that if a 
consumer challenges any information in his file the reporting agency 
must re~investigate and record the current status of the information.157 
. For a credit bureau, a re-check is not expensive, since it generally 
Involves no more than a couple of telephone calls. Where investigative 
consumer reports are involved, on the other hand, the re-investigation 
(or "re-handling") necessitates sending an inspector into the field to 
t~~k with the original or additional sources. Because of the possibility of 
hhgation an executive actively concerns himself with the case, with the 
result that an average re-handling may cost as much as $100, including 
management and clerical time.158 --:53. FCRA, supra note 5, § 612. c 54: Retail Credit Co. charges $5. If a Motor Vehicle Report is included in the disclosure, the 
a~~ ts added on. Retail Credit Co .. memorandum concerning compliance with FCRA section 609, 
1 
end um, June 24, 1971. 
1
55. See note 99 supra. 
156. S. REP. NO. 91-517, supra note 51, at 3. th 57. Re-investigation is not required if the reporting agency "has reasonable grounds to believe F"fh the dispute by the consumer is frivolous or irrelevant." FCRA, supra note 5, § 6ll(a). The 
s staff has warned that "frivolous or irrelevant" must not be used as a loophole. 4 CCH CCG. 
::Pra note 22, S 11,306 at 59,795. The reporting agencies interviewed stated that they had not had 
1caston to decline a requested re-investigation . a 58. Letter from Henry A. McQuade, Retail Credit Co., to U. CHI. L. REV., Feb. 23, 1972. The 
The;age_ handling time per contact for Retail Credit Co. is twenty-four minutes. ~et~il Cr~it Co., 
r e Fatr Credit R eporting Act. A Progress Report, dated October 1972. The Illtnots Servtce Bu-
wa1~. estimates its cost of re-investigation to be no more than $25, all inclusive. Interview with 
1 tam Dorf, President, I.S .B., Chicago, Nov. 14, 1972. 
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How intensive a re-investigation is required? The law is silent, but 
the FTC staff has recommended that the re-investigation must be a 
good-faith effort, and it should include checking with the original 
source, who ought to be informed of the nature of the dispute. Addi-
tional sources might also be contacted, the FTC staff suggests, and fair-
ness would dictate that the sources be warned that their names could 
be discovered in litigation. 159 
The most typical causes of dispute include faulty identification of 
subjects by the reporting agency, frequently involving a confusion of 
"juniors" and "seniors," or the misfiling of information due to the 
presence of many files on people with the same last name. These prob-
lems are easily resolved under the section 611 procedures. 
Another recurring problem results from the fact that there is no 
mandatory public filing of judgment satisfactions, releases on tax liens, 
and other documents which would signify to a reporting agency that a 
consumer had fulfilled his obligations. Thus an accurate representation 
of the public record as it exists at the time a report is furnished may 
not be an accurate representation of the consumer's financial and legal 
position. State legislation making mandatory and timely filings of satis-
factions of judgments, releases, dismissals, and such other documents 
pertinent to the disposition of suits, judgments, and liens is clearly indi-
cated.160 
A third type of dispute which regularly occurs arises where the re-
porting agency is convinced that the consumer is lying. For example, an 
automobile insurance applicant, knowing that it will increase his pre-
mium if the insurer learns that he drives to work and parks his car on 
the street at night, might falsify the application. But if he fails to 
inform his family and neighbors of the falsification the insurance in-
spector will learn the truth. He may even note in his report that he 
observed the car parked on the street at night but couldn't locate it at 
the consumer's residence during the day. Nevertheless, when the consu-
mer is notified that he has been up-rated, he demands that the inspec-
tion bureau re-investigate. By this time, of course, the family and neigh-
bors have the story straight, and the car is temporarily kept in the 
garage. 
Under section 611(a) of the FCRA, the inspection bureau would 
have to delete the original information because it could no longer be 
159. 4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, 9 11,306 at 59,795. 
160. This has been recommended by the Governor's Task Force on Credit and Personnel Report· 
ing in California. Sullivan Hgs .. supra note 37, at 126. The President of Hale-Prietsch Services 
suggests that the debtor should pay the $2 filing fee in Chicago, but that the plaintiffs attor~ey 
should be obligated to file a notice of satisfaction when a judgment has been satisfied . IntervieW 
with Paul Prietsch, President, Hale-Prietsch Services, Chicago, Jan. 18, 1972. 
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verified. This does not make particularly good sense, and some inspec-
tors admit that they handle this kind o{ situation by reporting that the 
re-investigation has confirmed the original information through addi-
tional (un-named) sources. Such a course would make the inspection 
bureau susceptible to suit under section 616 of the FCRA, but the 
chance of the consumer pursuing the matter into court is believed to be 
minimal. · 
The majority of disclosures do not lead to re-investigation.161 Appar-
ently the proportion of consumer reports containing errors is not larg~:2 
and most consumers who seek disclosure are satisfied with the know-
ledge that their record, however unfavorable, is accurate. 
If a re-investigation occurs and it is found that the disputed infor-
mation was indeed mistaken, or if the original information can no 
longer be verified, the reporting agency must promtly delete the infor-
mation from its records.163 At the time of deletion, the agency must 
ci_early disclose to the consumer that he may request the agency to fur-
ntsh notification that the item has been deleted to any person specifi-
cally designated by the consumer who has received a consumer report 
within the last six months~ 64 Interviews with consumer report users indi-
cate that this provision is rarely, if ever, utilized. 
If a dispute is not settled by re-investigation, the FCRA allows the 
consumer to file a brief statement setting forth the nature · of the dis-
pute!65The agency may limit the statement to one hundred words if it 
provides assistance to the consumer in writing the statement~66 This pro-
vision has not been invoked with any frequency. During the first half-
Year under the FCRA, the largest credit bureau in Chicago had only 10 
supplemental statements.167 --1161. Retail Credit Co. re-handles 7'/z% of disclosures, American Service Bureau , 15%, Credit 
5
nformation Corporation of Chicago, 25%, and Credit Bureau of Western Cook County, 10%. 
ources li sted in Appendix One. 
162. Of the reports re-investigated under the FCRA, the American Service Bureau has found it 
nec~ssary to revise 25o/o, Illinois Service Bureau, 0% (there was one re-investigation), Credit Infor-
~latlo~ Corporation of Chicago, tO%, and Credit Bureau of Western Cook County, 5%. Sources 
~sted 1n Appendix One. This is generally in line with information provided to the Governor's Task 
Orce on Credit and Personnel Reporting in California in 1%9, where reporting errors were dis-
~overed in 7% of the cred it reports, and 5% of the personnel reports which were re-investigated. 
Ul/ivan Hgs .. supra note 37, at 130. 
:~~ · FCRA, supra note 5, § 61l(a). 
u<t. FCRA, supra note 5, § 6tl(d). 
165. FCRA, supra noteS,§ 6ti(b). The statement (or a summary or code) must be included in 
all subsequent consumer reports. FCRA, supra noteS, § 611(c). 
166. At TRW Credit Data the supplementary statement is given a code summary, which enters 
the computer. The full statement remains in a manual file and is read to the inquirer by an opera-
tor. Interview with Gilbert Hamblet, Vice President, TRW, Chicago, Jan. 12, 1972. 
C
l67. Interview with T.E. Sheahen, Vice President, Credit Information Corporation of Chicago. 
h•cago, Jan. 25, 1972. 
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It has been suggested168that corrections and supplemental statements 
should be sent to other consumer reporting agencies as well as to consu-
mer report users in order to reduce the consumer's task in setting his 
record straight. The consumer, of course, is free to do this on his own, 
at his own expense; but to place this burden on the consumer reporting 
agency would be unworkable in a metropolitan area like Chicago, 
where the corrections would have to be sent to dozens of agencies, not 
to consider the non-local reporting market. 
D. CONFIDENTIALITY 
A fourth problem of the consumer reporting industry noted in the 
Senate Report was that information in a person's credit file is not al-
ways kept strictly confidential!69 An example of the easy relationship 
that existed between the consumer reporting agencies 170 and the govern-
ment may be seen: in the following excerpt from the Retail Credit Co.'s 
Manager Manual: 
[Requests for file information frotn Federal authorities] usually come 
from FBI men, and investigators from the Intelligence Units of the 
Internal Revenue Service of the U.S. Treasury Department. . . Where 
Treasury Department investigators ask to photostat our files, assure 
yourself that the investigator understands that the information is 
only hearsay and not guaranteed information ... Make such notes 
from what you learn from the inquiring authority, as will help on 
future investigations, but be sure they are used only as tips to direct 
the inspector handling an inquiry on the case, to enable him to de-
velop the factual information. The inspector must not reveal in his 
report that we have had this inquiry from a government agency.171 
Besides government agencies, private individuals who lacked any legiti-
mate purpose were sometimes able to gain access to consumer reports. 
An example which seemed to impress the Senate 172 involved a completely 
fictitious company created by a TV network for the purpose of testing 
the procedures of credit bureaus. The fictitious company was able to 
obtain 10 out of 20 reports requested at random from 20 credit bu-
reaus.173 
In response to the apparent looseness of reporting agency proce-
dures, the FCRA set forth three permissible circumstances under which 
168. Note, Protecting Consumers from Arbitrary. E rroneous. and Malicious Credit Information. 
4 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 403 (1971). 
169. SEN . REP. NO. 91 ·517, supra note 51, at 4. 
170. Not a ll reporting agencies were equally willing to cooperate with the government, but the 
courts generally came down on the side of the governmental investigators. See, e.g., U.S. v. Davey. 
426 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970). 
171. Page C-82, dated Oct. 1963. Policy changed since FCRA. 
172. SEN. REP. NO. 91 -517, supra note 51, at 4. 
173. See A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 72 (1971). 
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a consumer report can be furnished by a consumer reporting agency. A 
report can be furnished: (1) In response to a court order; (2) In accor-
dance with the written instructions of the subject; and (3) To a person 
whom the agency has reason to believe has a legitimate business need 
for the information in a credit, employment, insurance, or other busi-
ness transaction1174 with the consumer.175 
There are several additional provisions supporting these permissible 
purpose rules. Reporting agencies are required to maintain reasonable 
procedures for compliance, and these include that prospective users of 
consumer reports "identify themselves, certify the purposes for which 
information is sought, and certify that the information will be used for 
no other purpose."176Any person who knowingly and willfully provides 
information concerning an individual from a reporting agency's files to 
a person not authorized to receive that information is subject to fine 
and imprisonment.177 Conversely, one who obtains information from a 
consumer reporting agency under false pretenses is also liable to fine 
and imprisonment.178 
To comply with the FCRA, consumer reporting agencies modified 
their service contracts by adding a section outlining the FCRA and 
binding the recipient of any report to comply with the law in all re-
spects~79ln effect, any subscriber who signs the agreement gives a con-
tinuing certification that he has a legitimate purpose and will make 
le~itimate use of any report he requests. The potential weaknesses of 
thts system have been frequently commented upon:80 but an alternative 
system which would be both workable and foolproof has yet to be depic-
ted. The main area to be strengthened lies in defining "legitimate busi-
ness purpose" narrowly enough to keep the reporting agencies on guard 
lest they become passive partners in their subscribers' violations. This 
the FTC can do without additional authority. 
In dealing with governmental use of consumer reporting agencies, 
the FCRA attempted to distinguish between the legitimate requests of 
PUblic officials and mere snooping. The law bravely states that govern-
tnent officials are permitted to obtain consumer reports under only two ---1 174. Including cases where the information is to be used "in connection with a determination of 
he consumer's eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality 
§e~uu·ect by law to consider an applicant's financial responsibility or status." FCRA. supra note 5, 
I 04(3)(0). 
1
75. FCRA, supra note 5, § 604. 
1 ;~· FCRA, supra note 5, § 607. 
178
· FCRA, supra note 5, § 620. 
1 
· FCRA, supra note 5, § 619. . 
1
79. An example may be found in Appendix Five. 
N 80. See, e.g., Ullman, Liability of Credit Bureaus After the Fair Credit R eporting Act: The 
R. eedfor Further R eform, 17 VILL. L. REV. 44, 66 (1971); Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit 
L eports, 80 YALE L. J. 1035, 1066 (1971); Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 STAN. 
· REV. 550, 559 (1972). 
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circumstances: (1) When the information is to be used in connection 
with a determination of the consumer's eligibility for a license or other 
benefit, where the governmental agency is required by law to consider 
the applicant's financial responsibility or status;181or (2) Where the gov-
ernment has an "otherwise legitimate business need." 182 
Informal FTC staff opinions have thrown only limited light on what 
government purposes are legitimate. For example, non-legitimate pur-
poses include governmental surveys or economic studies.183 (Interviews 
were unable to ascertain how broadly the adjective "legitimate" is 
stretched in practice.) In all situations not covered by the two permis-
sible purposes, the reporting agency is allowed to furnish government 
representatives no more than identifying information; viz., the consu-
mer's name, address, former address, place of employment, and former 
places of employment.184 
Withholding information from non-legitimate recipients is the 
responsibility of the consumer reporting agency. The FTC staff has 
suggested that each government agent seeking information be required 
to complete a form certifying the specific purpose for which he seeks 
information and stating that the information will be used for no other 
purpose and be given to no other agency!85Whether this suggestion has 
been taken to heart could not be determined from the interviews con-
ducted by the author, but there was general agreement among respon-
dents that government usage of reporting agencies had substantially 
decreased. 
Government agencies believed to have made use of consumer reports 
prior to the FCRA were invited to evaluate the impact of the new law 
on their work. Responses are reproduced in Appendix Six. In general, 
the responses indicate that the government agencies took affirmative 
action to avoid violation of the FCRA, that the FCRA has resulted in 
governmental investigations taking longer and costing the public more 
than in the past, and that alternative sources of information were devel-
oped to replace adequately the consumer reporting agencies. 
E. PUBLIC RECORD INFORMATION 
The Senate Report accompanying the Proxmire bill identified public 
record information as another area of abuse! 86 Most consumer reporting 
agencies either systematically compile records of such items as law 
181. FCRA, supra note 5, § 604(3XD). 
182. FCRA, supra note 5, § 604(3XE). 
183. 4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, S 11,304 at 59,786. 
184. FCRA, supra note 5, § 608. 
185. 4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, S 11,306 at 59,799. 
186. S. REP. NO. 91-517, supra nofe 51, at 4. 
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suits, tax liens, arrests, indictments, convictions, bankruptcies, judg-
ments, and other publicly recorded data, or obtain such data on an ad 
hoc basis by sending their representatives to the courts. Public record 
items are often culled from newspapers or purchased from special 
sources such as the daily law reporters187or state motor vehicle depart-
ments.188 
Except for "clean" motor vehicle records (MVR's), nearly all public 
~ecord information finding its way into the personal information market 
ts potentially adverse. Some of it is undoubtedly inaccurate or incom-
plete, largely because of the absence of mandatory satisfaction filing~~9 
Newspaper clippings have a particular proclivity for causing problems 
because of incomplete identification of their subjects.190 · 
The FCRA's approach to public record information reflects a com-
promise between Senator Proxmire's original intention of requiring the 
r~porting agency to inform the individual whenever it received poten-
honally adverse public record information and the industry's contention 
that such a control would force the reporting agencies to cease filing 
a~d reporting this highly relevant data!91 0n the theory that a consumer 
Wtll be more seiously harmed if he loses a job or job opportunity due to 
erroneous or incomplete information than if he merely gets turned 
down for credit or insurance, the FCRA provided controls that are 
applicable only when public record information is used for employment 
purposes.192 
. Reporting agencies are given a choice in mode of compliance. Sec-
t~on 613 allows the reporting agency to (1) notify the consumer at the 
hme a report is made that public record information is being reported 
for employment purposes, naming the recipient; or (2) maintain strict 
~rocedures to insure that all potentially adverse public record informa-
tion is up-to-date and complete,. reflecting the current public record 
status when it is reported. In practice, the first alternative is used less 
fre9.uent1y because many employment-purpose investigations follow a 
Pohcy of not contacting the subject.193 
-----:87. See profile of Chicago Law Bulletin, Appendix One. 
c 88. See profile of Illinois Bureau of Motor Vehicle Services, Appendix One. The FTC staff has 
a onsJstently taken the position that a state motor vehicle department is a consumer reporting 
1 ~~~cy under the FCRA. An official interpretation to this effect is expected. FTC News, Mar. 8, 
18 ;June16.1972. 
1 9. See text a t note 160 supra. In~· Co_mputerization may reduce the amount of newspaper clipping by credit bureaus; Credit 
lnt ormatton Corporation of Chicago, at least, dropped this activity when it went to computer. 
1 ervtew with T.E. Sheahen, Vice President, C.I.C., Chicago, Jan. 25, 1972. lo 91. Sullivan Hgs .. supra note 37, at 147. The relevance of some items, such as arrests not fol-
l;;d by convictions, is certainly open to question. 
19 · FCRA, supra note 5, § 613. 3. Interview with Tom Linnen, Manager-Operations, Retail Credit Co., Chicago, Jan. 20, 1972. 
78 Consumer Journal [Vol. 11:37 
Congressman Koch of New York has proposed an amendment to 
the FCRA which would require the consumer reporting agency both to 
notify the consumer when public record information is being reported, 
and to maintain strict procedures to keep the information up-to-date 
and complete1•94 The first leg of the proposal, notification whenever pub-
lic record information is reported, is similar to the original Proxmire 
proposal and is susceptible to the same arguments of burden. Mainten-
ance of strict procedures to keep public record information up-to-date 
and complete, on the other hand, would appear to be a workable re-
quirem ent for all reports, employment and otherwise. Indeed, interviews 
left the impression that reporting agencies made no more than very 
minor changes in their procedures to comply with the "strict proce-
dures" alternative in section 613. Once again, the real problem has 
rested not with the reporting agencies but with the public records them-
selves . 
Because public records may not be up-to-date and complete, strict 
procedures on the part of a consumer reporting agency will not neces-
sarily protect the consumer. Since the consumer himself is the only per-
son who can say with certainty that a court record or newspaper article 
is accurate and complete, the ideal solution would be to require that he 
be interviewed prior to dissemination of any report containing such 
information. If we admit that this would be time consuming and expen-
sive, with a pay-off in only a minority of cases, we should nevertheless 
follow out the logic which in section 613 created a separate requirement 
for public record information used for employment purposes. Where 
public record information is to be furnished for employment purposes, 
the consumer reporting agency should be required to make a good faith 
effort to interview the subject of the report prior to dissemination.195 
F. OBSOLETE DATA 
"Creditors obviously have a right to know if a person has had trou-
ble in paying his bills. At the same time," Senate Report 91 -517 said, 
"it can be unfair to burden a consumer for life with a bad credit record 
if he has improved his performance."196The growth of dossiers in the 
personal information market 
creates a potential 'record prison' for millions of Americans, as past 
mistakes, omissions, or misunderstood events become permanent 
194. H.R. 10434, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1 971). 
195. This proposal may create two problems. First, should some employment situations be ex-
empted (e.g .• where an employer suspects that a present employee is stealing, and wants an inves-
tiga tory report without letting the employee know of the investiga tion)? Second , by increasing ~he 
burdens on employment reporting carri'ed out by consumer reporting agencies, we may be inducmg 
companies to do an increasing proportion of their own unregulated in-house investigations. See 
text at note 251 infra. 
I% . S. REP. NO. 91 -517, supra note 51, at 4. 
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evidence capable of controlling destinies for decades. Out-of-date 
facts, such as previous political affiliations or nervous disorders, 
often go unrevised, and these can hauht a person's life.197 
79 
How long is a reasonable period in which accurate adverse informa-
tion about individuals should be permitted to be retained in a credit 
file? The FCRA codified the voluntary industry guidelines of the Asso-
ciated Credit Bureaus 1 ~8-fourteen years for bankruptcy information and 
seven years for all other kinds of adverse information~99 There is nothing 
inherently correct in the time limits chosen~00whatever limits are selected 
wili necessarily reflect an arbitrary balancing of the consumer's privacy 
and commercial need. 
It is difficult to imagine what kind of evidence might be adduced to 
support the proposition that the present standard is inappropriate. The 
main controversy (and a minor one at that) revolves around the question 
of whether a Chapter 13 Wage-Earner's Bankruptcl01should be consi-
dered a bankruptcy, and be reportable for 14 years; or an honest effort 
of a debtor to pay all his debts, reportable for only 7 years~02 The FTC 
staff takes the position that wage-earner plans are not bankruptcies for 
purposes of the FCRA;03 but as Appendix Seven indicates, consumer 
reporting agencies are not of one mind on this. To promote consistency, 
a formal FTC interpretation is in order. 
Information which has become legally obsolete may be!retained204'but 
~ot used, except in connection with: (1) a credit transaction expected to 
t~volve a principal amount of $50,000 or more; (2) the underwriting of 
hfe insurance reasonably expected to involve a face amount of $50,000 
or more; or (3) the employment of an individual at an annual salary of 
$20,000 or more.205 . 
Because of these exceptions, some reporting agencies see no reason 
to destroy data that is statutorily old; it might be needed for a future 
"high finance" report. To assure that obsolete data is not used illegally, 
however, procedures have been instituted to screen out-going reports. --197. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 160 (1967). 
: ~8. ACB, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 6 (1971). 
2 9. FCRA, supra note 5, § 60S(a). c.f , § 605(b). 
2 00. Mrs. Sullivan's House bill would have set 3 years .for many ite.ms. f:I.R. 1634q. 91st Cong. , ~ d Sess. 0969). This proposal would have created confusiOn by adoptmg dtfferent agmg standards 
or dtfferent categories of information. 
201. II U.S.C. § 1001 et seq .. providing that a wage-earner may have the option to file a plan for 
P2Yment of his debts in full over a period not exceeding 3 years under court supervision. 
02. See statement of Royal E. Jackson, Chief, Bankruptcy Division, U.S. Courts , Sullivan Hgs., 
s~gra note 37, at 294. 
2 3. 4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, S 11,306 at 59,791. . . . th 04. The Sullivan bill would have required that obsolete mformatlon be physically removed from 
2~rles. H.R. !6340, 91st Cong .• 2d Sess. (1969). · FCRA, supra note 5, § 60S(b). 
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This does not appear to be a problem area. Indeed, if Appendix Seven 
presents a fair sample, it may be concluded that the costs of storage 
outweigh the costs of purging old information and only a fraction of the 
total data is retained in-file for more than 5 years. Continued compu-
terization promises to reduce even this amoune06 
G. INVESTIGATIONS AND PRIVACY INVASION 
Senate Report 91 -517 called attention to the pitfalls of gathering 
highly sensitive and personal information about an individual's private 
life, laying stress on the fact that such information is not only subjec-
tive, but is often of only marginal relevance to legitimate commercial 
needs~07 While neither the Senate Report nor the FCRA defined what is 
meant by "highly sensitive and personal information" or "marginal 
relevance to legitimate commercial needs," it is clear from the hearing 
which preceded the repore08 that Congress was thinking primarily of the 
investigations carried out by the inspection bureaus and in particular 
their focus upon the characters, habits, and morals of applicants for 
insurance or employment. Before evaluating the effectiveness of the 
FCRA in this area, therefore, it will be necessary to supply a fuller 
background on the activities of the inspection bureaus. 
1. Theory and Practice of Insurance Inspections 
The purpose of insurance is to distribute on a regular and moderate 
basis the expected economic losses of an unknown few among many 
who are susceptible to the loss.209 To succeed, an insurance company 
must be able to predict the extent and timing of the losses that may be 
sustained by the entire group covered. This requires establishing a 
"standard risk" which is representative of the degree of risk the firrn 
considers "normal" for the class of policyholders it proposes to cover. 
"For probability theory to be applied in a realistic and useful manner 
206. 
Unlike old fash ioned paper files , where storage is very cheap but selective removal 
of data is very expensive, in the case of the computer tile, storage is very expensive 
and selective removal is very cheap . Storage costs can run as much as half of the 
total computer cost. Consequently, the storage of information which is old and out-
dated simply cannot be permitted. 
Sta tement of Dr. Harry Jord an, TRW Info rm ation Services (now TRW Credit Data), Sulliv~n 
Hgs .. supra note 37, a t 159. This is not to suggest that computerization presents no potentta l 
threa t to privacy: the MIB file, described in the text at note 138 supra, is an example of how htghly 
private, often subjective, data might be computerized. As Professor Miller observes, "Today's l ~ser 
technology already makes it feasible to store a twenty-page dossier on every American on a ptec
2
e 
of tape tha t is less than fi ve thousand feet long. " A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY I 
(1 97 1 ). If, for example, Retail Credit Co. were to miniaturize and centralize its files, with comput~r 
retrieval, private information on 40 million citizens could be available immediately anywhere 10 
the country. 
207. S. REP. NO. 91 -51 7, supra note 51 , at 4. 
208. See the hearings cited in notes 37, 48 and 68, supra. 
209. FLINN, note 65 supra a t 100. 
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by the individual firm , it is imperative that each applicant for insurance 
be evaluated in relation to the standat:ds for acceptance adopted by 
that firm. This is the essential purpose of any underwriting inspection:' 210 
In determining whether a particular applicant for insurance quali-
fies as a standard risk, information about that person is needed. In 
particular, it may be necessary to know about the applicant's physical 
condition, his attitude, his environment, and his heredity. These consti-
tute what is known as the applicant's "personal hazard."1211 Where can 
an underwriter obtain this kind of information? 
The most obvious source is the applicant himself; he provides most 
of the information needed when he fills out the insurance application. 
But the applicant wants his policy to be accepted, and at the lowest 
premium. He may lie. Or he may forget. Or he may tell only half a 
story, thinking it sufficient. 
. What about the agent? He represents the company and can provide 
Information about the applicant, which he does. But the applicant may 
be his friend; and he does want to sell the policy. If he appears to be 
too probing, he might not be able to make his sales. So the agent, like 
the applicant, is not a sufficient source. 
Other sources are possible. For physical information, there is the 
physician, either the applicant's or the company's or both. But the 
Physician can say relatively little about the applicant's attitude (his 
character, habits and morals) or environment. For information about 
What other insurors have learned in the past, there are intercompany 
data banks. But what if the applicant is not already on record? What if 
the record is old or misleading? 
For many years, insurance companies experimented with various 
Ways of obtaining the extra, independent information they needed. Law-
Yers, consumer credit bureaus, mercantile agencies, commerical agents; 
th:se were tried, but found wanting:m By 1870, some insurance comp-
~ntes were using their own men to undertake inspections of applicants:!IJ 
n 1901, Retail Credit Co. entered upon the scene as the pioneer inde-
~endent insurance inspection service. By specialization, wide distribu-
tion, low cost standardized methods, and aggressive marketing, Retail ---~:o. Id. at 102. 
b t I. ld. a t 95. The more accurately the underwriter can evaluate personal hazard, in theory, the 
sue ter Wtll be his company's loss experience, and the fairer the distribution of risks among in-
reds 
b~ l 2. I d. at 160. Detective agencies were apparently never used for inspection reports . presumably 
2~a use their services were too expensive. 
in 3· ld. a t 158. The Equitable Life Assurance Society appears to have been the first company to 
in srsct Its policyholders regularly , beginning in 1870. The decision to inspect applicants was made 
92, when the Equitable reduced its contestability period to one year from issue. !d. . 
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Credit Co. convinced the insurance companies that independent inspec-
tions were a key to sound underwriting. Today only a minority of insur-
ance applicants--those under a particular age applying for less than a 
particualr amount of coverage--are not inspected by Retail Credit Co. 
or one of its competitors. 
The growth and shaping of the inspection bureaus reflected the 
needs of the insurance companies. These needs included (a) low cost 
per report, (b) speed of reporting, (c) standardization of reports, and (d) 
accuracy of information. 
a. Low Cost. The standard inspection report in Chicago 
costs the insurance company $5.25. For more penetrating investiga-
tions, where coverage will be extensive or where there is reason to be-
lieve that the subject presents an unusual risk, the inspection will be 
charged at twice or triple the standard rate. Open-ended investigations 
will be charged at an hourly rate, averaging $10.50 in Chicago. 
The capital requirements of an inspection bureau are minimal. The 
major items of expense are an office, preferably with telephone, desks 
and typewriters; file cabinets; and salaries for management, inspectors, 
and clerks. Low entry cost into the industry entices many inspectors 
with national bureaus to resign and open up their own independent 
bureaus. If they can develop contacts with underwriters and other 
insurance company management personnel, they may land orders for 
inspections sufficient to survive. The local independents have been most 
successful in dealing with the fire and casualty insurers. With market 
entry so easy, established bureaus are constrained to keep their prices 
low; indeed, at this writing, a number of newcomers in the Chicago 
market have cut prices and created a minor price war.214 
Given this orientation to competitive pricing for the favors of the 
insurance companies, it is natural that inspectors will not be highly 
paid professionals. The following classified ad is symptomatic: 
Male-- Misc. Employ. 
INSPECTORS 
MAKING insurance and business reports. 
No experience, minimum age 21 with car. 
Earnings depending on production. 
1313 SW 27 Ave. 215 
To qualify as an inspector, one must generally have a high school diplo-
ma, a car, and an ability to get along with people. Some inspection 
214. Interview with William Dorf, President, Illinois Service Bureau, Chicago, Dec. 18, 1972. 
215. Miami Herald, April 24, 1972, at 28-C. The address is Retail Credit Co.'s Miami office. 
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bureaus also require typing skills, but the trend in recent years has 
been for the bureau to provide secretari.es. 
"Earnings depending on production." While there are variations 
from one inspection bureau to the next, the general structure of the 
industry relates an inspector's salary to his production. Either directly 
or indirectly, this means that the inspector receives a percentage of the 
selling price of each report he prepares~ 1 6 Furthermore, the inspector's 
commission may be based on a set "quota" of reports made by him. If 
~he quota is surpassed, a bonus is paid~ 1 7 If the quota is not met, the 
~nspector will be reprimanded and may ultimately lose his job. Most 
Inspectors receive per mile travel expenses. 
A new inspector usually receives some training, often in the nature 
of on-the-job exposure to the methods of senior inspectors. The amount 
of training varies greatly among the inspection bureaus. When an in-
spector is fresh to the job, he is only expected to complete 12-14 reports 
a day. An experienced inspector is expected to handle as many as 24 
reports a day. When an inspector is sent out to prepare reports on con-
sumers living in rural areas (referred to as being "on circuit"), he might 
?btain the information for 40-60 reports in a single da/18ln short, the 
Inspection industry is structured so that each inspector produces the 
~aximum possible number of reports. That this is economically effi-
Cient seems clear; whether it results in a conflict with another insurance 
company need, accurate information, is a matter yet to be weighed. 
b. Speed. There are two main reasons why the insur-
a?ce companies desire speed of reporting from the inspection bureaus. 
First, the longer it takes to approve an application, the greater the 
Possibility that the potential insured will change his mind or ta~e his 
business elsewhere. Second, the premiums don't come in, and coverage 
doesn't begin until the inspection report has been received and the 
application evaluated?19 Delay, therefore, doesn't serve either the com-
pany or the applicant. 
--216. Inspectors say that their average portion is about 40%, or $2 on a $5 report . Inspectors 
ea rn, they say, between $400 and $800 a month. 
217. Determined by the percentage base applied to the number of reports in excess of the quota. 
The possibility of this type of bonus is another incentive to produce the maximum number of re-
POrts . 
1218. Figures in this paragraph were offered in testimony by two former Retail Credit Co. inspec-ors tn Reta il Credit Co. v. Derryberry, note 96 supra. The manager of the Oklahoma City Retail 
~edtt Co. office testified that the experienced inspector would average 16 to I8 reports per day . 
. · Congress had been informed by Retail Credit Co.'s president that the average is around 12 
teports per day. Sullivan Hgs .. supra note 37, at 503. In speaking of averages, one should keep in 
llltnd that inspectors are called upon to make many different kinds of reports under varying cir-
curnstances, and that at least some of these reports can easily be made in a few minutes. /d. 
}19. There are exceptions. E.g., automobile insurance is often available to apparently good risks 
on btnder," pending the outcome of inspection. 
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Fast service is related to the production quota system. Having to 
complete as many reports as possible, the inspector cannot dawdle. At 
the "average" inspection bureau, the inspector is given a batch of order 
tickets when he arrives at the office in the morning. The manager (or in 
a large bureau, a supervisor) has already segregated the in-coming 
order tickets by geographic area so that an individual inspector can 
limit his range for the day. The manager has also run the order tickets 
through the files, to see if the subjects have been previously inspected 
or if there is any public record information, and if so, whether it is 
legally obsolete. The inspector reviews any files that were found for 
leads, plans his route, and leaves for the field. In most cases, he won't 
return to the office until the following morning, or perhaps even several 
days later, depending on the size of his batch of order tickets and how 
far away his inspection areas are. A few bureaus deal with their inspec-
tors almost entirely through the mail. This is particularly true in the 
instance of part-time fee inspectors ("correspondents") who are located 
in areas far removed from inspection bureau offices. 
Once the inspector has left the office he is on his own. The hours he 
keeps are his business, and in fact many inspectors have to work at 
night or on weekends to locate sources at home. The inspector is sup-
posed to interview at least two sources on each report, and seek addi-
tional confirmation where there is derogatory information!20 ·In the 
majority of inspections for insurance purposes, the applicant himself or 
an adult member of his family will be one source. Prior to the FCRA, 
there was a certain amount of hesita~cy in approaching the applicant, 
and the Retail Credit Co. Inspector Manual instructed: 
Interviews should be avoided: (1) when we have in file or develop on 
preliminary investigation information on habits, morals, or reputa-
tion which is sufficiently serious to probably cause rejection; (2) when 
the agency situation is serious; (3) when a customer requirement 
prohibits. 221 
Now that the FCRA gives the subject access to the file, the inspec-
tion bureaus are less reluctant to interview the subject of a report. A 
1972 revision to the Retail Credit Co. Life and Health Manual speaks 
of the advantages to be gained by a direct interview: 
* Applicant's identity can be conclusively established. 
* His physical appearance can be observed as well as his manner 
of living and environment. 
220. Retail Credit Co. Inspector Manual3l, page dated Oct. 1967. 
221. !d. at 48, page dated June 1964. 
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* Information regarding health, habits, drug use, arrests, and dri-
ving record can be obtained. 
* Leads for further investigation can be secured.222 
85 
Nevertheless, the revision still sets out reasons to avoid interviewing the 
subject, including (1) the inquiry instructs "Do Not Interview," and (2) 
"The possibility exists that the applicant may be disturbed by our in-
vestigation (he was disturbed by a previous handling, or we have a tip 
from file or the agent that we should avoid an interView unless abso-
lutely necessary). " 223 
With the stress on production and speed, it is inevitable that inspec-
tors sometimes cut corners. According to the inspection bureaus this is 
most rare, but according to former inspectors interviewed it happens 
regularly. One informant estimated that the inspector departs from the 
manuallO% of the time in city inspections, and much more often when 
"on circuit." According to the inspection bureaus, the reason why the 
former inspectors interviewed think corner-cutting is common is the 
same reason these inspectors are "former." 224 
. There are several well-tred avenues of corner-cutting. Instead of 
Interviewing two sources and confirming all derogatory data, the inspec-
tor may interview only one source. (One former inspector confided that 
?e had on several occasions seen other inspectors create sources and 
Information out of air.) Instead of street investigations, the inspector 
may rely heavily on the telephone. Instead of using old information 
("O.I.") from the file as a lead, the inspector may rely on the file as his 
sole or substantial source. Stock informants,225 such as bankers, service 
station attendants or grocery store managers may be relied on, particu-
larly in rural areas, even though their knowledge of a particular consu-
mer may be highly tenuous. Publi.c records may be entirely overlooked. --222. Retail Credit Co. Life and Health Manual, page E-2, 1972. · 
5
;23. ld., Retail Credit Co.'s revised Automobile Reports M anual states : "A direct interview 
111 
outd be attempted on every Automobile Report whenever not specifically prohibited by a custo-
re er overprint ." Page C-17, dated June 1972. The increased willingness to confront the subject of a 
lort, seen in the cited revisions, must be considered an important effect of the FCRA. 
al 24. It was not possible to obtain information from inspectors presently em~ed by the nation-r Thts, say former inspectors, is because the nationals have power to bta~;Kba ll a former em-
~ oyee from fu ture employment. The sources most impressive to the author were inspectors and 
n anagers presently employed by local independent bureaus who had previously worked for the 
attonals 
i ~2S. Retail Credit Co. utilizes a file which "lists informants who are in a logical position to give t ormation on a group of people and who have been interviewed quite frequently and are there-
hore cognizant of our business and what we want." But, inspectors are told , " Some business 
c~~ses have a rule that no information what~ver is to_ be given ou~ <?n em_Pioyees. When this oc-
a s, get the point up to the Manager , who wtll determme whether tt ts destrable to attempt to get 
r r~gul ar informant at the plant or place of business." Retail Credit Co. Inspector M anual, 33, 
evtsed in 1970 to change the word "informant" to "source." 
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In sum, although there is no evidence available as to how frequently 
corner-cutting occurs, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that 
official inspection bureau policy and actual inspector behavior do not 
always remain in close joint:26This does not necessarily imply that con-
sumers are injured by corner-cutting; in fact, it is reasonable to assume 
that a cheating inspector would not invent derogatory information, 
because this would be likely to be challenged and a cycle begun which 
would lead back to the inspector. The problem arises, more probably, 
from situations where time pressures lead the inspector to accept derog-
atory information without sufficiently checking it out. · A certain amount 
of error, sloppiness, and unverified gossip is likely to enter any inspec-
tion system which requires an investigator to average over 15 reports a 
day;27with a minimum of two sources per report; where the investigator 
must locate sources (sometimes situated over a large geographic area), 
must convince the sources to talk about matters that are sometimes 
highly personal and subjective, and must put interview notes into shape 
for the report.228 
c. Standardization. To satisfy the insurance companies' 
need for low-cost, speedy reporting for a variety of lines of insurance, 
the inspection bureaus have developed a high degree of standardization 
in their procedures. This is reflected in the fact that each line of insur-
ance is reported on a separate form, each form containing questions 
deemed important for the particular underwriting needs~29 ln gathering 
his information, the inspector has merely to ask the questions in the 
order they appear on the form. Because the forms are drawn to meet 
the needs of underwriters, they tend to be similar from one company to 
another. A few independent inspection bureaus have experimented with 
departures from the norm; for example, they have deleted from their 
automobile inspection reports all questions regarding the applicant's 
character, habits, and morals?30 
Other manifestations of standardization may be found, especially in 
the national inspection bureaus, where inspectors fill out daily 
production sheets listing the .number of reports made and the amount 
226. For litiga tion involving inspector foul -ups, see: Bartels v. Retail Credit Co., 185 Neb. 304, 
175 N.W.2d 292 (1970); Atwell v. Retail Credit Co., 431 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1970); Peacock v. 
Retail Credit Co., 302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Copley v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
295 F. Supp. 93 (S .D. W. Va. 1968); Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 201 A.2d 344 (Md. Ct. App .• 
1964); Wagner v. Retail Credit Co., 338 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1964); Petition of Retailers Commerctal 
Agency, Inc., 174 N.E.2d 376 (1961); and Weinrich v. Retail Credit Co., 186 F. Supp. 392 (W.D· 
Pa. 1960). 
227. See note 218 supra. 
228. Mechanisms for control are described in the text following note 231 supra. 
229. Examples are found in Appendix Eight. . 
230. A few insurance companies are experimenting with automobile inspections that don't tn-
volve these subjects. Such inspections usually imply a skimming of the better risks in the market. 
Results of such experiments were not yet available. 
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of "significant" (also called "protective") data which they have 
uncovered. These sheets form the basis for a highly systematic 
evaulation of the work of individual inspectors, and allow comparisons 
~o be made between branch offices and even between competing 
tnspection bureaus. 
. d. Accuracy. Insurance companies naturally want the 
Information they receive to be accurate and complete. If it is not, the 
w~ong underwriting decisions will be made and the inspection reports 
Wtll not be serving a useful purpose. The main area for concern, how-
ever, is not that too much derogatory information will be supplied, but 
t?o little. That is, if inspectors are not doing their work, they are more 
hkely to err on the consumer's side, so that there is little chance of 
being caught. 
. To counteract this possibility, great stress is placed on the produc-
tion of "significant data," information which might lead to declinations 
or rate-ups. Examples from Retail Credit Co. Form 930 (Significant 
Pe~ture and Inquiry Control) include "bankruptcy," "bad driving repu-
tation," "youthful driver in family," "driving violations," "going into 
~avy," "topless dancer," "polio, age 25," "high performance car," 
husband's driver license suspended," and "girl crazy--D student." 
Some, but not all, inspection bureaus keep close statistics on signifi-
c~nt data production. By trending from the past, they know how much 
stgnificant data an inspector would normally produce if he were doing 
an honest and efficient job. These norms are made known to the inspec-
tor.s and become in effect--according to former inspectors--a quota. 
P~tlure to meet the quota without good reason leads to reprimand or 
dtsmissal. · 
The inspection bureaus deny that they use a quota system for signi-
~cant data, but internal documents, as well as the information provided 
Cy former inspectors, indicate otherwise. For example, Retail Credit 
0 · supplied its employees a booklet titled "Objectives 1970," which 
Opens with a note from a company vice president saying, "I encourage 
You to keep and use this booklet ... Nowhere else will you be able to 
compile as much important information to help you understand the 
goals of your company." The booklet shows the company's average 
rercentage of cases with significant information for various insurance 
1
tnes (e.g., automobile services, 52.3 per cent; life and health services, 
?A per cent) and gives the latest statistic for the local office, together 
Wtth the objective. The booklet also provides figures on below-standard 
~nderwriting and below-standard operating, where reports have been 
ounct to suffer from various deficiencies. 
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Significant information is also used in competition between inspec-
tion bureaus for insurance company contracts. A Retail Credit Co. 
internal letter to California managers stated that an account with the 
American National Insurance Company had just been won back from 
the American Service Bureau as a direct result of developing more pro-
tective information than the competitor.231 
The inspector, then, is faced with two important pressures: he must 
produce a large number of reports, and he must produce a given quota 
of significant information. To minimize the hazards of this situation, 
the inspection bureaus build in certain production controls. The work 
of inspectors is under periodic review to see if the reports "ring true." 
Occasionally a second inspector is sent out to interview sources already 
interviewed, for the purpose of exposing discrepancies. If an underwri-
ter notes a conflict between an inspection report and other information 
available to him, he will contact the inspection bureau, and an explana-
tion will be sought. Finally, with the FCRA in effect, mistakes will be 
brought to light by the report subjects themselves. 
Whether these various protections are sufficient is a matter requir-
ing more evidence than is now available. The impression gained from 
many interviews is that the adequacy of production controls varies 
greatly from one bureau to another and between the various branch 
offices of a particular bureau.232 A key variable appears to be the skill 
and integrity of each office manager. 
2. Personnel Reporting by Inspection Bureaus 
Expansion of the national inspection bureaus into the field of 
employment reporting was natural. Where else could employers gain 
information about a potential or present employee's character, habits, 
morals, and reputation for such a reasonable price? 
Retail Credit Co. moved into employment reporting rather slowly, 
beginning in 1901 or 1902 as an aid to the insurance companies in their 
selection of agents and medical examiners.233 From the standpoint of 
sales volume, however, personnel reporting didn't become important 
until the beginning of the Second World War. "As early as 1940, the 
desire to employ only persons loyal to the principles of Democracy 
231. Letter of Oct. 27, 1971 from the Regional Vice President. 
232. Mistakes have been known to happen even in cases where large policies are involved . E.g .. 
United Family Insurance Company has sued Retail Credit Co. for $8 million, charging that it was 
misled by an inspection report into issuing $ 15 million worth of life insurance to an Oklahoma 
rancher . Atlanta Journa l, June 19, 1972. Apparently, the inspection greatly overstated the ranch· 
er's worth, obta ined figures on the size of his ranch from an erroneous newspaper clipping hung 
on a wa ll as a joke, and neglected to mention a variety of suspicious circumstances about the 
rancher 's life. The rancher was mysteriously murdered one year after the insurance was drawn. 
Wall Street Journal , Nov. 23 and 24, 1971, both at 1, col. 1. 
233. FLINN, note 65 supra, at 289. 
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induced the Lockheed Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation . .. to utilize 
the facilities of the Retail Credit Company." 234 
Prior to 1940, the company had maintained a policy of reporting on 
applicants only, but, William A. Flinn relates, "Because of the conflic-
ting ideologies fired up by the impending conflagration of total war, the 
firm's policy was amended to permit the making of reports on present 
employees or"armament manufacturers:'~35Today, employment reporting 
accounts for about 15 per cent of Retail Credit Co.'s report!i.36"Very 
few" employment reports are made to employers on present iemployees337 
For the other national inspection bureaus, the percentage of reports 
made for employment purposes is generally much smaller, and in abso-
lute terms, no inspection bureau approaches Retail Credit Co.'s 6 mil-
lion a year.238 
Personnel reports are sold to a variety of industrial, commercial, 
financial and insurance companies, and cover education, job history, 
employment experience, character and skills. They may go beyond this. 
Retail Credit Co. lists 16 different types of personnel report, some of 
which are full-scale detective-type investigations. One example is the 
"personal progress report." 
The personal progress report is drawn on one who is presently 
employed. The inspector is warned not to interview either the subject or 
his present employer. According to a Retail Credit Co. solicitation, 
These Reports provide investigations of the standing of the employee 
as a citizen, his civic and other community activities, records as to 
payment of bills, and personal finances. This type of investigation is 
suggested on employees under consideration for promotion or for 
transfer in position or location; for periodic checks of employees, 
especially those at detached locations seldom visited; when disturbing 
rumors concerning an employee are circulated, or in any situations 
requiring full investigations.239 
234. /d. at 293. 
235. /d. at 294. 
236. Letter from Henry A. McQuade, Retal Credit Co., to U. CHI. L. REV., Feb. 23, 1972. To 
understand the perceived need for employment reports, see Walsh, The Case for Applicant /nvesti· 
~ations, in BUSINESS AND INDUSTRIAL SECURITY:PRACTICAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (2d 
.ed., 1972), where it is related that in a study of over 6,000 employment applicants, highly skilled 
lflvestigators found that 1 in every 7 who had been considered suitable for hire turned out to have 
had an unfavorable background. 
2.37. McQuade letter, supra note 236. In Chicago, about 33% of Retail Credit Co.'s disclosures 
ar1se from personnel reports. /d. 
238. Figure relies on McQuade's IS% estimate, /d., applied to 40 million annual reports. Listing 
Application to New York Stock Exchange, A-30695, Mar. 1, 1971. Personnel reporting fluctuates 
With the state of the economy, and in 1971 accounted for only 6o/o of Retail Credit Co.'s volume. 
1971 Retail Credit Co. Annual Report, 7. 
239. Retail Credit Co. Brochure titled Personnel Reports for Better Selection of Personnel (1966). 
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The report is charged at an hourly rate. The investigator is directed to 
describe, among other things, "marital status, domestic life, personal 
reputation, habits, morals, and type of associates. Careful attention to 
personal standing in the neighborhood and community; whether popu-
lar, well-liked, or disliked. Describe membership and extent of partici-
pation in any civic, social or fraternal organizations. Cover other leisure 
time activities." 240 
3. The FCRA and Investigations 
Recognizing that inspection bureaus were in important ways dif-
ferent from credit bureaus, Congress created the concept of the investi-
gative consumer reporf241 to deal with reporting that involves personal 
interviews. Investigative consumer reports are subject to the same re-
quirements as regular reports, with two additional provisions. First, 
under section 606 of the FCRA, when a person procures an investigative 
consumer report he must disclose to the consumer within three days 
that the report is being made, and must inform the consumer that he is 
entitled to request a further disclosure of the nature and scope of the 
investigation. There is one exception: pre-notification is not necessary 
when the report is to be used for employment purposes for which the 
consumer has not specifically applied. Second, under section 614, a 
consumer reporting agency may not include adverse information in an 
investigative report drawn from a previous report more than three 
months old, unless the agency first verifies the information. 
Pre-notification is achieved in three different ways. Some insurance 
companies and employers incorporate a pre-notification of investigation 
in their application forms. Others supply their agents or hiring person-
nel with pre-notification letter which can be personally presented to the 
applicane42Finally, some insurance companies mail the pre-notification 
letter to the potential insured after the insurance application has been 
received by the company from the agent. 
The last method is sometimes used as an alternative, at the choice 
of the agent, when the agent believes that mention of an impending 
investigation may block his sale~43This is legal, so long as the insurance 
company delivers the pre-notification within three days after the inspec-
tion report is requested. The procedure makes clear, however, that the 
existing pre-notification provisions do not necessarily allow a consumer 
to exercise knowing consent to an investigation. Indeed, if matters are 
240. I d. Sample forms for personnel investigations appear in Appendix Eight. 
241. See note 102 supra. 
242. See Appendix Nine. 
243. Interview with John Mauck, Insurance Broker, Jan. 6, 1972. 
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moving efficiently, an investigation can be completed before the consu-
mer even knows that his application entails an investigation. To assure 
knowing consent, the FCRA should be amended to provide that the 
consumer be apprised of a possible investigation at the time he applies 
for insurance, employment, or credit, where the application normally 
entails an investigation. 
Even where pre-notification comes at a time when the consumer still 
has an opportunity to decide that he does not wish to trade his privacy 
for the benefit applied for, the FCRA provisions do not provide ade-
quate information for the consumer to exercise knowing consent. The 
prenotification does not describe either the investigation's objectives or 
methods in any detail.244 If he desires more information, the consumer 
must make a written request "within a reasonable period of time." 245 
The follow-up letters used by most insurance companies upon receipt of 
a request for further information provide very little additional illumina-
t ion~46To allow the consumer to exercise knowing consent to an investi-
gation, the FCRA should be amended to require the party requesting 
the investigation to supply the consumer, prior to the investigation, 
with the standard form used by inspection bureaus or other consumer 
reporting agencies in reports of the kind normally prepared under the 
circumstances ofthe consumer's application.247 
The FCRA seems to be particularly weak in the area of employment 
reporting. Pre-notification is not required if the subject of the report 
has not specifically applied for an employment action~48 This obtains in 
four situations: (1) Where a potential employee has not been approached 
by the employer (e.g., an executive search organization scanning a 
number of possible candidates for a job); (2) Where incumbent employ-
ees are being reviewed pursuant to a periodic program; (3) Where an 
employee is being considered for promotion, although he hasn't applied 
for promotion; and (4) Where the employer suspects his employee of 
embezzlement or some other impropriety. It seems anomalous that 
employers may obtain investigative reports on an individual who has --244. See Appendix Nine. 
245. FCRA, supra noteS,§ 606(b). One underwriter estimated that IOo/o of the potential insureds 
request further information. 
246. See Appendix Nine. 
k 247. Two objections might be raised to this proposal. First. the consumer report user might not 
. now at the time of the application whom he will hire for the investigation. This does not seem 
~rnportant, however, because the standardized reports developed by the reporting agencies for var-
~ous purposes are sufficiently similar that, for example, if the consumer applied for life insurance, 
11 Wouldn't matter whether he saw the Retail Credit Co. form or the American Service Bureau 
~orrn. Second, if the consumer knows ahead of time what the investigation is looking for, he will be 
1n a position to make sure the report turns out well for him. This may be true, but why bother with 
any pre-notification at all if the purpose is not to put the consumer in a position where he can 
tnake reasonable choices about the relinquishment of privacy? 
248. FCRA, supra note S, § 606(a)(2). 
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not applied for employment when a creditor may not obtain less 
objectionable types of reports on individuals who have not applied for 
credit.249 
In non-notification investigations of the above type, the consumer 
may lose a valuable job without ever learning that he was investigated. 
This could happen because (a) the subject is often not interviewed in 
employment-purpose investigations, (b) other informants are often 
asked not to mention the investigation to the subject,250and (c) once the 
consumer reporting agency has met its obligation of ascertaining that 
the consumer report user has a legitimate purpose, there is no one look-
ing over the employer's shoulder to see to it that he meets his obliga-
tion of adverse action notification under the FCRA. There is no way of 
knowing how frequently abuse occurs in this area, but the potential 
loophole is large. 
Perhaps the loophole could be plugged by amendment to the FCRA, 
but no important gain would be registered unless a more gaping hole 
were plugged first . This is the problem of the "in-house" investigation. 
Employment investigations are often handled by a corporation's inter-
nal personnel or security department,251 These are not consumer report-
ing agencies under the section 603(f) definition because they do not 
furnish reports to "third parties. "·252 It makes no sense in terms of an 
employee's privacy that the degree of informational control to which he 
is entitled depends upon the technicality of whether an investigator is 
paid by the employer directly or through the intermediary of a third 
party. Legislation must be fashioned to protect all employees equally.253 
So long as in-house investigations have special privilege, any move to 
tighten controls on consumer reporting agencies will only lead more 
employers to create their own internal security divisions. 
Before leaving the subject of employment reporting, one additional 
ambiguity in the FCRA should be mentioned. Suppose an inspector 
decides, whether out of laziness or because he has not been successful 
in his attempts at a face-to-face interview, to obtain information from 
an employer through use of the telephone. Is this an investigative 
249. The author is gratefu l to James A. Ambrose, Vice President of Consumer Trends, Inc., for 
his lucid expression of this thought in a letter to U. CHI.L. REV., Jan. 11. 1972. 
250. See. e.g., Retail Credit Co. Inspector Manual at 37, page dated June, 1964. 
251. Industry sources suggest that a trend toward in-house investigations has been enhanced by 
the FCRA because of the necessity for disclosure when consumer reporting agencies are involved. 
252. A similar in -house problem exists with regard to inspection reports prepared by the Equi-
table Life Assurance Society's internal inspection division . The Equitable takes the position that 
these reports are covered by the FCRA', (letter from Paul H. Patterson, Regional Inspection Mana-
ger, to U. CHI. L. REV., Nov. 14, 1972), but a court might not agree. 
253. Such legislation may have to consider certain exceptions; e.g., where pre-notification of an 
investigation might make it impossible to uncover evidence of a suspected crime. 
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consumer report? The definition in section 603(e) speaks of "personal" 
interviews. Is a telephone conversation a personal interview? 
The question is not easily passed over for two reasons. First, because 
credit bureaus frequently obtain information by telephone, often in the 
form of direct reports. Must pre-notification be given? Second, because 
Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. is planning to enter into competition with 
the inspection bureaus, using a system whereby credit bureau employ-
ees would be trained to obtain the kinds of information by telephone 
which are presently obtained through face-to-face interviews by inspec-
tors?54 Presumably, if the telephone conversation elicits information 
about the consumer's "character, general reputation, personal charac-
teristics, or mode of living; '255it is an investigative consumer report. But 
to bring certainty, the FTC should make a formal interpretation that 
the words "personal interview" in section 60J(e) include telephone inter-
views. 
In evaluating the impact of the FCRA on investigative consumer 
reporting, three questions should be asked . First, has the new law fos-
tered more accurate and complete records? Second, has it changed 
methods of information collection to the enhancement of privacy values? 
And third , has it reduced the flow of what one writer has described as 
"informational communication that--however accurate and complete--
reports facts that cannot decently be retailed ?" 256 
To the first question, the answer is a qualified affirmative. The 
FCRA has provided a mechanism whereby the consumer can confront 
and challenge damaging information. By bringing the inspection 
bureaus out from behind their curtain of secrecy, by giving them pro-
tection from tort actions in return for opening up their files to consu-
mers, by making them more willing to approach the subject of · the 
report for information, by reducing somewhat the indiscriminate use of 
old information already in file, and by giving the consumer the oppor-
tunity to learn what is in his record and have it changed if it is wrong, 
the FCRA has undoubtedly been a force for accuracy of records. Never-
theless, that improvements can be made within the framework of the 
FCRA, should be clear from the foregoing pages.257 
Has the FCRA changed the methods of information collection? 
There have been a few changes. For example, with the possibility of 
disclosure to a consumer an inspector's reporting errors are more likely --2254. Plaintiffs brief, note 46 supra. 
55. FCRA, supra note 5. § 603(e). 
256. Lusky , Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 693 (1972). 
257._ For personalized examples of the FCRA 's weaknesses, see Shaefer, Consumers Gripe That 
Credtt R eporting Law Doesn 't Always Work , Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 1971; Auerbach, Credit 
Probers: Consumers Past Still Fair Game, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 22, 1972. 
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to get back to the inspector, forcing him to be more careful. The in-
creased likelihood that the subject of the report will himself be inter-
viewed marks another change. However, the one sentence which was 
repeated over and over in interviews was this: ''We're not doing any-
thing differently now from the way we were doing it before the FCRA." 
This response may seem curious because in many ways it is untrue. In a 
fundamental sense, however, it is true: the FCRA has done nothing to 
restructure the industry. 
Yet, there lurks in the FCRA a passage which creative public ad-
ministration could read as a lever for basic change. The passage is sec-
tion 607(b): 
Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report 
it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible 
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom 
the report relates. 
An unofficial FTC staff opinion has interpreted this section to imply 
the need for adequate training of personnel, verification of adverse in-
formation by more than one source, and an end to quotas for the devel-
opment of adverse information:58Jfthe FTC had rule-making authoritl;59 
section 607(b) could become a tool for the restructuring of the inspec-
tion industry; lacking that authority, the FTC can nevertheless move in 
that direction by the process of making formal interpretations of the 
phrase "reasonable procedures. " 260 
Finally, has the FCRA limited the reporting of facts which "cannot 
decently be retailed"? The simple answer is No. The FCRA made no 
attempt to control the subject matter of investigation. Character, habits, 
and morals are still standard reporting material. A person's drinking 
problems, sex life, health history, political beliefs, reputation, and asso-
ciates are still fair game. Insepction bureaus remain the bargain base-
ment detectives, the purveyors of hearsay, which they have always been. 
In fairness to the inspection bureaus several things should be said. 
First, hearsay itself carries connotations from the courtroom which are 
not quite as appropriate in the commercial world. Everyone makes deci-
sions based on hearsy, and the difference between A asking B about C 
and A paying D to ask B about C is not terribly great. The additional 
step may depersonalize the inquiry and may create new possibilities for 
error, but it doesn't change the nature of the communication. The 
258. 4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, 9 11,306 at 59,791. 
259. Other than to promulgate "procedural rules", the F.T.C. has no rule-making power. FCRA. 
supra note 5, § 621(a). 
260. For an indication of what might be reasonable procedures, see text preceding note 291 
infra. 
1974] PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET 95 
change occurs not when the third party intercedes, but when his report 
becomes a filed dossier available for future use. However, the future use 
of the dossier can be limited, which is one of the FCRA's objectives. 
The dossier could be required to be destroyed, but then the subject 
would never be able to confront damaging information. In a sense the 
files represent a bureaucratization of hearsay which serves the indivi-
dual, if properly controlled, by giving him a handle over communica-
tions which might otherwise be too ephemeral to grasp, and therefore 
impossible to defend against. 
Second , the inspection bureaus are not made up (as some of the 
more lurid episodes in their history might otherwise suggest) of evil, 
insatiably curious gumshoes. The inspectors are very much like other 
middle-class individuals, just doing a job. If the job requires snooping 
into sensitive personal information blame should be placed upon the 
master, not the servant, and in this case that means the insurance com-
panies. But the insurance companies themselves are just doing a job--
attempting to distribute risks in a fair fashion to themselves and the 
consumer public. 
The public can call off the inspectors, but presumably not without 
paying an economic price. "Presumably" is used because information is 
not available which would allow the public to estimate the cost in addi-
tional premiums of "characters, habits, morals" inspections were elimi-
nated. The underwriters say this information is "relevant," and so it is. 
The question which must be asked is, how relevant in terms of dollars 
and cents? If it costs more for an individual to retain privacy, he should 
be given the choice of paying the price. The worst fault of the present 
privacy-invading structure is that an individual is given no alternatives 
Which make practical sense. . 
A third point about inspection bureaus which might otherwise be 
overlooked is that the inspection bureaus perform many useful services 
for the insurance companies which have little or no bearing on privacy 
as it is usually understood. A reading of the report forms in Appendix 
Eight will reveal that, at least in the property lines of insurance, investi-
gation of character, habits, and morals is of relatively small importance 
compared to the objective types of information collected. 
In the final section of the paper we turn attention to the future. 
What are the strategies of reform; i.e., how can privacy be protected in 
the personal information market? 
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III. PROTECTING PRIVACY IN THE PERSONAL INFORMA-
TION MARKET 
Without the refuge of privacy, creativity is displaced by dogmatism, 
spontaneity by behavior for the record and autonomy by the over-
whelming sense of powerlessness. The neighbor becomes a potential 
informer, the acquaintance at the workbench, a hazardous confi-
dant. Without legal power to know what is being said about him, to 
find and confront the faceless bearer of tales, without the right of 
privacy, in short- -the only refuge is in radical orthodoxy. 
From a Speech by Edward F. Ryan, 
Counsel to the Ontario Law Reform Commission 
A universally accepted definition of privacy does not exist. We can 
all agree with Brandeis, however, that privacy has to do with being let 
alone, with not having one's autonomy invaded except by invitation. 
Whatever else it may mean, privacy implies an ability on the part of the 
individual to control at least certain kinds of information about him-
self:261 Privacy can rarely be absolute, of course, because individuals lead 
social lives, and society needs information about its members in order 
to function. But the needs of society can be balanced against the need 
for autonomy and individuality, and a working definition of privacy can 
be arrived at. The precise balance will reflect the institutions, tradi-
tions, and values of a particular society at a particular time. In any 
society, however, certain kinds of information will be considered so 
personal, so private, that they will be treated with special privilege; 
habits and institutions will develop to protect this personal information 
from uses which the society deems indecent. 
Perhaps the United States in 1972 has reached the type of equilib -
rium situation described , where the society (whatever that means pre-
cisely) has accomplished its balancing process and has determined that 
an acceptable working definition of privacy will permit millions of in-
vestigations each year where friends, neighbors, associates, and com-
mercial acquaintances will be asked questions about an individual' s 
character, his drinking habits, his sex life, his political beliefs, his 
health, his finances, his associates, and his attitudes. Certainly, there 
are surveys which indicate that large majorities approve of credit, insur-
ance, and employment investigations.262 But it is not clear from the 
261. "Privacy," Professor Westin says, "is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to de· 
termine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others." A WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
262. E.g., the Opinion Research Corporation's study commissioned by Retail Credit Co. in 1972 
showed, among other things, that only llo/o of a sample of the American public feels strongly that 
something should be done about the invasion of privacy. 
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surveys that the respondents were informed about either the quantity or 
the quality of investigations, and it may be that the surveys indicate no 
more than an abstract understanding · that certain types of decisions 
ought to be based upon information rather than guesswork. If we make 
the optimistic assumption that there is a latent support--nourished in 
traditional American attitudes that are both liberal and conservative--
in favor of protecting a larger degree of privacy than is presently pro-
tected , what changes should we seek? 
A. FTC FORMAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FCRA 
We can start the process of tightening controls on the personal in-
formation market by suggesting that the Federal Trade Commission 
use its existing power under the FCRA to issue formal interpretations 
of the law that will give the FCRA its fullest play. Several such inter-
pretations have been suggested during the course of this analysis: 
1. Chilling identification forms and waiver agreements vio-
late the intent of section 610 by discouraging consumers from seeking 
disclosure of their records!63 
2. The definition of medical information in section 603(i) 
implies that medical information can only be withheld from a consumer 
if it was originally obtained with the consumer's knowing consent,264 
3. In deciding whether to honor a request for information , 
a consumer reporting agency must determine in each case whether the 
potential report user's purpose is legitimate. The FTC should define the 
term "legitimate business need", found in section 604, in a narrow 
fashion, giving specific examples of what practices do and do not quali-
fy_265 This is of particular importance with regard to governmental re-
quests for information. No government need ever risk the political 
embarrassment involved in spying on its citizens when it can achieve 
the same thing by becoming a client of a private corporation like the 
Retail Credit Co. 
4. The word "bankruptcies" in section 605, pertaining to 
obsolete information, does not include wage-earner proceedings under 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act. Such proceedings are more in the 
nature of suits and judgments, and should only be reportable for 7 
Years_l66 
--~~~· See text following note 110 supra. 
26 · See text following note 149 supra. 26~· See text following note 180 supra. · See text at note 201 supra. 
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5. The words "personal interview" in section 603(e), defin-
ing an investigative consumer report, should include telephone inter-
views?67 
6. The FTC should set forth with detail what it considers to 
be "reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy," as 
required by section 607(b);268 Examples of procedures that might be in-
cluded will be suggested below.269 
B. AMENDMENTS WITHIN THE IMMEDIATE FRAME-
WORK OF THE FCRA 
Going beyond formal interpretations by the FTC, the FCRA itself 
needs to be strengthened in many ways. Most of the .following sugges-
tions were developed in the course of this analysis: 
1. Adverse information notifications should be in writing. 
They should include a brief summary of the consumer's legal rights 
under the FCRA. Additionally, they should include an explanation for 
the report user's decision to take adverse action. This could be achieved 
by a check-off list of common reasons.270 
2. At least one credit bureau has demonstrated that ade-
quate disclosure can be achieved by mail, as well as by personal inter-
view or telephone. This should be permissible, provided all terms and 
codes are put into lay language, and a contact person is identified in 
case further explanation is required.271 
3. The medical information exception in section 609 should 
be replaced by a permissive provision allowing the consumer reporting 
agency to make disclosure of medical information to the consumer's 
physician rather than directly to the consumer, provided that the consu-
mer is informed that there is medical information in the file which is 
being withheld, and that this information will be disclosed to a physi-
cian designated by the consumer. 272 
4. All investigative consumer reports should be reduced to 
writing and retained on file for at least one year. Sources of investiga-
tive consumer reports should be identified and retained on file for the 
same period of time, but should not be identified in the actual report or 
retained copies. Investigative consumer reports should be disclosed to 
the consumer by allowing the consumer to read the report copy and by 
having a trained person disclose the nature and substance of any other 
267. See text at note 255 supra. 
268. See text at note 260 supra. 
269. See text preceding note 291 infra. 
270. See text at note 97 supra. 
271. See note 113 supra. 
272. See text following note 149 supra. 
1974] PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET 99 
materials in the file~73 The consumer should have the right to make an 
abstract of the disclosed information and, upon payment of a reason-
able reproduction charge, to purchase 'a copy of any reports in his file . 
5. Each consumer should be entitled to disclosure at no 
charge once a year, upon request.274 Additional disclosures may be 
charged to the consumer, except where adverse action has been taken 
within the prior 30 days as a result of information provided by the con-
sumer reporting agency. 
6. The consumer reporting agency should be required to 
maintain strict procedures to keep public record information up-to-date 
and complete, without regard for the purpose in which it will be used .275 
Where public record information is to be furnished for employment 
purposes, the consumer reporting agency should be required to make a 
good faith effort to interview the subject of the report.276 
7. Where an application normally entails an investigation, 
or where it is known by a party offering credit, insurance or employ-
ment that he will probably request an investigation, the consumer 
should be so apprised at the time the application is made.277 At the same 
time, the applicant should be supplied with a standard form used by 
consumer reporting bureaus in reports of the kind normally prepared 
under the circumstances of the consumer's application:78 -
8. Because actual damages are often difficult to prove when 
credit, insurance, or employment is denied, but great inconvenience 
and embarrassment might be created for the consumer, the FCRA 
should be amended to include mandatory damages (plus attorney's fees) 
to be awarded in lieu of proof of actual damages, where the act is viola-
~~ . 
C. ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act is a model of administrative frag-
mentation. The law is set up to be enforced by nine different Federal --273. See text preceding and following note 1S1 supra. 
r4. See text following note ISS supra. 
2
7
7
S. See text following note 194 supra. 
6. See text at note 19S supra. 
2
2
77. See text following note 243 supra. 
78. See text at note 247 supra. 
0
279. The need for such a provision may be seen in Miller v. Credit Bureau, Inc. of Washington, 
.C. , (Superior Court of Dist. of Col. , June I 972) reported at 4 CCH CCG, supra note 22, S 
99.173. A consumer who was denied a credit card on the basis of1erroneous information sued the 
~redit bureau for failin g to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of 
Information . The Court found the credit bureau to have been in negligent non-compliance with 
the FCRA. However , since the plaintiff couldn 't prove damages. no recovery was allowed. Prece-
~ents for in lieu damages may be found in the Copyright Act , 17 U.S.C. § lOI(b), and in the UNI-
.ORM COMMERCIAL CODE. § 9-S07(1). In drawing an in lie_u .~rovision , atten~ion should be 
gtven to (a) the possibility of nuisance litigation, and (b) the posstbthty of class act1ons, and whe-
ther there should be a limit on the total amount recoverable. 
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agencies, no one of which has the authority to promulgate regulations~ 
Fragmentation in itself has little bearing on the government's ability to 
oversee the personal information market, because the consumer report-
ing agencies fall within the statutory ambit of a single agency, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. (The other agencies are charged with enforcing 
the FCRA as it pertains to particular consumer report users who were 
already under agency supervision.) 
A more significant obstacle to effective enforcement is the FTC's 
lack of rule-making authority.281 Such authority was deliberately left out 
of the FCRA because industry representatives, still in a haze over the 
complexities in Truth-in-Lending Regulation Z2~~which had been prom-
ulgated not long before passage of the FCRA--feared that they would 
be immersed in red tape of the FTC could write rules~831t is also possible 
to surmise that the consumer reporting industry felt that it could live 
with a law which it wrote, but didn't want to face the possibility of 
detailed oversight if the FTC could fill in the gaps with rules having the 
force of law. 
In the absence of regulatory power, the FTC has moved rather slowly 
in enforcing the FCRA. Definitional kinds of problems have been temp-
orarily resolved by having the FTC staff issue informal opinions about 
the meaning of the FCRA. These are non-binding and purely advisory. 
The Commission itself has held hearings on a few definitional matters, 
including whether motor vehicle departments, lenders exchanges, credit 
guides, protective bulletins, and pre-screening for direct mail solicita-
tion are covered by the FCRA~84 These hearings will eventuate in formal 
interpretations of the act, but the formal interpretations will not be 
binding on anyone, except to the extent that they are persuasive in 
court. Lack of binding guidance from a central source has caused some 
confusion and (according to FTC staff attorneys) substantially affected 
FTC's ability to administer the law. 
Vigorous enforcement of the FCRA will require a number of 
changes. Most importantly, the FTC should be given rule-making 
authority. It should be able, for instance, to define in detail what are 
"reasonable procedures" for consumer reporting agencies to follow. 
Going beyond rule-making, several other changes should be consid-
ered for the FTC. First, the FTC should be authorized to require all 
consumer reporting agencies to register. Registration should include 
basic information about the agency's operations, including a statement 
280. FCRA, supra note 5, § 621(b). 
281. FCRA, supra note 5, § 62l(a) . . 
282. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1972}. 
283. ACB, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 21 (1971). 
284. FTC News, June 16, 1972. 
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of the procedures used for compliance with the FCRA. Unless regis-
tered, one could not conduct business as a consumer reporting agency. 
Anyone could register except where the FTC finds that the applicant 
could not reasonably be expected to be financially responsible in the 
conduct of his business, or where the past conduct of tht> applicant pro-
vides reasonable grounds for believing that he would not carry on busi-
ness in accordance with law and with integrity and honesty.185 
Registration is needed for three reasons. First, it would allow the 
FTC and the public to identify the reporting agencies and to understand 
what each one does. Second, it would provide leads for enforcement, so 
that a scatter gun approach is no longer necessary. And third, it would 
provide a minimum control over market entry, to weed out at least 
some of the more dubious practitioners. 
Much has been written about regulat ion in recent years, with the 
increasingly common conclusion that government regulation generally 
doesn't do much good; rather, such closing off of market entry guaran-
tees a monopoly for the members of the regulated industry, to the ulti -
mate detriment of consumers;86As Professor Stigler has observed;87regu-
lation is generally acquired by an industry and is designed and operated 
primarily for the industry's benefit. 
Indeed, regulation is beginning to find advocates among the ranks 
of inspection bureau owners?88 This is particularly true for the local 
independents who are the first to suffer when new competition enters 
their market. With market entry costs minimal new inspection bureaus 
are constantly entering the scene, and, as one would expect, are making 
their presence known by under-pricing the existing firms~89 To meet the 
new competition, existing firms must also cut prices. This is normally 
done by discount arrangements rather than by changing the published 
price schedule, with the effect that no firm is certain how low it must go 
~n negotiating for contracts. Cutting prices has but one meaning to the 
Inspector: he must increase an already overwhelming production of 
reports in order to maintain the same income. Price competition, then, 
leads to shabby reporting. It would be far better, the argument goes, if 
competition revolved around quality of reporting rather than pricing. --285. In a bill proposed by the Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations in Ontario, 
Canada, these powers would be given to a newly created Registrar of Consumer Reporting Agen-
Cies. Bill 229, 2d Sess .. 29th Legis., Ontario, 21 El iz. II, 1972. 
~86. See. e.g., Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN . L. REV. 548 (1968); 
l·hlton, The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act, 9 J. OF LAW & ECONOMICS 87 (1966); 
a
7
nct Note, Is L egislation Necessary? California Air Transportation. and National Regulatory Power, 
4 YALE L. J. 1416 (1965). 
287. Stigler, Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT 
SCIENCE 3 (1971). 
288. Interview with William Dorf, Illinois Service Bureau, Dec. 18, 1972. 
289. /d. 
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One implication of this argument might be that the prices of consu-
mer reports ought to be regulated. This approach should be rejected for 
three reasons. First, price regulation is always difficult, expensive, and 
subject to political distortions:90 Second, price regulation would make it 
.difficult for new firms to break into the market, even if the new firms 
were capable of more efficient operations than the existing firms. And 
third , there is no guarantee that increased income for the more efficient 
regulated firms would be passed down to inspectors in the form of 
lower production quotas. It may be that price competition leads to anti-
social results in the insurance inspection industry, but price regulation 
does not seem to be the proper antidote. 
Registration of the type described earlier would have only a small 
effect on market entry, by allowing the FTC to screen out firms which 
can be predicted to by shabby operators. The screening should not be 
used to block entry to firms about whom there is reason to believe they 
would operate efficiently and with integrity. It is logical, however, that 
registration should carry with it certain standards of how a firm must 
operate, in order to be considered satisfactory. It also follows that a 
firm which does not meet the required standards should lose its regis-
tered status. 
The basic standards for maintaining registered status should be set 
by Congress, with details supplied in rules and regulations promulgated 
by the FTC. A number of standards worthy of consideration have al-
ready been suggested in this section. Additional standards applicable to 
inspection bureaus include: 
1. Individual inspectors must pass an examination showing 
understanding of the relevant laws and ethical guidelines for inspection. 
2. Training programs and apprenticeship period should be 
mandatory and subject to FTC approval. 
3. Inspectors should be equipped with identification cards 
containing their picture. Interviews under pretext should be prohibited, 
and every source be informed of the identity of the interviewer, his 
employer (the inspection bureau, not the client), and the purpose of the 
interview. The source should be informed that his remarks will be 
treated as confidential, but that his identity may become known in the 
case of litigation. 
4. Management and supervisory personnel must meet li-
censing standards based upon examination and prior experience. The 
290. See Stigler, note 287 supra. 
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supervisory license may be revoked after a hearing by the FTC upon 
evidence of incompetence in maintaining high standards of conduct by 
the inspectors for whom the supervisor is responsible. 
5. All investigative consumer reports must be red uced to 
writing and retained on file for at least one year, but for no more than 
seven years unless it is up-dated. Identification of sources must be 
retained as long as a report, but must not be a part of the report. The 
FTC should make random audits at least once a year to assure compli-
ance with this and all other aspects of the law. 
6. Protective information quotas and norms should not be 
used either in connection with evaluating the work of inspectors or in 
the sale of agency services .. 
7. Inspection bureaus should be required to develop meth-
?ds for evaluating the work of inspectors wherein numerical production 
Is not the predominant factor. 
8. Consolidation of files which contain investigative consu -
mer reports are not to occur without prior FTC approval. This is inten-
ded as a safeguard against the centralization of Retail Credit Co.'s files, 
and to insure that files will remain in the vicinity of their subjects where 
they are easily available for FCRA access. 
9. The FTC should have the power to adjudicate disputes 
between consumers and reporting agencies which are not satisfactorily 
settled under the FCRA procedures. 
The type of regulation proposed in the above standards and in the 
earlier proposals would not result in most of the disadvantages decried 
by the economists (See note 287, supra). Although market entry might 
be made slightly more difficult because of registration standards, comp-
etition would not be reduced. By avoiding price regulation, many of the 
~riticisms of regulation can be overlooked. Finally, by leaving regulation 
In the hands of the FTC rather than by setting up a new governmental 
agency, the possibility of industry having an overwhelming impact on 
the regulators decisions is reduced, because consumer reporting agen-
cies represent only one relatively small concern of the Commission. 
. What would be the impact of regulation on the economics of the 
Inspection bureau industry? It can be foreseen that higher standards of 
~onduct will increase the marginal costs of preparing reports. This 
Increment would probably be passed on to the insurance companies 
and employers. Whether this would, in turn, be passed on to consumers 
de~ends upon the flexibility of demand for reports, a factor about 
Which no information could be ascertained. 
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It should be pointed out, however, that the demand for reports is 
not constant, but reflects the so-called underwriting cycle~91 When, as in 
1972, insurance companies are particularly anxious to sell policies, they 
are less interested in the careful weighing of risks. Consequently they 
do not buy as many inspection reports, and are more willing to buy cut-
rate reports which might reflect a lower quality of reporting. This cycli-
cal effect, which coincided with the passage of the FCRA, must be kept 
in mind when members of the inspection industry complain that their 
industry is being killed off. 
One other point to keep in mind is that the inspection industry can 
be expected to benefit in the near future from the expansion of no-fault 
auto insurance. No-fault, inspectors believe, will make it more necessary 
for an insurer to know how many people are in an insured's household, 
how many potential drivers there are, and whether any of the drivers is 
accident prone, or a candidate for smashing into a tree for the collec-
tion of insurance~92 A final factor which makes prediction of the impact 
of regulation rather difficult is the possibility of market changes in the 
wake of the antitrust actions (described earlier) which are pending 
against Retail Credit Co. 
D. CONTENT CONTROLS 
A proposal which has fequently been made by critics of the personal 
information market is that we should simply not allow subjective infor-
mation to be collected. Phrased in this way the proposal presents ser-
ious problems. First, it is not always self-evident whether a particular 
datum is subjective. Enough "subjective" confirmations tend to give 
information an objective quality. Furthermore, if the purpose of con-
trolling the content of reports is to promote privacy, it must be recog-
nized that certain private kinds of information may be completely 
objective. For example, instead of reporting that an automobile insur-
ance applicant's teenage son is a "hippie-type," the report could state 
objectively that the son has hair that comes to his collar:93 Instead of 
291. According to Jaffe, The Undenvriting Cycle, INSURANCE 35 (May 1972), and Snyder, The 
Insurance Industry 's 5-Year Cycle. NATIONAL UNDERWRITER 37 (June 16, 1972), the insur-
ance industry operates in phases. During Phase I, rates are adequate, underwriting is good, agents 
are cooperative. and in general the industry is profitable. The word goes out to increase volume 
and not to worry too much about risks. During Phase II, underwriting barriers are let down. Auto 
and homeowners (personal lines) business suddenly becomes good business. The push for the pre-
mium dollar is on. Phase III appears about two years later. After the aggressive premium "buy-
ing". the results show up in two ways: deleted surplus and adverse loss experience. In Phase IV, 
agencies are terminated, lines reduced, areas of operation withdrawn, company personnel changed, 
and classes of risk dropped. The emphasis shifts back to sound underwriting. Phase V is a waiting 
period, where the industry waits to see if it can move back to phase I profits. During mid-1972. the 
insurance industry was said to be in Phase II, the "go-get-'em" phase. 
292. Interview with William Dorf, Illinois Service Bureau, Dec. 18, 1972. 
293. See Richard A. Shaeffer, Consumers Gripe That Credit Reporting Law Doesn 't Always 
Work, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 6. 
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reporting that a female applicant for automobile insurance has loose 
morals, the inspector might write, "Your subject is known to be single 
and residing with a male room-mate without the benefit of marriage:'294 
Objective information, therefore, may be as detrimental to privacy as 
subjective information. 
Another way of stating the problem may be to say that only "rele-
vant" information should be reported. But this, too, has limitations. 
The life style of the auto insurance applicant's son may not appear to 
have much relevance to the risk presented by the father, but an auto 
insurer can certainly argue that it is important to know that a young 
woman's boy friend is a potential driver of her insured vehicle. Indeed, 
given the desires of an insurance company or an employer to predict as 
much as possible about a potential insured or a potential employee, 
everything has a certain amount of relevance. As a representative of the 
American Insurance Association told Senator Proxmire's committee: 
With the existing type of reparations system for automobile cover-
age, the question of whether or not, in case of an accident of a serious 
nature, that the insured is one who would be a defendant that could 
be credible, or conduct himself, or have the kind of habits that would 
have the proper effect on jury determination, has a lot to do with 
what the eventual impact will be on damages in the event of a serious 
accident.295 -
The real question seems to be; What kinds of information are we 
Willing to see collected? And this carries with it an additional question; 
Under what circumstances are we willing to have certain kinds of infor-
mation used in decision-making? 
At present, these questions are answered in a laissez-faire manner; 
that is , if the party paying for the information considers it worth pur-
chasing, it is collected. This is a relatively haphazard method of deter-
mination, however, because once it is decided to undertake an investi-
gation, the marginal costs of seeking one type of information as opposed 
to another are almost infinitesimally small. 
Of equal importance, there is no substantial evidence that the pur-
~hasers of investigative consumer reports can point to which would 
Indicate the economic impact of not obtaining particular kinds of infor-
mation. The representative of the American Insurance Association w.as 
asked by Senator Proxmire if he could prove his assertion that the 
Potential risk of an insured includes his possible credibility to a jury. --294. Notarized statement provided by the subject of an article titled VISTA Worker's Car Insur-
a29e Soars, The Atlanta Constitution, Dec. 9, 1971. 
S. Proxmire Hgs .. supra note 48, at 313. 
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"No," he responded, "it is a question of judgment:'296 The hidden ques-
tion in the controversy over content controls turns out to be; Whose 
judgment should be accepted? 
The judgment could be left to a government agency. After the ap-
propriate hearings, such an agency (most likely the FTC) could state 
officially what kinds of information could be gathered for what pur-
poses. The problem with this approach, though, is that privacy is an 
individual concern as well as a societal concern; and if the government 
agency accepts the arguments of relevancy produced by consumer 
report users, individuals who value their privacy more highly than the 
government would have nowhere to turn . On the other hand, if the 
government were to adopt stringent standards it would be saying, in 
effect, that citizens may not traffic in certain kinds of information. 
While the courts have given the government leniency in controlling 
commercial communications,297 there may be a limit beyond which the 
First Amendment should be made applicable. 298 · 
The government's role in limiting content should probably extend 
no further than to a series of general statements concerning subjects 
about which there is wide agreement. For example; in supplementing 
the existing controls on obsolete data in section 605 of the FCRA, a 
statute might state that a consumer reporting agency shall not include 
in a consumer report: 
a. any information based on evidence that is not corrobor-
ated unless the lack of corroboration is noted with and accompanies the 
information; 
b. information regarding any criminal charges against the 
consumer where the charges have been dismissed , set aside or not pro-
ceeded with; 
c. information as to race, creed, color, ancestry, ethnic 
origin, or political affiliation. 
Beyond this, the proper goal should be to give the consumer reason-
able alternatives so that if he is forewarned that a particular application 
will involve an investigation which the consumer finds offensive, he 
might obtain 'his objectives in other ways without having to give up 
valued privacy. For example, group life insurance could be expanded as 
an alternative to individual life insurance. Insurance companies should 
296. !d. 
297. See, e.g .. Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet , 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 898 
(1971); and Dun & Bradstreet v. Kansas Electric Supply Co., 448 F.2d 647 (lOth Cir. 1971), cert. 
den. 405 U.S. 1026 (1971), both holding that credit information is not protected from libel by the 
First Amendment. 
298. See Christie , The Right to Privacy and the Freedom to Know; A Comment on Professor 
Miller's The A ssualt on Privacy, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 970 (1971). 
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be pressured to experiment with other forms of insurance that would 
require less personal information about potential insureds. Employers 
should be required to bargain, collectively and individually, on their 
policies toward employee privacy.299 
There is no single, quick and easy way to readjust the balance of 
privacy and commercial need in the personal information market. 
Many approaches are needed, and all of the participants in the market--
reporting agencies, report users, consumers, and government--must be 
involved in the search for a decent equilibrium. More information 
about the market, particularly about detectives and other private inves-
tigators, mail-list brokers, and others not treated here, may be required 
before a complete program of reform can be drawn. But this analysis 
has hopefully presented sufficient information about the entities covered 
by the Fair Credit Reporting Act to indicate the areas in which this 
pioneering attempt to protect individual privacy is strong, and where it 
is weak; and to suggest the specific directions in which we must move if 
we are to keep alive the age-old drea~ of a society of free, autonomous, 
and above all, spontaneous individuals. 
---. 299. Legislation should be considered for the purpose of bringing employer investigative practices 
~nto line with the policies encompassed in the FCRA. One possibility would be to redefine section 
03(0 of the FCRA (supra note 5) so as not to exclude " in-house" investigations. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
THE PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET IN CHICAGO 
I. Limited Purpose Credit Bureaus 
II. Full-Service Credit Bureaus 
III. Credit Agencies 
IV . Mercantile Agencies 
V. Inspection Bureaus 
VI. Personnel Reporting 
VII . Miscellaneous Participants in the Personal Information Market 
I. LIMITED PURPOSE CREDIT BUREAUS 
1. Consolidated Employee Index 
The Consolidated Employee Index is an agency which maintains an index 
of employees working in large corporations. Only subscribers have access to 
the index, and they use it for employment verification purposes. Information 
provided includes: name of employer, type of work, how long employee has 
been with company. An estimated 60,000 to 70,000 reports are made per year. 
Source: Harvey Van Geem, Manager, telephone interview, Feb. 22, 1972. 
2. Guaranty Credit Corp. 
This is a specialized agency, a credit bureau and a collection agency deal -
ing strictly in the contracting and rental fields. It has files on about 2,000 peo-
ple, mostly "colored people" who do business out of their own homes, e.g. by 
borrowing home improvement or building equipment from a rental firm. Most 
information comes from day-to-day contacts with renters. Some comes from 
Credit Information Corporation of Chicago. By reporting on independent con-
tractors, this small bureau falls on the unclear border line between consumer 
and commercial reporting. Source: Arthur J. Wetle, owner, telephone inter-
view, Feb. 22, 1972. 
3. Hooper-Holmes Inc. Credit Index Division 
The Chicago office of this national derogatory information index employs 
five people, none of whom are investigators. The central computer, located in 
Basking Ridge, N.J., contains 12 million items. An item includes the name of a 
consumer who has been written off as a bad debt; the dollar amount lost; the 
date reported by the subscriber; the age of the account at the time reported; 
the code number for the reporting company; and the reporting company's 
code number for the account. The operation is fully computerized, but uses a 
batch system of processing which results in a lapse of 12 to 24 hours in-house 
instead of instantaneous response. The Hooper-Holmes Index has approxi-
mately 150 subscribers nationally, most of whom are oil companies with credit 
card programs, direct merchandise marketers such as mail order houses, and 
book and record companies. These clients are national in orientation and use 
the index for pre-screening of credit applications so as to reduce their volume 
of full credit reports bought in the non-local reporting market. The subscriber 
pays lOc/per request, regardless of whether derogatory information is located. 
Volume discounts are given at plateaux of 100,000 annual inquiries. With the 
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exception of a very minor amount of public record information which is col-
lected in some metropolitan areas, all of the information in the computer is 
provided by the subscribers. One to two million requests from subscribers go 
through the Chicago office each year, with about two-thirds originating in Chi-
cago. Source: E. William Carney, Regional Manager, and Wayne Kaminski 
Chicago Manager, interview, Jan. 28, 1972. ' 
4. Chicago Lenders Exchange 
Every metropolitan area has a lenders exchange. The Chicago Lenders 
Exchange has a secret telephone number and is not listed in its building direc-
tory; the Chicago Daily News calls it "Chicago's secret credit bureau. " (Nov. 
11, 1972 at 17.) The function, however, is not particularly sinister. The Ex-
change is an organization of small loan companies, representing 48 member 
companies in the metropolitan area, with 329 offices. All of these offices tele-
phone the Exchange before approving a loan . The information they receive is 
In the form of code numbers representing loan companies with whom the 
potential borrower has outstanding debts. According the Exchange rules, when 
a company calls in and obtains a code, he must then call the coded loan com-
pany to find out whether the account is open or closed. (In theory it should be 
open, because when a company closes an account it is supposed to notify the 
Exchange.) The Chicago Lenders Exchange is a "closed exchange," which 
means that if a record contains three listings for an individual, either as maker 
or co-maker, no loan can be made unless the proceeds of such loan will be 
used to pay off one or more of the outstanding loan balances in full. In the 
fourth quarter of 1971, the 16 employees of the Exchange handled 66,267 
clearances. Source: R. W. Hahne, President, telephone interview, Jan. 26., 1972. 
S. TRW Credit Data 
TRW Credit Data is a national credit bureau, whose operations are fo-
cused in a computer in Anaheim, Calif. The Chicago office handles the 7 nor-
tht:rn counties of Illinois, plus Lake Co., Ind., and holds information on an 
~sttmated 5 million individuals in that area. Its projected volume for 1973 is 
rom .65 to 1.2 million reports. Subscribers pay 95c per report if they feed their 
?Wn automated files into the TRW computer; $1.05 if they turn over account 
Information manually. The Chicago office has approximately twenty visual 
t~rl!linals and one printer (for subscribers who want a written record), which 
thie Into the Anaheim computer in about 8 seconds. Some individual subscribers 
ave their own remote terminals which have direct access to Anaheim. 
TRW Credit Data is classified as a limited purpose bureau because the 
great bulk of information carried is objective financial transaction data. Ap-
parently the company is just beginning to include public record information 
(ban~ruptcies, bankruptcy dishcarges, wage earner plans, wage earner plans 
termmated, judgments, judgment satisfactions, federal and state tax liens 
~e5Ieased) in at least some of its reports. Chicago office business is classified as .8 per cent in-file reports and 4.2 _per cent special reporting. The latter in-
~u~es mortgage reporting, 'developed' reporting, and employment verification. 
o Investigative reports are made. From its beginning as the Credit Data Cor-
Poration in 1960, this firm has been the leading advocate of reform in the 
chredit reporting industry. The company's history and activities are detailed in 
t ~forthcoming book, Data Banks in a Free Society, by Alan F. Westin and 
l\.1
1 
Ichael A. Baker. Sources: Gilbert J:Iambl~t, Vice Presid~nt, in~erview, Jan. 
1
2, 1972; letter, Cheri L. Cole, Associate Director of Pubhc Affa1rs, Dec. 12, 
972. 
110 Consumer Journal 
II. FULL-SERVICE CREDIT BUREAUS 
1. Chicago Credit Bureau, Inc. 
[Vol. 11:37 
The Chicago Credit Bureau is not only the oldest in the city, but is the 
only one of the Big Three (CIC and TRW Credit Data are the others) which is 
not computerized. CCB advertises that it has over 7 million credit records in 
file, and that it serves more than 2,000 local subscriber firms. It employs about 
200 individuals, some of whom work at the subscriber's place of business. All 
investigations are by telephone. CCB offers a variety of services, including in-
file clearances (30c to a subscriber if no record is found; 45c if there is one), 
trade reports, short form reports, standard credit reports ("complete detailed 
information as to residential data, character, employment or business, finan -
cial responsibility and trade history residing in Chicago" for $2.75 to subscri-
bers), employment verification, employee reports, business reports, assets-
locate reports, and mortgage reports ($7.00 to subscribers). CCB also has a 
collection division, the Credit Service Corporation. Subscription to credit 
bureau services is $25 yearly. Source: Milton I. Deutsch, President, interview, 
Jan. 19, 1972. 
2. Credit Bureau of Western Cook County 
CBWCC is a full-service credit bureau located in the Chicago suburb of 
Oak Park. It is a manual operation, employs about 85 persons, and has ap-
proximately 2 million individual files . Of the 250,000 reports prepared each 
year, about 55 per cent are consumer credit reports, 40 per cent mortgage 
reports, and 5 per cent investigative reports, prepared for employment pur-
poses. Criminal record and arrest information is obtained from police depart-
ments. CBWCC has a collection division. Source: Mr. Sterling, Manager, 
interview, Jan.17, 1972; letter, Nov. 21,1972. 
3. Credit Information Corporation of Chicago (CIC) 
CIC, the largest credit bureau in Chicago, is a subsidiary of the Trans 
Union Systems Corporation, which is an affiliate of Trans Union Corporation. 
It is the successor to the old credit bureau of the State Street merchants, but 
has grown rapidly since the 1968 Trans Union takeover, computerizing and 
acquiring six other metropolitan area credit bureaus. All information is in the 
central computer on Michigan Avenue, the branch offices being tied in by 
remote terminals. CIC has records on 5.8 million individuals in the Chicago 
area. It sells over 3 million reports a year, 90 per cent of which are consumer 
credit reports. About 1 per cent of the reports are for employment purposes, 
with the remainder divided between mortgage reports and tenant reports. All 
investigating is by telephone or mail. CIC advertises that it serves "over 3,000 
Chicagoland businesses." Its 250 employees answer over 10,000 inquiries a 
day. CIC does not engage in collection work, but like CCB, it is associated with 
brokerage and sales firms in the non-local market. Like the other full-service 
credit bureaus, CIC collects and reports public record information. In addition 
to the in-file report, which sells for $1.25, CIC's schedule of reporting services 
and prices includes 13 categories of reports, ranging from skip tracing reports 
($6) to special investigations ($10 per hour). [The latter would seem to contra-
dict the assertion that all investigations are made by phone or mail.] Source: 
T.E. Sheahen, Vice President, interview, Jan. 25, 1972, and letter, Nov. 17, 
1972. 
4. Service Credit Bureau 
Service Credit Bureau is a full-service bureau located on the South Side 
of Chicago. It has manual files on 500,000 individuals, and specializes in 
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written reports. Consumer credit reports account for 10 per cent of Service 
Credit's volume; rental reports, for 60 per cent; mortgage reports for 15 per 
cent; and personnel reports for 5 per cent. The only investigative reports, 
under the FCRA definition, are those prepared for personnel purposes. 
Source: Joanne Strong, Manager, interview, Feb. 10, 1972. 
5. Other Credit Bureaus 
Other full-service credit bureaus serving the metropolitan area include: 
Central Credit Bureau of Cook County; Credit Bureau of Arlington Heights; 
Credit Bureau of the South-West Area; Credit Bureau of Eash Chicago; Credit 
Bureau of Hinsdale; Credit Bureau of Palatine; Credit Bureau of Skokie Val-
ley, Inc.; Credit Bureau of Southern Cook Co., Inc.; Credit-Q Suburban Bu-
reau; and Southtown Service Bureau, Inc. 
Ill. CREDIT AGENCIES 
1. Blomquist Reporting Service, Inc. 
This is one of several reporting agencies listed in the telephone directory 
which was unwilling to grant an interview. Mr. Blomquist stated, however, that 
his firm only does mortgage reporting, and that these are non-investigative 
reports, routinely containing information on the mortgagor's age, wife, child-
ren, residence, employment, assets, references, and litigation. Source: Mr. 
Blomquist, telephone interview, Jan. 30, 1972. 
2. Hale-Prietsch Services. Inc. 
Founded in 1933, Hale-Prietsch is one of the larger independent report-
ing agencies in the country. Its primary, though not exclusive, area of service is 
~hicagoland. The clients of Hale-Prietsch tend to be banks and savings & loan 
Institutions; these are frequently faced with commercial decisions involving 
large amounts of money, where the standard credit report would provide suf-
ficient information. Hale-Prietsch has 8 to 12 million records on more than 2 
million individuals. About half of the business relates to commercial reports. 
Of the 100,000 reports per year covered by the FCRA, in-file clearances ($1.25) 
account for 70 per cent. Narrative written reports ($15 minimum) account for 
30 per cent. No reports are made for insurance purposes; 5 to 10 per cent are 
personnel reports. All investigating is by telephone or mail. Of the 55 to 65 
employees, 30 are "reporters" who gather information and write reports. Two 
men are in the courts daily to check public records. Several people monitor the 
telephones for in-file clearances. The operation is not computerized. Except 
for telephone clearances, the average report takes days or weeks to prepare. 
Source: Mr. and Mrs. Prietsch, interview, Jan. 18, 1972, supplemented by their 
testimonty before the Proxmire and Sullivan committees (see footnotes to the 
text, No.s 38 and 49, supra). 
3. Retailers Commercial Agency (RCA) 
. A wholly owned subsidiary of Retail Credit Company, with offices adjoin-
Ing the parent, RCA is one of the older credit bureaus in Chicago. Although it 
does some work for local clients (e.g., checking out tenants for the John Han-
cock building), it mainly handles national accounts such as the credit card oil 
companies. The RCA report is different from other credit reports in that it is 
narrative in form and goes into more depth. Most of the investigating is done 
by telephone, although if more is needed, street work will be subcontracted to 
Retail Credit Co., (whose office is adjoining). The Chicago office of RCA has 
about 200,000 individuals on file and prepares about 32,000 consumer reports 
per year, according to a spokesman for Retail Credit Co. There are 14 employ-
ees in this office. Sources: Tom Linnen, Manager-Operations, Chicago Retai! 
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Credit Office, Jan. 20, 1972; letter from Henry A. McQuade, Assistant Direc-
tor Public Relations, Retail Credit Co., Feb. 23, 1972. 
IV. MERCANTILE AGENCIES 
1. Dun & Bradstreet 
The Chicago office of D & B, which covers DuPage, Cook, and Will 
Counties in Illinois and Lake County in Indiana, has files on approximately 
87,000 of the more than 200,000 businesses in the area. Because D & B might 
send out 10 to 100 or more reports concerning a given company during a year, 
the 87,000 figure is the most meaningful indicator of size. Subscribers to D & 
B services are primarily manufacturers, wholesalers, banks and insurance 
companies who have need for reports on other businesses to serve as a basis for 
credit, insurance or other business decisions. Less than 'h of 1 per cent of D & 
B's reports are consumer reports within the FCRA definition. Typically these 
are reports requested by lending institutions which are considering granting a 
mortgage loan. "Such reports, while they contain identifying information con-
cerning the consumer, verification of employment if possible and, if requested, 
permissable record items, are less broad in scope than consumer reports which 
might be prepared by other companies, for purposes such as determining qual-
ifications for insurance. In other words, we do not seek or publish information 
concerning a subject's personal habits, consumption of alcohol, etc." D & B 
Individual Report Form 98, however, does include a question about character 
and general reputation. 
Commercial reports also contain a limited amount of personal informa-
tion, usually concerning the proprietor, partners or officers of the business 
reported on. The primary source of information is the subject himself. "Our 
employees always indentify themselves and never act under subterfuge. Every 
Company (or individual) on which we report may read and discuss his report 
with us at any time desired." Source: Charles F.G. Raikes, General Counsel of 
D & B, letter, Mar. 14, 1972, and interview, Mar. 22, 1972. 
2. Other Mercantile Agencies 
Among the other mercantile agencies listed in the Chicago Yellow Pages 
are: Builders Commercial Agency; Dairy Credit Bureau; Dealers Control Cre-
dit Bureau; Electrical Manufacturers Credit Bureau, Inc.; Florists Credit 
Association, Inc.; Food Industries Credit Bureau; Food Service Equipment 
Manufacturers Credit Bureau; Graphic Arts Credit Bureau; The Jewelers 
Board of Trade; Lumbermen's Credit Association, Inc.; Manufacturers Clear-
ing House of Illinois Inc.; Printing Trades Credit Association; Professional 
Merchants Credit Bureau; and the Sporting Goods Industries Clearing House. 
V. INSPECTION BUREAUS 
1. American Service Bureau 
Founded in 1920 by the American Life Convention in order to provide 
competitively priced inspection to the life insurance industry, ASB is a leading 
inspection bureau in the life and health insurance area. Life and health 
account for 93 per cent of ASB's reporting; auto insurance constitutes 6 per 
cent; and personnel reporting, 1 per cent. The Standard rate for an ASB life 
insurance inspection in Chicago is $5. Special reports for insurance, personnel, 
or claims investigations are charged at double or triple the standard rate, or on 
any hourly rate of $10.50. ASB employs approximately 40 full -time inspectors 
and 11 part-time inspectors in the Chicago area. They report on approximately 
112,000 individuals annually. Source: Frank D. Wood, President, interview 
Jan. 27, 1972; letter from Claude Tinsley, Jr., Exec. V.P., Dec. 8, 1972. 
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2. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States 
Equitable has had an "in-house" inspection operation for over 100 years ; 
at present, however, it is the only insurance company which does not turn to 
independent inspectors for reporting. For its Chicago area reports, Equitable 
employs 6 full-time and 5 part-time inspectors. They reported on approxi-
mately 12,000 individuals in the Chicago area in 1972. Eight-five percent of 
these reJ>orts were for life and health insurance. Other reporting included per-
sonnel (5 per cent), mortgages, claims, group cases, and ann rttants. Source: 
Paul H. Patterson, Regional Inspection Manager, telephone interriew, Feb. 15, 
1972, and letter, Nov. 14, 1972. 
3. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. 
GAB was formed about 60 years ago by the stock casualty companies. It 
has about 700 offices nationally, Prior to 1965 GAB served the industry in 
~and ling all types of losses and claims under every class of property and liabil -
~ty insurance policy. Since 1965, GAB has been moving gradually into the 
111spection field. It now has 15 to 20 inspectors working in the Chicago area, 
primarily or completely in the property field. Sources: Telephone interview 
with GAB employee who wishes to remain anonymous; Retail Cred it Co. Com-
petitor Index. 
4. Hooper-Holmes Bureau 
Hooper-Holmes is Retai l Credit Co.'s main competitor nationally, and its 
operations are modeled after Retail's. In Chicago, Hooper-Holmes has 13 in-
spectors who prepare between 48,000 and 54,000 reports a year. Of these, 
approximately 60 per cent fall under the FCRA. About 39 percent of Hooper-
Holmes volume is life insurance reporting; 2 per cent is employment reporting. 
Source: Loy R. Ivester, Manager, telephone interview, Feb. 11, 1972. 
5. Illinois Service Bureau 
ISB is the largest of the local independents, having statewide inspection 
operations. ISB's full-time Chicago inspectors report on 35,000 individuals a 
year. (Statewide, 85 inspectors prepare about 60,000 reports annually.) Report-
Ing breaks down as 60 per cent commercial, 30 per cent fire and casualty in-
surance, 5 percent life and health, and 5 per cent claims. ISB has files on over 
one million individuals , but these are mainly order tickets and news clippings. 
C?nly 100,000 old reports are maintained. The standard rate for an ISB inspec-
tion in Chicago is $5.25. For automobile inspections, a motor vehicle report 
(MVR) is obtained from the state (at a cost of $2 to the state plus 25c to the 
Springfield Service Bureau, which expedites matters) and sold to the insurance 
company for $2.35. ISB types out an interpretation of the code for each MVR. 
Source: William Dorf, President, inverviews, Mar. 24, 1972, and Dec. 18, 1972. 
6. Insurance Inspections. Ltd. 
This is a relatively small inspection bureau on the South Side, run by a 
young man who had earlier experience with two of the nationals . Seven inspec-
tors are employed to prepare over 7,000 reports a year. A majority of the 
:eports are automobile insurance inspections; the remainder are property 
Inspections. Source: Michael Davenport, President, interview, Feb. 3, 1972. 
7. 0 'Hanlon Reports (National Inspection Bureau, Inc.) 
O'Hanlon Reports was founded in 1934 by a former officer of Hooper-
Hohnes, Inspection methods are similar to Retail Credit's, but most of O'Han-
l?n's reporting is in the fire and casualty and claims field. Unlike most inspec-
tion bureaus, O'Hanlon's uses a color code system on its reports which indicate 
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at a glance the result of the report. O'Hanlon's refused to grant an interview, 
but it is believed that Chicago operations are on a very small scale. Source: 
Retail Credit Co. Competitor Index and confidential industry sources in Chica-
go. 
8. Retail Credit Co. 
As the national leader in the provision of business information, Retail 
Credit's operations are discussed at length in the text and footnotes . The 
Chicago office employs about 75 persons, about three-fourths of whom are 
inspectors ("field representatives"). The office prepares approximately 75,000 
consumer reports annually, which break down as : life and health insurance, 45 
per cent, automobile insurance, 19 per cent, property lines, 9 per cent, employ-
ment, 7 per cent, claims, 5 per cent, and miscellaneous, 2 per cent. About 
400,000 individuals are subjects of files kept in the Chicago office. Source: 
Tom Linnen, Manager-Operations, Chicago office, interview, Jan. 20, 1972; 
letter from Henry A. McQuade, Public Relations, Feb. 23, 1972. 
9. Service Review 
Service Review is a subsidiary of Allstate Enterprises, Inc., and has been 
making reports for Allstate Insurance since 1929. In the last two years it has 
also been making reports for other insurance companies, in competition with 
Retail Credit and the other bureaus. Service Review has 27 inspectors covering 
the Chicago area. While Chicago statistics are not available, Service Review 
prepares 75,000 to 90,000 reports per year statewide. Of these reports, 70 per 
cent are for automobile insurance; 20 per cent for property; and 10 percent for 
life insurance, personal reports, and claims. Sources: Mr. Colliver, Service Re-
view employee, telephone interview, Feb. 1, 1972; letter from S.R. Burg, Oper-
ating Manager, March 27, 1972. 
10. Underwriters Reports. Inc. 
U.R.I. is a local independent which has an office in St. Louis as well as 
the Chicago office. In Chicago, it employs 6 full-time and 8 part-time inspec-
tors, and annually prepares between 75,000 and 100,000 reports . Of these, 65 
per cent are for commercial lines of insurance; 20 per cent for automobile 
insurance; 10 per cent for homeowners insurance; and 5 per cent miscella-
neous. U.R.I. has files on approximately 200,000 Chicago area residents. 
Source: H. Gianvecchio, General Manager, interview, Feb. 16, 1972; letter, 
Nov. 17, 1972. 
11. Others 
Other inspection bureaus thought to be operating in Chicago include 
Best's Reports (organized in 1960 by a former O'Hanlon employee); Factual 
Service Bureau (formed in 1953 by former Retail Credit Co. claim inspectors, 
specializing in more involved types of investigations); Jasper's reports (formed 
by a former Hooper-Holmes manager in 1949, working in the fire and casualty 
field); and Thomas Reports (mainly fire and casualty lines). It is believed that 
several other small inspection bureaus are operating in Chicago, often with 
only one or two inspectors. Sources: Retail Credit Co. Competitor Index; confi -
dential industry sources in Chicago. 
VI. PERSONNEL REPORTING 
1. Burns Detective Agency 
Like the other big detective agencies, Burns handles personnel reports as 
a sideline. Most of this work involves highly paid executives either being consi-
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dered for a job or suspected of malfeasance while on the job. Source: Mr. 
Springborn, Investigations Division, telephone interview, Feb. 15, 1972. 
2. Fidelifacts 
This nationwide firm, originally formed by former FBI men, had fran -
chises in 27 cities in 1969. It specializes in personnel investigations. No inter-
view could be obtained. Source: Retail Credit Co. Competitor Index. 
3. Heidrick and Struggles 
Heidrick and Struggles is a national executive search and management 
consulting firm with home offices in Chicago. It is retained by organizations 
~earching for peculiarly well-qualified high level officials. Most of the research 
1s carried out by the Heidrick and Struggles staff, though supplementary infor-
mation is occasionally obtained from Retail Credit Co. and other investigative 
firms . Source: Gardner Heidrick, interview, May 2, 1972; Wall Street Journal, 
September 28, 1971. 
4. John T. Lynch Co. 
Prior to the FCRA, this detective agency had a fairly steady flow of re-
quests for background pre-employment investigations on executives. These 
would take in the vicinity of SO hours, charged at $12.50 an hour. This busi-
ness has fallen off drastically since passage of the FCRA. Source: unidentified 
head of investigation, telephone interview, Feb. 22, 1972. 
5. Wackenhut Corporation 
Wackenhut's Investigations Division specializes in the field of security 
personnel investigative work for defense connected industry. According to the 
Retail Credit Co. Competitor Index, "The company's plan is to set itself up as 
a clearing house to aid private business in its hiring of personnel -- pre-
~mployment clearing house. It also plans intensive involvement in counter bus-
~ness espionage ... They currently have files on over 3,000,000 people." As to 
Inspection methods, the RCC Competitor Index says, "Essentially the same as 
ours with less rigid requirements as to how the information is obtained. Use a 
great deal of policemen on their off duty hours or vacations and retired mili-
tary personnel with investigative backgrounds. However, in the Investigative 
Division they use far more equipment than we do." . 
According to the head of investigations in Chicago, Wackenhut does very 
few pre-employment reports, except on the executive level. Source: Mr. Gavin, 
telephone interview, Feb. 15, 1972. 
VII. MISCELLANEOUS PARTICIPANTS IN THE PERSONAL INFORMA-
TIONMARKET 
l. Bureau of Motor Vehicle Services 
In 1971, the State of Illinois transmitted 1,585,543 motor vehicle reports 
(MVR's). Of this total, 1,392,174 were sent to private citizens, insurance com-
panies, credit bureaus, etc. The remainder, 193,369, were sent to Iaw-enforce-
m~nt officials. Disclosure of these records is mandatory under state law upon 
W~1~ten request accompanied by the statutory fee of $2. Source: Thomas ·R. 
Bllhngton, Legal Advisor, Mar. 22, 1972. 
2. The Chicago Law Bulletin 
As a sideline to its normal function as a daily law bulletin, this company 
~ells public record information to local consumer reporting agencies. As an 
Indication of the volume of this sideline, the Chicago Credit Bureau purchased 
the following items, each on a small card, in the m~mth of December, 1971: 
6,0Jl judgments; 956 satisfactions; 855 federal tax hens; 281 federal tax lien 
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releases; 714 Lake County judgments; 405 Will County judgments. Source: 
Milton Deutsch, Chicago Credit Bureau, interview, Jan. 19, 1972. 
APPENDIX TWO 
ADVERSE ACTION NOTIFICATIONS 
I. Sample Form Letter Used By A Chicago Women's Clothing Chain 
Dear 
Your application for a charge account has had our careful consideration 
and we truly wish we could give you a favorable decision. 
The information submitted, however, does not meet our requirements and 
we, therefore, cannot grant your request. Our decision is based on the in-
formation given on the application and supplemented by a routine credit 
report received from the credit bureau named below. 
It is always most difficult to give such a decision to a customer and we are 
sorry we cannot servie you in this instance. 
Name of Credit Bureau 
Address 
(information stamped in) 
Very truly yours, 
ABC COMPANY 
Credit Department 
II . Sample Form Letter Used By A National Insurance Company 
Headquartered in Chicago 
Dear 
Re: Policy# 
As a regular part of our business we develop certain facts necessary for 
proper rating and thorough underwriting. Sometimes we seek to verify this 
information by ordering a report from an unbiased third party. 
We did order such a report in your case and wholly or partly on the basis 
of information contained in that report we: 
are unable to write your insurance 
are unable to renew your coverage 
find it necessary to cancel your policy 
have increased your premium 
have restricted your coverage 
This information was provided in a consumer report made by 
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a reputable source of information. 
If you have not already heard from your agent on this, you will shortly. 
If you want to know more about the a ctual content on that report, please 
contact the company named above. 
Yours very truly, 
Manager, Underwriting Division 
APPENDIX THREE 
DISCLOSURES. SELECTED CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIES, 
CHICAGO 
I. Credit Bureaus 
Agency Disclosures per Month to Consumers Date of Information 
Pre-FCRA Post-FCRA 
Chicago Credit Bureau 40- 60 200- 500 Jan. 19, 1972 
Credit Information Corporation 
of Chicago 200 - 300 4,000 Nov.17,1972 
TRW Credit Data 100 600 Dec. 12, 1972 
Western Cook County 80 140- 160 Nov. 21, 1972 
II. Inspection Bureaus 
Agency Disclosures per Month to Consumers Date of Information 
American Service Bureau 
Hooper-Holmes Bureau 
Illinois Service Bureau 
Retail Credit Co. 
Pre-FCRA Post-FCRA 
0* 10- 15 Dec. 8, 1972 
0 2 Feb. 11, 1972 
0 
0* 
1 Nov. 14, 1972 
80 - 120 Jan. 20, 1972 
* Sometimes the consumer would learn the content of his file from the mana-
ger of the inspection bureau or from his insurance agent; but this was rare. 
Source: Figures were provided by executives of the agencies concerned . 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
IDENTIFICATION FORMS AND WAIVERS 
I. Sample Identification Form Used for FCRA Disclosure* 
II. Sample Waiver Form Used for FCRA Disclosure 
[Vol. 11:37 
* This identification form is not necessarily typical for the industry. The Presi-
dent of ASB acknowledged that it asks for too much information, and stated 
that it would be changed when the supply runs out. Interview, Frank D. Wood, 
Jan. 27, 1972. As of Dec. 8, 1972, it is still in use. Letter from Claude H. Tins-
ley, Jr., Exec. V.P., Dec. 8, 1972. 
I 
A\I£RICAI'o' SEII\'ICE BtJIIEAU 
IDENTIFICATION ASD FILE COMPARISON 
Thi s fort~~ when completed will pro•·id(' proper identil'ication as required by Publ ic Law 9!-508, (fair 
Credn Reporttng Acd. h will ai.!IO usis1 in our desire to kef!p your cuts (Tel~hone Tull Chnge) to 
1 mi nimum whtn disclosure is made. Thank You. 
\lya-1!11 O.tl!ofBin.b ------
Drive,.. Licet~H ;"\...,.bcr Stott: Social Seunty N~mber ------
lamm.mecl Sinsle Divorced have __ dependenta 
\ly ruideoce addr10u is ReL Phoae: ___ Bua: ___ _ 
\\yfol'!llerretlldtt~ceaddn:n••-----------------------
\lyoccupatooeia _________________________ _ 
N-1! of •r ~Ioyer ia I h..-1! beu.., -ployed __ yu .. 
\lybu•••e .. addreui• -------------------------
Satareofllly bu,~eni•------------------------
\lyoc~auoa for thepaatflveyuuh .. beell __________________ _ 
\ l y!!ppr. wottki a \ly&ppr. rncomti•----------
[ o,.11thl!io!lo .. inlrt:aluute -----------------------
1 have th follo..;al h.o~k••s e<tnlltC:tiolla Chcl•a 1 
s. .... ~ •• 
Co.rtrecorda, ofoay,(lododla&Dnvlnl}llllllfl-e- ao lollowl --------------
REFERENCES: 
~~~----------
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(To he• o<l ,ll: rll'd 11nd n•tuml'd 1.0 the Americ&n Se!'·ice Bureau) 
I undcrslanU tlmt tlw •\ mo·rkan ."i.ror\u •• Bureau ond/ or agent will di11close to me by telephone, the 
content~ of tht•ar flit· <1101f•ming mf' o"' JmHidrd by Public La,.· 91-508, (!he Fai r Credit Report ing 
Ard r~)Jio,.·injl: JHHJU'r i fi~>ntifiration and paymen t o f any 1.011 charges. 
I furthrr undrr,..tand th:~t thl" ,\ rt grants me the right to question any statemen t in my file, as to its 
arrutaC) or t1amplt·trnr~~-
Regarding rhar~s for Sf'!' ice, I understand that· 
A. Th~r.: .,.jJI be no charge for disclosure of file information to me if my f"('qUf'.'U for 
disclosure is being made within 60 days follo.,.•ing my re<:eipt of a nolice of rat· 
ing or decline for insurance, or rejection for emplo)·ment. I am to pro' ide the no· 
tice. or copy thereof, as proof of receipt. 
B. If more than 60 days ha'e elapsed from the time I recei'ed notice. and the time 
of my request for disclosure, the law pro\'ides a reasonable charge to be made. 
(The charge will be $5.00> 
C. If request is bei ng made for personal reasons (no notice recei,·ed) the law pro· 
\'ides a reasonable charge to be made. (The charge to be $5.00) 
(\\'here the $5.00 payment is required, your check or money order should accom-
pan) the Agrt"ement.) 
I ue~der.tand th•t the AlllericiUI Se!""ice Bureau. Inc • .h•ll .. -ithia a reuouble period of time n::illvutii!IILe 
aad record the cuneot statue of Ill) i11fom•tioo io qvntioo, uQ.lus i t b .. ruao••ble ground• to belie•·c: 
th•tthedap11teia fnvolouaorinele•·llflt, 
lben re•n•·utisation fail • to confirm or re· •enfy previouly reported infonnation, the Americllfl Servi~e 
Buruu ehall promptly del ete au t b ~ofonn•tion from i ta filn. I •lao undeutand that if the reinveatisation 
don oot resolve the dispute, I may file a brief statement setting fo rth the nature of the dispu te and th e 
.'unerican Service Bureau , Inc. sh•ll on any aubsequent report containins the inform1tion in queatlon. 
d early 110te thllt it 11 doaputed 11nd pro•-ide my atSiemmt or accurate summary thereo f. I further undu· 
saud that. loJio.,·•ng •ny deleuoo of iofonn• tion or not•tiona •• tocLaputedi,.formation. the American 
Ser;oice Boreau. Inc. sh•ll , •t my requett, properly adv1sethe current•t•tua to any person• who re.cei>ed 
• report {•a the p•at two ye•• for emp\oymeoll purpo11u, or wil.hi11 !.he paat 6 •<Hitha for inavrance.}which 
coe~ t•o ud !lie deleted o r diaputtd inform•uoa. 
To aaaiat me and the :\mentiUI Sen·ice Bure•u. Inc, to re.ahe any itenu ill queauon or in diapute in 
acurda.ace woth Public l.aw 91-508 IF•tr Ctedit Reportons \ ctl I authorize the Areerican Sen·ice Bureau 
In c, toconductftl1 on~eoot i ,;ntion at itao..,. expense •ndhereby authorize.,y buaineaa, •nyorsanintion, 
any profe .. iun•l nuon ... r "")'One el.e, to diado•e fulllnfollllati<HI •bout me and to g1ve to the American 
Service Bureau, In c, '"I'"'" .,f ""Y recurda 1tbout ••e. 
Name----------
!},,,,. ------ Address ----------
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APPENDIX FIVE 
SERVICE AGREEMENT FOR FCRA COMPLIANCE 
HALE-PRIETSCH SERVICES, INC. 
COMMERCIAL REPORTS 
SERVI CE AGREEMENT 
I n compliance with-Section 607 of Title VI (Fol r Credit Reporting Act) under Publ ic 
Law 91 ... 508, kn01m as the Consumer Cred i t Protection Act, we must ask our clients to 
sign this ag reement and certification. 
In order to cooperate with other business and professional people In the 
dissemination of confidentia l credit, employment, and other Information, 
the unde r signed •grees to the fo l lowing when using the reporting serv ice 
of Ha l e • Prletseh Services, Incorporated , for consumer credit a nd emp l oy ... 
ment purposes. 
THE UNDER 51 GNED Cll ENT AGREES: 
That he will comply wi th all the provisions of Title VI (Fair Credit Reporting Act) 
of Public Low 91-5o8. 
The client certifies that consumer Inquiries wi ll be "'-de, and / or consumer repor ts 
ordered on l y for a permissib l e purpose at defined in Section 604 of the Act, name l y 
(A) Intends to use the lnforrutlon In connection wi th • cred i t trans-
•ctlon invo l ving the consumer on whom t he Information is t o be 
furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or 
collect ion of an account of, the consumer; or 
(B ) intends to use the fnfonutlon for employntent purposes: or 
(C) Intends to use the lnform~~tfon In connection with the underwriting 
of Insurance Involving the consumer; or 
(D) otherwise has a legltlrute business need for the lnforNtlon In con-
nection with a business transaction Involving the consumer. 
The client further certl fles th11t the InforMation wi 11 be used for no other purpose 
th11n the one gl ven when orderIng the consUWtr report , 11nd 
Th11t the employees of the client 11re forbidden to attempt to obtain reports on them-
se l ves or associates, or on 11ny other person except In the exercise of their officia l 
dutIes. 
C 11 ent 's code II _____ _ 
Nome ________ __________ _ 
By _____________ _ _ 
Dote ____________ _ 
Title of officer 
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APPENDIX SIX 
IMPACT OF FCRA ON GOVERNMENT 
I. Correspondence from City of Chicago Department of Police 
II. Correspondence from Federal Housing Administration 
III. Correspondence from Veterans Administration 
IV. Correspondence from U.S. Postal Service 
V. Correspondence from Department of Justice 
CITY OF CHICAGO/ D[PARTMfNT 0' POLICE 1121 South Stalt Street Ch•UIO, llhnoi• 60605 
Hr. Albert A. Foer 
Aaaocbte Editor 
The Unlveulty of Chicago 
Law Review 
1111 Eut 60th Street 
Chicago , Illinoil 60637 
Dear Hr. Foer: 
RICHARD J, DALEY, M•r• 
JAMES I, COHLISIC, JA., S•p•R•u.ooiul 
26 January 1972 
The Superintendent of Police , Jamn 8. Conlilk, Jr., haa 
referred t o the underaigned your recent COimlunfcation for 
acknOitfledgment and reaponae. 
You r l ette r contained reference to the Federal Fair Credit 
Reporting Act o f 1971 and itl impact on tnvntfgative procedurea of 
the Chicago Police Department, u well 1111 aome rehted inquirtu. 
Questions poled and responaea to the aame follow: 
1. Q - Ex t ent of uae of Conaumer Reporting Agenciea prior 
to approva l of FCRA 7 
A - Unable t o determine frequency of such use but 
reliance on auch agenciel declined conaiderably after service fees 
we re impoa ed. 
2. Q- Purposes for which they were utUhed? 
A - To determine criminal motive, such as collection of 
fraudulent insurance clai.ml; •a•ociation o f persona and/or organh.a -
t iona which could be con1trued aa "front" cor poration or partneraht.p 
for pouibh illictt purpoaea; l oution of victims, offendera and 
wt tneasea, and locat e mta•lng peuona , to ident ify aome purpoaea. 
). Q -Impor tance of auch aaenclea 11 in~attaacion aida? 
A - Signif i cant onl y aa additional aour cu of information. 
The t nforml t ion g leaned hu been auuud ea "m inimal but he lpful " in 
developing tnvea t igations. 
I. Correspondence from City of Chicago Department of Police 
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~·· :'. ltll~ \ II ; DEPARTMENT OF HOUS ING ANO URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
"'ta.. _.,.#c FEDERAL HOU SING ADMINISTRATION 
'USHIHGTON , 0. C. 20.12 
Hr. Albert A. Foer 
,_.sociate Editor 
Janu.uy 14, 1972 
The lkliversity of Chicago Lav Review 
1111 East 60th Street 
dlicaqo, Illinoia 60637 
Dear Hr. Foer: 
IN ............ 1;101:" •01 
FAMO 
This wil l supplement IIY letter of December 29, 1971 concerning your 
request for infonaation reqardinq credit r eport-a obtained for ntA use. 
You a.re correct in your understanding that FHA N.}:;es extensive use of 
conSW!Ier credit reports . Credit report• are the basis for evalu.atinq 
the acceptability of the mortg age credit riak on applications for U"Ort -
gaqs insurance . 'Itle FHA contracts for credit reporting services on the 
bash of ~titive bids . under the terM of the contract FHA 1110rtqaqees 
may elect to purchue reports from the contract sources at the contract 
price . Althouqh FHA does not refuse to •ccept credit reports submitted 
vith • .ortgage insurance application fro~:~~ any credit infol"Diilltion source 
of a JI'Ortgagee's choosing, FHA reserves the riqht to supple-.nt or verify 
the credit infonMtion subaitted by the 1110rtgagees. 'l'he number of reports 
obtained by FHA during a qiven month varies extensively vith the necessity 
of suppl eme.ntinq or verifying credit infoi'llt4tion obtained with the appli-
cations sul:lmitted. During the calendar year of 1971 approxilllately 600,000 
cases were insured . Each of these cases ..,.s covered by a consumer credit 
report which was obtained by the mor tqaqee or the FHA. Jlejected cases 
are not reflected in this figure even thoUC]h credit reports would have 
been attached to the su.t.aissions. 
The credit reportinq coveraqe criterion required under the FUA Factual 
Data {Credit) Reports contract falls within the guidelines of the CONSUMER 
REPOR!' type sat out in the Fair Credit Jleporting Act (Public: Law 91 - 508) , 
wherein the infol"'ID.Jtion co-• from repositories of accumulated credit re-
cord s and public records as to suits , judgments, foreclosures , qarnishlrlent..s, 
bankruptcies and other leqal actions involving a subject. \oie do not re -
quire or order the type of INVESTIGATIVE ~SUMER REPORTS set out in the 
Fair Credit Repor ting Act de&linq with a consUIII8.r ' s c:ha.racter , qeneral 
reputation, personal characteristics or mode of livinq obtained throuqh 
personal interviews with neiqhbors, friends o r associates. 
Credit raporu are obtained from a varying number of firJU each year . 
Credit reporting agencies bid competitively for award of the annual contract(&) 
in their respective geogr aphic al areas of interest . Twenty- six contracts 
were awarded fo r the Fiscal Year 1972. several of these twenty- six provide 
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4. Q - Extent of uu since sppr<Nal of FCRA 1 
A - Utilizat i on declitw:d to t he uro leve l. 
S. Q - Hu FCRA hurpe r ed de~lopm~~nt of pe r tinen t and 
nec.euary 1nfor-stlon1 
A - No . Depart~~~ent reaourcefu l neu hu developed 
productive colla t eral aources which have bean and s t ill ara 
ut il ized . 
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Puagnph 604 of Title VI of the Fair Credit Reporting Act list.e the pur-
poses for which c.redit reports may be ordered. TtLis has caused u.s to forego 
order.inq credit report. in one phase of our operations. SOIIIeti.llles an appli-
cant for an insured a:art9age has recently sold a property on lthich there 
is an outstandinq FHA insured mortgage and the buyer has usu::.d the mortgage 
paygenta. Often in such cases , ve will review the credit of the substitute 
mortqaqor before we will qu.arantee another loan to the seller . To assist 
i.n the review, ve require the subi!Lission of a credit report on the substitute 
t~C~rt.gagor. some credit bureaus have refused to provide these credit reports 
because the substitute mortgagor is not a party to the purchase transaction 
or mortgaqe application that is under consideration. !be credit bureaus 
hold that this is not one of the purposes for which credit reports may be 
provided. \oie h&ve not contested their interpretation of Pu:aqraph 604 o·f 
tha Law . 
Wa tru.1t that the t:oret}Oing information will be of some aasbtance to you 
in your study. 
sfil.l~, 
R. David Lasure 
Director 
~a9ement and Operations 
Assistance Division 
2 . 
credit information in 1:10r e than one 9eQ9r&phical Metropolitan area, and 
only one givaa qua.si total coveraqe of the entire United States . 
We do not require nor use investi9ative reports . The Consumer credit 
report as previously stated is \Uied to assist \UI in determin9 whether an 
applicant has a satisfactory credit standing . It would not be possible 
to determine what percentage of reports result in a rejection of the 
applications. 
Each insurance proqru contains specific and vuyinq requirements for 
qualification for 1110rt9119e insurance . 1\ny one or colabination of reasons 
therefore lllilY be the reason for rejection, including of course, an un-
aatisfactory credit standing-. 
To co:roply with that section of Public Law 91- 508 which requires the user 
of a credit report to notify the cons\ll!l8:r whenever the consumer has been 
denied credit or insurance because of information in the credit report , 
the FHA advises the mortgagee who had ~;ub!IU.tted the mortgage appl ication 
of the rejection, and in these insunces the mortqagee forwards the extra 
copy of the FHA "Report on Application" to the mortgagor. On this copy 
of the " Report on Application" is the name and address of the credit re -
porting agency as well as a notification of the rejection due to credit 
characteristics. There is no definite form letter used by the ~K'rt9a9ee 
in notifying- the mort9agor. The mort9a9ees prepare their own letter& 
based on instructions from this office to include the required i nformation 
under the Public Law . 
The requirement limiting responses to inquiries about individuals has not 
resulted in any changes in our procedures. on an individual case basis, 
mortgage credit personnel .soa.e.ti..e& request "'ri.fication of information 
conu..ined in an application by phone or letter. However , the IDOrtqagor 
in his application qive& us permis sion to ~rify any information contained 
therein. Thus, we do not believe this ill a violation of the Fair Credit 
Raportinq Act. 
Creditors in the pas t ha.ve alw•ys rated the accounu with their cu.~tomera . 
That is, they would advise that "payt:~ents u:e as aqreed," or "30 to 60 
days slow," or "unsatisfactory, " etc . These ratinqa along with information 
on the accounu would appe•r in the credit report. Since the Pair Credit 
Reportinq Act has become law, we have been advised by some field offices 
that ac- credi tors will not r•te the accounts any more . They will only 
provide information on the &mOunt of credit extended, tertllllll of payment, 
and balance owing. This ha.s not become a &eri.oua problem for u.s , but 
whenever i t occurs , evaluation of the borrower's credit is made IDOre 
difficult. 
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Hr . Alber t A. Foe r 
In each cau where a l o. n is den ied because of the infonutt.on con· 
talned in the c redit re po rt the applicant is furnished with a copy 
of a htur vhich. infor•s hit~~ that the reason for denta l of his 
loan was bined on lnfor1111t i on contained in a c redit r eport prepared 
by a spedUc credi t re porting agency. Copies of t he form leneu 
that are used by our field stations a re ;~ttached. 
t n..,es tiKit ive consumer report s ar e ob t ained on fee apprai ser•, compli· 
ance inspectora, and pr ope rty 1111rn~ge~~~en t broker s , We have no sta· 
tls tics as t o number of report s ob t ained or cos t . These r eports are 
obtai ned under the contrac t disc ussed abo..,e . When an individual 
h des i ¥nated 1 cred it report la o rde r ed . the notice advises that 
designation was ~Nde pend ing receipt of a sat hhc t or y credi t report. 
In t h.e account 1 receivable act l \l ity there are two types of reports 
secured froa Retail Credit C0111pany for persons wh.o a re indebted to 
the Veterans Adcllin i st r ation: (a) asset and inc0111e reportl for debts 
of $200 or IIIOU , and (b) skip-locate r epor t a fo r thoae persons wh0111 
we a r e unable to locate and when t he deb t exceeda $300 . the price 
of c redit reporu ranges from $4 , 90 t o $5 . 2S; skip·locau report s 
tan¥e fro. $10 . 00 t o $10,75 pe r h.our with a limit of $35 each . 
Whl.le we have no statist i cs as to number of r epor t s o r dered , t he 
cos t for fY 1971 was $204 ,000 . I t h estl1111ted that $51,000 was used 
for 5kip·locau reports and $141 ,000 was used for ,user 11nd income. 
reports. these re po rt s are used in mak ing a determination as to th.e 
debtor's ab ilit y to pay. Prenot ification t o the conaumoer is not 
required aa benefits are not denied because o[ infor~Wtion contained 
in ~he report. 
In addit i on to the foregoing, several elements of our Departa~ent 
of Medicine and Surge r y utilh.e credit reports on an as-needed basis . 
Included are the Vet erans Canteen Serv i ce , t h.e Supply Servi ce, and 
the Board on Co llections and Co.p r omises . the r epo rts are o r de r ed 
by indiv i dual field station s , and this office ma in tains no statistics 
wi th respect to them that would enable us to .!ln s1Jer your questions. 
the Veterans Adminis t ra tion has no t made any major change• i n it a 
procedu r e• as a result of the req ui r emen t lllaitin¥ reaponae• to in · 
qu iries about individuals since we do not order inveati~ati\le type 
reporu incident t o l oan appllca ti ona . 
When the Fair Credit Reporting Ac t wa s fi ra t i mplemen t ed ther e \o'ere 
IOIDe doubts in t h.e minds of lending in s tituti onl , especially bank1, 
aa to wheth.er by sub111itting a c redit re port to the Veurana Admin· 
htra t ion they would be con s l de re.d c red it r eportln~ agencies . !his 
m.atur has been the s ubjec t of interpretation by thf': Federal Agencie s 
cha r ged 1Jith t he supervision of the va rlou a typel o{ lending inlltl-
tutlons. 
'· 
• 
Mr. Albert A. Foer 
Auochte Editor 
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION 
Orne~: Of'" Gu.vu.1.. COUHsG. 
WASHINGTON. D .C . 20420 
FEB 1'1'fJ1Z 
The Un iversi t y of Chicago Law 
Review 
1111 tut 60th Street 
Chicago , lllinoh 60637 
Dear Hr . Poer: 
024 
Thi 1 il in respons e to your lstter of November 30, 11171, request • 
ing information fr 0111 the Vetera..n s Administr ation pursuan t to your 
s tudy of the effscts of the Fa.lr Credit Reporting Ac t . 
the Veterans Adclliniltr a tion requiru that a Credit Report be s ub• 
ai tted with each Gl loan applica tion aubtr~ itted by a private lender 
for 1 guaranty coamitme.nt . Ou..ring C&lenda.r Year 1971 we guarant.eed 
soee 275,000 h ome loan s o f an lliiiOUnt. of approximately $6 billion . 
Credit Repo rt• are llso obtainsd by the Veterans Administration in 
connection with the processing of direct loans, release of liabll -
it.y applications and offe r a to purchas e Ve t eraos Administration 
Ololt\ed propert ies which a re for sale . these are conaut~~er type cred-
it report s . Investigative ty pe reports are not submitted with 
l oan applications nor are t hey ordered dlrect.ly by the Vet.e r ans 
Admin.htratlon . 
For s everal yea r s the Veterans Administration has bad an agree:ment 
with t he Dep&rtment of Housing and Urba n Development whereby HUD , 
as the contracting a gency, let.s inv it a tions to bid and enters into 
contracts wit.h qualU:ied bidders t o aupply consumer type credit re• 
ports and both agencies, as 1Jell •• lenders , -y ob tain consume r 
t ype credit reports for loan purposes from these contrac tors . For 
Fiacal Year 1972, HUD awarded 26 credit reporting con tracts under 
which the Veterans Administration and private lenders who int.end 
to sublllit Gl loan applicat ions - Y order con1umer cred it reports. 
The price of the s e reports ranges fr0111 $5 . SO to $1.50 for t he basic 
report p l us $4 . 00 for anteced&ntl or foreign reports . We have no 
stathtics as to the number of credit reports submitted to the 
Veterans Acbainiatration or ordered by the Veterans A.cbainhtratlon 
or lenders frOID aucceuful bidders . 
Consumer reports that are supportive data to loan applicat i ons are 
used to deter-in• whethe r the veteran is 1 1atlsfactory cred i t riak 
u r equired by the governing law. No figures are available aa to 
the number of ad\lerse actions or rejections of Gl loans solely as 
a reault of the infonution contained in tbeaa reports. 
Sl»w WtrrMis f.Jl -, VA jlt u.W, ..J s.ri.J Jrc.rif7 •.mbrr M .Jl ,,.,.,,,,...U.a. 
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Mr. Albert A. Foer 
Auociate Editor 
The University of Chicago 
Law Review 
1111 Eut 60th Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60637 
Dear Mr . Foer: 
~'fU~ 
=~ = 
~ = ~ · ...... . 
LAW DEPARTMENT 
WMhlnQIOn. DC 20260 
December 30 , 1971 
This i1 i.n reply to your letter of December 3, 1971, asking for our 
eva.luat ion of the effect of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (P. L . 91-508) 
on the postal system. We have r eceiver' the following informatio n from 
the Postal Inspection Service: 
Unquestionably, the restraints placed on credit reporting agencies 
have bad a delete r ious effect on the investigative eflorh of the 
P ostal inspection Service. This is particularl.y true in the a r ea 
o f mail fraud where incipient violations were previously brought 
to attention by casualty indexes and r epor ting agencies such as 
Hooper Holmes and Company. Since enactment of the new l aw, 
such c r edit reporting agencies no longer provide thia Service 
with reports, and violato r s in such instances are able to ope rate 
for longer periods of time without being detected. 
Inspectors obtained consumer credit r epo r ts as an investigative 
ai d in many classes of cases . Such reports p rovided much helpful 
info r m ation and l eads quite aside from pu r e financ.ial data, L e ., 
leads to acquisition of known handwriting exemplars, physical 
deacription of suspects and fugitives, etc. On March ZS, 1971, 
approximately one n'l.onth before the effective date of the Act, ita 
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Nr. Alber t .\ . Poe.r 
We have noticed an inc r e11e ln the number of c red ltou who dec line 
t o furn ish c redit bureaus ~o~lth lnforJUtlon, or decline to give a 
r a ting. We hav e no s t a ti s tics on this and our v lew1 a re ba1ed on 
revle1.11 of indi v idual easel 1nd r eport• frou our field 1tatlon 
personnel . 
I tru s t the above 1.1lll 1s1hl you ln conduct i ng your study, 
Enclo1ures 
S ince rel y yours , 
;;
/ "7'> . 
i(... ztl/n, . /( l """ ...... ' 
WARD~. D~N~Y 
Asalatant General Couiae l 
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Associate Editor 
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MAR 2 I 1972 
University of Chicago Law Review 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60637 
Dear Mr . Foer: 
This i s in response to your l e tter t o Mr. Kleindienst 
regarding the Study that you are making of the operations 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, P.L. 91 - 508, Title VI; 
84 Stat . 1127; 15 U.S.C . 1681 ("the Act"). 
The letter asks a number of factual questions about 
consumer reporting agencies and government investigations. 
Your questions were referred t o the FBI which has furnished 
us with the following answers. 
1. What degree of reliance is placed on information 
f r oo consumer reporting agencies? 
With enactment of the Act , credit files became 
unavailable as investigative resources in criminal and 
security investigations . The FBI responded to the limita-
t ions of the statute by discontinuing credit bureau file 
checks as a routine investigative technique in other than 
employment cases. Credi t information obtained under the 
exceptions provided in the statute is identified ::o that 
it will not be used subsequently for purposes other than 
those permitted by the law. 
2. Has the Act i ncreased the cost of investigations? 
While precise accounting i s not available, the 
FBI feels that the restrictions imposed by the Act have 
generally increased time and manpower costs. 
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restrictive provisions were brought t o the attention of all Postal 
lnlpection Service personnel with irutructiona to dhcontinue ob-
taining or r eviewing credit reports, and, thereafter, such reports 
were no lo nger r elied upon for investigative purposes. 
Although the Fair Credit Reporting Act has limited our quick acceu 
to certain probative and othe r helpful data and has increased the 
overall cost of investigations, we have no means of accurately 
estimating the increased coat. Additionally, it has the effect of 
reducing to some extent the thoroughness of some of our investi. 
gations from the standpoint of bringing all poasible !acts together 
for analysis . 
The resourcefulnes s of Inspectors haa resulted i n the development 
of alternate me ana of obtaining appropriate information, however, 
it is difficult to quantify the effectiveness of these means. Certainly, 
they are more time consunling than was the case when such data was 
obtainable at one source. 
1 hope this answers your questions. 
~~·ot~~~~y 
W. Allen Sanders 
Aasistant General Counsel 
Legislative Divisio n 
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It is conceded, for.example, that the government is limited 
in obtaining informati on from consumer reporting agencies 
by f 604 of the Act , 15 U. S . C. 168lb. However, the defini -
tion of 11 consumer r eporting agency11 includes words of l imi-
tation which appear to exclude the FBI f r om the definition. 
The FBI does not furnish information outs i de the government 
for monetary fees. Moreover , t he term 11cooperative non-
prof it basis" is not applicable to the reporting activities 
of Federal agencies . 11 Cooperative non- profit basis 11 is 
generally understood to refer to the functions of private 
associations that provide services to their members on a 
mutually beneficial basis, such as the cooperati ve credit 
bureaus which exist in this field. 
The letter of April 7, 19 70 to wbi.ch you refer from 
Deputy Attorney General Kleindiens t to Leonor K. Sullivan, 
Olairman of the SubcOtmDi ttee on ConsUIJ'Ier Affairs of the 
House Banking Committee confirms this. (The text of the 
l etter appears in Fair Credit Reporting, Hearings on H. R. 
16340 before the subcotrlllittee on consumer affairs of the 
House Conl:Dittee on Banking and Currency, 9lst Cong., 2d 
Sess . (1970) a t page 605 . ) The letter states in pertinent 
part : 
Another factor which warrants close 
Cotmnittee consideration is the possibility 
that the definition of 11consumer reporting 
agency 11 in H.R . 16340 may be read to include 
agencies of Government . This is obviously 
not intended and so we would suggest some 
limiting language such as that used on page 
5, lines 10 and 11, of S . 823. Certainly, 
there is no intention to require the F.B.I. 
or other agenc i es o f Government to open their 
files to all person s whose names appear in 
them . 
At the time that thi s letter was written S. 823 had already 
passed the Senate and had been introduced in the House. 
The Senate bill at p. 5, lines 10 and 11, included the 
l anguage limiting t he de finition of 1'consumer reporting 
- 3 -
3 . To what extent have substi tute means of ob taining 
similar i nformation been found? 
The estimate given above that costs have been 
increased is based on the fact that investigative l eads 
now must be developed, if they are available at a ll, though 
various alternatives involving direct interviews of numerous 
possible sources seeking the one having relevant inform,tion. 
4. How often do banks utilize FBI fingerprint checks? 
While stati stics concerning the total number of 
fingerprint checks requested by banks are not readily avai l -
able, employment application fingerprint identification 
service is available by law and regulation (Public Law 
92-184; 28 C. F . R. 0.85(b)) to federally insured or chartered 
banks . 
You have a l so raised a legal question as to whether a 
government agency such as the FBI may be a consumer reporting 
agency within the meaning of the Fair Credit Reporting Ac t, 
P.L. 91- 508, Title VI, 84 Stat. 1127, 151 u.s.c . 1681. The 
Office of Legal Counsel cannot furnish you with an official 
legal opinion on this question since we are limited by law 
to providing such opinions to officers of the Executive 
branch acting in their official capacities. However , we 
offer the fo l l owing analys i s for your information . 
The Act defines consumer reporting agency as any person 
which "for monetary fees, dues , or on a cooperative nonprofit 
basis 11 regularly engages in assembling consumer credit 
information for the purposes of 11 furnishing consumer reports 
to t hird parties. 11 15 U. S.C. 168la(f). An example of 
dissemination t o a third party, .!·.!·, outside the government, 
by the FBI could be the employment applicant fingerprint 
service available to Federally insured banks pursuant to 
P.L. 92-184 . 
It is true that the Act includes a general definition 
of 11 person11 , 15 U.S . C. 168la , that covers government 
agencies and that some sections may apply t o such agencies. 
- 2 -
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It may be noted that legislation has been proposed 
by the Admini stra tion which would provide new rights for 
individuals to examine records main t ained by the govern· 
ment. On September 20 , 1971, the Attorney General sent 
to Congress the "Criminal Justice Information Sys t ems 
Security and Privacy Ac t o f 1971," which has been intro· 
duced as H. R. 10789 . Section J(c) of the bil l provides : 
(c) An individual who believes that 
criminal offender record information con· 
cerning him i s inac curate, incomplete, or 
maintained in violation of this Act shall, 
upon satisfactor y ver i fication of his 
identity, and in accordance with published 
rules seating the t ime , place , fees to the 
extent authorized by sta t ute, and procedure 
to be followed, be entitled to review such 
information and to obtain a copy of it for 
the purpose of chal l enge or correction. 
Thus, some of t h e same sort of protecdon afforded to con· 
sumers against private investigative agencies would , under 
t he bi ll, be provided in the government field as well. 
Sincerel y , 
?~P.e. 
Ra l ph E. Erickson 
Assis tant At t orney Genera l 
Office of Legal Counsel 
- 5 -
agency11 to enterprises acting "for monetary fees, dues, or 
on a cooperative nonprofit basis ," which now appears in t he 
Act. (See S . 823 , November 12, 1969, as referred to the 
House Corm! , on Banking and CUr r ency , printed a t page 15 of 
House hearings, supra .) The bil l introduced by Congress· 
woman Sul livan, H. R. 1 6340 , did not , as noted in the l e tter , 
include similar l anguage . See page 2 of House hearings, 
~· ~/ The Department ' s view was that the addi tion o f 
thi s l anguage woul d make it clear that goverm~ent agencies 
did not fall within the definition. 
There is nothing in the subsequent l egis l ative history 
which suggests that anyone took issue with the Department ' s 
position. The findings and purpose set out by the Congress 
at the beginning of the Act reflect the view that Congress 
was concerned with comnercial interests and not with the 
practices of government agencies . Sec. 602 , 15 U. S.C. 1 681. 
The entire tenor of the legislative history reflects a con· 
cern with private rather than public agencies. 
The whol e question of disclosure of government f il es 
was the recent subject of searching debate when the Freedom 
of I nformation Ac t was passed . 5 U.S.C. 552. It hard l y 
seems like l y that Congress in passing the Act woul d have 
radically upset or altered che equilibrium and compromise 
achieved by che Freedom of Information Act wi t hout indi ca · 
cing that i t had an intention to do so . 
~/ H.R. 16340 was not reported out by the Comni ttee . 
Instead, another bill which did no t include a provision 
dealing with credit agencies , H.R . 15073, was reported 
out. H. Rep . No. 91· 975. Tha t bill, in substantially 
similar f orm was introduced i n t he Senate as S. 3578. It 
was amended on the Senate floo r to include the provisions 
relating to credit agencies and then adop ted as an amend· 
men t in the nature of substitute for H.R. 15073. What 
became the present Act was then agr eed t o by the House in 
confer ence . H. Rep . 91·1587, p. 25. 
- 4 -
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1974] PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET 
APPENDIX SEVEN 
OBSOLETE DATA PROCEDURES, SELECTED CONSUMER 
REPORTING AGENCIES, CHICAGO 
129 
I. CREDIT BUREAUS 
A. Manual 
1. Chicago Credit Bureau 
Everything over 10 years old destroyed. Personnel trained to avoid 
giving out statutorily obsolete data. 
2. Credit Bureau of Western Cook County 
On-going manual purging. Also, obsolete data destroyed as encoun-
tered in response to inquiries. 
3. Hale-Prietsch Services 
Obsolete data retained, not segregated in file . Supervisor reads and 
pulls obsolete data before passing file to reported, unless section 
605(b) exceptions apply. Reported double-checks. Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcies considered under 14 year limit. 
B. Computerized 
1. Credit Information Corporation of Chicago 
All information programmed out prior to statutory limit. Chapter 13 
bankruptcies kept only 7 years. Inquiry records kept 10 years. 
2. Hooper-Holmes Credit Index 
All information purged with in 5 years. 
3. TRW Credit Data 
All information programmed out of computer prior to statutory 
limit. 
II. INSPECTION BUREAUS (All Manual) 
I. American Service Bureau 
Favorable information destroyed after 13 months. Adverse informa-
tion retained 5 years. 
2. Illinois Service Bureau 
Copy of report destroyed after 2 years, including derogatory infor-
mation. Files containing newspaper clippings and order tickets kept 
5 years. Daily manual weeding. 
3. Insurance Inspections, Ltd. 
All information destroyed after 13 months. 
4. Retail Credit Co. · 
Files destroyed after 13 months, except that significant adverse data 
kept 5 years. Bankruptcy data kept 10 years. A file with highly sensi-
tive data, e.g. concerning crime syndicate, retained longer, but obso-
lete data not reported. 
5. Underwriters Reports, Inc. 
Oldest information is 2 years, except for adverse information . Too 
costly to purge manually. Manager checks each file when it is pulled 
before passing it to an inspector. 
Sources: See profiles of the respective bureaus in Appendix One. 
130 Consumer Journal [Vol. 11:37 
APPENDIX EIGHT 
SAMPLE FORMS USED BY INSPECTION BUREAUS 
I. Tenant Home Owners Report, Blank Form, Retail Credit Co., 1968. 
II . Comprehensive-Homeowners-Tenants Report, Blank Form, Insurance In-
spections, Ltd ., 1972. 
III. Personnel Selection Investigation, Specimen Report*, Retail Credit Co., 
1965. 
IV. Fire-Report-Dwelling, Sample Form, O'Hanlon Reports, 1964. 
Note: For a sample of an American Service Bureau "Special Service Life 
Report", see Senate Hearings on S. 823 (Fair Credit Reporting) 
before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., First Session (May 19, 
1969), at 278-279. 
*All names, locations, and information appearing in this Specimen Report 
are fictitious. 
1974] PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET 
I. Tenant Home Owners Report, Blank Form, 
Retail Credit Co., 1%8. 
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II. Comprehensive-Homeowners-Tenants Report, Blank Form, 
Insurance Inspections, Ltd., 1972. 
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arm . This condttton has coapletely healed and hU appearance 1s entirely 
norul . He has dlaplayed no nervousneaa as a result or th ll lnjUrJ , 
though thh ar11 11 eaatly fatigued. We learn or no other health hlatory, 
He uses lnto:~:tcanta on a ~aode rate and tnt' r eouent basta. He has ee'l'er 
been known to drlnk to excess or use dr~J&&. 
FINANCES: Subject 111'eS wtthln hll :~~eans and matntalnl cloae control 
O't'er hla rtnancea; no known !'1nanctal curnculty. He draws d11ab111ty 
payr.:ents rroa the goverDtlent as a result or hla aer't'lce connected injury. 
ll'ormer employwent recorda tndlcate the a111ount to 'Oe $50 a month . 
PEBSONAL- !I:EP11rATION: Kr. Carl eton 1s qrrted and lhes w1th hls wHe 
and lnt'ant daughter tn a rent.f!d duplex located tn a well kept, stable, 
ll lddle- elaas area. He has ll'fed at hts present address for- the past two 
rear-a. Prlor to thla he lhed tn a well kept, lower llllddle.clan sec tlon 
located on the east slde or th111 clt)'. He 1s well thought of at both 
locatlona and hla sasoctates a re destrable. Hta drtvtn& reputatto'O 11 
ta ra•orable. He ts rl!!gal"ded aa an tndtvtdual wtth high 110ral standards 
and good charactel", Although t he subJect spenda aoat or hll letaure 
tl~:~e wtth hta ra~a1ly , we also leal"n he ta active tn the local A=erlcan 
Legt on Poat where he holds t he posttton or Treuurer . Wtre's attltude 
and influence would be considered helpful to subJect . 
CEB 
UTAil. Cll!DIT COMPANT _ .. 
PERSONNEL SELECTION 
INVESTIGATION 
a 
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CAOTIOK TO CtlSTOMDl.o U~ d.o ...,.... •f -
~f:~~'!:t:43t~~ 
A=!.. No. 012t I ";~·= I ~lor LI'M'U BOCK orra 
~~N. 1~.w:s DEAN I .ttr..!!~P~!t.!.~!!?.t!._.J 
L1 ttle Rook, Arkanu.a, ?2 'It. Second St . 
Ant. Kanager- Htlldale Da.ir)' 
~:- t2-2~J? -~ooo~oo-oooo 
ICOI'I Ott DI'I'Dncu.no. 
Q~Spedcd.p~·..­
!li~P---Il.poo! 
'l'hll 1nveat1gatlon waa conducted tn Lt ttl e Bock , Arkanaas, aubJeot •a 
present addreas . One ror11er e11plorer , present reatdenoe addreaa, and 
one fon:e r residence address were coYered. 
~ 
Contact was E&de with a roraer superYlaor knowt~ ~rears, t~o~o present 
residence nel&hbore kllowtng l and 2 rears respectlYel)', lll.lld two rormer-
r ealdence neighbors kl'lowtn& 1 years eaoh. 
No COTicurrent handling 
MPLOXl"ffiHT RECORD: ii::P<5il.fOf"lHVtSiTTiGXii'OOnoilo.IK----------
8· 21 - 6) to Present James D. Carleton ts presentl7 emplored by th l a 
MILLDALE DAIRY local datr7 as Asatatant Planager or thetr bottllng 
Little Rock , Ark . plant . At your tnatruotton , we ha'fe not oonta.oted 
thla f1r11, howeYer, ~o~e haYe been able to Yerlfy 
thla ea.plo}a.ent throuch personal aourees , 
6~;5~59 to 8~1 6~6) Thla rare. equlpctent sales rtn reporte a.pplloant 
REGAL JI{ACHINERY CO. worked for thea during the datea shown aa a aerY~ 
Ll ttle Book, Ark. leectan, repa.lrlng far111 uohlnerJ, He Mal con~ 
actenttoua, applied htmaelf well, end wa s rated 
as a good meohanlo . He Mae partt oularl)' aklllad ln ctlnute asaembl7 work . 
Hla aalarr ~o~aa leo per week and attendance waa regular. Kanqe•ent a nd 
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APPENDIX NINE 
PRE-NOTIFICATION AND FURTHER INFORMATION 
I. Pre-notification Hand-out, Aetna Life'& Casualty. 
II. Pre-notification Letter* 
135 
III. Response to Request for Additional Information Under Section 606(b)* 
I. Pre-notification Hand-out, 
Aetna Life & Casualty. 
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*(facsimile of form letter used by a major insurance company) 
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II. Pre-notification Letter 
III . Response to Request for Additional Information Under Section 606(b). 
[ H ~H =; 
1 ~] t!§ •• . ~ 
11 ].! .. 151 H r ] a! .a-; i •• "8. ~i ili ~~~ • h1 jl 5 .; .. j~ !H .. .• 5 •• ~ i~ ~ ~it h s 'l ~ •• M <! ~, -n ·•-r. 
I -~_!; t:p n ·-a-g:! ,b! -! ~·-= r~ 
1 
.s! ~ r- K~ ~a !I ·l . ~h j .. :S~ 1 dfi •1 
~ Ij; ]h.i :fa .~ 
.!! 
..!~! .Hi .• j i .;iH H ~ ! 5 ~ 
t ~=2i ~n~ H s tl! 
fi 
t=t L ., 'i~ 
~1 g (~H g. 
·c I 8 • a • i !iJ • r f~ ·  Hi -: 
j 
:ii] 
~~~ ~b "i ~ H H!i ~lr 
1974] PERSONAL INFORMATION MARKET 137 
APPENDIX TEN 
AUTHOR'S APPROACH AND METHODS OF RESEARCH 
Although my intention was to be as scientific as possible, after a year in the 
vineyards I have to admit that science, in a study of this nature, turns out to 
mean little more than gathering as much information as possible from the 
greatest possible variety of sources, and then attempting to evaluate it with as 
much sophistication and judgment as one can muster. To study an industry 
like the personal information market, much of which has traditionally been 
shrouded in secrecy, where statistics are almost entirely lacking, where many 
informants must be promised confidentially, and where the subpoena power is 
the researcher's pipe dream, required more art than science. 
The major source of information upon which this article is based was the 
personal interview. During the last two months of 1971, I sought out users of 
consumer reports in Chicago. These included retailers, insurance companies, 
banks, savings and loan institutions, finance companies, real estate companies, 
and government agencies. Executives or counsel of 40 such units were person-
ally interviewed by the author or an associate. These interviews followed a pre-
pared pattern and lasted an average of one hour, focusing on the uses and 
sources of consumer reports and the perceived impact of the FCRA. Another 
40 consumer report users were interviewed in less depth by telephone. Respon-
dents were informed that publication was intended and that they might request 
confidentiality. 
Based upon this interview experience. a four-page questionnaire was pre-
pared and mailed to 200 additional consumer report users. "The replies_ to our 
questionnaires soon illustrated that questionnaires are utterly useless in a fact-
finding study of this kind."* An insignificant percentage of potential respon-
dents were willing to utilize our stamped, self-addressed envelopes. 
During the first two months of 1972, attention was shifted to the consumer 
reporting agencies in Chicago. Executives of 6 credit bureaus and 8 inspection 
bureaus were interviewed for an average of 3 hours each. Executives of an ad-
ditional 9 consumer reporting agencies were interviewed over the telephone. 
Many of those interviewed were of continuing help throughout the project, 
answering additional questions as they occurred and serving as a sounding 
board for my observations and proposals. Considering the reputation of the 
credit bureaus and inspection bureaus for secrecy, I was amazed to find this 
d.egree of openness and cooperation. Only a few firms refused to be inter-
VIewed. 
The basic footwork in Chicago was supplemented in many ways, beginning 
with a thorough search of the literature on privacy, credit bureaus, insurance 
Underwriting, and the FCRA. Contact was est:J.blished with consumer groups 
and privacy-concerned individuals around the nation. Some correspondents 
produced documentation of abuses in the personal information market. Others 
provided internal documents from various consumer reporting agencies, 
?btained in ways which I can only imagine. Additional sources included former 
Insurance inspectors and credit bureau employees, detectives, insurance agents 
--* S. DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS 9 (1959). 
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and underwriters, Congressional staff members, and Federal Trade Commis-
sion attorneys in Chicago and Washington. In all, over 250 people were consul-
ted. 
Many, if not all, of my sources had a point of view to sell. A former insur-
ance inspector, for instance, might give biased information if he had been fired 
from his job. Facts, I found, rarely exist in pristine form; rather, there are ten-
dencies of opinion and observation which point in particular directions. I have 
attempted to be alive to my own prejudices and those of my sources, elimina-
ting information (except in Appendix One) which could not be verified from 
other sources. To foster objectivity, I submitted drafts to a variety of experts in 
the various fields involved, including persons less than sympathetic to my ob-
jectives. I am grateful to them all, but take full responsibility for the results, 
some of which will certainly not appeal to all my correspondents. 
My own prejudices must not be overlooked. Objectivity can carry a writer 
only so far when his material requires constant evaluation as to truth or signi-
ficance. I start with the belief that the best society is one where diversity is 
encouraged, where debate is vigorous, and where spontaneity is undampened 
by the lurking fear that someone is watching and taking notes. The invasion of 
privacy is, in a word, a matter of serious concern to me. On the other hand, 
I've grown up on a consumer credit society (my father is a retailer with much 
credit business), and I make full use of the benefits of credit cards and charge 
accounts. My approach, therefore, assumes the continued existence of consu-
mer credit in its various forms. Nor do I believe that insurance companies 
should accept all risks without any attempt to evaluate them. I believe that 
credit bureaus and inspection bureaus can serve a useful purpose; my objective 
is to seek ways in which that purpose can be served without unduly violating 
individual privacy. 
I chose Chicago as the locus of the study because I was attending the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School. As a financial, retail, mail-order, and insurance 
center, Chicago provided a wealth of subjects to study. Indeed, Chicago is not 
typical of the personal information market, because there is so much competi-
tion, so much activity. Where other cities have only one or two credit bureaus 
and a couple of inspection bureaus, Chicago has over 20 credit bureaus and 
almost as many inspection bureaus. This unusual degree of competition impo-
ses upon the empirical part of the study, but should not affect my observations 
and recommendations concerning the FCRA. 
DIETHYLSTILBESTROL 
Joyce E. Br.eiman* 
EDITOR'S NOTE 
On April 27, 1973, the Food and Drug Administration an-
nounced the withdrawal of all authorization for the use of diethyl-
stilbestrol in food-producing animals. t While the following article 
was prepared prior to that date, its impact is not affected by the 
FDA ruling. For one thing, it is very likely that the ruling will be 
appealed in the courts by the drug manufacturers, and such ap-
peals will probably involve many of the same issues and research 
findings discussed below. 
Of greater importance within the context of this Joumal. 
though, is the fact that the diethylstilbestrol problem is not an 
isolated one, occurring because it was unexpected and the appro-
priate agencies lacked machinery to deal with it. On the contrary, 
the greater concem is not for diethylstilbestrol per se (as alarming 
as that may be in itself), but that the administrative and legal 
processes involved work slowly. unevenly. and often provide guid-
ance and protection to no one -- not the drug manufacturer nor the 
livestock producer, who are often left without clear and reasonable 
guidelines, and certainly not the public-at-large whose health is the 
chief reason that any controls at all are placed upon drugs admin-
istered to food producing animals. 
Already advertising campaigns are being mounted by drug 
companies to induce livestock producers to use substitutes for 
diethylstilbestrol which may prove to be equally undesireable, and 
perhaps even more so. Thus. the problem is a continuing one. Even 
!f the FDA ban on diethylstilbestrol is upheld in the courts. issues 
similar to those discussed below will likely also arise with respect to 
the substitute drugs. 
139 
* A.B., University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1972, Loyola University of Los Angeles, 
School of Law . 
. t 38 Fed. Reg. 10926 (1973). This ruling withdrew all new drug applications for the use of 
dt~thylstilbestrol in animal implants. As will be seen below in the text, the use of this drug in 
antmal feed was earlier prohibited. At the present time, therefore, all uses of diethylstilbestrol in 
food producing animals have been banned. The April 27 ruling was based on 
. . . new Department of Agriculture tests that detected residues of DES (diethylstil-
bestrol) in livers and kidneys of animals slaughtered 120 days after the synthetic 
estrogen was implanted in their ears. 
Los Angeles Times, April 26, 1973, pt. I, at 9. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Diethylstilbestrol, often called stilbestrol or DES, is a synthetic 
female sex hormone first developed in 1938.1 Although once limited to 
specific clinical uses, 2 continued research indicated that the adminis-
tration of this drug to chickens and cattle resulted in more efficient 
feed conversion with a corresponding weight gain in the animals treat-
ed.3 With governmental approval, DES became widely used on animals 
bred for human consumption.4 
This article will explore the complicated medical, legal, and legis-
lative history of DES and will review the dangers of its widespread and 
relatively casual administration to beef-cattle. It will also demonstrate 
the need for continuing consumer action to enforce already existing 
legislation which clearly prohibits the use of DES in food -producing 
animals. 
In 1941, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), acting under 
the "new drug" section of the 1938 Federal Food, · Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, permitted eleven firms to begin marketing DES for clinical use. 5 
Six years later an application for the use of DES pellet implants in 
poultry was allowed to become effective.6 In November, 1954, the FDA 
approved the first application for the daily use of 10 milligrams (mg.) of 
DES to be added to feed for fattening cattle weighing at least six-
hundred pounds.7 Subsequently, in 1955, the use of DES pellets for 
implantation in the ears of cattle was permitted.8 By 1958, DES was 
routinely added to 75% of all feed for beef-cattle in feed lots.9 
1. Parkes, Dodds & Noble, Interruption of Early Pregnancy by Means of Orally Active 
Oestrogens. BRIT. MED. J. 557 (1938). See also J. MEIGS & S.H. STURGIS, PROGRESS IN 
GYNECOLOGY 499 (1946). Two compounds were synthesized by Dodds: one, stilbestrol, which is 
relatively inactive; and the other, diethylstilbestrol, which is highly active. See note 25 infra. and 
accompanying text. Some pharmaceutical companies, however, use the trade name "stilbestrol" 
for the more active hormone, diethylstilbestrol (DES). These terms are used interchangeably in 
this article as referring to DES. 
2. Hearings on H.R. 7624 and S. 2197, the Color Additives Amendment to the Federal Food. 
Drug. and Cosmetic Act. before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 86th 
Cong .. 2nd Sess. at 69 (1960) [ hereinafter, /960 Hearings]. Statement of Arthur S. Flemming. 
Secretary of Health, Education , and Welfare. 
3. Ringuette, Medicated Animal Feeds of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958: A Case 
Study. IS FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 320 (1960). . 
4. See generally 1960 Hearings, supra note 2, at 69-70. 
5. Id. at 69. 
6. ld. 
7. T. Byerly, hormones in Feed, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON MEDICATED 
FEEDS, BEFORE THE VETERINARY MEDICAL BRANCH OF THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION 17 (H. Welch & F. Marti -Ibanez eds. 1956) [hereinafter, SYMPOSIUM]. 
8. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 70. 
9. Ringuette, supra note 3, at 320. In the 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, Secretary of HEW. 
ArthurS. Flemming, estimated that " ... 80 to 85 percent of the beef cattle are now fed on feed 
containing stilbestrol." I d. at 70. 
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Although use in poultry was discontinued in 1959,10 it is conceivable 
that virtually all beef-cattle received medicated feed: 1 implants , or both 
until January 1, 1973. As of that date, by order of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), the use of DES in feed was to 
be discontinued.12 This order did not apply to DES implants and, in 
fact, it specifically stated that its purpose was to allow the industry 
sufficient time to convert the drug to use in implants rather than feed .13 
The argument for allowing the use of DES is based upon the theory 
that it allows a greater efficiency of feed conversion, resulting in the 
production of more and better meat at less cost to the producer and 
consumer. The Department of Agriculture has estimated that to prohi-
bit the use of DES would cost consumers up to $460,000,000 annually~ 4 
There seems little question that DES results in financial gain to the 
cattle raiser, but the savings to the consumer have been estimated to 
amount to no more than $2.30 per person, per year.15 
Furthermore, there is evidence which suggests that DES does not 
result in better quality food . Carcasses of treated animals do not grade 
consistently to the same standard of quality as do carcasses of non-
treated animals; rather, reduced carcass quality is common after DES 
. _10. Bell v. Goddard . 366 F.2d 177. 179 (7th Cir., 1966). The FDA issued a final order prohi-
bttlng the use of DES implants in poultry in 1961. but the manufacturers of DES poultry implants 
had agreed to suspend the sa le of their products as early as December. 1959. /d .. court's footnote 
3. See text at notes I 08-112. il!fra. 
. I I. Cf note 9 , supra. The resu lts of a telephone survey conducted by the author indicate that 
from 75 to 99 percent of beef cattle received such feed . The agencies contacted are: Veterinary 
Med tcal Officer , State of California, Department of Agriculture. Bureau of Animal Hea lth . Los 
Angeles, Nov. 19, 1970; Senior Meat Inspector, California Department of Agriculture, Burea u of 
Meat Inspection , Los Angeles , Nov. 19, 1970; Senior Inspector, Cali fornia Department of Agricul-
ture, Field Agricu lture and Chemical Division, Los Angeles, Nov. 20, 1970; California Cattle 
Feeders Assoc .. Bakersfield , California, Nov. 20, 1970; Persons in the meat packing industry. Los 
Angeles. Nov. 20. 1970; State Farm and Home Advisor, University of California at Los Angeles. 
Nov. 20, 1970 (who indicated that such records are simply not kept). Stated estimates did vary 
from 75 to 99 percent. In July, 197 1. the California State Department of Agriculture estimated 
!hat 90 percent of cattle in feed lots are fed either DES or other growth stimu lants. Western States 
Meat Packers Assoc .. Inc .. Bulletin No. 1309 (1971). 
12. 37 Fed. Reg. 15747. 15749 (1972). See also 37 Fed . Reg. 26307 0972). 
13. /d. at 15748. For discussion of the legality of the Commissioner's allowing time for the 
Phaseout of DES in feeds , see Hearings on the R egulation of Diethylstilbestrol (DES) (Irs use as a 
~rug fo r humans and in animal feeds) before the Intergovernmental R elations Subcommittee of 
(he House Committee on Governmental Operations. 92nd Con g., 2nd Sess., pt . 3, at 417 et seq. 
1972) !hereinafter , Aug. 1972 Hearings]. 
14. Western States Meat Packers Assoc .. Inc .. Bulletin No. 1309 (1971). 
IS. /d. See also Hearings on the R egulation of Food Additives and Medicated Animal Feed 
before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental R elations of the House Committee on Govem-
'»e'!ta / Operations, 92nd Cong., lst Sess. at 445-458 (1971) [hereinafter: March 1~71 Hearings]. 
EstJmated cost increases due to the non-use of DES are stated for vartous sttuattons . All such 
tnneases are qua lified as being subject to over-estimation . ;tnd ~ee Hearings on the R egulation of 
Dtethylst ilbestrol (DES) (Its use as a drug for humans and m Ammalfeeds) before the lntergovern-
'rt enta{ R elat ions Subcommittee of the House Committee on Governme~zt Operations, 92nd Cong., 
lst Sess .. pt. 2. at 253 (1971) [hereinafter, Dec. 1971 Hearmgsj , where tt was asserted by Dr. C.D. 
Vanl-louweling Direc tor Bureau of Veterinary Medicine, Food and Drug Administration. that the 
cost increase t~ the con'sumer due to the non -use of DES would amount to $3.85 per person 
an nua lly. 
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implantation or feeding.16 It has been found that cattle treated with 
DES often develop cover fat, sometimes to excess, without correspond-
ing marbling through the lean meat, with the meat becoming watery~ 7 
In fact, there is evidence that the extra weight gain may be due to water 
retention, indicating that the consumer is actually paying for extra 
water.18 Similar criticisms had been raised regarding DES treated poul-
try. In one study the fat of such fowl reportedly differed chemically 
from that of normally fattened birds; it was watery and "culinarily 
inferior." 19 
Perhaps the most important consumer issue is the potentially seri-
ous health hazards presented by DES. It is an active female sex hor-
mone which, as indicated below, is capable of producing undesirable 
sex-related physiological effects. Moreover, it is acknowledged to be a 
carcinogen.20 At the time that the initial application for DES pellets was 
allowed to become effective, DES had been shown to cause cancer in 
test animals when administered orally.21 It was believed, however, that 
no significant residues of the drug would remain in the edible tissues of 
treated animals, which would thereby endanger the health of consu-
mers. Unfortunately, this did not prove to be the case.22 
I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DIETHYLSTILBESTROL 
Hormones are chemical substances secreted into the bloodstream by 
specific glands. Among these glands are the adrenals, and parts of the 
ovaries and testes. Secretion hormones are transported through the 
bloodstream to other parts of the body (so-called target organs), 
where they cause various specialized effects. Hormones are remarkably 
potent and only minute amounts circulate in the blood. This makes the 
16. For specific details of reduced carcass quality follow ing DES implantation in lambs and 
catt le. see REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL NUTRITION, AGRICULTURAL 
BOARD, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. HOR-
MONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND APPLICATIONS IN THE PRODUCTION OF MEATS. 
MILK AND EGGS, at 34-35, No. 714 (Supp. 1959). 
17. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 287 (statement of Sen. John Dingell, reading excerpt from 
the Western Livestock Reporter). Also. personal interview with a spokesman for the Meat Industry. 
Los Angeles, Oct. 19, 1970, who stated that treated meat may be recognized by its excessive water 
content. 
18. See L. WICKENDEN, OUR DAILY POISON, 11 7-119 (1956). 
19. LEGISLATIVE RECORD OF 1958 FOOD ADDITIVES AMENDMENT TO THE FED-
ERAL FOOD. DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT at 95 (C. Dunn ed . 1958) [hereinafter. LEGIS. 
REC.]. 
20. Hearings on the Regulation of Diethylstilbestrol (DES> Uts use as a drug for humans and 
in anima/feeds) before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations. of the House Commit-
tee on Governmental Operations. 92nd Cong., 1st Sess .. pt . I. at 43 (1971) [hereinafter, Nov. 1971 
Hearings]. Statement by Dr. Umberti Saffiatti of the National Cancer Institute. Cf statement of 
Dr. Charles C. Edwards, Commissioner, FDA. /d. at SO. 
21. / 960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 69. 
22. See LEGIS. REC .. supra note 19, at 96. 
1974] DIETHYLSTILBESTROL 143 
development of sensitive and accurate assay methods difficult.23 Further-
more, hormones may diffuse slowly between cells and produce some 
local effects without entering the bloodstream in detectable quantities.24 
DES has been estimated to be about four times as potent as the 
natural estrogen, estradiol, and about ten times as active as estrone~5 
Unlike the natural hormones, however, DES passes unchanged through 
the portal circulation,26 rather than undergoing degradation and detoxi-
fication in the liver. As a result, the liver's normal protective function is 
largely ineffective27 and this may account for ·some of the toxic effects of 
DES.28 
1. DES as a Cause of Cancer 
A carcinogen is defined as "any agent which tends to promote ... 
[or] accelerates the development of cancer ... " 29 Stronger carcinogens, 
by their very strength, are subject to almost certain clinical discovery;30 
23. Hormones are discussed general ly in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL 
NUTRITION. supra note 16. at 14. For a discussion of the problems involved in detec ting hor-
monal residues in animal tissues. see text i1~{ra at notes 141-150. 
24. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL NUTRITION. supra note 16. at 14. 
25. A. OSAL, R. PRATT & M. ALTSCHULE, THE UNITED STATES DiSPENSATORY 
AND PHYSICIANS PHARMACOLOGY (26th ed. 1967). Cf Dodds. Stilbestrol. CXLI I TH E 
PRACTITIONER 309, 312 (1939), in which DES is estimated to be three to four times as active as 
estrone when administered subcutaneously, and almost as active as estrone when given orally. 
. Estrogen is a generic term applied to any substance, whether naturally occurring or syn -
thetic. that. exerts biologic_al effects characterist_i~ of estrogenic hormone~ (e.g. , secondary sex 
charactenstlcs). The name IS denved from the ab1hty of such substances to mduce estrus in lower 
mammals. STEI?MAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (22nd ed: 1972). There are three major. 
naturally occumng estrogens m the human female: estradiOl, estrone, and estriol. R.W. 
KISTNER, GYNECOLOGY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 556 (1%4). 
. 26. The portal circulation refers to the circulation of blood between the liver and the small 
tntestine via the portal vein. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (22nd ed. 1972). 
27. See A. H. CURTIS & W. HUFFMAN, A TEXT BOOK OF GYNECOLOGY 118 (1950). 
28. See Shorr, Robinson & Papanicolaou, A Clinical Study of the Synthetic Estrogen Stilbes-
trol, 113 J.A.M.A. 2312, 2315 (1939). See generally MERCK CO .. STILBESTROL ANN. BIB-
LIOG. (1941) [hereinafter, MERCK]. A group of women treated with DES (primarily to curb 
symptoms of menopause) developed toxic reactions to the hormone in the form of nausea, vomit-
mg. and acute psychotic reaction. They demonstrated no tendency to acquire a tolerance to DES. 
See generally Zondek & Sulman, Inactivation of Diethylstilbestrol in the Organism, 144 NATURE 
596 0939). 
29. BLAKISTON'S GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1972) at 254. See also 1960 
Hearings. supra note 2, at 44, for a summary of a special report prepared by Dr. C. Midler, Asso-
Ciate Director for Intramural Research of the National Cancer Institute. Emphasized in the report 
are the following: 
I. Cancer can be caused by extraneous agents. 2. Not all members of the exposed 
population are expected to develop cancer, but those more susceptible to cancer 
cannot be identified except by experience. 3. Even a [known] powerful carcinogen 
requires weeks or months to elicit cancer in mice or rats and probably requires years 
in man . 4. No change need be recognizable in the organ or tissue destined to become 
cancerous before the cancer itself appears. 
30. 1960 Hearings , supra note 2. at 44. 
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they identify themselves by that very characteristic which makes them 
dangerous (i.e., the more rapid development of malignant tumors)!' 
Less potent carcinogens, paradoxically, are therefore potentially more 
dangerous, in that their harmful effects may evade recognition;2 In fact, 
they are a significant factor in human cancer and present difficult eval-
uation problems~3 The effect of certain chemical carcinogens, moreover, 
can be markedly increased by other compounds which are not in them-
selves carcinogenic!" 
Evidence also indicates the irreversibility of a malignant response 
once initiated and, furthermore, suggests cumulative effects of carcino-
genic agents, at least in animals?5 Thus, the effect of a small dose is not 
"forgotten" by the organism. Unlike some poisons, carcinogens may 
not have threshold values.36 The body is often capable of excreting a 
small amount of an ingested toxic substance (if it does not do substan-
tial harm initially), but this may not be true ot carcinogens, insofar as 
they are believed to have irreversible cytologic effects. 
Evidence exists to show that the time of appearance of tumors after 
exposure to carcinogenic agents is, within limits, dependent upon the 
dose and frequency of exposure, but small and often a single dose of 
carcinogenic agents may elicit tumors, notably after prolonged latent 
·periods. In view of the latter findings,and in view of the summative 
carcinogenic effect of repeated small doses, concepts of safe thresh-
hold doses· are dubious where complete control of a hazard involving 
exposure to carcinogenic agents is desired.37 
Furthermore, it has been established that 
. .. any of the known human carcinogens takes about 10 to 20 years 
to produce its specific biological effect---[whereas] in the experimen-
tal animal, it requires on the average of a third of the lifespan of the 
animal to elicit these effects.38 
31. /d. 
32. The danger lies in the fact that such substances may not be recognized as being potentially 
harmful. Certainly a substance which produces a malignant growth quickly in a laboratory test 
animal can be more easily and positively identified as a carcinogen than one which makes its 
effects known only after a considerable delay. The longer the time of exposure needed to develo.p a 
discoverable cancer, the less likely it will be that the actual source can be pinpointed. See 1960 
Hearings. supra note 2, at 53-SS, which includes an excerpt from P. Kotin, Experimentally Weak 
Carcinogens. 18 CANCER RESEARCH at 1-3 (1958). 
33. 1960 Hearings, supra note 2, at 44, and 53-SS. 
34. /d. 
35. /d. See also SYMPOSIUM, supra note 7, at 176. 
36. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 7, at 176. 
37. /d. at 9, quoting from the resolutions adopted by the International Union against Cancer; 
XI ACTA Union International Contre le Cancer, No. I, 72-76 (1954). . 
38. Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra note 20, at 57 (statement of Dr. Roy Hertz, Senior Physician , 
Rockefeller University, New York). 
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A substance that is not normally a carcinogen may disturb the regu-
lar functioning of some part of the body in such a way that a malig-
nancy results. For instance, hormone~ are not normally carcinogenic, 
but certain cancers (particularly of the reproductive system) have been 
linked with disturbances of the balance of the sex hormones. There is 
evidence indicating that estrogens, if allowed to build up to abnormally 
high levels, may become carcinogenic. Extensive experiments on mice, 
rats , guinea pigs, and monkeys show that prolonged administration of 
estrogens, not necessarily at high levels, causes changes in the t issues of 
the reproductive organs, varying from benign overgrowths to definite 
malignancies?9 Thus, even at low dosage levels, estrogens adminis ered 
over a period of time present a significant threat of cancer, and it is this 
continuing exposure to minute doses that is to be feared from the intro-
duction of hormones into the food supply.40 
There is also evidence indicating that human tissue may be suscep-
tible to the same carcinogenic effects observed in animals.41 Investigators 
at the Royal Victoria Hospital (McGill University), Canada, discovered 
that two-thirds of the one hundred-fifty cases of uterine cancer studied 
had abnormally high estrogen levels.42 In a later study of twenty cases, 
eighteen showed similar high estrogen levels.43 
Because of its estrogenic activity, DES also proved to be a carcino-
~en;44it has been shown to lead to a wide range of pathological changes 
In animals and humans.45 In guinea pigs, for example, uterine tumors 
39. See generally R. CARSON , SILENT SPRING (1962). See also 1960 Hearings. supra note 
2. at 55. In mice, rats, and hamsters the adm inistration of estrogens has been found to ind uce 
va rious forms of cancer. /d. 
40. See generally Knight , Martin, Eglesias & Smith , Possible Cancer Hazard Presented by 
Feedmg Diethylstilbestrol to Cattle, SYMPOSIUM, supra note 7. at 167-169. 
41. In the Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra note 20, Dr. Roy Hertz of Rockefeller University noted 
that 
. .. a ll o f the known huma n carcinogens a lso produce ca ncer in animals. We cann~t 
say the reverse, but we ca n say that there is this crossover between human carcino-
genes is and animal carcinogenesis to the extent that any substance which is known 
to produce ca ncer in humans will a lso produce cancer in animals. and frequently a t 
the same site . . . 
ld. at 57-58. Dr. Hertz a lso offered this warning: 
. . . when you observe a carcinogenic effect in experimental animals, you had better 
sit up and take notice as to whether this is going to happen under similar conditions 
of exposure for similr periods of time in the huma n subject . 
ld. at 58. 
42. R. CARSON , SILENT SPRING 236 (1962). 
43. /d. See also 1960 Hearings. supra note 2. at 55-56. 
44. See generally Gerschicker. Mamm ary Carcinoma in the Rat with M etastasin Induced by 
e strogen . 89 SCI. 35-37 (1939). 
45. G . Knight, W.C. Martin, R. Inglesias. W.E. Smith , Possible Cancer Hazard Presem ed by 
Feeding Diethylstilbestrol to Cattle. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 7, a t 167. 
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have been induced with as little as 1.5 mg. of DES in subcutaneously 
implanted pellets.46 In fact, tumors have been induced in guinea pigs 
exposed to as little as 0.008 mg. of DES per day.47 A DES pellet removed 
from a guinea pig one year after implantation has been found to retain 
sufficient activity to induce a tumor upon reimplantation in another 
animal.48 Investigators at the National Cancer Institute found that 
cancers of the breast can be induced in mice with as little as 0.0007 mg. 
of DES per day.49 Fifty percent of male mice, which do not normally 
develop such tumors, were found to develop breast cancer when ex-
posed to DES.50 Thus, the carcinogenic effects of DES have repeatedly 
been demonstrated in test animals, and even extremely low dosage 
levels have been shown to produce these effects. 
DES has also been linked to cancer in humans. Prolonged admin-
istration of the hormone as a therapeutic agent has been found to be 
accompanied by the development of mammary cancer in some male 
patients.51 Recent studies have also demonstrated a clear association 
between the administration of DES to pregnant women and the occur-
rence of vaginal adenocarcinoma (a rare form of cancer) in their daugh-
ters, fifteen to twenty years later.52 Dr. Herbst of the Massachusetts 
General Hospital (the Herbst Report) studied a number of cases of 
vaginal adenocarcinoma and found that a significant number of the 
mothers of these patients had been treated with DES during pregnan-
cy.53 Later research has substantially corroborated Dr. Herbst's find-
ings;'4 The reason that the mothers themselves did not ultimately develop 
malignancies was explained by the extreme sensitivity of fetal and neo-
natal tissues to carcinogenic agents. The dosages used were apparently 
insufficient to affect the mother, but were in fact capable of inducing 
cancer in the highly susceptible unborn child.55 
46. /d. at 167-168. 
47. /d. at 168. 
48. /d. See discussion of implantation infra. 
49. Knight eta/., supra note 45, at 168. 
SO. /d. at 168. 
51 . 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 55 (Report - The Role of Certain Chemical and Physical 
Agents in the Causation of Cancers, by Dr. G.B. Mider, Associate Director of Research, National 
Cancer Institute). • 
52. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskazner, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 N. ENG. J. OF MED. 
878-881 (April 22, 1971). Dr. Herbst presented a summary of his findings in his testimony during 
the Nov. 1971 Hearings, supra note 20, at 2-9. See also Science Editors, Inc., Clin-Aiert 188 (Sept. 
4, 1971). 
53. /d. 
54. See 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 33,35 (Dec. 25, 1972). 
55. Clin-A/ert. supra note 52. Note; The fact that the mothers did not demonstrate any malig-
nant response might suggest that DES does have a "threshold value." Cf note 36 and accompany-
ing text, supra. However, the fact that no cancer was observed in the mother does not necessarily 
es tab lish that none was present. See note 29, supra. 
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Thus, there are theoretical reasons, as well as animal verification 
and increasingly suggestive human findings, to indicate that this hor-
mone is specifically carcinogenic to human beings. This conclusion has 
even been afforded judicial recognition, one court finding as early as 
1966 that: 
The record shows that DES is definitely a cause of cancer in animals, 
at least an inciter of incipient cancer in man, and possibly a cause of 
cancer in man. The record also shows that it may take many years, 
as much as the greater part of a lifespan, for a carcinogen to produce 
a detectable cancer, and that the quantity of DES which is required 
to cause a cancer is presently unknown. All that is positively known 
is that there is a definite connection between DES and cancer. 
Furthermore, it was shown that prolonged exposure to even small 
amounts of carcinogenic substances is more dangerous than short 
term exposure to the same of even larger quantities. 56 
As was suggested in the Herbst Report, by avoiding the treatment of 
pregnant women with stilbestrol, vaginal adenocarcinoma may be pre-
vented in the future. Of more immediate concern, however, is the possi-
bility of DES residues in meat, especially when consumed by women 
who are pregnant. Because the fetus is so vulnerable to minute doses of 
carcinogenic substances, there is no way of judging the extent of the 
risk created by DES residues which are not detected by the current 
government assay methods.57 
2. Hormonal Effects of DES 
DES may have adverse effects on human health aside from its ten-
dency to produce cancer. Because it is a female sex hormone, its effect 
is predictably antagonistic to those of masculine hormones. In one 
study it was found that male birds treated with stilbestrol " .. . lose 
many male characteristics; combs, wattles, and reproductive organs 
shriveled, and their propensities for crowing and fighting disappear-
ed."58Similar results were observed in another study using male rats; in 
adult rats the testes atrophied, and normal development of the testes in 
immature animals was retarded.59 Where pregnant rats were adminis--56. Bell v. Goddard, supra note 10, at 182. 
57. See Clin-Alert. supra note 52. Note: A given person's susceptibility to carcinogenic sub-
stances may be determined by a number of factors. One such factor is age, which helps to explain 
the extreme vu lnerability of fetal tissues. " By and large, the younger the individual exposed. the 
more susceptible is the tissue to carcinogenic response experimentally." Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra 
note 20, at 58. Another possible factor is heredity. " ... cancer <?f the breast among occidental 
w
1 
omen runs in the family. Mother-daughter cancer of the breast ts a very common association." 
d. 
58. LEGIS. REC. , supra note 19, at 95. 
59. Gaarenstroom & Johen, Th e Effect of Diethylstilbestrol in the Male Organism, 9 ACTA 
REV. NEERLAND 178-181 (1939), as reported in MERCK , supra note 28. 
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tered DES, the sexual development of their male offspring was altered 
in such a way that they acquired female characteristics. They were 
found to develop nipples and rudimentary vaginae, and their testes 
failed to descend but remained in the female position at the base of the 
kidney.60 In still another study, one hundred chicken eggs were injected 
with DES on the second day of the brooding period. Ofthe one hundred 
eggs, eighty-two produced hens. No roosters were hatched.61 Also, a 
previously common failure . of male minks to induce pregnancy in fe-
males was found to be the result of their being fed chicken heads which 
contained DES residues.fi 2 
In humans, stilbestrol has been shown to have similar effects. DES 
injections given to a seventeen year old girl who had never menstruated, 
completely lacked breast development, had an enlarged clitoris, and 
showed a masculine growth of hair, resulted in discernible breast devel-
opment within a month, menstruation after four months, atrophy of the 
clitoris, and paling and partial disappearance of the abnormal hair~3 
Similarly, a 27-year-old male with a history of sex crimes was treated 
with DES to correct a hormonal imbalance causing him to have an 
abnormally large penis and testes. As a result of the treatment, his 
penis and testes decreased in size, and there was a corresponding 
decrease in sexual function~ Because of its effect of shrinking the male 
sex organs, DES has been prescribed by doctors to ease the pain of 
prostatic cancer by reducing the pressure of the malignancy.65 
Stilbestrol has also been known to cause breast enlargement in male 
laboratory workers who were exposed to the hormone.66 A four-year-old 
boy, whose mother worked in a pharmaceutical company packaging 
DES veterinary pellets, developed enlarged breasts with the nipple area 
showing pigmentation as in pregnancy.67 His ten-year-old sister began 
60. R. Green , M. Burrill & A. Ivy, Experimental Intersexuality: Effects ofEstrogens on t~e 
Antenatal Sexual Development of the Rat, 67 AM. J. ANAT. 305-345 (Sept. 1940), as reported tn 
MERCK, supra note 28. 
61. J. Gaarenstroom. Geschlechtsbeeinflussung Durch Diathylstilboestrol, 9 ACTA BREV. 
NEERLAND 13-14 (1939), as reported in MERCK, supra note 28. 
62. THE MERCK VETERINARY MANUAL - AND HANDBOOK OF DIAGNOSIS AND 
THERAPY FOR THE VETERINARIAN (O.H . Siegmund ed . 1967). Cf WICKENDEN. supra 
note 18, indicating that it was the male mink that was suffering the disability. · 
63. H. Diser, Feminization and Demasculinization of a Seventeen Y ear Old Girl by Injections 
of Stilbestrol, 27 ENDOCRINOLOGY 385-386 (Sept. 1940), as reported in MERCK, supra note 
28. 
64. C. Dunn , Stilbestrol - Induced Gynecomastia in the Male, liS J.A.M.A. 2263-2264 (Dec. 
28, 1940). 
65. LEGIS. REC., supra note 19, at 96-96. 
66. R. Scarff & C. Smith, Proliferative and other Lesions of the Male Breast with Bestrol <Es-
trogen) Workers, 29 BRIT. J. SURG. 393 (1942), as noted in Prouty, Gynecomastia with Pigmew 
tation in a Four Y ear Old Male Following Stilbestrol Ex posure, 9 PEDIATRICS 55, 56 (1952). 
67. Prouty , supra note 66, at 55. 
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menstruating, and the mother experienced almost continuous menstru-
al bleeding.68 The hormonal activity of DES has even been linked with 
the manifestation of previously Iaten~ leprosy.69 
The hormonal effects of DES on animals and humans seem clearly 
established. Under close medical supervision these effects may be des-
irable. 70 What is undesirable, however, is to expose the general popu-
lation to such effects due to the presence of DES in the meat they 
consume. The danger exists because of the practice and inherent diffi-
culties of administering DES to livestock, and the problems in detecting 
residues ofthe drug in meat. 
II. THE METHODS OF DES APPLICATION AND THEIR REGU-
LATION 
Three basic methods have been employed for the administration of 
diethylstilbestrol to animals: (1) mixed in the animals' feed; (2) pellet 
implantation; and (3) combined implantation and feed mixing. 
1. Mixing With Feed 
Although the use of DES in cattle feed has been prohibited since 
January, 1973?1 it is important to understand the problems involved in 
DES treated feeds for three reasons: (1) There remains some question 
as to whether the prohibition is being honored, especially by the small 
cattle feeders. In fact, it is believed that some feeders might even have 
stockpiled DES premixes for later use.72 (2) There is a possibility that 
legislative amendments will allow the resumption of DES use in feed;73 
and (3) The ruling prohibiting the use of DES in feed is presently being 
appealed by several drug manufacturers and could conceivably be over-
turned.74 
Prior to the ban on DES mixed feeds, livestock producers were 
allowed to administer to each head of cattle (weighing over 750 pounds) 
68. ld. at 56. 
69. W. Symmers, Sudden Appearance of a L epromatous Eruption During Prolonged Admi.ni.s-
tratwn of Stilbestrol in a Case of Unsuspected Leprosy. l 9 INT. J. OF LEPROSY 37 (1951). 
. 70. The question of DES as a drug used in medicine is beyond the scop~ of this article. For a 
hst of medica l uses for which it has been recommended , see Nov. 1971 Heanngs, supra note 20, at 
49-50. 
71. See note 12, supra. 
72. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 13, 15 (Dec. 24, 1972). 
73. See tex t at note 160, infra . 
74. See text at notes 156-1 59, infra. 
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a daily dose of 10 mg. of DES in the feed.75 Usually, however, cattle are 
not fed on an individual basis. They are typically grouped together in 
"feed pens" where a number of animals share a common supply of 
feed. The body weight of the cattle is averaged and, on the assumption 
that each head will consume two-and-one-half to three percent of its 
body weight daily, a per capita allotment of feed is computed for each 
pen. This practice led to problems in controlling the amount of DES 
ingested by individual animals. While cattle of similar weight within a 
given feed pen presented little problem, the greater the weight variation 
among cattle in the same pen the more likely it was that some would 
consume more than their allotted share.76 
The accuracy in determining the amount of DES that a particular 
steer received depended upon the safeguards instituted at a particular 
feed lot. These safeguards could vary considerably, as might be expec-
ted. Moreover, an ingredient added frequently to feed in small quanti-
ties will not necessarily possess uniform dispersion characteristics. 
There was a tendency for a portion of the DES added to remain undis-
persed in the feed, forming small zones of excessive concentration,77 so 
that, again, a particular animal could well have received a dispropor-
tionate amount. 
The manufacture and use of DES-treated feeds also gives rise to the 
danger that other feeds might become contaminated.78 DES is so potent 
an agent that it is difficult to control even under laboratory conditions. 
For example, one researcher noted that " ... occasionally the presence of 
estrogen-treated animals in the laboratory leads to accidental contami-
nation of the food supplies of animals in adjacent or nearby cages.'m 
Contamination of "non-medicated" feeds has often been discovered 
where such feeds were prepared in the same machinery previously used 
to mix DES-treated feeds.80 It has been argued that careful cleaning of 
75. FDA Statement of Position on DIETHYLSTILBESTROL, Food and Drug Administration, 
Office of Public Information (January 20, 1971). In 1970 the FDA permitted the users of DES 
prepared by one particular drug company to administer up to 20 mg. per day in cattle feed. Id. 
See 35 Fed. Reg. 14391 (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 13Se.l8 (1972). The maximum allowable daily dosage 
per head of sheep was 3.0 mg. See 21 C.F.R. § 121.241 (b). Note; As of January 1, 1973, all uses of 
DES in livestock feeds were prohibited. 37 Fed . Reg. 26307 (1972). 
76. Personal Interview with cattle feeder, Los Angeles, July 10, 1971. 
77. Mahoney & Benson, Design of M edicated Feed Supplements. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 
7, at 74. 
78. T. Byerly, SYMPOSIUM, supra note 7, at 23. 
79. Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra note 20, at 68. 
80. See 160 AMER. VET. MED. ASSOC. J. 1399 (1972). This problem has been particularly 
acute where liquid feeds have been used. A common ingredient of liquid feeds is molasses, and 
because of the nature of this substance, where DES is added to the feed it is often impossible to 
clean the mixing apparatus sufficiently to prevent the contamination of non -medicated feeds pre· 
pared later with the same equipment. In one investigation, "non-medicated" feeds from fourteen 
liquid feed manufacturers were found to contain low amounts of DES. /d. As will be discussed 
immediately below in the text, the use of non-medicated feeds in cattle was required during the 
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mixing equipment would eliminate this danger, but such seems unlikely 
considering the potency of even minute traces of the hormone. Even the 
use of entirely separate facilities for the preparation of treated and non-
treated feeds may not solve the problem of contamination. DES resi-
dues have been found in cattle whose "non-medicated" feed had been 
contaminated by airborn amounts of the hormone which had emanated 
from a nearby source.81 In any event, comprehensive governmental in-
spection and regulation of the animal feed industry is clearly warranted 
in order to help eliminate the danger of contamination.82 
Earlier regulations had required that cattle be withdrawn from DES 
treated feed for a set time period prior to marketing, in order that any 
residues in the animal be eliminated from its system.83 The enforcement 
of these regulations was substantially dependent on the voluntary coop-
eration of the feed producers and cattle raisers.84 In extending the 48-
hour period (which had been in effect from 1954 to 1971) to seven days, 
the Commissioner of the FDA acknowledged the impracticality of 
expecting a cattle feeder, who would probably regard the change-over 
to non-medicated feeds as a mere nuisance, to have complied with this 
regulation.85 Although the Commissioner indicated that the seven-day 
"withdrawal period" which preceded slaughter. In order that such withdrawal periods be of any 
effect, it is important that the feed used therein be absolutely free of DES contamination. See 
Hearing on S. 2818 (R egulation of Diethylstilbestron. before the Subcommittee on Health of the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public We(fa re, 92nd Cong. , 2nd Sess., at 43 (1 972) [hereinafter. 
July 1972 Hearing]. See also 37 Fed . Reg. 1S748 (points 8, 9, and 10), (1972). 
81. Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra note 20, at 70. 
82. For a discussion of the problems involved in regulatiiJg r:n anufacturers of medicated feeds, 
~ee March 1971 Hearings. supra note IS, at S04-Sl3. Of special Importance are the following: The 
teed industry is the sixteenth larges t industry in the United States. There are 8,S67 fi rms registered 
as manufacturers of medicated feed (no break-down is given as to the number of manufacturers 
~pproved for the use of DES). In ~ecen~ :rears the FDA has b~en turning over the responsibility of 
~ndu stry surve illance to the states tn a JOillt state/ federal medica~ed feed program, and d.ecreasing 
~ts own active participation. In fi scal year 1968- 1969, the FDA withdrew from feedmill inspections 
In those sta tes which have entered in to this program. In 1970 there were 32 such states. !d. at 508-
509. The program has been unsuccessful , however , and !n fi s_cal :rear 1968-1969 only 700 out of the 
total number of registered firms were mspected. In Caltforma, tor example, there were no inspec-
tions made during either fi scal year 1969 or 1970. id. at S07. Furthermore, in 1969 there were 
fewer than 200 collections for analysis of medicated feed samples, as compared to 2,S31 in 1967. 
ld. In 197 1, however, the FDA inspected S50 feedmills, while 1,6SO inspections were made by the 
sate. Dec. 1971 Hearings. supra note IS. at 276. 
83. See 36 Fed. Reg. 23292 (1971). It had been generally believed that the period fo r the elimi-
nation of DES from most tissues was about 72 hours, or less. Consequently, beef-cattle were not to 
be fed DES containing feed for 48 hours before slaughter. ~ased upon a later study which showed 
that radioac tive DES fed to animals left no detectable residues after 132 hours, the FDA deter-
mined that a ll residues were eliminated from the anim al in "about" five and one-half days. The 
required withdrawal period was increased to seven days. /d. . 
84. See Dec. 1971 Hearings. supra note IS, at 218-219, and Los Angeles Times, pt. I. pg. 26 
(Sept. 17, 1970). Problems arose concerning the lack of cooperation from livestock prod ucers. In 
1971 the Department of Agriculture withheld from slaughter all cattle from two Texas feed lots 
when it was discovered that the withdrawal feed used for these cattle contamed DES. Associated 
Press Bulletin. Washington, D.C. (Nov. 18, 1971). 
8S. 36 Fed . Reg. 23292 (1971). 
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withdrawal period was more likely to be followed,86 it was ultimately 
conceded that such controls were not " . . . reasonably certain to be 
followed in practice . .. ". 87 
2. Pellet Implantation 
Implantation involves the insertion of a small "pellet", containing 
DES (or other active agent), .under the skin of the animal to be treated. 
The pellet is designed to be absorbed into the animal's system over a 
protracted period of time, thus permitting a continuous application of 
the drug at a rate slower and more consistent than would occur with 
feed-mixing or hypodermic injection. Nonetheless, the theoretical and 
practical aspects of hormone implantation are quite complex, and do 
present problems in controlling the administration of the drug. 
When DES is implanted as a pellet, the rate of release of the active 
material cannot be completely controlled. It may be released too rapidly 
initially, and too slowly during the latter part of the absorption period~8 
The rate of pellet absorption is generally related to the surface area of 
the pellet. With the passage of time, as the surface area decreases, 
there is a corresponding decrease in the rate of absorption. Pellets con-
taining 12 to 15 mg. of DES are absorbed at the rate of about two 
milligrams per week for a three to four week period, and more slowly 
thereafter as the surface area of the pellet decreases.89 
In addition, the absorption rate may vary between different animals 
of the same species. Pellets of differing chemical compositions (even 
though they contain similar concentrations of DES) likewise may have 
differing absorption rates.90 Moreover, the use of DES implants in the 
livestock industry presents several practical problems in insuring that 
no animal receives too much of the hormone. This is particularly true 
where DES was administered by both implant and feed-mixes because 
of the difficulty in calculating the actual amount of the hormone intro-
duced into the animal's system. In addition, it is possible that some 
cattle raisers use an excessive number of pellets.91 Of course, the greater 
86. /d. The seven-day period was deemed more likely to be followed because it conformed to 
the normal "feeding cycle'' used in the industry. Dec. /971 Hearings. supra note IS, at 219. 
87. 37 Fed . Reg. IS748 (1972). 
88. Burroughs , Culbertson, Kastelic, Cheng & Hale, The Effects of Trace Amounts of Dietlzy/· 
stilbestrol in Rations of Fattening Steers, 120 SCI. 66-67 (1954). 
89. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL NUTRITION, supra note 16 at IS. 
90. /d. 
91. It is certainly possible that some cattle-raisers will attempt to achieve greater animal 
weight increases by administering more than the recommended number of DES pellets to each 
animal. Due to the lack of adequate governmental controls over the cattle industry. there does not 
appea r to be any way to effectively prevent this from happening. · 
For a general discussion of the use of hormones in livestock, see BUNDY & DIGGINS. 
LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY PRODUCTION at 261 -263 (2nd ed. 1961). 
1974] DIETHYLSTILBESTROL 153 
the amount of DES introduced into an animal's system, the more likely 
it will be that residues of the hormone will remain in the edible tissues 
of the animal when it is slaughtered. , 
Aside from the possibility of DES residues remaining in the animal, 
there is also a possibility that traces of the implanted pellet itself might 
find their way to the meat counter. This possibility obviously presents a 
significant danger to human health. As a result of the tendency of 
living tissue to "wall off'' foreign bodies, the stilbestrol pellet may not 
be completely absorbed into the animal's tissues.92 Moreover, if an ani-
mal is marketed prior to the required time for pellet absorption, it is 
likely that a portion of the pellet will remain in the carcass.93 
One possible solution to this particular problem might be to require 
that all pellets be implanted in parts of the animal which would not be 
sold for human consumption~ In the cattle industry, the recommended 
procedure is to insert DES pellets in the flesh of the animal's ear:5 The 
ears are not used for food, although it should be considered that ears 
are often salvaged for use in soap products. However, the Federal Regu-
lations provide no clear mandate that implantation in cattle be limited 
to the animals' ears.96 In fact, meat packers have seriously questioned 
92. See LEGIS. REC., supra note 19, at 96. 
93. /d. 
94. Prior to the banning of DES pellets in poultry, it was required that the pellets be implanted 
under the skin at the base of the bird's skull. LEGIS. REC., supra note 19, at 96. The theory was 
that any un absorbed portion of the pellet would be removed with the head at the time of slaughter. 
However, FDA sampling revealed that sixty percent of the chickens tested contained portions of 
un absorbed stilbestrol pellets in the areas of the neck which would be bought by the consumer 
after the normal severing of the head. /d. Chicken necks were not thought to be a popular food 
Item. See WICKENDEN, supra note 18, at 117-118. 
95. See. e.g .. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., TECHNICAL INFORMATION BULL. No. lOS, July, 
1965. 
. 96. Prior to 1969, it was not required that the approva l of any app lication for the use of a drug 
In meat an imals be published in the Federal Register (or the Code of Federal Regulations). Hence, 
many of the earlier approved uses of DES (many of which were still in effect in early 1973) are not 
to be found in the Federal Regulations, although uses approved after 1969 are published (see note 
128, illfra). Letter from Daniel W. Clink, Food and Drug Officer, Bureau of Veterinary Medicine, 
Public Health Service, Food and Drug Admin. (Rockville, Md.), dated April 6, 1973. 
The only published regulations concerning DES implants in cattle pertain to its use in 
conjunction with the male hormone, testosterone. Originally, 21 C.F.R. § 121.241 (Table 2) (1970); 
d~leted in 1971 and replaced with 21 C.F.R. § 13Sb.6 q6 Fed . Reg. 7648 (1971Jl .. These regulations 
d1d req uire th at cattle implants of DES combmed w1th testosterone be ad mmtstered subcutane-
ously in the animal's ear. Two months after its inclusion in the Code of Federal Regulations, how-
ever, § 13Sb .6 was amended so as to pertain to "injections" rather than implants, although the 
requirement that such be made in the animal's ear was retained. 36 Fed . Reg. 12608 (1971). It is 
important to note that these regulations covered only the adminis~ration of DES in combina~ion 
With testosterone, and did not apply to any previously approved Implants of DES alone Which , 
aga in , do not appear in the Federal Regulations). 
. See also 21 C.F.R. § 131.21 (1971). This regulation recommends that the following "warn -
Ing statement" appear on packages of DES implant pellets: 
Drugs for Veterinary Use: Recommended Warning and Caution Statements: 
ESTROGEN PELLETS IN CATTLE AND SHEEP. 
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whether cattle receive only implantations in the ear. Scar tissue found 
on the hip and loin areas tend to indicate that this is where many im-
plants are actually made.97 
3. Combined Implantation and Feed-Mixing 
Although the FDA has never sanctioned the simultaneous use of 
DES implants and mixed-feeds,98 interviews with industry personnel 
indicate that this may have been a common practice?9 In fact, the FDA 
acknowledged that no information is available as to number of cattle 
administered DES solely by way of implant, and that USDA sampling 
had revealed DES residues in animals which had been treated with 
both implants and mixed-feed.100 
III: THE REGULATION OF DES UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD, 
DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY 
As enacted in 1938, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter, 
"the Act") included two sets of provisions which were pertinent to the 
r.egulation of DES as used in the animal industry. The "Food" sections 
of the Act prohibited the sale or transportation in interstate commerce 
of any "adulterated" food products~ 01 For the purposes of these provi-
sions 
Warning--Implant pellets in the_(name of the anatomical area) __ only. Any 
other location may result in violation of Federal law. Do not attempt salvage of 
implanted site for human or animal food. 
Note that this warning statement is only recommended, and is not required. Note also that the 
particular anatomical area where the implant is to be made is to be designated by the drug manu-
facturer (ostensibly in conformance to the conditions stipulated in the manufacturer's new animal 
drug application). Moreover, it is important to consider that the warning is from the drug manu-
facturer to the cattle raiser. No similar warning is given to the meat packer, who is usually respon-
sible for discarding the implanted part. See note 99, infra. 
97. Interviews with persons in the Meat Packing Industry, Los Angeles, July 10. 1971. See also 
March 1971 Hearings. supra note 15, at 495, where it was reported that regulation at the meat 
packing level has been largely ineffective due to the time required to analyze meat samples in the 
laboratory (Statement of Dr. C. Yeutter, Adminstrator of Consumer and Marketing Service of the 
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture). 
98. FDA FACT SHEET, CSS-D, at I and 2 (Dec. 5, 1969). See also, FDA Position on Diethyl -
stilbestrol. supra note 75. In a letter dated Oct. 7, 1960, Charles P. Orr, Administrative Offtcer 
·(Division of Federal-State Relations), Food and Drug Admin., stated: "Feeds containing diethyl-
stilbestrol should not be fed to diethylstilbestrol implanted cattle or sheep." C.f 21 C.F.R. § 
13Sb.6. permitting the simultaneous use of DES in combination with testosterone in feeds and by 
means_ of "injections" in beef cattle 0971). 
99. Note 97, supra. See also. March 1971 Hearings. supra note 15, at 491, 494, wherein the 
FDA took the position that the livestock producer bears the responsibility for the proper use of the 
drug. The producer should be cognizant of instructions on drug container labels (see note 96. 
supra), and is in the best position to determine if a drug has been adminsitered. In actuality, 
though. even if DES residues are discovered at the processing level, it is usually difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine the identity of the culpable producer. 
100. 37 Fed. Reg. 15747,15750(1972). 
101. 52 Stat. 1042, 1044, and 1049 (1938); codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331,334, and 346 (1964). 
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A food shall be deemed to be adulterated ... if it bears or contains 
any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious 
to health.102 
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Because it is basically a pharmaceutical product, DES also fell with-
in the scope of the "New Drug" provisions of the Act~03 Prior to market-
ing their products, the manufacturers of DES pellets and feed additives 
were required to submit a "new drug application" to the Food and 
Drug Administration.104 
A 'new-drug application' must contain, among other things, reports 
of animal tests, clinical studies, or other research to show that the 
drug will be safe under the proposed directions and conditions of 
use. In the case of veterinary drugs [such as DES implants and feed-
mixes], the Food and Drug Administration has interpreted this sec-
tion to require that evidence be produced to show that no residue of 
the drug remains in human food products derived from the treated 
animals. If the evidence is convincing, the application is allowed to 
'become effective' and the drug may be marketed . If the evidence of 
safety is not convincing, the application is denied, and marketing of 
the drug in interstate commerce is a violation of the law.105 
While it was known that DES had been shown to induce cancer in 
test animals, the assay methods used prior to 1957 failed to detect any 
residues of the drug in the edible portions of treated animals.106 As a 
result, DES was deemed to b.e "safe" for use in meat producing ani-
mals, and the first application for its use as an implant in poultry was 
allowed to "become effective" in 194 7. 107 
In 1957, however, a more sensitive and reliable assay method was 
developed. Using this new procedure, the FDA discovered traces of 
DES in the liver ~,tnd skin fat of treated chickens.108 At that time no resi-
dues were detected in DES treated beef cattle. Pursuant to these find -
ings, the FDA considered revoking its approval of DES implants in 
poultry!09ln order to revoke a new drug application which had previous-
ly become effective, however, the Government was required to show not 
only that residues of the drug had been detected, but also that, as a 
102. 52 Stat. 1046 (1938); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 342 (a)(l) (1964). 
103. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 69· 70. 
104. 52 Stat. 1052 (1938); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1964). 
lOS. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 69 (Statement of Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of Health , 
Education. and Welfare). 
I 06. I d. at 69-70. 
107. /d. at 69. 
108. /d. at 70. The following concentrations of DES were detected: liver tissues · 20 to 30 parts 
per billion. skin fat. 35 to 100 parts per billion. ld. 
109. /d. 
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result of such residues, the drug was "unsafe" as used.110 At that time, 
the Commissioner determined that there was not sufficient evidence to 
show that the residues found in the treated chickens posed a threat to 
human health/ 11 and no action was taken to revoke these new drug 
applications until 1961.112 
An important development took place in 1958 when Congress passed 
the "Food Additives Amendment" to the Act~ 13 Under this Amendment, 
a party seeking to use a food additive is required to file with the FDA a 
"petition", which is similar in content to a new drug application! 14 Such 
petition could be denied " ... if a fair evaluation of the data ... fails to 
establish that the proposed use of the food additive, under the condi-
tions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be safe." 115 
Of special importance here is one particular provision added by the 
Food Additives Amendment, the so-called "anti-cancer clause" or the 
"Delaney clause," which provides that: 
... no additive shaH be deemed safe if it is found to induce cancer 
when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which 
are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to 
induce cancer in man or animal .. . 116 
It has been held that the Delaney clause " ... is generally intended 
to prohibit the use of any additives which under any conditions induce 
cancer in any strain of test animal! 17lt has further been found that this 
clause 
.. . indicates the magnitude of Congressional concern about the 
hazards created by carcinogenic chemicals, and places a heavy bur-
den on any administrative officer to explain the basis for his decision 
110. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (e) (1964). In effect, this provision shifts the burden of proof onto the 
Government in revocation of suspension proceedings. Rather than the drug manufacturer having 
to demonstrate that its product is "safe" (see text at note 105, supra), the Government is required 
to estab lish that the drug is unsafe. See Bell v. Goddard, supra note 10, at 181, and 1960 Hearings. 
supra note 2, at 70. In so proving, however, the Government is allowed to use 
(2) ... new evidence of clinical experience, not contained in such application or not 
available ... until after such application was approved, or tests by methods not 
deemed reasonably applicable when such application was approved ... 
21 U.S. C.~ 355 (e). This Section has been criticized. See 1960 Hearings, supra note 2, at 72-73. 
Ill. 1900 Hearings. supra note 2, at 70. 
112. Bell v. Goddard, supra note 10, at 179 (court's footnote 4). This case affirmed the Commis· 
sioner's final order, issued in December 1961 , suspending all new drug applications for DES im· 
plants in poultry. !d. (court's footnote 5). 
113. Pub. L. No. 85-929 (1958); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1964). 
114. 72 Stat. 1785 (1958); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348 (b) (1964). 
115. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (c)(3)(A) (1964). 
116. 1d. 
117. Bell v. Goddard, supra note 10, at 181. 
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to permit the continued use of a chemical known to produce cancer 
in experimental animals. 11 8 
157 
The Delaney clause not only affe~ts the standards applied to test a 
"food additive petition," but it also has a bearing on the basic prohibi-
tion against "adulterated" foods, as mentioned above; "A food shall be 
deemed to be adulterated ... if it is, or it bears or contains, any food 
additive which is unsafe .. :• 119 Moreover, the Delaney test of "safeness" 
was also deemed applicable in determining whether a new drug appli-
cation should be denied or revoked. 120 
The effect of the Delaney clause on DES depended largely on how 
the term "food additive" was interpreted. Under the Act, a food addi-
tive is defined as including " .. . any substance the intended use of 
which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indi-
rectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the charac-
teristics of any food . .. ".121 Animal feeds were deemed to be "foods" 
within the meaning of the Act, and hence DES, as used in such feeds, 
was thought to be a "food additive:' 122 Under the interpretation it ap-
pears that the FDA, by applying the Delaney clause, could have banned 
the use of DES in cattle feed solely on the ground that the hormone 
had been shown to be a carcinogen in animal tests, even though no 
residues of the drug were found in the edible parts of the animals fat-
tened on it~ 23DES implants, however, were not in themselves considered 
to be food additives, even though such could certainly be said to "[af-
fect] the characteristics of .. . food:' 124 The FDA took the position that 
hormone implants were not additives to food unless residues of the 
drug were found to exist in the edible tissues of the treated 
animai~ 25Thus, the Delany clause was not deemed applicable to DES 
implants unless estrogenic residues were actually detected. 
11 8. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596 (court's footnote 41) 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). · · 
11 9. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (a)(2)(C) (1964). 
120. See 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 70-71 , and Bell v. Go~da!d, supra note 10. While the 
court in Bell v. Goddard seemed to suggest that a new drug application could be revoked on the 
basis that the drug is unsafe under the Delaney test, it does not appear that its decision was based 
on that provision. For one thing, the petitioner drug company argued that, since its new drug 
application had become effective prior to the enactment of the Delaney clause, to apply that pro-
vision in this case would constitute "improper retroactive" legislation . /d. at 181. The fact that the 
court never specifica lly answered this contention seems to indicate that it did not use the Delaney 
clause to find that the drug was unsafe. 
121. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (s) (1964). 
122. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 70. . . . . 
123. It does not appear that the FDA ever applied the Delaney clause m t~1s way. As is dis-
cussed in the text infra at notes 126-127, the 1962 amendment to the Act effech~ely pre~ented the 
use of the Delaney clause to prohibit the use of med1c_ated feeds where no residues of the drug 
were detected in the treated animal. See also 1960 Heanngs. supra note 2, at 73. 
124. See note 17, supra, and accompanying text to see how DES might be said to affect the 
characteristics of food . 
125. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 70. 
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The inconsistent application of the Delaney clause, as between DES 
implants and feed additives, was equalized in 1962 when the Act was 
again amended~ 26 Unfortunately this was accomplished by creating a 
"no residues" exception to the Delaney clause for medicated feeds, 
rather than by applying the clause to DES implants irrespective of 
residues, as had previously been the case with feed additives. Under 
this amendment the Delaney clause was made expressly inapplicable to 
drugs used as additives in animal feeds, in the event that the Secretary 
of Health, Education, and Welfare were to find: 
(i) that, under the conditions of use and feeding specified in proposed 
labeling and reasonably certain to be followed in practice, such 
additives will not adversely affect the animals for which such feed is 
intended, and 
(ii) that no residue of the additive will be found ... in any edible 
portion of such animal after slaughter or in any food yielded or 
derived from the living animal ... 127 
The ostensible effect of this was that an application for the use of 
DES in animal feeds could be approved, even though DES had been 
shown to be a carcinogen, if both of the above criteria were established. 
The Act was amended once more in 1968, and a new regulatory 
category was created: "Animal Drugs."128Both DES implants and feed 
additives fall within the scope of this amendment, although they are 
actually covered under separate sets of provisions.129 
126. Pub. L. No. 87-781 (1962). 
127. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (3)(a) (1964). 
128. Pub. L. No. 90-399 (1968); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360b (1971). The basic purpose of this 
amendment was to 
. .. consolidate into one place in the law all of the principal provisions of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which relate to premarketing clearance of new drugs 
for administration to animals, either directly or in their feed and water. 
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2607, 2608 (90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1968). As has been men-
tioned above in the text, the regulation of DES as it was used in livestock and poultry was subject 
to the "Food," "New Drug," and "Food Additives" provisions of the Act. Thus, this amendment 
served to centralize the regulation of animal drugs. (e.g., this amendment altered the definition of 
"new drugs" so that it does not apply to animal drugs or animal drugs used in an imal feeds. See 
21 U.S.C. § 321 (p), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-399 § 102 (a) and (b) (1968)). The Animal dr.ug 
and feed manufacturing industry, by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the 
Bureau of the Budget, and the Department of Agriculture." 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS. 
supra at 2608. 
It should also be noted that, under the 1968 Amendment, all actions taken by the FDA to 
approve a new animal drug application are to be published in the Federal Register as regulations. 
21 u.s.c. § 360b (i) (1971). 
129. Implants (as "animal drugs"): 21 U.S.C .... (1971) 
a) Standard of "safeness" - § 360b (aX!). 
b) Applications for New Animal Drugs - § 360b (b) & (c). 
c) Grounds for refusing application - § 360b (d). 
e) Revocation & suspension of applications - § 360b (e)-(h). 
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Under the 1968 Amendment a "new animal drug" application must 
be refused if the drug is found to induce cancer when ingested by 
animal or man, unless it is found that .the drug will not adversely affect 
the animal for which it is intended, and that no residues of the drug 
will be found in any edible portion of the animal after slaughter ~ 30 The 
corresponding provisions pertaining to animal feeds do not include a 
similar requirement. However, no use of a medicated animal feed is to 
be approved unless the drug additive itself has previously been ap-
proved.131 Thus, no animal feed -mix may be approved unless the drug 
additive is non-carcinogenic unless it has no adverse effects on the ani-
mal, or unless no residues of the drug will be found in the edible tissues 
of an animal administered the mixed feed. 
In considering the regulatory history of DES under the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, it is important to realize that, from the time it was 
first approved for use in the livestock industry, this drug was known to 
be a carcinogen. Its approval for use in food animals has therefore 
turned on whether such ·uses were deemed to be "safe", and this in turn 
has usually depended upon whether any residues of the drug were 
found in the edible portions of the animals treated. 
While changes in the law have affected the permissible uses of DES, 
so too have developments in science and technology. Since the test has 
been whether any DES residues are found in meat products, the " safe-
ness" of DES has usually been determined by the ability of science to 
effectively detect such residues. This problem is treated in the next 
section. 
Feed Mixes (as "animal feeds bearing or containing a new animal drug" ): 21 U. S.C. . . . 
(1971) 
a) Stand ard of " safeness" - § 360b (a)(2). 
b) Application for Animal Feeds - § 360b (m)(l) & (2). 
c) Grounds for refusing application - § 360b (m)(3). 
d) Revoca tion & suspension of appl ications - § 360b (m)(4). 
130. 21 U.S.C. § 360b (d)(l)(H) (1968). 
131. 21 U.S .C. §§ 360b (m)(3XA) and 360b (i) (1 968). Section 360b (m)(3)(A) provides that an 
~pp l ica t ion " for uses of an animal feed bearing or containing a new animal drug" may be rejected 
tf there is not then in effect a regulation, published pursuant to § 360b (i), permitting the use of 
such drug in animal feeds . Section 360b (m) also provides that: 
An order under this subsection approving an application with respect to an animal 
feed bearing or containing a new animal drug shall be effective only while there is in 
effect a regulation pursuant to subsection (i) . . . , on th~ basis of which such applica-
tion ... was approved , relating to the use of such drug m or on such feed. 
'fhus, if a new drug application is suspended o~ rev<?ked (e.g. , because it is found t_o be unsafe as 
used), any application for the use of that drug tn ammal feeds wtll also be of no effect. However , 
Mr. Peter B. Hutt, Assistant General Counsel for the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, has taken the position that the basic new animal d~ug application must be "d isapproved in 
toto, completely, 100 percent" before the use of the drug tn am mal feeds must also be disapproved. 
Aug. 1971 Hearings. supra note 13; at 409. 
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IV. PROBLEMS IN DETECTION, PROOF, AND ENFORCEMENT 
In the five-year period from 1965 to 1969, the Department of Agri-
culture took random samples from slaughterhouses, and in the follow-
ing percentages of beef tested, found traces of DES: 2.7% in 1965, 1.1% 
in 1966, 2.6% in 1967, 0. 7% in 1968, and 0.6% in 1969~ 32 These samples 
were taken from cattle whose allowed rate of DES ingestion was 10 mg. 
per day.IJJ Although it is arguable that these findings would seem suffi-
cient to take DES feed mixes out of the "no residues" exceptions to the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act:34the FDA nevertheless allowed a 10 mg. 
increase in the daily dosage 6f DES in feed as of September 13, 1970.135 
In 1971, following earlier reports by the Department of Agriculture 
that no residues had been discovered in beef, the agency confirmed that 
residues had been found in 10 beef carcasses out of 2,500 samples 
taken~36The incidence of DES residues in the livers of treated, marketed 
cattle was 0.5% for each year from 1968 to 1970.137 USDA testing also 
132. Los Angeles Times, pt. I, pg. 26 (Sept. 17, 1970). This report did not indicate the amount 
of residues found in edible tissues. 
133. /d. 
134. See text supra at notes 12S, 127. and 130. 
13S. See note 7S, supra. Submitted data indicated that a daily dosage of SO mg. would leave no 
residue if a proper withdrawal period (48 hours) were observed . See note 83, supra. See also Los 
Angeles Times, supra note 132. 
With respect to the FDA's apparent inaction regarding the discovery of DES residues in 
cattle, Senator Proxmire made this observation: 
With a 7-year history of residues, why hasn't the FDA banned DES under the 
Delaney Clause? 
The answer they gave last wi nter was to insist that there is in theory no reason 
for there to be residues. The FDA said its experiements persuaded it that DES, used 
in accordance with the regulations, leaves no residue. Therefore, even though there 
was no evidence of procedural violations in a number of cases the FDA reported . .. , 
they argued that if there were residues, there must have been procedural violations. 
July 1972 Hearing. supra note 80. at 7. 
136. Associated Press Bulletin, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 12, 1971). The ten positive samples, all 
of which were taken from the animals' livers, were discovered in April (2), May (1), June (4) and 
July (3) of 1971. This report followed a U.S . Dept. of Agriculture news release, dated May 27, 1971 
(No. USDA 1721-71), which included this statement: "Assistant Secretary Lyng emphasized that 
no residues have been found in any samples checked for DES in 1971." Note that at least two of 
the positive samples reported in the Associated Press Bulletin were discovered prior to the May 27 
statement. "The samples were not reported earlier, USDA said, because the responsible laboratory 
official considered the results to be preliminary until confirmed by a second procedure." 
Associated Press Bulletin. supra. The FDA also reported finding DES residues in four samples of 
cattle liver during 1971. Dec. 1971 Hearings, supra note IS, at 340. 
Both the Associated Press Bulletin and the USDA news release, supra, indicated that the 
USDA testing program involved the taking of 6,000 samples per year. However. in 1970 alone 
3S.086, 700 head of cattle were slaughtered in the United States. Livestock Slaughter 1970, Crop 
Reporting Board, Statistical Reporting Service, USDA, April, 1971 release. Such a disproportion-
ate ratio casts grave doubts upon the reliability of USDA pronouncements concerning hormonal 
food additives. The statistical validity of USDA testing has been seriously questioned. See letter 
from Stern Community Law Firm (1971), as noted in March 1971 Hearings, supra note IS, at S14. 
137. Nov. 1971 Hearings. supra note 20, at 93. The concentration of DES detected in cattle 
livers has been reported to be as high as 36 parts per billion. Dec. 1971 Hearings, supra note IS, at 
226. Cf Aug. 1972 Hearings. supra note 13, at 393, where it was stated that concentrations of up 
to only 9 parts per billion had been detected. 
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confirmed residues in steers seven days after they had received a single 
oral dose of 10 mg. of DES.138 
The new drug applications for the. use of DES in the manufact~re of 
animal feed for cattle and sheep were finally withdrawn, in part, on 
August 4, 1972~ 39 (DES used for feed which had already been manufac-
tured was not immediately affected by this order. Its use was ordered 
discontinued as of January 1, 1973~40 ) The Commissioner, however, 
determined that it was premature to rule on the objections and requests 
for a hearing with respect to DES implants, on the basis that: (1) The 
new studies did not include implants;141(2) earlier testing of implanted 
animals had not shown detectable residues; and (3) smaller dosage 
levels were involved with implants. Although interim data indicated 
that DES residues were present from 30 to 60 days after pellet implan-
tation, the FDA concluded that this was not a sufficient basis to with-
draw its approval of DES pellets which were marketed under labeling 
which called for slaughter no sooner than 120 days after implantation}42 
Perhaps much of the problem in determining whether certain uses 
of DES should be disallowed, on the basis of residues found or not 
found in animal tissues, has resulted from variations and inherent limi-
tations in the methods of testing used~ 43 Many of the claims that estro-
genic residues were not found in test animals were based on a method 
of testing having a sensitivity range of 1 microgram per 1.1 pound!44 If 
DES were removed from the animal's feed from between 48 and 72 
hours before the animal was killed, the amount of residue was reduced 
to such low levels that often it could not be detected by this method~45 
With respect to DES implants, the FDA has acknowledged the difficul-
ty in effectively testing the low residue levels involved where the animal 
was killed 120 days after implantation.146 
Because of this limited range of sensitivity in testing, a pound of 
meat certified as being free ofDES residues could nonetheless contain 
undetected traces of the hormone. This is significant because the actual 
scope of danger presented by low levels of DES, especially if a long 
138. 37 Fed. Reg. 15747, 15749. See also 37 Fed. Reg. 26307 (1972). 
139. 37 FEd. Reg. 15747 (1972). 
140. /d. at 15749. 
141. Jd. at 15750. 
142. See 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 33, 35 (Dec. 25, 1972). Pending the outcome of further test-
ing, the FDA has proposed the requiring of a 120 day withdrawal period for DES implants. Two 
drug manufacturers were told by letter to stop recommending (in the instruction labels to their 
products) withdrawal periods of only 21 and 70 days. /d. 
143. See B. Vas, Tissu e R esidues of Drugs from the Use of Medicated Feeds. SYMPOSIUM. 
supra note 7, at 115, 116. 
144. Jd. at 167-169. One microgram (one millionth of a gram) per 1.1 pounds is the equivalent 
of0.9 parts per billion . See note 149, infra. 
145. See Dec. 1971 Hearings. supra note I 5, at 218-219. 
146. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 33 (Dec. 25, 1972). 
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range exposure is involved, is presently unknown. Moreover, it has been 
established that minute amounts of DES can in fact cause cancer, at 
least in test animals.147 Consequently, the claim that no appreciable 
quantities of estrogenic residue could be demonstrated in cattle fed 
DES may well have been misleading.148 
The fact that in recent years there has been an increase in the num-
ber of instances where DES residues have been detected might be attri-
buted in part to the development of better methods of testing (rather 
than an actual increase in residues)~49The latest method to be employed 
is a chemical technique known as the "GLC (gas-liquid chromatog-
raphy) Method", which has detected DES residues in a higher percen-
tage of samples taken than had previous methods~50There is some skep-
ticism, though, as to the reliability of this new technique! 51 and the FDA 
has not as yet officially approved its use!52 
Irrespective of the particular assay methods used, however, the fact 
remains that DES residues have been found in beef-cattle,153 and this 
alon~ is significant in light of the potential health hazards presented by 
the existence of these residues. After reviewing the various methods 
147. See Dec. 1971 Hearings, supra note IS. at 226. 
148. See J. Kastelic, RESIDUES PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 
ON FOOD PRODUCTION, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS IN FOOD at 136-137 
(C. Ayres , A. Kraft, H. Snyder, H. Walker eds. 1962). 
149. At least some proponents of DES have taken this position. See 37 Fed. Reg. 122SI (1972) 
in which the FDA intim ated that a recent increase in reported residues was attributable to the 
employment of a new testing method . This particular controversy arose in 1971 when residues in 
cattle were detected using a new chemical assay technique (see text at note ISO, infra), whereas the 
previously used biological assay method had not produced such results. This argument seems to 
break down, however, when one considers that the difference in sensitivity between the two 
methods does not appear to be significant. The biological method is considered to be " ... sensitive 
at a ll times to 2 [parts per billion] and occasionally, to a half a part per billion ... " (Dec. 1971 
Hearings. supra note IS. at 17S). The chemical method is said to have a sensitivity of from one to 
two parts per billion (Nov. 1971 Hearings, supra note 20, at 54; Dec. 1971 Hearings. supra note 
IS, at 126, 132, and 317-320). Note; "Superior insensitivity" (of chemical method) was interpreted 
to mean that its relative speed and convenience in regulatory program make it "superior" to biolo-
gical assay method. /d. at 318. See also July 1972 Hearing, supra note 80, at 7. 
ISO. See Dec. 1971 Hearings, supra note IS, at 320-322, and July 1972 Hearing, supra note 80, 
at 7. 
lSI. Dec. 1971 Hearings. supra note IS, at 317-321. 
IS2. /d. at 341. 
IS3. For the purposes of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, it may be important to consider 
whether these residues were found in an edible portion of the animal. See text at notes 117, 126 
and 130. supra. Note that the original approval of the use of DES implants in poultry was prem-
ised on the condition that a ll pellets be implanted in the head or neck region of the bird, which 
parts were not deemed to be "edible". See note 94, supra. Various investigations have shown 
that.if DES residues are present, they are usually found to a greater extent in the kidneys and 
livers of the treated animals, rather than in the fat or muscle tissues. See Kastelic, supra note 148, 
at 136-137. See also note 138, supra. Although the most popular cuts of beef are probably those 
taken from the muscle tissues, it is clear that the liver and kidneys are also "edible" parts of the 
animal. In fact, the FDA has considered (and rejected) the possibility of requiring that these 
or~ans, when taken from an animal treated with DES, be destroyed (in order that the rest of the 
ammal could be marketed). See 37 Fed. Reg. IS749 (1972). 
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used to detect DES residues in beef, the American Medical Association 
Council on Foods and Nutrition adopted a report which states in part: 
[T]race amounts of estrogen activity n;tay sometimes be found by sen-
sitive assay methods in meat from beef cattle ... treated with the 
usual levels of compounds having estrogenic activity. Since such 
compounds are not destroyed by cooking, it is possible that a person 
eating large amounts of liver, kidney, or other organs from animals 
treated with estrogen could consume up to several micrograms of 
compounds with estrogenic activity per day. However, based on the 
average daily consumption of meat, less than 1 [microgram] of com-
pounds with estrogenic activity would be consumed .154 
The inherent dangers arising from the consumption of even these 
small quantities of DES, especially if on a continual basis over a long 
period of time, have been demonstrated above. It is therefore of great 
importance that no meat products be allowed to reach the consumer 
which contain any residues of DES, no matter how minute. 
CONCLUSION 
Diethylstilbestrol has been found to constitute so serious a hazard 
to human health that at least 21 other nations have completely banned 
its use as a growth-stimulant in meat animals.155 The future of DES in 
the United States is presently unclear. At the time of this writing, three 
drug manufacturers have appealed the FDA ruling which (as of January 
1, 1973) prohibited the use of DES treated animal feeds .' 56 Among other 
things, these companies have alleged that the residue being found in 
animal tissues is not DES, but is a chemically different metabolite of 
stilbestrol, known as diethylstilbestrol-monoglucuronide. They argue 
that, because this compound is not really DES, its presence in the 
animal tissues is not a "residue" within the meaning of the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act.157 The appe!Jants also argue that they have . been 
denied the due process of law, resulting from the FDA's rejection of 
their request for a hearing~ 58If this argument is successful, it could force 
the FDA to conduct a protracted public hearing. Pending the outcome 
of such hearing, the reviewing court could still conceivably avoid the 
order and reinstate the DES new drug applications.'59 -
154. Briggs. Estrogen Residues in Meat: Public Health Aspects, 164 J. A.M.A. 1473, 147S 
0 9S7). The conclusions drawn by Briggs differ from those reached by this writer. 
ISS. March f97f Hearings. supra note IS. at Sl4. 
IS6. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 2 (Sept. 18, 1972). Case initiated in the District of Columbia 
Court or Appeals on Sept. IS, 1972. !d. . 
IS7. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 33 (Sept. 2S. 1972). It ts argued that "resid ues" within the 
llleaning of the law must be the original substance, biologically unchanged. 
158. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 32 (Nov. 20. 1972). 
IS9. See id. 
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The possibility of future legislation withdrawing the present restric-
tions on the use of DES should also be considered. Congressional 
hearings have been scheduled to review the impact of the Delaney 
Clause, and it is likely that substantial lobbying will be used in an 
effort to have the "no residues" test reduced to one of "no effect lev-
els."1 60 ln view of the current controversy over rising meat prices, it is 
likely that arguments for extending the uses of DES will be seriously 
considered . 
Mention should also be made of the fact that the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act does not pre-empt similar state regulation, unless the 
state law is in direct and positive conflict with the Federal provisions~6 1 
Thus, the states might well consider the possibility of enacting laws to 
supplement the Federal regulations. 
The problem of diethylstilbestrol does not lend itself to an easy 
solution. The economic benefits obtained through the use of this drug 
appear, at least to some, to be a compelling reason in favor of its con-
tinued use. This argument must be viewed, however, against the evi-
dence which shows DES to be a major threat to the public health. 
Perhaps, again to some, this evidence is not sufficiently compelling. 
Yet, when dealing with matters of health there can be no allowances for 
speculation or compromise. In the words of former Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, ArthurS. Flemming: 
Unless and until there is a sound scientific basis for the estab-
lishment of tolerance for carcinogens, I believe the government has a 
duty to make clear -- in law as well as in administration --that it will 
do everything possible to put persons in a position where they will 
not unnecessarily be adding residues of carcinogens to their diet. 
The population is inadvertently exposed to certain carcinogens. 
Ultra-violet light occurs in sunlight. The burning of most fuel pro-
duces some minute quantities of chemical compounds that elicit 
cancer in experimental animals . .. In view of these facts it becomes 
all the more imperative to protect the public from deliberate intro-
duction of additional carcinogenic materials into the human envi-
ronment . . . 
It is clear that if we include in our diet substances that induce 
cancer when included in the diet of test animals, we are taking a 
risk. In the light of the rising number of cases of cancer, why should 
we take that risk? Why shouldn't the government do everything 
160. 14 FOOD CHEM. NEWS 33 (Dec. 25, 1972). 
161. See Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Emerson, 270 F. 429 (8th Cir. 1920), which held that 
where a state law is not in conflict with the National Food and Drug Act, a broad latitude is al-
lowed states in protecting their citizens from adulterated or misbranded articles. 
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possible to see to it that we do not involuntarily take that risk? The 
purpose of our Food and Drug laws, as Justice Frankfurter put it, is 
to touch 'phases of the lives and health of people which, in the cir-
cumstances of modern industrialism are largely beyond self-protec-
tion.' And, as Judge Hastie put it, the government may reasonably 
decide to take action which will not subject the public to even 'slight 
risks'. 162 
162. 1960 Hearings. supra note 2, at 61-70. 
165 
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APPENDIX 
The following article by Daniel Zwerdling appeared in the Los 
Angeles Times, May 20, 1973, and is reprinted here with the au-
thor's permission. Mr. Zwerdling is a former staff writer for The 
New Republic and is now a free-lance writer and researcher in 
Washington, D.C. The article discusses the prospective use of new 
and potentially harmful. drugs in the cattle industry, to serve as 
replacements for the now banned Diethethylstilbestrol. 
The Food and Drug Administration finally banned DES, the cancer-causing 
growth hormone, from the nation's farms last month, but cattle feeders needn't 
fret. They've already started buying other FDA-approved hormone fatteners to 
take its place. 
It is the consumer who still has reason to worry-because these other hor-
mones, like DES, are also considered cancer-causing agents, or carcinogens, at 
least in laboratory animals. 
In fact, our beef, hogs, sheep and poultry digest daily doses of at least 16 
other drugs which the FDA knows or suspects are cancer-causing. Federal 
meat and poultry inspectors at the Department of Agriculture cannot say whe-
ther we are or are not eating residues of the potent drugs, because they have 
never tested for them. They can't. 
For most of the drugs, says Harry Mussman, the department's deputy di-
rector for scientific and technical services, "we just don't have the technology." 
Some of the risks to ponder: 
-The cattle industry expects the major replacement for DES to be Syno-
vex, a compound of the estrogen estradiol benzoate and progesterone. "All es-
trogens are considered to be carcinogens," according to an FDA memo, "since 
all estrogens that have been adequately tested have been shown to be carcino-
gens in animals." The FDA also considers progesterone, which metabolizes to 
estrogen in the body, a "potential" carcinogen. 
"Whatever dangers you want to attribute to DES," says Dr. Mortimer Lip-
sett at the National Institutes of Health, "you can attribute to Synovex." 
- Heifers, which accounted for 35% of our beef last year, have been munch-
ing feed laced with MGA since 1968. The FDA has been debating for more 
than two years now whether MGA (melengestrol acetate) causes cancer-as 
animal studies by the Upjohn Co., its manufacturer, suggest may be the case. 
Meanwhile, sales of the synthetic hormone are increasing. 
-Poultry farmers inject their chickens with estradiol monopalmitate, 
another estrogen, which makes them grow fatter faster on less feed-and 
which FDA considers, like "all estrogens," cancer-causing. Until very recently, 
the FDA also permitted farmers to inject dienestrol diacetate, which scientists 
linked along with DES, to rare vaginal cancer in young women. And Thanks-
giving turkeys might have eaten dimetridazole or ipronidazole; they aren't hor-
mones but they do induce cancer. 
-FDA files hold disturbing evidence suggesting that the popular nitrofu-
ran and sulfa compounds-used on chicken and hog farms across the country 
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to promote growth and prevent disease-may be candidates for the cancer ros-
ter, too. 
Plowing through FDA reports on the~e drugs and interviewing a dozen top 
FDA and Agriculture Department officials gives one a troubling sense of deja 
vu. The files on the drugs-the scientific warnings, the test procedures and the 
sometimes startling rationales the FDA uses to justify their use-could well be 
the DES story all over again. 
. Consider Synovex. Since Syntex Laboratories, the maker of birth control 
pills, brought this cattle fattener on the market in 1956, it's played a poor sec-
ond to DES. DES is a synthetic estrogen and easy to produce; Synovex, a 
natural compound, is harder to manufacture and consequently costs nine times 
as much. DES thus captured about 95% of the market. 
But "now that DES is off the market," says company spokesman Bill 
Spencer, Syntex expects that Synovex "will be fine." Full-page ads have hit the 
farm journals, trying to persuade cattle feeders that "1973 could be the year 
you surpass your DES gains with Synovex"; they claim that a Synovex implant 
can put 37 pounds more on the animals than DES ever could. 
"The biggest majority of them (cattle feeders) will probably use Synovex" 
or another cattle fattener called Ralgro, predicts Duane Flack, vice president 
of the mammoth Montfort Feedlots in Greeley, Colo. James Herrick, the 
USDA's top veterinarian in Iowa, estimates that "already 35% to SO% of cattle 
feeders across the country" who once used DES have switched to Synovex or 
Ralgro. 
Few scientists doubt that estradiol benzoate, the chief ingredient in Syno-
vex, induces cancer. "There are literally thousands of studies-well, maybe 
hundreds-which show estrogens are carcinogenic," says Richard Lehman, 
director of nutritional sciences in the FDA's bureau of veterinary medicine. 
Under federal law, the FDA must ban any drug which causes cancer in ani-
mals or humans except if "no residue of the additive will be found" in the 
meat by test methods "prescribed and approved" by the FDA. Why does the 
FDA ban DES but bless Synovex? The government inspectors kept finding 
residues of DES, Lehman explains, but "we have no data that show we alter 
the amount of estrogen that naturally occurs in the meat" after a Synovex im-
plant. 
But the USDA has never inspected the meat we eat for Synovex residues. 
And even now that the drug is coming to the farms in a big way, "we aren't 
doing any testing and will not be doing any testing for Synovex," says Muss-
man at the USDA. 
If you ask FDA officials where they get their safety data, they'll refer you to 
some bioassay tests which Syntex made about 18 years ago under controlled 
laboratory conditions, not on a farm . These cumbersome and time-consuming 
tests, which Mussman says "just don't work for a regulatory testing program," 
can't measure residues below 2 parts per billion (ppb). Theoretically, there 
could be 1.9 ppb in the meat and the test wouldn't show it. 
The FDA used the same kind of test when DES was around. Quoting "vol-
uminous" data from the test results, the FDA's director of veterinary medicine 
C.D. Van Houweling, assured a House of Representatives subcommittee i~ 
March, 1971, that "no residue (of DES) would be left" when farmers follow 
directions. 
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But about six months ago scientists developed a far more sensitive experi-
mt::ntal radioactive tracing technique, which found around 42 parts per trillion 
in meat of DES long after there should have been none. Reluctantly, the FDA 
banned the hormone from the animal market. The test methods available, it 
said, are "not sufficiently sensitive" to assure consumers they're not eating 
DES residues in their meat. 
With this history in mind, it is difficult for FDA and USDA officials to 
.explain how they can guarantee safe use of Synovex, using the same method 
that can't protect us from DES. Looking for Synovex residues in meat, in fact, 
will be far more difficult because its estrogen-unlike synthetic DES-already 
exists naturally in animals. 
"So far," says Lehman, "we don't even know what the amounts occurring 
naturally are in the meat. The FDA asked Syntex last September to perfect the 
new parts-per-trillion method and to start figuring out how to set up a work-
able testing program. In a year and a half (the deadline) says Van Houweling, 
"we'll know a lot more." 
Mussman, when asked if he could assure the public that there is no Syno-
vex residue in the meat, answered simply, "No, we cannot." 
Whatever the FDA tells you-or can't tell you-about Synovex holds true 
for the other cancer-causing hormones on the farms, too. Farmers inject 10-
milligram pellets of estradiol monopalmitate, from the Mattox & Moore Co., 
in chicken necks; but again, it's a naturally occurring estrogen and the USDA 
has no way to measure the residue. 
"It's being used very little in relation to the total amount of chicken being 
produced," says Mussman. Just how much is being used, however, is the 
FDA's and the company's "trade secret." 
While consumers wait for the companies to figure out a way to detect 
known carcinogens in the meat, FDA scientists are mulling over studies which 
suggest that other widely used drugs-also undetectable-may induce cancer. 
For example, Van Houweling reported in 1968 that "one of our scientists 
has concluded that furazolidone ... is tumorigenic and carcinogenic" -a dis-
tressing bit of news, since farmers across the country have been feeding fura-
zolidone and over 40 other nitrofuran compounds to hogs and chickens for 
several decades. 
The FDA proposed banning four nitrofuran drugs on March 31, 1971-and 
since then it has continually postponed a final decision while the Norwich 
Pharmacal Co., the manufacturer, bumbles its carcinogenicity tests (at the cru-
cial stage in one round of tests, some heat mechanism went haywire and re-
searchers cooked all the test animals). Results are expected around next Octo-
ber. Residue data: "We haven't tested for them, either," says Mussman. 
Or take the sulfa drugs, commonly mixed with low-level antibotics in the 
feed of cattle, hogs and poultry. The FDA received test results "two or three 
years ago," according to veterinary assistant director Fred Kingma, which 
show that these mixtures sometimes produce thyroid tumors-" a goiter effect," 
Kingma says, "which could be easily removed surgically." 
Follow-up tests: The FDA has " alerted" manufacturers that it "may ask" 
them to start new studies sometime this month. Residue data: surveys of 6,000 
random beef carcasses by FDA consultant William Huber of the University of 
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Illinois found that "one out of every four pieces of meat you consume contains 
antibiotics"-usually a compound of antibiotics and sulfamethazine. 
Perhaps two of every five pieces of m«:!at you eat this year will come from 
heifers, according to USDA, many of them fattended on MGA, the "female 
DES." MGA suppresses estrus-kills their sex drive. "When females are in 
heat they're continually jumping around," says FDA veterinarian Robert Gill-
espie. "It keeps a turmoil going in the fattening lot, and the animals don't eat 
as well as they should . With MGA, they'll pay a little more attention to the 
feed bunk." 
FDA scientists have considered MGA a "potential" carcinogen since Up-
john brought it on the market, since it's a synthetic progesterone. Upjohn stu-
dies over two years ago showed that MGA induces a high rate of cancer in one 
cancer-prone strain of mice, and the FDA has been interpreting the results 
ever since. The National Cancer Institute reviewed the studies, and although it 
won't conclude that MGA does induce cancer, it urged last month that the 
FDA conduct more tests. 
Even if FDA gives MGA its seal of approval (and if it does, scientists on its 
own staff are likely to protest) the drug poses other safety problems. Upjohn 
followed its mouse studies with dog tests "to prove the product is safe," says 
one FDA official, "but it ·didn't quite work out that way." At high doses, 
MGA disrupted the dogs' reproductive cycles and damaged the uterus. 
''I'm worried," this official said, "that trace residues of the hormone (in 
the meat) could disrupt a woman's menstrual cycle." Richard Lehman, in the 
FDA's veterinary drug bureau, was asked if the findings worry him. "Quite 
honestly," he said, "the reason you put MGA in cattle in the first place is to 
suppress the reproductive process. So if it interferes with a dog's reproductive 
system, that's what it's supposed to do. Dogs, cattle, humans-it does the 
same thing if you get enough there." 
"If you monkey around with the natural balance of hormones, something's 
going to happen," Lehman said. "You don't have to be a scientist to figure 
that out." Now, Van Houweling added in a separate conversation, "the ques-
tion is whether the amounts in beef are harmful to people. It will be a little 
while yet before we reach our conclusions." 
The answer becomes more urgent as time goes by because cattle feeders are 
increasing the proportion of heifers in the feedlots and increasing the use of 
MGA now that DES is gone. USDA officials assured the Congress two years 
ago that they had a workable method sensitive to 25 ppb, but now Mussman 
concedes that the USDA never used it. "It just hasn't worked well in our 
hands," he says. 
Upjohn's own experimental data, according .to one FDA veterinary official, 
indicate that consumers are eating "a few parts per billion" in the fat marbled 
throughout their meat. 
The DES debacle, which dragged several years through FDA deliberations, 
congressional hearings and the federal courts, came to a close little more than 
a month ago. But already the lessons it should have taught the FDA about try-
ing to control cancer-causing drugs on ~he farr:ns <."really a foolhardy under-
taking," a former National Cancer Institute scientist warned a congressional 
subcommittee) seem to be lost. 
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When the FDA insisted that DES residues wouldn't end up in the meat, 
for example, it meant that tests showed that there would be no residues of the 
drug according to directions "reasonably certain to be followed in practice." 
As DES violation files in the FDA's own compliance section show, however, 
farmers didn't always obey the label. 
Even if the USDA were to test every piece of meat in the market for these 
carcinogenic drugs- now, of course, it doesn't test even one--and to report 
that it found "no residues," it would mean only that it found no residues at the 
sensitivity level of its tests. "Now, this means that there will be a residue of car-
cinogens in the meat," FDA assistant general counsel Peter Barton Hutt em-
phasized recently before the Senate Commerce Committee. "We know that ... 
The point is to keep it low enough so that it cannot be detected by current me-
thods." 
"Current methods" in 1962 defined 50 ppb as practically zero; this year, the 
FDA concludes that 2 ppb "is not sufficiently sensitive." How sensitive is sen-
sitive enough? Cancer researchers have never been able to determine a safe 
level for a carcinogen, a quantity so small that it may not cause cancer in 
some persons. 
Just three weeks ago the FDA banned the chicken growth hormone dienes-
trol diacetate, No, federal inspectors didn't report any residues in the meat 
(they never inspected for them), but, Van Houweling reports, "it would take a 
year or longer of intensive investigation" before the manufacturer could devel-
op "a more sensitive test." In his opinion that's "too long." 
It's a bewildering show of force: The agency has given the makers of Syno-
vex, for just one example, at least another year and a half for the same pur-
pose. Even as it banishes one carcinogen from the farms, the FDA brings on 
another-like Pfizer Laboratories' Carbodox, a new wonder drug for hogs, 
which Pfizer tests show causes cancer in animals. It's been on the market 
about four months, and already "they've been spending more money adverti-
sing that drug than any drug I've ever seen," says a USDA official. 
"Of the 330,000 cancer deaths a year in this country," estimates cancer 
expert Samuel Epstein, "somewhere in the region of 60o/o to 80o/o of them are 
environmental in origin." Some FDA critics like Dr. Roy Hertz are asking: 
When the human body already can develop cancer on its own, "what sense 
does it make to add an additional load at will?" 
Van Houweling, on the other hand, conceives a grand portrait of a greatly 
polluted world and paints cancer-causing drugs on the farms as just a tiny 
dab. "There are many possible carcinogenic substances in the enviroment that 
people can't escape," he said . "Why, even sunlight is definitely hazardous if 
you stay in it too long." 
COMMENT 
USURY LAWS: 
171 
11/usm:-r Protection for the Necessitous Bm-rou'Pr 
"Law grind the poor, and rich men rule the law. " 1 
Through the ages, man has often found it necessary to borrow to 
meet expenses beyond those normally budgeted for under his regular 
income. To meet this need, lending and charging for such service devel-
oped as a business. Obviously, as the demand for this service increased, 
the price for use of the borrowed funds (i.e. the interest rates on the 
loans) did likewise. When these interest rates, as set by trade custom, 
became "usurious" 2 they were subjected to governmental regulation. 
Usury has been a prohibited practice in civilized nations since the 
Babylonian period. 3 Many sections of the Bible,4 have condemned 
usurious practices, saying. " ... take thou no usury of him or his, but fear 
thy God ." 5 Presently, all SO states have usury laws on their books 
intended to protect borrowers.6 However, as will be shown, these laws 
are usually ineffectual insulation for the class of borrower 7 which is 
most in need of protection. 
The Necessitous Borrower 
One who is subject to the pressures of indigency or oppressed by 
poverty, and who borrows money to alleviate it, is a necessitous borrow-
er.8 Such an individual will take out a small loan primarily to consoli-
date or re-finance existing obligations (e.g. taxes, medical expenses, 
utility bills, etc.), or to purchase durable goods (e.g. automobiles,house-
hold appliances, etc.). 9 
I. Oliver Goldsmith . The Traveller, line 386. 
2. Usury was defined as the taking of exorbitant interest (i.e. 40 percent) under English Com-
mon Law, and was punishable as a misdemeanor. 55 AM. JUR. Usury§ 172 (1946). 
3. The King had the power to regulate interest rates. CODE OF HAMMURABI § 51 (2 G.R. 
DRIVER & JOHN C. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 29 (1955)]. 
4. Deuteronomy 23: 19, 20, Ezekie/18: 5, 13. 
5. Leviticus 25: 35, 36, 37. 
6. See appendix, for a state-by-state breakdown of statutes and interest rates. 
7. J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD, S. MESSINGER, CIVILJUSTICE AND THE POOR 8 (1967). 
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (4th ed. 1951). 
9. S. BOOTH, FINANCE FACTS YEARBOOK 57 (1970). Note: With respect to the purchase 
of durable goods, the consumer may also "borrow" the purchase price by buying the desired item 
"on time." The installment sales contract is in effect, a loan of the purchase price of a retail item 
extended to the buyer by his vendor. Such an extension of credit also involves a "finance charge" 
rather than "interest", and the maximum rates chargeable may also be regulated by state law. For 
example see the Unruh Act of California, [CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1801 et. seq. (West 1973)]. 
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Statistically it is assumed that such a borrower earns less than 
$6,000 annually,10 and is generally unable to obtain a loan in excess of 
$1,000, due to lack of adequate collateral! 1 Besides limiting the amount 
of his loan, the necessitous borrower's lack of collateral also limits his 
choice of lenders!2 Since large lending institutions (i.e. banks, and sav-
ings and loan companies) are disinclined to take credit risks by extend-
ing small unsecured personal loans of the type this borrower requires, 
he is forced to deal with the small finance companies which will do so. 
As will later be illustrated, such lenders are often immune from the 
operation of usury laws and may therefore impose higher ("maximum") 
interest rates. ·Thus the necessitous borrower must pay the exceedingly 
high rates which they ask for their services, since he cannot readily 
obtain these services from other lending institutions. 
The pool of necessitous borrowers, in fact, provides a major portion 
of the business of small loan companies. It has been assumed that a 
necessitous borrower characteristically receives less than $6,000 per 
year. Nationally, approximately 26 percent of all families have annual 
incomes of less than $6,000.13 In California, about 20 percent of all 
families are in this income bracket.14 Over 70 percent of the unrelated 
individuals in both California, and in the entire country are below the 
$6,000 annual income level.15 And, nationwide, approximately 40 per-
cent of all loans are taken out by those with less than $6,000 annual 
income.16 
Secondly, it has been assumed that a necessitous borrower is limited 
to loans of less than $1,000 due to his lack of collateral. National figures 
show that the average amount for a small personal loan is approximate-
ly $696.17 In 1970, of the California finance company loans under $5,000, 
approximately 34 percent were for $500 or less,18 and 66 percent of such 
loans were for less than $1,000.19 Maximum interest rates were charged 
I 0. According to the finance industry, approximately 40 percent of the borrowers of finance 
companies have annual incomes less than $6,000. BOOTH, supra note 9, at 58. 
II. Also, the finance industry has stated that the average size personal loan for 1968 was $696. 
BOOTH, supra note 9, at 63. The current trend of rising prices generally will shift the size of the 
average loan upward accordingly. 
12. Comment, Accounts R eceivable Financing and the California Personal Property Brokers 
Act, 14 STAN. L. REV. 520, 526 (1962). 
13. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
316 (1971). 
14. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTER-
ISTICS-CALIFORNIA 384 (1971). 
15. See notes 13 & 14, supra. 
16. See note 10, supra. 
17. See note 11, supra. 
18. 1970 CAL. DEPT OF CORP. ANN. REP., Operations of Licensed Finance Companies, 
exhibit D. 
19. 1970 CAL. DEPT. OF CORP. ANN. REP., Operations of Licensed Finance Companies, 
exhibit C. 
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on over 90 percent of the loans in this category (i.e. loans of under 
$5,000).20 
Hence, it can be seen that the majority of small personal loans, both 
in California and nationwide, do not exceed $1,000. It is logical to 
assume, then, that the majority of these loans are granted to low in-
come/necessitous borrowers, who do not have enough collateral to 
support larger loans. Since maximum interest rates are being charged 
on a great majority of such small loans, the necessitous borrower is, 
therefore, the one most oppressed by the lack of effective regulation of 
these rates. 
Structurally, state laws usually do not fulfill their purpose of pro-
tecting the necessitous borrower; and, federal regulations (i.e. Truth-In-
Lending laws) require only full disclosure of terms and charges for 
loans, but are silent upon the interest rates permitted.21 
Effect of Interest Rates in Selected Jurisdictions 
The following table illustrates the vast discrepancies between allow-
able interest rates on small loans and those rates statutorily designated 
as usurious, in a group of states selected either for extremely high or 
low interest rates, or as otherwise notable jurisdictions (i.e. New York 
and California). For purposes of this comparison, the amount of the 
loan will be $500. All interest rates will be expressed in annual percent-
ages. 
STATE 
ALASKA22 
ARKANSAS 23 
20. ld. 
TABLE 
RATE ON $500 
33.6% 
lO.Oo/o 
MAX. RATE 
36.0% 
lO.Oo/o 
USURY 
8o/o 
lOo/o 
21. 82 Stat. 146, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et. seq. (1968). 
22. Max Rate; ALA. STAT. Title 6, ch. 20, § 06.20.230 (Supp. 1971). Usury; ALA . STAT. Title 
45, ch . 45, § 45.45.010 (Supp. 1971). Note: The usual practice of the Finance Industry is to fix the 
maximum allowable interest rate to each incremental portion of a loan. For instance, in Alaska 
the annual rate of interest on a loan of $500 is computed in the following manner: 
1) The first $400 bears a maximum interest rate of 36o/o. 
2) The additional $100 bears a maximum interest rate of 24%. 
3) The actual interest rate on the total amount of the loan may be found by first 
multiplying each incremental portion by the applicable interest rates, adding the 
resulting figures, and dividing this total by the amount of the loan. 
$400 X 36 = $14,400 
$100 X 24 = $ 2,400 + 
$16,800 
$16,800 -;- $500 = 33.6 
This same method is used to arrive at the annual rates of interest on $500 in each of 
the exam pies set out in the text. 
23. Max. Rate; ARK. STAT. ANN. Const. art. 19, § 13 (1947). Usury; ARK. STAT. ANN. 
Const. art. 19, § 13 (1947). 
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STATE 
CALIFORNIA
24 
COLORAD025 
GEORGIA26 
HAWAII 27 
MICHIGAN28 
NEW YORK'29 
OHI0 30 
TEXAS 31 
WISCONSIN 32 
U.C.C.C. Alt. A
33 
U.C.C.C. Alt. B 34 
Consumer Journal 
TABLE (CONT.) 
RATE ON $500 MAX. RATE 
26.4% 30.0% 
28.8% 36.0% 
16.0% 16.0% 
' 25.2% 42.0% 
24.0% 30.0% 
22.8% 30.0% 
16.0% 16.0% 
14.0% 18.0% 
18.0% 18.0% 
15.6% 18.0% 
30.0% 36.0% 
[Vol. II: 171 
USURY 
10% 
6% 
6% 
12% 
7% 
7112% 
8% 
10% 
12% 
N/A 
N/A 
It is readily apparent from the figures cited in the preceding table 
that small loans carry the highest rates of interest possible under the 
law, despite their exceeding those rates which are deemed to be usur-
ious. Thirty-one states have small loan laws which allow interest rates 
of 30 percent or more; 35 and, there are seven states with statutes that 
acquiesce to rates of 20 percent or more?6 Few states remain which have 
maximum interest rates of 18 percent or lower. So, the low income 
borrower has no relief in sight from these exorbitant rates on the small 
24. Max. Rate; CAL. FIN. CODE ANN. § 22451 (West 1968). Usury; CAL. CONST. CODE 
ANN. art 20, § 22 (West Supp. 1972). 
25. Max. Rate; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 73, art. 3, § 14 (1963). Usury; COLO REV. 
STAT. ANN. ch 73, art),§ 1 (S~p.1969). 
26. Max. Rate; GA. COD'E ANN. Title 25, § 315 (1971). Usury; GA. CODE ANN. Title 57,§ 
116 (1971). 
27. Max. Rate; HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 409, § 16 (1968). Usury; HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 
478, § 3 (1968). 
28. Max. Rate; MICH. STAT. ANN. Title 23, § 667(13) (1971). Usury; MICH. STAT. ANN. 
Title 19, § 1 5(1) (Supp. 1972). 
29. Max. Rate; N.Y. BANK LAW§ 352 (McKinney 1971). Usury; N.Y. GEN. OBLG. LAW§ 
5-501 (McKinney Supp. 1 972). 
30. Max. Rate; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 1321, § 13 (Supp. 1972). Usury; OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. ch. 1343, § 01 (Supp. 1972). 
31. Max. Rate; TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, § 3.15 (1971). Usury; TEX. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. art 5069, § 1.02 (1971). 
32. Max. Rate; WIS. STAT. ANN. ch. 422, § 201(2)(a) (Supp. 1973). Usury; WIS . STAT. ANN. 
ch . 138, § 05(1)(a) (Supp. 1973). 
33. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Working Draft No.6,§ 3.508, Alt. A (1967). 
34. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Working Draft No.6,§ 3.508, Alt. B (1967). 
35. See appendix: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, lndmna, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, & Wyoming. 
36. See appendix: Kentucky, Mississippi , Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, & South Car, 
olina. 
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loans necessity forces him to seek. At this point, however, it should be 
noted that somewhat higher interest rates are justified on these small 
unsecured personal loans because of the credit risks involved. None-
theless, these risks to the finance companies are not a sufficient ration-
alization for their charging the exceedingly high rates which they do. 
The crux of the problem for the necessitous borrower is that the fin-
ance companies do, in fact, use the aforementioned rationalization to 
charge burdensome interest rates, and are allowed to do so in that most 
of them are exempted from having to comply with usury law interest 
rate limitations imposed by their respective states. Even if loans are 
made that are usurious, the penalties are generally nominal~7 Only the 
State of Arkansas effectively enforces its usury law, by imposing a 10 
percent interest ceiling across the board, with no exemptions for any 
lenders.38 
To put the problems occasioned by such lack of effective legislative 
control in sharper perspective we will look to the history of a single 
state which typifies the situation in most other jurisdictions. 
History of Usury in California 
Prior to 1909, there was no general usury law in California.39 In that 
year regulations were first imposed on personal property brokers.40 Per-
sonal property brokers, including small loan or finance companies are 
those engaged in lending money with personal property being all or 
part of the security for the loan.41 They developed as a special class of 
lenders, who would loan money for short terms on collateral that was 
thought of as unacceptable to banks.42 This was a reaction to the evolu-
tion of a special class of borrowers who were poor in comparison to the 
traditional bank clientele. Such brokers were permitted to charge up to 
S percent per month on a loan,43 or 60 percent a year. When it became 
obvious that the new class of borrowers was being subjected to this 
usurious practice, the voting population of California passed an initia-
tive to curtail it.44 
This statute was intended to cover all lenders, and put a maximum 
annual interest rate at 12 percent.45 The enforcement section provided 
-
37. See note 7, supra. 
38. See text accompanying note 23, supra. See generally Comment, Usury and Conflicts, 55 
CALIF. L. REV. 123, 178 (1967). 
39. See note 12, supra. 
40. Cal. Stats. 1909, ch. 634, §§ 1, 2, at %9. See Comment, supra note 12. 
41. CAL. FIN. CODE ANN.§ 22009 (West 1968). 
42. See Comment, supra note 12. 
43. See note 40, supra and accompanying text. 
44. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1916-1 et. seq. (West Supp. 1973). 
45. W. Warren, California House Financing, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 555, 565 (1%1). 
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for forfeiture of his loan by any personal property broker found in vio-
lation of the statute.46 Further, it was intended to repeal all previous 
regulations for lenders,47 including personal property brokers.48 Court 
decisions in the following decade extended the application of the Usury 
Law to forbearances,49 and to re-financing of the originalloan.50 
Unfortunately, this trend of further extending protection against 
usurious practices was soon' reversed. In 1934, a legislative referendum 
to amend the State Constitution was presented to the California voters.51 
The effect of its acceptance was to exempt almost every lending institu-
tion from the interest rate regulations.52 Obstensibly, the amendment's 
lowering of the interest rate ceiling on all loans from 12 percent to 10 
percent annually was advantageous to the necessitous borrower. How-
ever, this is not an accurate picture of the amendment's true effect; in 
reality, the exemptions negate this apparent benefit. Since almost all 
lending institutions are exempt from the lowered rate, the necessitous 
borrower is subjected to the independent regulations set up by these 
institutions themselves. Even though further legislation has been pre-
sented, to the state lawmakers, as recently as 1971, it has not been 
accepted.53 Hence, the State of California does not presently have an 
effective usury law with respect to small loans. 
Conclusion 
What is needed is a promulgation of new and viable Consumer 
Protection legislation similar to that in effect in Wisconsin. The Wis-
consin act lowers the maximum rate of interest on small loans from 30 
percent to 18 percent annually.54 In California, another logical alterna-
tive would be to amend the State Constitution to eliminate the existing 
exemptions, and to allow for strict enforcement of the present 10 
percent interest ceiling on all loans. Such effective protection has yet to 
materialize. in any but two of the fifty United States.55 Lacking these 
46. In re Washer, 200 Cal. 598, 254 P. 951 (1927). 
47. Recent Decision, Usury: Personal Property Brokers: Pawnbrokers, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 213 
(1931). 
48. Crooks v. People's Finance & Thrift Co., 1 Cal. Supp. 86, 292 P. 1065, 1067 (1930). 
49. "Forbearance" is defined as an "Act by which creditor waits for payment of debt due him 
by debtor after it becomes due." BLACK'S LAW DICfiONARY 733 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968), (citing 
Upton v. Gould, 64 Cal. App. 2d 814, 149 P.2d 731 , 733 (1944)). 
SO. Aitken v. Southwest Fin. Corp. of Cal., 131 Cal. App. 95, 104,20 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1933). 
51. W. Warren , California Housing Financing, supra note 45, at 562. 
52. CAL. CONST. CODE ANN. art 20, ~ 20 (West Supp. 1972). This section includes: 
Building and Loan Associations, Credit Unions, Pawnbrokers, Personal Property Brokers, Banks, 
and Agricultural Cooperatives. 
53. California Senate Bill 738, which would have enforced the Usury Law, died in committee. 
Cal. Final Calendar of Legislative Business, 1971 Sess. 249. The Senate Judiciary Committee is at 
present studying the U .C.C.C. as modified by the usage of Personal Property Brokers interest 
rates. Cal. Sen. J. 1971 Sess. 1617. 
54. WIS. STAT. ANN. ch. 422, § 201 (Supp. 1972). 
55. The two exceptions are Arkansas and Wisconsin, supra notes 38 & 54 respectively. 
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necessary prophylactic devices, the necessitous borrower will bury him-
self further in debt. 
Due to the general inflationary trend in our society, one pays more 
to buy less. Hence, those of low income must borrow more or more 
often to meet their present needs, as well as to alleviate their prior 
indebtedness. Ironically, the exorbitant interest rates which the finance 
companies force them to pay, on the very money they borrow to extri-
cate themselves, actually compounds their plight. Obviously, then, with-
out potent regulation of the finance companies' lending practices, the 
situation of the poor who turn to them for help can only get worse. This 
in turn may tend to cause a greater economic stratification of our soci-
ety, a result which is obviously undesirable. 
-ERIC R. YAMAMOTO 
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Appendix 
The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate the descrepancies be-
tween the usury rate (maximum contractual rate of interest for a loan) 
and the maximum rate of interest permissible by the small loan acts of 
the 50 states. For uniformity, all of the interest rates will be expressed 
in annual percentage. · 
STATE USURY MAXIMUM RATES 
ALABAMA Over 8% 36% 0 to $200 
24% $200 to $300 
ALA. CODE 9 § 60 5§ 290 
(Michie Co.) (Supp. 1971) (Supp. 1971) 
ALASKA Over 8% 36% 0 to $400 
24o/o $400 to $800 
12% $800 to $1,500 
ALAS. STAT. 45.45.010 06.20.230 
(Michie Co.) (Supp. 1971) (Supp. 1971) 
ARIZONA Over 10% 36% 0 to $300 
24% $300 to $600 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 44-1201 6-622 
ANN. 
(West) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
ARKANSAS Over 10% 10% 
ARK. STAT. ANN. Const. Art. XIX § 13 I d. 
(Hobbs-Merrill Co.) (1947) 
CALIFORNIA Over 10% 30% 0 to $200 
24% $200 to $500 
18% $500 to $700 
12% $700 to $1,500 
CAL. CODE ANN. Const. Art. XX § 22 Fin. § 22451 
(West) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
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STATE USURY MAXIMUM RATE 
COLORADO Over 6% 36% 0 to $300 
18% $300 to $500 
12% $500 to $1,500 
COLO. REV. STAT. 73-1-1 73-3-14 
ANN. 
(Bradford-Robinson Co.) (Supp. 1969) (1963) 
CONNECTICUT Over 12% 17% 0 to $300 
. 11% $300 to $1,800 
CONN. STAT. ANN. 37 § 4 36 § 233 
(West) (1958) (Supp. 1972) 
DELAWARE Over 9% 7o/o interest 
2% service fee 
5% late fine 
DEL. CODE ANN. 6 § 2301 5 § 2108 
(West) (Supp. 1970) (Supp. 1970) 
FLORIDA Over 10% 36% 0 to $300 
24% $300 to $600 
FLA. STAT. ANN. 687.02 516.14 
(West) (1966) (1972) 
GEORGIA Over 6% 16% 0 to $600 
12% $600+ 
GA. CODE ANN. ·§ 57-116 § 25-315 
(Harrison Co.) (1971) (1971) 
HAWAII Over 12% 42% 0 to $100 
30% $100 to $300 
HAWAII REV. STAT. 478-3 409-16 
(State printer) (1968) (1968) 
IDAHO Over 10% 36% 0 to $300 
21% $300 to $1,000 
15% $1 ,000 to $1,500 
IDAHO CODE 28-22-105 28-33-508 
(Hobbs-Merrill Co.) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
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STATE USURY MAXIMUM RATE 
ILLINOIS Over 8% 36% 0 to $150 
24% $150 to $300 
12% $300 to $800 
ILL. STAT. ANN. 74 § 4 74 § 31 
(West) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
INDIANA Over 8% 36% 0 to $300 
21% $300 to $1,000 
15% $1,000 to $1,500 
IND. STAT. ANN. Const. Art. 11 § 9 19-23-508 
(Hobbs-Merrill Co.) (1955) (Supp. 1972) 
IOWA Over 9% 36% 0 to $150 
24% $150 to $300 
18% $300 to $700 
12% $700+ 
lOW A CODE ANN. 535.2 536.13 
(West) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
KANSAS Over 10% 36% 0 to $300 
10% $300+ 
KAN. GEN. STAT. 16-202 16-410 
ANN. 
(State Printer) (Supp. 1961) (Supp. 1961) 
KENTUCKY Over 6% 20% 0 to $300 
16% $300 to $800 
13% $800 to $1,200 
KY. REV. STAT. 360.010 288.530 
(Hobbs-Merrill Co.) (Supp. 1972) (1972) 
LOUISIANA Over 8% 36% 0 to $800 
27% $800 to $2,000 
21 o/o $2,000 to $3,500 
15% $3,500 and above 
LA. STAT. ANN. Civ. Code§ 2924 9:3519 
(West) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
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STATE USURY MAXIMUM RATE 
MAINE Over 12% 30% 0 to $300 
18% $300+ 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 9 § 3086 9 § 3081 
(West) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
MARYLAND Over 8% 36% 0 to $300 
24% $300 to $500 
MD. CODE ANN. 49 § 3 58A § 16 
(Michie Co.) (Supp. 1972) (1972) 
MASSACHUSETTS Over 6% 18% $1,000 or less 
MASS. GEN. LAWS 107 § 3 140 § 90 
ANN. 
(West) (1958) (1958) 
MICHIGAN Over 7% 30% 0 to $300 
15% $300 to $1,000 
MICH. STAT. ANN. 19:15 (1) 23:667 (13) 
(Callaghan & Co.) (Supp. 1972) (1971) 
MINNESOTA Over 8% 33% 0 to $300 
18% $300 to $600 
15% $600 to $900 
MINN. STAT. ANN. 334.01 56.13 
(West) (1966) (1970) 
MISSISSIPPI Over 8% 24% $100+ 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 36 § 5591-09 
(Harrison Co.) (Supp. 1971) (Supp. 1971) 
MISSOURI Over 8% 15% 0 to $500 
8% $500+ 
MO. STAT. ANN. 408.030 408.100 
(West) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
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STATE USURY MAXIMUM RATE 
MONTANA Over 10% 20% 0 to $300 
16% $300 to $500 
12% $500 to $1,000 
MONT. REV. CODE 47-125 47-210 
ANN. 
(Allen Smith Co.) (1961) (Supp. 1971) 
NEBRASKA Over 9% 30% 0 to $300 
24% $300 to $500 
18% $500 to $1,000 
12% $1,000 to $3,000 
NEB. REV. STAT. 45-101 45-137 
(Dennis & Co.) (1968) (1968) 
NEVADA Over 12% 9% 0 to $1,000 
8% $1,000 to $2,500 
12% 0 to $200 service 
fee 
6% $200 to $400 ser-
vice fee 
NEV. REV. STAT. 99.050 675.290 
(State Printer) (1970) (1970) 
NEW HAMPSHIRE Over 6% 24% 0 to $600 
18% $600 to $1,500 
18% $1,500+ 
N.H. REV. STAT. 336:1 399-A:3 
ANN. 
(Equity Publishing Co.) (1966) (1968) 
NEW JERSEY Over 6% 24% 0 to $500 
22% $500 to $1,000 
N.J. STAT. ANN. 31:1-1 17:10-14 
(West) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
NEW MEXICO Over 12% 36% 0 to $150 
30% $150 to $300 
12% $300 to $1,000 
N.M. STAT. ANN. 50-6-5 48-17-43 
(Allen Smith Co.) (1962) (1966) 
1974] USURY IN SMALL LOANS 183 
STATE USURY MAXIMUM RATE 
NEW YORK Over 7112o/o 30o/o 0 to $100 
24o/o $100 to $300 
18o/o $300 to $900 
15o/o $900 to $1,400 
N.Y. LAWS (McKinney) Gen. Oblg. 5-501 Bank 352 
(West) (Supp. 1972) (1971) 
NORTH CAROLINA Over 7o/o 18o/o 0 to $300 
10o/o $300 to $600 
8o/o $600 to $900 
N.C. GEN. STAT. 24-1 53-173 
(Michie Co.) (Supp. 1971) (Supp. 1971) 
NORTH DAKOTA Over 7o/o 30o/o 0 to $250 
24o/o $250 to $500 
21 o/o $500 to $750 
18o/o $750 to $1,000 
N.D. CODE ANN. 47-14-09 13-03-14 
(Allen Smith Co.) (Supp. 1971) (1971) 
OHIO Over 8o/o 16o/o 0 to $500 
9o/o $500 to $1,000 
7o/o $1,000 to $2,000 
OHIO REV. CODE 1343.01 1321.13 
ANN. 
(Anderson Co.) (Supp. 1971) (Supp. 1971) 
OKLAHOMA Over 10o/o 30o/o 0 to $300 
21 o/o $300 to $1,000 
15o/o $1,000+ 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. Const. Art. 14 § 2 14A § 2-201 
(West) (Supp. 1972) · (Supp. 1972) 
OREGON Over 10o/o 36o/o 0 to $300 
24o/o $300 to $500 
12o/o $500 to $1,500 
ORE. REV. STAT. 82.010 725.340 
(Binsford & Mort Pub.) (1971) (1971) 
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STATE USURY MAXIMUM RATE 
PENNSYLVANIA Over 6% 36% 0 to $150 
24% $150 to $300 
12% $300 to $600 
PA. STAT. ANN. 41 § 3 7 § 6152 
(West) (1971) (1967) 
RHODE ISLAND Over 21% 36% 0 to $300 
30% $300 to $800 
24% $800 to $2,500 
R.I. GEN. LAWS 6-27-4 19-25-25 
(Bobbs-Merrill Co.) (Supp. 1971) (1968) 
SOUTH CAROLINA Over 8% 20% 0 to $100 
18% $100 to $300 
9% $300 to $1,000 
S.C. CODE LAWS § 8-3 § 8-800.10 
(Michie Co.) (Supp. 1971) (Supp. 1971) 
SOUTH DAKOTA Over 10% 30% 0 to $300 
24% $300 to $600 
18o/o $600 to $1,200 
12% $1,200 to $2,500 
S.D. LAWS ANN. 54-3-7 54-6-2 
(Allen Smith Co.) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
TENNESEE Over 6% 6% interest 
12% service fee 
TENN. CODE ANN. 47-14-104 45-2113 
(Bobbs-Merrill Co.) (Supp. 1972) (1964) 
TEXAS Over 10% 18% 0 to $300 
8% $300 to $2,500 
TEX. CIV. STAT. 5069-1.02 5069-3.15 
ANN. 
(West) (1971) (1971) 
UTAH Over 6% 36% 0 to $300 
21% $300 to $1,000 
15% $1,000+ 
UTAH CODE ANN. 15-1-1 70B-3-508 
(Allen Smith Co.) (1953) (Supp. 1971) 
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STATE USURY MAXIMUM RATE 
VERMONT Over 7th% 14% 0 to $1,500 
VT. STAT. ANN. 9 § 41 8 § 2223 
(Equity Publishing Co.) (1971) (1971) 
VIRGINIA Over 8% 30% 0 to $300 
18% $300 to $1 ,000 
VA. CODE § 6.1-319 § 6.1-272 
(Michie Co.) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
WASHINGTON Over 12% 36% 0 to $300 
18% $300 to $500 
12% $500 to $1,000 
WASH. REV. CODE 19.52.020 31.08.160 
ANN. 
(West & Bancroft-Whitney (Supp. 1971) (1961) 
WEST VIRGINIA Over 8% 36% 0 to $200 
24% $200 to $600 
18% $600 to $800 
W.VA. CODE § 47-6-5 § 47-7A-13 
(Michie Co.) (Supp. 1972) (1966) 
WISCONSIN Over 12% 18% 0 to $500 
12% $500+ 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 138.05 422.201 
(West) (Supp. 1972) (Supp. 1972) 
WYOMING Over 7o/o 36% 0 to $300 
21% $300 to $1,000 
15% $1,000+ 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 13-477 § 40-3-508 
(Michie Co.) (supp. 1971) (Supp. 1971) 
UNIFORM NIA 18% 0 to $300 
CONSUMER CREDIT 
CODE 
12% $300 to $1,000 · 
8% $1,000+ 
Working Draft No. 6 (1967) § 3.508 Alt. A 
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STATE USURY 
UNIFORM N/A 
.CONSUMER CREDIT 
CODE 
Working Draft No.6 (1967) 
[Vol. 11:171 
MAXIMUM RATE 
36% 0 to $300 
21% $300 to $1,000 
15% $1,000+ 
§ 3.508 Alt. B 
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Modern technology has made it possible to redistribute and intensify 
the natural sources of radiation found in the earth's crust. At the same 
time, it is now possible to produce devices that constitute new sources 
of radiation, and often such products are intended for use in the home. 
As a result, man (in fact, all life on earth) continually risks exposure to 
levels of radiation significantly higher than those that occur naturally. 
In testimony before the Senate, Dr. William H. Stewart, former 
Surgeon General of the United States, appropriately quoted the remarks 
of Dr. Donald Chadwick of the U.S. Public Health Service: 
Our knowledge of the biological effects of radiation has many 
gaps, but enough is known that practitioners ·Of medicine, dentistry, 
and public health should make every feasible effort to prevent or re-
duce all unnecessary radiation exposures. The size of the population 
at risk and the possible consequences of failure to take appropriate 
action are too great.' 
Dr. Stewart also offered the words of former Surgeon General Burney: 
In law the suspect is innocent until his guilt is proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In the protection of human health, such absolute 
proof often comes late. 
To wait for it is to invite disaster, or to suffer unnecessarily 
through long periods of time! 
Dr. Stewart himself went on to say: 
The principal objective of the Public Health Service and other 
public and private organizations interested in radiation protection is 
to prevent exposure of the population to unnecessary radiation and 
to reduce to a minimum the exposures that may be necessary for 
medical and other beneficial ,applications:3 
This comment is presented in the belief that no one can, or should, 
seriously question that there are severe consequences attached to any 
significant increases in the radiation levels of our environment, and 
that as a general principle, zealous efforts are in order to insure that 
mankind, individually and collectively, is not exposed to radiation levels 
significantly higher than those found in nature. 
I. Hearings o11 S. 2067 Before the Se11ate Com~. 011 Commerce, ';lOth Cong .•. l.st Sess., pt . t, at 
83 (1%7), [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Heartn!JS]. Dr. Chadwtck had ortgmally made this 
statement while addressing the 1%4 Congress _of Environmental Health. . 
2. !d. This statement was originally made m an address to the 1958 Nattonal Pollution Confer-
ence. 
3. ld. 
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As its title suggests, this comment is directed primarily to an exami-
nation of the legal controls on the emission of X-rays from television 
receivers~ There are, of course other electronic products produced for 
use in the home that emit radiation of one kind or another. However, of 
all the electronic products considered capable of emitting hazardous 
radiation, television receivers are the most widespread and represent 
the greatest potential source of exposure for the public in this Country. 
This is made evident by noting that there were about 24,000,000 color 
television receivers alone in use in this country by 1970, a number rep-
resenting eight times the total of all other such products "selected" for 
counting by the Bureau of Radiological Health: 
It should further be noted that the 24 million television sets pro-
duced before January 15, 1970 were not subject to Federal radiation 
emission controls. These sets were particularly susceptible to maladjust-
ment, both by the user and by slipshod repairmen, that could result in 
excessive emissions. Moreover, it will be shown that sets produced sub-
sequently under Federal controls, while not as susceptible to misadjust-
ment, are still capable of emitting excessive radiation as a result of 
component failures or modifications by unwary servicemen. Thus, it is 
appropriate to consider the effectiveness of federal controls, and the 
need for similar state legislation in order to insure the complete protec-
tion of the public from electronic product radiation. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
In November, 1966, the "discovery" that color television sets manu-
factured by General Electric were emitting significant levels of X-radia-
. tion received widespread publicity.6 Considerable alarm was generated 
by this discovery, but the alarm was typically short-lived, and it abated 
soon after "health authorities" assured the public that no hazards to 
the public were presented by the situation? 
Ultimately, General Electric "corrected" approximately 90,000 sets 
already in use by the public. While the levels of radiation emitted by 
these sets were not widely publicized, the conclusion that General Elec-
tric thought the levels at least moderately dangerous seems inescapable 
4. The problem of radiation from television receivers first surfaced in connection with color 
receivers; however, as will be discussed below in the text, black-and-white sets may also be capable 
of emitting X-radiation. 
5. M essage From the President of the United S tates Transmitting the First Annual R eport on 
the Administration of the Radiation Control for H ealth and Safety A ct of 1968, H.R. Doc. No. 
91 -126, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 40 (1969). 
6. 1967 Senate Hearings. supra note I , at 3. 
7. /d. 
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in view of the fact that General Electric corrected these sets at a cost to 
itself of "several million dollars.'18 - - -
In testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee, Mr. Ralph 
Nader stated that he considered it "gross negligence at the very least" 
that General Electric had subjected assembly line technicians to exces-
sive radiation from these sets during their manufacture? 
. Is it likely, then, that television receivers are capable of emitting 
radiation which might in fact be harmful to human health? 
A. A BIRIEF TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION 
It has long been known as a general principle of physics that elec-
tromagnetic radiation is emitted by any process involving the accelera-
tion of charged particles~0 The frequency (and energy level) of radiation 
thus produced depends on the acceleration imparted to the particles; 
i.e., the greater the acceleration, the greater the intensity and range of 
possible frequencies of the resulting radiation. 
Vacuum tubes operate on the principle that electrons (negatively 
charged particles) are accelerated from one element, the cathode, to 
another element, the anode. The process of accelerating the electrons 
from the cathode produces some radiation, but the acceleration at this 
point is relatively gradual; the resulting radiation is of fairly low fre-
quency, and consequently is of little significance. On the other hand, 
when the electrons reach the anode they are abruptly decelerated. In 
effect, this deceleration also represents a rapid acceleration, in the 
opposite direction. If the voltage applied between the cathode and the 
anode is increased, the electrons will be made to travel at a greater rate 
of speed, and hence will decelerate to a greater extent upon striking the 
anode. Thus, the higher the voltage applied, the more likely it will be 
that radiation will be produced. 
In a general sense, then, X-radiation may be produced wher~ elec-
trons, accelerated at a sufficiently high voltage, strike the surface of any 
material which causes them to quickly decelerate. The anode of a va-
cuum tube is usually made of metal and, if approximately 30,000 volts 
or more are applied, the electrons striking this metal surface could 
cause the tube to emit X-radiation. 
8. Letter to Senator E.L. Bartlett from General Electric Co., dated May 31, 1968; reported in 
Hearings 011 S. 2067, S. 3211, a11d H.R. 10~90 Befo~e the Se11ate Comm. 011 Commerce, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 936, 937 (1 968), [heremafter c1ted as 1968 Senate H earings ]. 
9. /d. at 753. 
10. The material herein may be authenticated by referring toR. EISBERG, FUNDAMENTALS 
OF MODERN PHYSICS, Ch. 14, "X-R~ys" {1961_); See App~ndix T-:vo for a brief glossary of tech-
nical terms used in this comment. Also mcl uded m Appendix Two IS a short note on the nature 
and various forms of electromagnetic radiation. 
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High intensity X-rays, of a narrow frequency band, may also be 
produced by a second, more complicated, process. This process depends 
largely on the type of material which acts to decelerate the moving elec-
trons. For instance, the use of particular types of metal in making va-
cuum tube anodes could result in their emitting radiation of this sort. 
Most television receivers utilize a number of vacuum tubes. Indeed, 
the picture tube is a type of vacuum tube although it has no anode, at 
least not in the same sense as have other tubes. Instead, the electrons 
projected in a picture tube are decelerated when they strike the inside 
surface of the picture screen (which is a glass surface coated with phos-
phors that emit light when struck by the electron beam). Nonetheless, 
the basic process is the same in all tubes, and picture tubes have the 
same potential capability of producing X-rays as do tubes with metal 
anodes. 
A picture tube normally operates at a relatively high voltage and, in 
order to provide it with the level of power it requires to function, the 
television must include a special high-voltage supply circuit. This circuit 
typically includes other tubes which also operate at high voltage levels 
(e.g., the high-voltage rectifier tube and the high-voltage shunt regula-
tor tube). In black-and-white receivers, the voltage applied to the pic-
ture tube ranges from approximately 12,000 to 24,000 volts, while in 
color sets it ranges from around 24,000 volts to 32,000 volts. 
The high-voltage power supplies in many television sets are capable 
of being adjusted- or, perhaps, misadjusted. Such adjustment is often 
made possible by design, by incorporating variable resistors in the high-
voltage circuit. Misadjustment of a black-and-white television can raise 
the picture tube voltage to around 30,000, and in color sets, misadjust-
ment can result in much higher voltage levels, well within the range 
sufficient to cause the emission of X-rays. 
Since black-and-white televisions would have to be grossly misad-
justed before the picture tube supply voltage could reach the 30,000 
volt range, hazardous radiation from these sets, while possible in theory, 
is not at all likely. In fact no instances have been reported where this 
has occurred. In color sets, however, the high-voltage circuit may oper-
ate normally within this range, and potentially hazardous X-radiation, 
emitted from both picture tubes and other high-voltage tubes, has been 
detected on a number of occasions.I 1 This has often been due to mis-
adjustment or defective components in the high-voltage circuit. 
11. Supplemental Hearings on H.R. 10790 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare 
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 17-19 
(1968), [hereinafter cited as 1968 Supplemental Hearings]. 
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It is interesting to note that Roentgen discovered X-radiation in 
1895 while experimenting with a d.evice similar to a picture tube (in 
which electrons were decelerated by striking a glass surface). Knowing 
this, television manufacturers should certainly have been aware of the 
potential X-ray producing capabilities of their products at an early 
stage in their development. This should have led the manufacturers to 
ascertain the extent of possible hazards, especially insofar as misadjust-
ment and componant malfunctions were readily foreseeable. 
It is important to recognize that whether or not X-rays are emitted 
under certain conditions may depend on a number of other factors 
besides the voltage used to accelerate electrons, and the nature of the 
material which they strike. For the purposes of this discussion, however, 
it must be kept in mind that the use of particular materials and higher 
voltage levels in television tubes may substantially increase the likeli-
hood that they will emit X-radiation. 
B. THE NATURE OF THE1HAZARD 
In order to assess the potential hazards created by the emission of 
X-rays from television receivers, it is necessary to consider briefly ·the 
biological effects of exposure to various levels of radiation. In 1959, the 
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)I 2 
recommended that the emission rate at a distance of 5 em (about two 
inches) from any outer surface of a home television receiver should not 
exceed 0.5 milliroentgen (mr) per hour.13 A maximum annual exposure 
to members of the general public of 500mr has also been recognized as 
an acceptable standard for the protection of health! 4 
12. The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) was established 
in 1929 as the result of a cooperative effort between the radiological and medical organizations 
existing at the time, and the National Bureau of S~andards. The NC:RP is a private, non-profit 
organization similar to the National_Academy of Sc1e~ces_. but operatl_ng on ~ smaller scale. It is 
certified by Federal Charter. For a hst of NCRP publications concernmg vanous problems invol-
ving radiation, see 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 385, 386 . . 
13. 1967 Senate Hearings. supra note 1, at 363; 1968 Senate Heanngs, supra note 8, at 675-678. 
The roentgen (r) is a basic unit of radi_atio!l which is defined in_ te:rns of the energy lost by . radi-
ation as it passes through air. When cons1den_ng the effects of rad1a~10~ on human health a differ-
ent measure is often used, the roentgen equ1valent man (rem). Th1s IS defined as the amount of 
any type of radiation which, when absorbed by ~an, will produc~ the s_ame biol~gica~ effects as the 
absorption of one roentgen of gamma or X-rad1at1on. When d1scussmg the bwlog1cal effects of 
X-rays, then, these two measures would be equivalent. (To avoid co~f~siof!. only the roentgen mea-
sure will be used in this discussion.) The rate of exposure to radmtwn 1s usually considered by 
using the standard roentgens per hour (r/ hr). See A. MELISSINOS, EXPERIMENTS IN MOD-
ERN PHYSICS at 143 (1966). 
14. Hearings on the Administration of the Radia~ion Control For Health and Safety Act of 1968 
(public Law 90·602) Before the Subcomm. on Puhilc Health and Welfare of the House Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 283 0969), [hereinafter cited as 1969 
House Hearings). 
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Imagine a hypothetical viewer who watches three hours of television 
a day from a set held in his lap. If the set conforms to the NCRP stan-
dard, our viewer will receive about SSOmr of radiation in a year. Of 
course, such a viewer would obviously represent a very small portion of 
the population. Most people presumably watch from a distance of at 
least three feet, so the dosages received should be much smaller on the 
average than that incurred ,by our hypothetical viewer. Thus, the stan-
dard at 5 em is set on the assumption that dosages at greater distances 
would be safe. 
Nevertheless, It is interesting (if not frightening) to note that in one 
experiment in which a General Electric color television was operated 
with a defective high-voltage shunt regulator tube (but otherwise under 
normal conditions), the following X-ray emission levels were measured: 
1. 640 mr/ hr at a distance of 331;2 inches (85 em.) below the 
anode of the shunt regulator tube, after passing through a simulated 
apartment floor and ceiling, and 
2. 83,200 mr/hr at the surface of the floor, 12114 inches (31 em.) 
below the tube anode. 
3. Calculations show that the exposure rate near the underside 
of the receiver at the ventilating louvers would be at least 800,000 
mr/ hr, 4 inches (10 em.) below the tube anode.15 
This last figure indicates an exposure of a whopping 800 roentgens 
per hour! A dose of from 450 to 600 roentgens to the whole body will in 
most cases cause serious injury or death within a few weeks, if the expo-
sure was received within a short period of time!6 Symptoms such as 
nausea and vomiting usually occur within 24 hours. These may be fol-
lowed by a feeling of well-being lasting a few days, then severe prostra-
tion, diarrhea, fever, loss of hair, and tachycardia (rapid heartbeat) 
which may last for weeks. 
Even if the person recovers, new symptoms (such as cancer) may 
occur at a later date! 7 Transient effects would occur with much lower 
doses of SO to 100 roentgens delivered within a short period of time~8 
Chronic low dosage over a long period of time, such as one might 
receive from a television receiver, produces less dramatic results!9 · 
IS. 1967 Senate Hearings. supra note 1, at 189. 198-200. 
16. A. MELISSINOS, EXPERIMENTS IN MODERN PHYSICS at 147 (1966). 
17. See G. HUTTON. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ON IONIZING RADIATION at 26 (1966). 
18. /d. at 27. 
19. Chronic low radiation dosages may produce unusually dry skin, chapping, loss ·of hair, 
warts. slow healing of skin injuries, brittle fingernails , blurred or blunted fingerprints, cataracts ?f 
the eye, sterility , changes in blood composition (the most common being leukemia), and genetic 
defects . /d. at 27, 28. 
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Under certain conditions, a clear relationship has been demonstra-
ted between leukemia and prior radiation exposure. For example, 
leukemia has occurred after acute exposures of 100 to 500 roentgens to 
the whole body; after acute doses, possibly as low as 2 to 5 roentgens, to 
the fetus; and after doses greater than 100 roentgens to the neck region 
of children:0 
The biological inheritance mechanism is probably the most sensitive 
to radiation because human genes are affected by almost any radiation 
that reaches the reproductive cells, causing mutations which are passed 
onto succeeding generations. Because all of us are subjected to natural 
background radiation, an unavoidable number of so-called "sponta-
neous" mutations occur continually. Anything that adds radiation 
above this background level, though, may be considered genetically 
harmful. There is no minimum level of exposure which must be ex-
ceeded before some damage will result. Any amount of radiation that 
reaches the reproductive cells can cause a corresponding number of 
mutations; the more radiation the more mutations~' Moreover, the 
effects of radiation are cumulative, and the amount of organic damage 
continues to build up as more radiation is received. 
Taking the population as a whole, a little radiation to a lot ofpeople 
over a long time span can be considered more harmful than a lot of 
radiation to a few. While the total number of mutant genes may be the 
same in both cases, they are more likely to survive and affect future 
generations in the former. This is because a lot of radiation may either 
kill directly those exposed, or it may cause such serious mutations that 
their offspring will not survive, and hence the mutant inheritance line 
will quickly die out.22 
It is certainly possible that some individuals could receive danger-
ously large doses of X-radiati<;>n from television sets. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that a child sleeps in the upper bunk of a bunk bed, and· that a 
color set with a defective high-voltage shunt regulator tube is located 
directly above on the next floor. If the child goes to bed at 8:00 p.m. 
and the television is operated nightly between 8:00 and 11:00 p.m., it is 
conceivable, from the results of the experiment cited above, that the 
child would be exposed to almost 2 roentgens in a single evening. This 
would amount to over 700 roentgens in the course of a year. Remember 
that the recognized health standard is set at a maximum exposure of 
20. 1967 Senate Hearings. supra note 1, at 375. 
21. The average exposure to the gonads over a thirty year period would be about 4.3 r from 
background radiation, 3 r from medical X-rays and tluroscopy, and O.J r from the residual radia-
tion from nuclear weapons tests. The average dental X-ray causes an exposure to the gonads of 
about 1/ 5,000 r. See id. at 381. 
22. /d. at 380, 381. 
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only 500 mil/iroentgens, or only one-half of a roentgen per year. The· 
sleeping child has thus been exposed to 1,400 times the amount of radi-
ation which is considered safe. 
Nonetheless, it has been argued by a number of independent experts 
that no hazard exists with radiation from color TV sets. For example, 
Dr. Hanson Blatt, director of Radiological Control, New York City 
Health Department, in April of 1969 stated: 
... X-radiation is 'trivial' from color TV sets ... ; ... field testing of 
color TV sets for X-radiation would make about as much sense as 
pulling the Beligian stone blocks out of certain roads in the Bronx. 
[These blocks] emit 25 millirontge12s [sic] [of radiation] per year.23 
These remarks are typically conclusory. No analysis to support the con-
clusion is provided. (One might hote that radiation of 25 mr/year cor-
responds to approximately 0.003 mr/hour, a rate hardly comparable to 
the 0.5 mr/hr NCRP standard.) 
In 1968 Dr. V.P. Bond, Associate Director of the Brookhaven 
National Laboratory, had this to say: 
... [W]hile it is prudent to control and severely limit exposure to ra-
diation, . .. it is quite clear that the probability of significant or even 
detectable medical effects from X-rays emitted by faulty color televi-
sion receivers is vanishingly smalJ.24 
Dr. Robert D. Mosely, Jr., of the University of Chicago, also ob-
served: 
... [T]he biological risk of radiation from color television receivers is 
negligible . .. [B]ecause the quality of this radiation is such that it is 
absorbed in the first few millimeters of the skin and therefore is 
markedly or completely attenuated before it reaches the depth of the 
critical organs [gonads and bone marrow V5 
It thus appears that some experts do not agree that television sets 
present a potential radiation hazard, and they seem quite willing to 
adopt a "wait and see" approach, or discount the matter entirely. But 
it has been established that X-radiation is potentially dangerous to 
health, and it seems reasonable to assume that X-radiation from TV 
23. 1969 House Hearings. supra note 14, at 282. 
24. Excerpt from a letter dated February 20, 1968, written by Dr. V.P. Bond, Associate Direc· 
tor. Brookhaven National Laboratory, reproduced in 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at. 678. 
25. Excerpt from a letter dated May 3, 1968, written by Dr. Robert D. Mosely , Jr. , Professor 
and Chairman of the Department of Radiology, University of Chicago, reproduced in 1968 Senate 
Hearings. supra note 8, at 680. 
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sets may present some hazard. It seems foolhardy then, to adopt such 
an attitude when the consequences may be so grave, and while the solu-
tion may be quite simple. · 
II. RADIATION CONTROL FOR HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT 
OF 1968 
Subsequent to the General Electric episode in 1966, a study was 
conducted by the Suffolk County Department of Health in New York~6 
This study, conducted in 1967, surveyed approximately 5,000 color tele-
vision sets, and found that 20% of these were emitting radiation in ex-
cess of the 0.5 mr/hr standard established by the National Council on 
Radiation Protection and Measurements. The study was widely publi-
cized, and it quickly aroused the interest of the Federal Government. 
The first bill submitted to Congress concerning this problem was intro-
duced on July 10, 1967 by Senator Bartlett of Alaska~7 Subsequently 
two other bills were introduced, one in each House.28 
A series of hearings. was conducted in both the House and the Sen-
ate.Z9 Testimony was heard from members of the Federal, state, and 
local governments, the scientific community, the electronics industry, 
professional trade associations, labor unions, and from other indivi-
duals. The purpose of the hearings, in the words of Senator Bartlett, 
was to 
. .. gain an overview of the wide and growing range of devices which 
utilize or give off ionizing or other types of radiation, to learn what 
health hazards might be involved, and to devise an effective program 
for surveillance and control:W 
On October 18, 1968, Congress enacted the Radiation Control for 
Health and Safety Act of 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)?1 
A. PROVISIONS OF THE A'CT 
The declared purpose of the Act is to insure " ... that the public 
health and safety . . . be protected from the dangers of electronic pro-
duct radiation." 32 
26. 1969 House Hearings. supra note 14, at 276. 
27. S. 2067, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
28. S. 3211, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 10790, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., (1967) . . 
29. 1967 Senate Hearings. supra note 1; 1968 Senate Heanngs. supra note 8; Heanngs on H .R. 
10790 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare of the House C?mm. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. , 1st Sess., (1967); 1968 Supplem ental Heanngs, supra note 11. 
30. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1. 
31. The Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1%8, Pub. L. No. 90-602; 82 Stat. 1173 
(1 %8); cod ified at 42 U.S.C. !;\263b et seq. 
32. 42 u.s.c. § 263b (1971). 
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The Act defines an "electronic product" as: 
(A) any manufactured or assembled product which, when in oper-
ation, (i) contains or acts as part of an electronic circuit and (ii) emits 
(or in the absence of effective shielding or other controls would emit) 
electronic product radiation, or 
(B) any manufactured or assembled article which is intended for 
use as a component, part, or accessory of a product described in 
clause (A) and which when in operation emits (or in the absence of 
effective shielding or other controls would emit) such radiation?3 
This definition clearly includes not only television receivers, micro-
wave ovens, and X-ray machines used in medicine and science, but 
would also encompass all products which might purposefully or inci-
dently emit radiation, including those which may be introduced in the 
future. 
"Electronic product radiation" is defined as "any ionizing or non-
ionizing electromagnetic or particulate radiation" and as "any sonic, 
infrasonic or ultrasonic radiation . . . . " 34 
The Act directs the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
(hereinafter referred to as the Secretary) to establish and carry out an 
electronic product radiation control program. Under this program, the 
Secretary is to "plan, conduct, coordinate, and support research, devel-
opment, tra ining and operational activities to minimize the emissions 
of ... unnecessary electronic product radiation ... " 35 
In hearings before the House Subcommitte on Public Health and 
Welare, which was considering the administration of the Act, the Direc-
tor of the Bureau of Radiological Health reported on the Bureau's "X-
Radiation Control Programs in the Color Television Industry." 36 This 
report states that under the program's objectives, factory visits by 
Bureau staff members gave them the opportunity to " . .. review efforts 
being made in the design of current and future models of receivers for 
the reduction of X-ray emissions .. . [and] to review servicing procedures 
recommended by the manufacturer for receivers currently on the mar-
ket .... " 37During these hearings several witnesses were questioned about 
the possibilities of developing "fail-safe" systems to prevent dangerous 
component malfunctions and of eliminating any need for repairmen to 
"adjust" the high voltage circuits in television receivers:8It is apparent 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 263c(2) (1 97 1). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 263c(l) (1971); See Glossary, Append ix Two. 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 263d(a)(2) (1971). 
36. 1969 House Hearings. supra note 14, at 23. 
37. /d. at 25. 
38. /d. at 286-289. 
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that these legislators considered component failures and shoddy repair 
practices to be major causes of hazardous television emissions. It is 
thus also apparent that the Act was intended to encompass these prob-
lems. 
Under the Act, the Secretary is also required to report to Congress 
the results of various studies conducted from time to time as he may 
find necessary, with recommendations for appropriate legislation~9 The 
Secretary is also required to conduct studies into the feasibility of enter-
ing 
. .. into arrangements with individual States or groups of States to 
define their respective functions and responsibilities for the control 
of electronic product radiation and other ionizing radiation .. . . 40 
Furthermore, the Secretary is to prescribe radiation level "perfor-
mance standards" for electronic products (presumably on a product-by-
product basis) when deemed necessary for the protection of public 
health and safety (the first such standard was to be set prior to January 
1' 1970).41 
Electronic products intended solely for export are exempted from 
such performance standards so long as they meet the standards--if 
any--of the importing country.42 
The Act also provides for the judicial review of the performance 
standards imposed in the case of an "actual controversy." 43 
Every electronic product marketed in the United States which is 
subject to such a performance standard must bear a written certifica-
tion that it conforms to that standard. This certification by the manu-
facturer must be based on either (1) a test of the individual item, or (2) 
a testing program " ... which ,is in accord with good manufac~uring 
practice and which hasjnotjbeenjdisapprovedjbyJthe JSecretary . . . .'' 441The 
obvious purpose of such certification is to insure that no television re-
ceiver or other product is sold which emits radiation in excess of the 
prescribed standard. 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 263e{a) {1971). 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 263e{a){1){F) {1971). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 263f(a){1) {1971). These pe~formance standards are to be imposed .in the form of 
Federal Regulations, and they may be found m 42.C.F.R. § 78 et seq .. The Act requtres the Secre-
tary to appoint a 15 member "Technical Electrontc Product Safety Standards Committee" and to 
consult this Committee before prescribing any new performance standards. 42 U.S.C. § 263f(f). 
This Committee is to be composed of five m~mbers from each of; 1) governmental agencies, 2) the 
electronics industry, and 3) the general publtc. /d. 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 263f(a){3) {1971). 
43. 42 u.s.c. § 263f(d){l) {1971). 
44_ 42 u.s.c. § 263f{h) {1971). 
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In the event that a manufacturer discovers a radiation defect in a 
product after it leaves his possession, which defect would indicate non-
compliance with the performance standard, he is required to notify 
immediately the Secretary of such, as well as any distributor, dealer, or 
consumer to whom the product has been delivered~5 However, the Sec-
retary may exempt the manufacturer from his duty to notify distribu-
tors, dealers, and consumers if the defect is deemed not to create a 
"significant" risk of injury to any person~6 Of course, the Secretary may 
determine from his own investigation that certain products do not meet 
the established standards. 
Failure to comply with these provisions may subject the manufac-
turer to several liabilities:17 For one thing, he is required to correct or 
replace, at his own expense, any items sold which do not conform to the 
performance standards~8 This would not apply, however, with respect to 
products manufactured prior to the effecitve date of the Act.49 
All imported products are subject to the same performance stan-
dards as are domestic products, and must likewise bear a certification 
of compliance.50 Nonconforming products can be denied entry into the 
United States. 
Furthermore, it is unlawful to violate any provision of the Ace
1
and 
offenders are subject to a civil penalty of not . more than $1,000 per 
violation, the maximum penalty being $300,000 for a series of related 
45. 42 u.s.c. § 263g (1971). 
46. 42 U.S.C. § 263g(aXI) (1971). 
47. In theory at least, the manufacturer of an electronic product that emits harmful radiation 
could be held civilly liable in tort for any injury caused to a user of the product. Depending on the 
jurisdiction in which such an action is brought, the manufacturer might be sued on theories of 
strict liability for defective product (see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2d, § 402 A), negligence, 
breach of warranty, or, if the product failed to conform to a performance standard applicable to 
it, negligence per se. See generally PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, ch. 19, at 658-696 (3d Ed., 
1964). Whatever theory is used, however, the injured party will have to show some causal link be-
tween the radiation defect in the product and the physical harm suffered. In that the effects of 
chronic low-level exposures to radiation are typically long range, and may not manifest themselves 
for years, the aggrieved party will bear an almost impossible burden in showing that his injury was 
caused by this product, and not by some other source of radiation. Moreover, he will likely have to 
show that the radiation defect existed in the product at the time it left the manufacturer's posses-
sion. The manufacturer will surely argue that the radiation was caused by a component that just 
"wore out", or by improper servicing of the product. 
In short , it seems unlikely that the manufacturer would be exposed to civil liability as a practi-
cal matter. As will be seen shortly, though, the manufacturer may well be subject to civil pernalties 
imposed by the Act. 
48. 42 u.s.c. § 263g(O (1971); 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 263g(g) (1971). While the Act became effective on October 18, 1968, (the date of 
its enactment), the Secretary did not begin prescribing performance standards until later. (The 
first set of standards were published on Dec. 25, 1969; 34 Fed. Reg. 20274.) Items manufactured 
after the effective date of the Act, but prior to the prescription of the performance standard appli-
cable to it, would obviously not have to conform to such standard. 
so. 42 u.s.c. § 263h (1971). 
51. 42 u.s.c. § 263j (1971). 
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violations~2Moreover, it does not appear that a violation must have been 
committed willfully or intentionally; ,the offender may be held strictly 
accountable for his conduct. Finally, the Federal District Courts are 
authorized to issue injunctions to restrain the distribution or sale of 
products which do not conform to the applicable performance 
standards.53 
Mention should also be made of one other potentially significant 
provision of the Act. As will be discussed below, the effective control of 
electronic product radiation may depend largely on state involvement. 
While the Act expressly precludes states from promulgating their own 
performance standards,54 it does authorize the Secretary 
to accept from State and local authorities engaged in activities 
related to health or safety or consumer protection ... any assistance 
in the administration and enforcement of this (Act) which he may 
request and which they may be able and willing to provide .... 55 
In short, the Act establishes a broad basis for Federal -State coopera-
tion. 
B. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ACT 
The Act states its basic purpose as being, in broad terms, to protect 
the public health and safety from the dangers of electronic product 
radiation.56 In order to assess the effectiveness of the Act in achieving 
this purpose, particularly with respect to television receivers, it may be 
helpful to discuss its provisions in terms of specific objectives. 
From the material presented above, the major objectives of the Act 
might be restated as being: 
1. to establish reasonable and safe standards for the maximum 
allowable radiation from electronic products; 
2. to prevent the sale or distribution in this Country, by domestic 
or foreign manufacturers, of electronic products that emit radiation in 
excess of the established standards; 
52. 42 u.s.c. § 263k(b)(I)(I97J). 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 263k(a) (1971). 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 263n (1971). The sta tes are allowed to in;p<?se their own performance standards, 
but only if such are idelltical to the Federal standards .. It ts Important to note, however, that the 
setting of performance standards is the only ~atter whtch Congress has expressly sought to pre· 
empt. Obstensibly, then, the states are left free to regulate other matters concerning electronic 
product radiation; e.g., repair practices. 
55. 42 U.S.C. §263m (1971). 
56. Note 32, supra. 
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3. to prevent electronic products in use by consumers from radia-
ting in excess of the standards as the result of componant malfunction; 
and 
4. to prevent electronic products in use by consumers from radia-
ting in excess of the standard as the result of improper repairs per-
formed on such products. 
C. 'THE EXPECTED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ACT 
1. The First Objective 
Presumably, the first objective is being accomplished by the Secre-
tary's promulgation of performance standards for the various types of 
electronic products covered by the Act.57 The standard which has been 
applied to television receivers is the same as was recommended by the 
NCRP in 1959; 0.5 mr per hour at 5 em from any surface of the receiv-
er.58 Apparently this standard was generally considered to be adequate 
at the time the Act was passed.59 However, evidence was introduced 
during the hearings on the Act which indicated that any given television 
receiver could be "corrected" in the home so that the radiation emitted 
by the set would be indistinguishable from the natural background 
radiation .60 
It might, then, be argued that while the NCRP standard is generally· 
accepted as a reasonable safety limit, it is still too high because it may 
be possible to eliminate virtually all X-radiation from television sets. 
Moreover, since the corrections could be made in the home, industry 
would seem hard-pressed in any efforts to resist a "no-more-than-black-
ground" standard at the time a set leaves the factory, and it would 
hardly be unreasonable to impose such a standard. 
57. The performance standards are published in the Code of Federal Regulations; see 42 C.F.R. 
§ 78.210 et. seq. 
58. 42 C.F.R. § 78.210(c) (1972). 
59. During the course of the hearings on the Act the NCRP standard was discussed on numer-
ous occasions. For the most part, comments critical of the standard tended to indicate that it is, if 
anything, too stringent. See, e.g., letter by Dr. V.P. Bond, supra note 24, and 1968 Senate Hear-
ings. supra note 8, at 670. It was apparently never suggested that this standard is inadequate as a 
measure of safety, although Ralph Nader did hint that the NCRP standard pertaining to X-ray 
machines might be weak. !d. at 736. 
60. In hearings before the House Subcommitte on Public Health and Welfare, Mr. Seymour 
Becker, Chief of the Radiation Control Unit of the Suffolk County (New York) Department of 
Health, discussed a door-to-door testing program conducted by his Unit. Home televisions were 
tested for excessive radiation and, when one was found to emit X-rays, a repairman was ca lled in 
to correct the set. Mr. Becker testified that: 
. .. when correcting the thousand sets, of that 5,000 that we surveyed, we were able 
to bring the levels of radiation down to natural background radiation . In other 
words, we didn't bring it down to 0.5 mr/ hr; we brought it down even furth er. 
/969 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 277, 278. 
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It should also be noted that, while the Act speaks generally about 
protection of the public from the dangers of electronic product radia-
tion, it also speaks about minimizing the exposure of people to "unnec-
essary electronic product radiation." 61This language seems to reflect the 
testimony of several witnesses at the hearings who suggested that any 
unnecessary exposure to radiation should be prevented.62 It is at least 
arguable, then, that Congress intended the Secretary to prescribe per-
formance standards which would prohibit any electronic product radia-
tion that is deemed to be "unnecessary", even though such is not likely 
to be hazardous. Assuming this to have been the case, the first objective 
of the Act can then be interpreted to mean that (1) if all radiation can-
not be (practicably) eliminated from a product, the amount radiated 
must be non-hazardous; and (2) if all the radiation from a product can 
be eliminated (or reduced to the level of background radiation), any 
detectable amount of radiation emitted by the product is therefore "un-
necessary" and should not be allowed. 
Under this interpretation, the first objective, as it applies to televi-
sion sets, may not have been achieved . If the evidence referred to above 
(at note 59) is accepted as being true, it is apparent that the perfor-
mance standard presently in effect for televisions does permit the mar-
keting of sets which emit "unnecessary" radiation, because such radia-
tion can be easily eliminated. 
2. The Second Objective 
Presumably the second objective of the Act has also been accomp-
lished. As mentioned before, the Act requires that every electronic 
product manufactured for sale in this County bear a label or tag certi -
fying that it conforms to the established standard ~3 The basis of such 
certification is, again, either the individual testing of each item pro-
duced, or" ... a testing program which is in accord with good manufac-
t . . "64 urmg practtce .... 
In reviewing the testimony given during the hearings on the Act 
concerning the problem of assuring that each item sold meets the stan-
dard, it is difficult not to conclude that the legislators gave too little 
attention to this problem, and that the witnesses (usually representing 
61. 42 U.S.C. § 263d(a)(2) (1971). (emphasis added) 
62. See. e.g .. language quoted in the text at notes 1 and 3, supra. 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 263flh) (1971); See also the corresponding regulations at 42 C.F.R. § 78.201 
(1972). 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 263flh) (1971); Note, as mentioned above at notes 27 and 28, three bills were 
submitted to Congress during 1967 and 1968 ~m the prob_le~ <;Jf elec_tromc product radiation . One 
of these. S. 3211, would have requi red the testm& of eac~ mdtvtdualttem manufactured which was 
subject to a performance standard . No alternative tes~mg program would have been authorized. 
(The text of S. 3211 is reproduced in 1968 Se!wte Hearmgs. supra note 8, at 410-417. The relevant 
provision is§ 357 (e), id. at 412). The Btll ultunately enacted was H.R. 10790. 
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industry) made little effort to explain the problem clearly. For example, 
prior to the promulgation of the standards (but after the Act had been 
passed), the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare held 
hearings on the administration of the Act.65 Testifying on the methods 
by which manufacturers would make certain that all items produced in 
an assembly line meet the standards, Mr. Edward Day, a lawyer repre-
senting the industry, described the "quality control procedure" used by 
manufacturers as a 
... random sampling, ... by established scientific methods ... where-
by what has been determined to be a proper and adequate sample is 
withdrawn at the end of the manufacturing process and is checked 
very thoroughly ... . 66 
This seemed to imply that a random sampling will suffice to insure that 
all items from a production line will be within the standard. 
The Subcommittee seemed to accept the sufficiency of "quality con-
trol testing" of the end product as portrayed by Mr. Day, in spite of the 
fact that this method was criticized in a written report submitted to the 
Subcommittee by the Bureau of Radiological Health earlier in the hear-
ing.67 No one raised this point in oral testimony before the Subcommit-
tee. 
It is submitted that the concept of quality control techniques as 
presented is less than completely clear. As a rule, random sampling 
techniques are not applied to assembled functional units (i.e., units that 
consist of many parts and are at a stage of assembly at which they can 
be operated).68 Generally, random sampling techniques are applied only 
to component parts as a means of increasing the likelihood that, upon 
assembly, the functional unit (into which the parts are installed) will 
operate satisfactorily for a predetermined period of time.69 It is clear, 
however, that if it is intended that none of the assembled television re-
ceivers radiate in excess of the standard, this goal should be considered 
as part of the operating criteria of the television receiver, and each set 
should thus be tested for radiation, just as each set is tested to see if the 
volume control, picture tube, etc., operate properly. Otherwise, the cer-
tification means no more than that within a certain probability a given 
television receiver conforms to the standard. 
65. 1969 House Hearings. supra note 14. 
66. /d. at 290. 
67. /d. at 30. 
68. Mil -H-2 17, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. MILITARY STANDARDIZATION HAND-
BOOK, RELIABILITY STRESS AND FAILURE RATE DATA FOR ELECTRONIC EQUIP-
MENT. at I (1962). . 
69. /d. 
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One might argue that the civil penalty imposed for selling a set not 
in conformance with the standard wii.I deter manufacturers from selling 
such receivers?0 However, it might be suggested that as the testing pro-
cedures used by a manufacturer must be approved by the Secretary (or 
at least "not disapproved")/ 1 the manufacturer may argue that non-
culpability in a given case may be established by this governmental 
'~approval". 
Thus it is possible that a manufacturer could employ an "approved" 
system of random sample testing which might insulate him from civil 
penalties, yet might nonetheless result in the production and sale of 
products which do not conform to the established standard. To this 
extent, then, the second objective is not achieved , in that potentially 
dangerous items could conceivably still be marketed. 
3. The Third and Fourth Objectives 
The third and fourth objectives of the Act, eliminating radiation in 
excess of the standard resulting from component failure and from the 
improper repair of television receivers, will be quite difficult to achieve 
because these objectives are inherently tied to the regulation of the re-
pair industry. The Act itself has no provision pertaining to these prob-
lems. However, the radiation control programs required under the Act 
(undertaken by the Bureau of Radiological Health) do address them-
selves to the problem of television repair.72 So far these programs have 
taken the approach that the manufacturer is responsible for the general 
service practices employed in repairing his product. The tendency has 
been to assume that the manufacturer, by controlling the design of the 
product and by disseminating the information needed by repairmen, 
can in effect control the activities of the repair industry.73 
On the other hand, perhaps the nature of the problem was not fully 
perceived by those conducting the hearings, and the witnesses may have 
been willing to allow the legislators to proceed on skimpy knowledge. In 
discussing the omission of variable resistors from high-voltage circuits 
as a means of preventing television repairmen from adjusting the volt-
age above the design limits (and thereby increasing radiation from the 
70. See text at note 52, supra. 
71. 42 u.s.c. § 263f(h) (1971). 
72. Such programs are required under Section 356 of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 263d), and are to be 
undertaken by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare: In initiating su~h programs , the 
Bureau of Radiological Health (an agency of the Department of Health, EducatiOn and Welfare) 
set out a number of objectives, one of which was to " .. . (6) review servicing procedures recom -
mended by the manufacturer for receivers currently on the market, ... . " 1969 House Hearings. 
supra note 14, at 25. 
73. See, X-RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM IN THE COLOR TELEVISION INDUS-
TRY-SUMMARY REPORT ON VISITS TO MANUFACTURERS, MAY 1968- DECEMBER 
1968, 1969 House Hearings. supra note 14, at 30-32 ("Observations" ). 
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set), the Committe members seemed to accept the notion that by simply 
eliminating the variable resistors the problem would be solved.74 They 
seemed to miss the significance of a brief statement made by an indus-
try representative to the effect that any repairman could easily replace a 
fixed resistor in order to change the voltage to the picture tube?5 In fact, 
a television serviceman can, and may actually, replace almost any com-
ponent of a receiver and thereby alter its preformance characteristics. 
It should be noted in this connection that the 24,000,000 color tele-
vision sets produced prior to 1970 76 are not subject to the performance 
standards promulgated by the Secretary.77 Moreover, it is very likely that 
many of these have by now seen numerous repairs. It cannot be over-
emphasized that the repair of television sets, especially those not manu-
factured under the requirements of the Act, should be closely regulated. 
The problem, of course, is how to regulate such repairs effectively. 
As has been seen, the regulation of television manufacturers may have 
little effect in most cases on repair activities. The apparent solution, 
then, would seem to be the regulation of the repair industry itself. 
Unlike the manufacturers, however, repairmen are not to be found in a 
few central locations where they can easily be watched over and com-
municated with. Instead, they are well dispersed throughout the entire 
Country and, as such, are not particularly good subjects for a nationally 
centralized regulatory program. As will be seen, however, the solution 
to this problem may be found at the state level of government. 
With respect to the problem of component malfunctions, similar 
considerations are involved. Unless a component is defective when it 
leaves the factory, it would seem that the repairman is in the best posi-
tion to recognize and replace a part that has gone bad. Again, this sug-
gests some form of regulation of the repair industry. This notion will be 
further developed in the following sections. 
III. CALIFORNIA LAWS RELATING TO RADIATION AND 
ELECTRONIC REPAIR DEALERS 78 
The foregoing material provides compelling reasons for concluding 
that the Act, in order to be effective, must be supplemented by pro-
grams at the state level. Congress recognized this and provided that the 
74. 1969 House Hearings. supra note 14, at 286, 287. 
75. /d. at 287. line 9. It should be pointed out that, by increasing the voltage to the picture tube, 
a better quality picture can often be achieved. Thus , repairmen may be inclined to perform such 
adjustments, rather than telling their customers that they need a new picture tube. 
76. See text at note 5, supra. 
77. 42 C.F.R. § 78.210 (a) (1972). 
78. The laws of this State wi ll be exami ned in order to depict the desired role of every state in 
helping to achieve the Federal objectives. 
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Federal agency administering the Act can accept assistance from state 
and local agencies in its administration and enforcement?9 Moreover, 
the studies required under the Act are to give attention to the feasibility 
of authorizing the Secretary 
. .. to enter into arrangements with individual states or groups of 
states to define their respective functions and responsibilities for the 
control of electronic product radiation ... . so 
Such agreements are not only authorized, but in a sense are also re-
quired by the Act. 
California has enacted two laws, both of which touch upon the areas 
covered by the Act. However, in their present form, these laws do not 
complement this Federal law. 
In 1961, California enacted the Radiation Control Law,81 which was 
intended to supplement the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.82 Then in 
1963, California passed the Electronic Repair Dealer Registration LaJ3 
which was designed to regulate business practices in the electronic 
repair industry. 
A. The Radiation Control Law 
The Radiation Control Law basically provides for a regulatory pro-
gram to control ionizing radiation. The purpose of the Radiation Con-
trol Law is to create _progr~ms that: 
(a) Effectively regulate sources of ionizing radiation for the protection 
of the occupational and public health and safety. 
(b) Promote an orderly regulatory pattern within the State, among 
the states, and between the Federal government and the State, and 
facilitate inter-governmental co-operation with respect to use and 
regulation of sources of ionizing radiation to the end that duplication 
of regulation may be minimized . 
(c) Establish procedures for assumption and performance of certain 
regulatory responsibilities with respect to byproduct, source, and 
special nuclear materials. 
(d) Permit maximum utilization of sources of ionizing radiation con-
sistent with the health and safety of the publ ic.84 
Ionizing radiation is defined by this law as meaning " ... gamma 
rays and X-rays; alpha and beta particles, high-speed electrons, 
79. See notes 40 and 55, supra, and accompanying text. 
80. Note 40, supra. 
81. Cal. Stats. 1961. c. 17 11; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25800 etseq. (West 1967). 
82. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25802 (West 1967), and§ 25856 (West Supp. 1973). 
83. Cal. Stats. 1963, c. 1492; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 9800 et seq. (West 1964). 
84. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25802 (West 1967). 
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neutrons, protons, and other nuclear particles; but not sound or radio 
waves, or visible, infrared, or ultraviolet light."85A spearate definition of 
non-ionizing radiation is not provided, nor is there any provision for its 
regulation. 
The administration of this law is assigned to the State Department 
of Health and Safety86(hereinafter referred to as the Department). Note 
that subsections (b) and (c). of the above quoted provision indicate that 
the State should engage in co-operative programs with other states and 
the Federal Government, and assume certain regulatory responsibili-
ties which might be delegated to it by the Federal Government. It is 
,provided that the Governor has the authority to enter into such agree-
ments with Federal agencies, but the agreements must be ratified by 
law.87 The Department is also authorized to agree with the Federal 
Government, as well as with other states and interstate agencies, to de-
velop co-operative programs of inspection (of potential sources of radia-
tion).88 At the present time this law contains the provisions of an agree-
ment between California and the Atomic Energy Commission under 
which certain regulatory functions of the AEC are taken over by the 
State.89 
The Radiation Control Law further authorizes the institution of 
training programs by the Department or other State agencies, in order 
to secure qualified personnel to carry out the provisions of the law. 
Such trained personnel may be made available for use by the Federal 
Government, other states, or interstate agencies?<> The significance of 
this will be discussed in a later section. 
A number of rules are imposed by the Radiation Control Law for 
regulating sources of ionizing radiation. For the purposes of this discus-
sion, though, these rules need not be considered in detail. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that this law pertains only to ionizing radiation . 
Since X-rays produced by television receivers are a form of ionizing 
radiation, it is possible that this law would apply to such products if it 
were to be construed along certain lines.91 It would not apply, however, 
85. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25805(b) (West Supp. 1973); See Glossary, Appendix 
Two. 
86. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 25810, 25811 (West Supp. 1973). 
87. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25830 (West 1967). 
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25835 (West 1967). 
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 25875,25876 (West 1967). 
90. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25836 (West 1967). 
91. As mentioned previously in the text at note 82, supra, this law was intended to supplement 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This would seem to indicate that its primary intended purpose 
was to control ionizing radiation produced by radioactive materials. This mi~ht explain in part 
why sources of non-ionizing radiation are not covered . In any event, no mention of televisions is 
made in this law (although this may be due to the fact that the problem of television emissions was 
not recognized until a few years after this law was enacted), but the law's reference to the "sources" 
of ionizing radiation does seem broad enough to include television sets. 
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to many potentially hazardous sources of non-ionizing radiation, such 
as microwave ovens,92 for example. It might be interesting to recall that 
the Federal Act does purport to regulate sources of non-ionizing radia-
tion?3 
It will be suggested below how a state law, similar to California's 
Radiation Control Law, might be amended so as to provide more effec-
tive protection from hazardous radiation, and thereby also help to 
achieve the objectives of the Federal Act. 
B. The Electronic Repair Dealer Registration Law 
The Electronic Repair Dealer Registration Law was enacted primar-
ily for the purpose of regulating business practices in the repair indus-
try. Under this law, a repair or "service dealer" is defined as any 
... person who, for compensation, engages in the business of repair-
ing, servicing, or maintaining television, radio, or audio or video 
recorders or playback equipment normally used or sold for use in the 
home or in private motor vehicles.94 
The administration and enforcement of this law is assigned to the 
Director of the Bureau of Repair Services (hereinafter referred to re-
spectively as the Director and the Bureau), which is itself within the 
California Department of Consumer Affairs.95 
The Director is vested with the authority to establish regulations for 
the conduct of service dealers, for the administration of the law, and for 
the general protection of the public from improper business practices?<' 
The Director is also required to prepare an annual roster of all regis-
tered service dealers. Copies of this roster are to be made available to 
the public?7 Every service dealer in the State is required to register with 
the Bureau;8 and a failure to do so may be punished as a misdemeanor;'l 
The Electronic Repair Dealer Registration Law makes no provision 
for regulating repair practices which might affect a given product's 
capability of emitting harmful radiation. The possibility of amending 
this law to cover such problems will be discussed below. 
92. See Microwave Ovens: Not R ecommended, CONSUMER'S REPORTS, April 1973, at 221. 
93. See the definition of "electronic product radiation" used by the Federal Act, in the text at 
note 34. supra. 
94. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 980l(g) (West Supp. 1973); Note: effective June 30, 1973, 
this provision will also include persons who repair, etc. "any appliances". Cal. Stats. 1972, c. 1288, 
p. . § 2.5. 
95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 9810 (West Supp. 1973). 
96. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 9814 (West 1964). 
97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 9815 (West 1964). 
98. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§ 9830 (West Supp. 1973). 
99. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE§§ 9840, 9850 (West 1964). 
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE LAWS 
State laws similar to the two described above could very likely pro-
vide a suitable basis for extending the purpose and effect of the Federal 
Act. Under California's Radiation Control Law, the State Department 
of Public Health should by now have achieved some expertise in evalua-
ting radiation hazards; and under the Electronic Repair Dealer Regis-
tration Law, repair practices have been brought under direct State con-
trol. Appendix One to this comment contains proposals for amending 
these laws so that they will conform to and supplement the Federal Act, 
and help to accomplish the objectives of protecting the public from 
electronic product radiation resulting from faulty components and im-
proper repair practices. These laws, as they appear in their proposed 
forms, might serve as models for other states which presently have no 
similar legislation. 
Under the proposed amendments, electronic product radiation, as 
defined in the Federal Act, would be brought under the control of the 
State Public Health Department. The Department would be required to 
establish programs, possibly in co-operation with the State Bureau of 
Electronic Repair Dealer Registration, for the regu lation of electronic 
product radiation. Such programs should, following the precepts of the 
Federal Act, include the promulgation of rules or regulations to be 
observed by electronic repair dealers in servicing electronic products 
capable of emitting radiation. The program should also include the 
compilation and dissemination of information regarding potentially 
hazardous or defective components available on the market or already 
in use by consumers. 
The adopted rules or regulations could be published and enforced 
by the Bureau of Electronic Repair Dealer Registration. In the repair of 
television sets, for example, repairmen could be required to: 
1. Check the high-voltage, and if necessary adjust or reset it to its 
prescribed level; 
2. Check certain components (such as the high-voltage shunt re-
gulator and rectifier tubes) to assure that any parts known to be hazar-
dous, as indicated by manufacturers' bulletins and those of the State 
Department of Public Health or of the Federal Government, are imme-
diately replaced (at manufacturer's cost, as required by the Federal Act) 
with non-hazardous components; and 
3. Check that all shielding on the set is in place as required by 
the manufacturer. 
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The program would also include the establishment of facilities and 
procedures for assuring that the equipment used by electronic repair 
dealers is properly maintained and calibrated. 
Such a scheme, properly administered, could easily result in the 
effective reduction of radiation hazards in electronic products resulting 
from component failures, or from improper repairs of these products. 
It should be noted that under the Federal Act, the Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare is allowed to make grants to public 
agencies in order to " . . . plan, conduct, coordinate, and support ... " 
the training of personnel, and to "develop, test, and evaluate the effec-
.tiveness of procedures and techniques for minimizing the exposure to 
electronic product radiation .... "HXlJn 1971, $1,200,000 were allocated 
under twenty-four grants for the training of 120 specialists and 110 
technicians in the field of electronic product radiation!01 Funding re-
quests for the fiscal year 1972 were at the same Ievel.102 
In implementing the type of program discussed above, a state might 
well obtain a substantial grant from the Federal Government. It might 
be recalled that California has already laid the foundation for the insti-
tution of personnel training programs103and other programs for the de-
tection and control of certain radiation hazards.l04 If the proposed 
amendments were to be adopted by this State, the acquisition of a Fed-
eral grant would certainly help to defray the additional expenses invol-
ved in expanding these programs to conform to the new provisions. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968 attempts 
to eliminate public exposure to unnecessary radiation, establishes per-
formance standards for maximum emission of radiation by electronic 
products, attempts to prevent 'the sale in this country of electronic pro-
ducts that emit radiation in excess of these standards, and also attempts 
to prevent the emission of radiation in excess of these standards by 
electronic products as a result of component failure or improper repair 
of the product. 
The performance standard established under the Act for television 
sets, 0.5 mr per hour at 5 em, is detectable above the background 
radiation. Since virtually all radiation can be eliminated this represents 
.100. 42 u.s.c. § 263d(b)(2) 0971). . . 
101. Hearings on H.R. /0061 Before a Subcommttlee of the Senate Committee 0 11 Appropria-
tions, 92nd Cong .. 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 3440 0971). 
102. !d. 
103. S ee text at note 90, supra. 
104. See text at note 84, supra. 
212 Consumer Journal [Vol. 11:187 
unnecessary radiation, and it can therefore be argued that the existing 
standard does not meet the objectives of the Act. The standard should 
be: no radiation detectable above the background level. 
To prevent the sale in this country of products that emit radiation · 
in excess of the standards, manufacturers are to certify that each unit 
produced meets the existing standard for the particular product. How-
ever, under the Act; certification may be based on a testing program 
that ultimately involves testing only a predetermined portion of all the 
units produced. Such testing programs can, at best, assure only that a 
certain (presumably small) percent of the units sold will fail to meet the 
standard. Testing of each unit is not an unreasonable requirement. It 
can be argued that by not testing each unit, some units will be sold that 
do not meet the standards, and thus the objectives of the Act are not 
met. The Act should require the testing of every unit manufactured. 
It is admittedly difficult to regulate the electronic repair industry at 
the national level. While the Act attempts to eliminate electronic pro-
duct radiation that might occur after a product is sold, it contains no 
specific provisions for regulation of the electronic repair industry. The 
Act does, however, provide for programs to control electronic product 
radiation through joint Federal, state, and local efforts. In a sense the 
Act requires such programs, although it does not, of course, purport to 
compel state legislation. Clearly there is a need, though, to establish 
more controls through state legislation coupled specifically to the provi-
sions of the Act. 
The amendments to the California laws proposed in Appendix One 
present a feasible means of establishing more effective controls. Under 
these amendments, two State agencies already in existence would be 
able to control the practices of the electronic repair industry as they 
relate to electronic product radiation. 
Revising the Federal Act and establishing state laws (as suggested 
by the proposed California amendments) would provide the greatest 
possible measure of assurance to consumers that their homes will be 
free from unnecessary radiation. 
- J. J. CHAVEZ 
- J. C. PIERSON 
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APPENDIX ONE 
I. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFORNIA RADIATION 
CONTROL LAW* 
Section 25801 should be amended as follows: 
Sect. 25801. Policy. It is the policy of the State of California, in furtherance 
of its responsibility to protect the public health and safety, to institute and 
maintain [a] regulatory programs for sources of ionizing radiation andfor elec-
tronic product radiation so as to provide for: (a) compatibility with the stan-
dards and regulatory programs of the federal government, (b) an integrated 
system of regulation within the State, and (c) a system consonant insofar as 
possible with those of other states. 
Section 25802 should be amended as follows: 
Sect. 25802. Purpose. It is the purpose of this chapter to effectuate the 
policies set forth in Section 25801 by providing for programs to: 
(a) Effectively regulate sources of ionizing radiation and electronic product 
radiation for the protection of the occupational and public health and safety. 
(b) Promote an orderly regulatory pattern within the State, among the sates, 
and between the federal government and the State, and facilitate inter-govern-
mental co-operation with · respect to use and regulation of sources of ionizing 
radiation and electronic product radiation to the end that duplication of regu-
lation may be minimized. 
(c) Establish procedures for assumption and performance of certain regulatory 
responsibilities with respect to byproduct, source, and special nuclear mater-
ials , and with respect to electronic product radiation. 
(d) Permit maximum utilization of sources of ionizing radiation and electronic 
product radiation consistent with the health and safety of the public. 
Section 25805 should be amended by adding new subsections as follows: 
Section 25805. Definitions as used in this Chapter: (Subsections (a) through 
(i) remain unchanged) 
(j) "Electronic product radiation·· means any ionizing or non-ionizing electro-
magnetic or particulate radiation or any sonic. infrasonic, or ultrasonic wave 
which is emitted from an electronic product as the result of the operation of an 
electronic circuit in such product. 
(k) "Electronic product" means (A) any manufactured or assembled product 
which, when in operation, (i) contains or acts as part of an electronic circuit 
and (ii) emits (or in the absence of effective shielding or other controls would 
emit) electronic product radiation, or (B) any manufactured or assembled arti-
cle which is intended for use as a component, part, or accessory of a product 
described in clause (A) and which when inooperatiom emits (or in the absence 
of effective shielding or other controls would emit) such radiation. 
Section 25811 should be amended as follows: 
Section 25811. Duties of Department. The Department shall, for the pro-
tection of public Health and Safety; 
(a) Develop programs for evaluation of hazards associated with use of sources 
of ionizing radiation. 
(b) Develop programs for evaluation of hazards associated with electronic 
product radiation. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
I. GLOSSARY: 
A) Electronic Product:* "Electronic product" means 
(1) any manufactured or assembled product which, when in operation, 
(i) contains or acts as part of an electronic circuit and 
(ii) emits (or in the absence of effective shielding or other controls 
would emit) electronic product radiation, or 
(2) any manufactured or assembled article which is intended for use as 
a component, part, or accessory of a product described in subpara-
graph (1) and which when in operation emits (or in the absence of 
effective shielding or other controls would emit) such radiation. 
B) Electronic Product Radiation * "Electronic product radiation" means--
(1) Any ionizing or nonionizing electromagnetic or particulate radia-
tion, or 
(2) Any sonic, infrasonic, or ultrasonic wave, which is emitted from an 
electronic product as the result of the operation of an electronic 
circuit in such product. 
C) ,:;Lectromagnetic Radiation:* "Electromagnetic radiation" includes the 
entire electromagnetic spectrum of radiation of any wavelength. The . 
electromagnetic spectrum (See diagram below) includes, but is not limi-
ted to, gamma rays, X-rays, ultraviolet, visible, infrared, microwave, 
radiowave and low frequency radiations. 
D) Ionizing Radiation: "Ionizing radiation" is radiation of sufficient en-
ergy to dislodge one or more electrons (negatively charged sub-atomic 
particles) from a material upon which it impinges. Such material may 
thus be left in an "ionized" state; that is, lacking electrons, it takes on 
a positive electrical charge. Ionizing radiation may also cause the ma-
terial which it strikes to itself produce radiation (£.g., X-rays, gamma 
rays). 
E) Non-Ionizing Radiation: "Non-ionizing radiation" is radiation of insuf-
ficient energy to dislodge electrons from materials which it strikes. Non-
ionizing radiation may, however, produce a "mechanical agitation" 
within certain materials, and this can result in the generation of heat 
(e.g. , microwaves, as used to heat foods in a microwave oven). 
F) Particulate Radiation:* "Particulate radiation" is defined as charged 
particles such as protons, electrons, alpha particles, heavy particles, 
etc., which have sufficient kinetic energy to produce ionization or 
atomic or electron excitation by collision, electrical attractions or elec-
trical repulsion of uncharged particles such as neutrons, which can ini-
tiate a nuclear transformation or liberate charged particles having 
sufficient kinetic energy to produce ionization or atomic or electron 
excitation by collision (e.g., particles emitted by the decay of radioactive 
materials). 
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(c) Develop programs, with due regard to compatibility with federal pro-
grams, for licensing and regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear . 
materials. 
(d) Develop programs, with due regard to compatibility with f ederal pro-
grams, for controlling electronic product radiation, including (I) Establish-
mer,t of a program in cooperation with the Bureau of Electronic Repair Deal-
ers Registration, as authorized under article 8 (section 25836) of this chapter 
for the training of Bureau personnel, if necessary, in order that such Bureau 
personnel may determine that such procedures and equipment used in the 
repair of electronic products that affect the emission of electronic product ra-
diation are effectively utilized so as to assure that electronic products repaired 
by electronic repair dealers are maintained in accordance with federally estab-
lished standards relating to electronic product radiation. (2) The establishment 
of a program to collect and diseminate, in cooperation with the Bureau of 
Electronic Repair Dealers, information on electronic products as defined under 
subsection (j) (B) of Section 25805 that are determined by manufacturers, the 
federal government, or the Department, to be capable of emitting electronic 
product radiation in excess of federally established standards relating to 
electronic product radiation and are (i) available on the market as replacement 
items in the repair of electronic products or (ii) known to have been installed in 
electronic products in use by consumers. 
(e) Formulate, adopt, and promulgate rules and regulations relating to con-
trol of electronic product radiation. (Re-letter present subsections (c) and (d) 
accordingly.) 
II. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ELECTRONIC REPAIR DEAL-
ERS REGISTRATION LAW. 
Section 9801 should be amended as follows: 
(Subsection (a) through (f) remain unchanged.) 
(g) "Service dealer" means a person who, for compensation, engages in the 
business of repairing, servicing, or maintaining {A) any manufactured or as-
sembled product which, when in operation, contains or acts as part of an 
electronic circuit or normally used or sold for use in the home, (B) any manu-
factured or assembled article which is intended for use as a component, part, 
or accessory of a product described in clause (A) (Subsection (h) remains un-
changed.) 
Section 9814 should be amended as follows: 
Section 9814. Establishment and enforcement of Regulations. The director. 
may in the protection of the public shall establish and enforce such regulations 
as may be reasonable for the conduct of service dealers and for the general 
enforcement of the various provisions of this chapter and of the provisions of 
Chapter 7.6 (commencing with section 25800) of Division 20 of the Health and 
Safety Code as they relate to eleCtronic products [in the protection of the pub-
lic]. 
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G) Sonic Waves:* "Infrasonic, sonic (or audible) and ultrasonic waves" 
refer to energy transmitted as an alteration (pressure, particle displace-
ment or density) in a property of an elastic medium (gas, liquid or solid) 
that can be detected by an instrument or listener. 
*Note; Those definitions above indicated by an asterisk(*) are taken from the 
Federal Regulations pertaining to the Radiation Control Act, its enforcement 
and interpretation (42 C.P.R. §78.100). The other definitions are provided by 
the authors. See generally EISBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN 
PHYSICS (1961). 
II. ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION: X-Rays are a form of radiant ener-
gy similar in nature to radio waves, visible light and microwaves, etc. These 
are all part of the "electromagnetic spectrum", diagrammed below. The 
characteristics of each distinguishable form of electromagnetic radiation 
depend on its frequency (cycles-per-second or hertz) which is inversely pro-
portional to its wavelength (measured in meters). Sound waves ("sonic radi-
ation") and particulate radiation are not forms of electromagnetic radiation 
and are not found on the electromagnetic spectrum. 
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM 
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Note; The lines used to differentiate between the various categories of radiation 
are only approximated in this diagram. In reality there are no sharp lines of 
distinction; each type of electromagnetic radiation merges imperceptibly into 
each adjoining category. 
